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1 EQ1: Policy framework 
Evaluation Question 1: To what extent has the EC managed to establish a policy 
framework that facilitates programming & implementation of the EC support to 
decentralisation? 
1.1 JC1.1 EC incorporates decentralisation in its co-operation with third 
countries 
Main findings at JC level 
For the EC, support to decentralisation has, over the last 20 years, evolved from a marginal 
area of co-operation to one of increasing importance – not least reflected in increasing (but 
still moderate) levels of financial support directly aimed at decentralisation. By the end of the 
evaluation period, this support constituted approximately 2.5% of all EC development 
assistance1.  
Today, a large number of EC reference documents (such as policies and strategy papers) 
include references to direct or indirect support to decentralisation and local governance. 
However, this process took time, and support for decentralisation is still a thematic area 
under development.  
The inventory showed that, over the last decade, a growing number of Country and Regional 
Strategy Papers include programmes directly or indirectly related to decentralisation and 
local governance: increasing from 30 CSPs for the period 2000-2007 to 42 CSPs in 2008-
2013. Moreover, most of the EC support to decentralisation is concentrated in Africa (74% of 
all direct support to decentralisation). Particularly in recent years, it specifically targets a few 
large programmes in selected francophone African countries (Mali, Benin and Madagascar) 
where the decentralisation support accounts for a very significant part of the particular 
country-programming portfolio. 
The EC Reference Document (no 2, 2007): ―Supporting Decentralisation and Local 
Governance in Third Countries‖ is the most comprehensive guidance document on 
decentralisation. It ―seeks to provide strategic and operational guidance on: (1) how best to 
support processes of decentralisation and local governance in third countries, (2) how to 
ensure that EC sector strategies (e.g. in health and education) take into account and 
(indirectly) reinforce ongoing decentralisation processes. The most recent and 
comprehensive broader policy guidance is found in the European Charter on development 
co-operation in support of Local governance‖ (2008) that sets out principles and modalities 
for better effectiveness of co-operation in support of local governance and decentralisation in 
partner countries. It was launched during the European Development Days of Strasbourg on 
16 November 2008.  
Finally, the analysis carried out suggests the following: 
 Entry points evolve over time: In several countries, EC approaches to support 
decentralisation and local governance have gradually become more sophisticated, as 
decentralisation processes have advanced and the EC has learned from experience. 
 Strategic versus piecemeal approaches: Analysis of existing support programmes 
reveals that some EC strategies are well conceived and properly coordinated. In other 
countries, assistance is less comprehensive and appears somehow more 
fragmented. 
 Diversity of support modalities: Some countries display a mix of modalities to feed 
strategically into partner country‘s development processes. In other cases, this mix is 
not evident or clear. It is noteworthy that the EC is increasingly promoting, whenever 
                                               
1
 The Inventory (Volume III) of this desk report shows that the EC financial contributions to a direct support to 
decentralisation increased from less 20mEUR to more than 120mEUR over the period 2000-2009 (excluding the 
contributions to support a sectoral decentralisation policy). 
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possible, the use of sector budget support in governance related processes. The 
main reason is the potential ―trigger-effects‖ that budget support may bring along in 
terms of enhancing ownership; facilitating dialogue; improving public financial 
management (at both central and local level); and increasing transparency and 
accountability.  
1.1.1 Ind1.1.1 - Financial volumes and numbers and types of projects in the different 
regions/ localities 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The inventory exercise2 carried out in the present study showed that, over the last decade, a 
growing number of Country and Regional Strategy Papers include programmes directly or 
indirectly related to decentralisation and local governance: increasing from 30 CSPs for the 
period 2000-2007 to 42 CSPs in 2008-2013.  
EC support programmes are increasingly sophisticated and in several cases mobilise 
substantial funding. The main features are3: 
 A variety of policy objectives: Most EC support programmes seek to achieve a 
multiplicity of (interlinked) objectives. However, in essence two major motivations 
stand central: (i) poverty reduction through improved social service delivery and (ii) 
governance reforms. 
 A relatively high variety of possible “entry points”: EC support is provided under 
different umbrellas or ―entry points‖. Sometimes the support is provided under the 
label ―policy support to decentralisation‖ or under the broader concept of ―good 
governance‖. In other cases, it is focused on ―decentralisation of services‖, integrated 
into ―rural development‖ or specified as ―urban management‖. In several countries, 
one finds a combination of entry points to the subject (e.g. ―local governance‖ and 
―support to decentralisation in specific sectors‖), targeting a diversity of actors (central 
government agencies and local governments, as well as their associations and civil 
society). 
Moreover, the typology of the inventory is based on the following criteria: 
 Geographical areas: Africa, Asia, Caribbean, ENP, Latin America, Pacific, Gulf4. 
 Financial Instruments: Geographical instruments (EDF, DCI, ENPI, etc.) and 
thematic instruments (Food security, NSA-LA, ONG-PVD, Decentralised Co-
operation, Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights…). 
 Entry points: Top-down approach, sectoral approach, bottom-up approach, indirect 
support (see below). 
 Funding channels: Government, Private companies or Development agencies, Local 
Association or NGO, UN bodies, Development Banks, other. 
The criteria used for the typology by entry points are closely related to the various entry 
points adopted by the EC to support decentralisation as described in 2007 Reference 
Document5: 
 Category 1: Direct support to a national decentralisation policy or strategy (top-
down approach).  
This category corresponds to the ―top-down‖ entry point. The interventions under this 
category aim to support central government to define or strengthen its orientations in terms 
of decentralisation policy and to adapt its instruments accordingly. 
                                               
2
 For details on the inventory including methodological issues see Volume III. 
3
 See page 10 - ―Support to Decentralisation and Local Governance in Third Countries‖ (EuropeAid, 2007). For an 
illustration of the variety of EC-supported interventions, see ―Part II – Inventory‖ of the present Inception Report. 
4
 This geographical categorisation follows the EC Classification on the website of EuropeAid: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/index_en.htm. 
5
 Reference Document ―Supporting Decentralisation and Local Governance in Third Countries‖ (EuropeAid, 
2007). 
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 Category 2: Sectoral support in a decentralising context – with or without an 
explicit intention of supporting decentralisation (sectoral approach) 
Sector programmes and projects focus primarily on the improvements of service delivery 
within a particular sector (health, education, water, agriculture etc). As part of the 
implementation strategies and sector reforms this may or may not include explicit support to 
decentralisation. The evaluation will, during country case studies, explore to what extent 
decentralised contexts have been taken into account in the design and policy dialogue in 
those specific programmes. Programmes with an explicit intention of ―decentralisation of 
services‖ focus on how sectoral responsibilities, authorities and resources are devolved to 
regional and local levels and on capacity of the latter.  
 Category 3: Support to a national decentralisation policy or strategy at local 
level (bottom-up approach) 
The entry point on local and rural development focuses on strengthening development at 
local level and local governance. 
 Category 4: Other indirect support 
This category includes EC funded interventions that indirectly support a decentralisation 
process and that might be of interest in the coming phases of the evaluation. In particular, 
the interventions aiming at enhancing democratic participation at the local level (but without 
an explicit link to a support to decentralisation) were classified in this category. Although not 
really in the scope of the evaluation, these interventions were kept and classified under this 
category because they potentially provide interesting information on the history and the 
context of the support to decentralisation in the various countries under analysis. 
Although a sound and systematic approach was applied, the results remain dependent to a 
certain extent on limits that concern the CRIS database. Indeed, some of the work depended 
on the information provided in the contract or financial decision titles6.  
However, the data cross-checking with previous inventories7 and with thematic experts and 
European Commission staff helped the team to obtain the most comprehensive inventory. 
The following key patterns emerge from the analysis (for details see the full report in Volume 
II – Annex 3). 
Analysis at the aggregated level 
This analysis of aggregate level of support to decentralisation can only meaningfully capture 
data on the Category 1 (Direct support to a national decentralisation policy or strategy/top-
down approach) and the Category 3 (Support to a national decentralisation policy or strategy 
at local level/bottom-up approach). The reason is that the Category 2 is not exhaustive (as 
mentioned above) and, even if it was, it would not be possible to tell what proportion of each 
intervention goes to decentralisation; this makes it impossible to aggregate the financial 
information of this category. This particular focus of ―decentralisation support‖ is similar to the 
approach by the recent World Bank evaluation of support to decentralisation.8 
                                               
6
 The limits inherent to CRIS for the purpose of an inventory for thematic evaluations are described in depth in the 
Inventory Notes for several past thematic evaluations (e.g., the Evaluation of EC‟s external co-operation with 
partner countries through the organisations of the UN family, May 2008; the evaluation of EC aid delivery through 
civil society organisations, December 2008, available on the EuropeAid website). 
7
 For instance, the data was cross-checked with the information provided in the Annex 1 of the Reference 
Document ―Supporting Decentralisation and Local Governance in Third Countries‖ (EuropeAid, 2007). 
8
 World Bank, Independent Evaluation Group: Decentralization in Client Countries – An Evaluation of World Bank 
Support 1990-2007 
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Figure 1 Evolution of EC financial contributions by category – commitments 
 
Source: CRIS and Particip analysis (2010) 
We can see an overall increase of the EC financial contributions to support to 
decentralisation over the period 2000-2009. It is important to note that the EC financial 
contributions to directly support decentralisation were representing less than 1% of all the EC 
financial contributions (all sectors and countries included) over the period 2000-2004. Over 
the period 2004-2008, the direct contributions to decentralisation increased in average 
representing around 2.5% of all contributions and thus confirming the increase in absolute 
values observed above. 
The decrease in the last years of the evaluation (2008-09) is partly explained by a general 
decrease in programming in this period (awaiting a new programme cycle) but could also be 
an indication of decreasing commitment for providing direct support to decentralisation 
(except in a few countries with larger decentralisation programmes). In fact it is striking how 
few new major interventions have been funded since 2008:  
Box 1 Overview of the most recent (2007-2010) major programmes in direct support 
of decentralisation  
In 2007, around 20mEUR were contracted in Tanzania (mainly for the "Support to the Local 
Government Grant Scheme"), around 20mEUR in Mali (mainly for the "Programme d'appui à 
la réforme administrative et à la decentralisation"- PARAD) and 15mEUR in Madagascar 
(mainly for the ACORDS programme). These 3 country contributions account for half the 
total amount committed to decentralisation that year (support at local level and direct support 
to a national policy). 
In 2008, the situation is quite similar, the amounts going to Mali (32mEUR, mainly PARAD), 
Madagascar (21mEUR, mainly ACORDS), Liberia (12mEUR - County Programme) and 
Benin (12mEUR - PACTE) account for more than 60% of the total amount committed to 
decentralisation that year. 
In 2009, there are still some funds going to Madagascar (11mEUR) but very little or nothing 
to the other big programmes of the EC (only 1mEUR to Benin).  
In the year 2010 (outside the scope of this evaluation), the funds are increasing again driven 
by the launch of the new Mali programme supported by budget support (44mEUR going to 
the PARADDER programme in 2010) and the new Rwanda programme (10mEUR going to 
the ―Sector Budget Support for decentralised Agriculture‖ which appears as the continuation 
of the ―Decentralised programme for rural poverty reduction‖ that started in 2003). 
-
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In summary, it seems as if only 3-5 big programmes determine the evolution of the EC 
commitments going to decentralisation in recent years. 
Geographical breakdown 
Figure 2 Overview of EC funding by region – Direct support (commitments) 
 
Source: CRIS and Particip analysis (2010) 
The figure above shows the geographical breakdown of the EC funding to direct support to 
decentralisation (category 1 and 3).  
 74% (586mEUR) of the funds (commitments) supporting decentralisation goes to 
Africa. 
 Latin America is the second most important recipient of EC funds aiming at 
supporting decentralisation (10% - 78mEUR).  
 Only 4% (33mEUR) were committed to support decentralisation in partner countries 
in Asia. 
The table below highlights the relative importance of the support to decentralisation 
compared to the whole EC support in the region (during the evaluation period). The 
information on the relative importance is in line with the absolute figures showed above. 
However, the table below also suggests a relative emphasis of decentralisation support in 
Africa and Latin America compared to Asia and ENP. According to interviews in EC HQs this 
is a reflection of the relatively low demand for decentralisation support in Asia. However, 
alternative explanations could be: decentralisation reforms in Asia have taken place relatively 
earlier than in Africa (from the mid 1980s) and Asia is today overall in a more advanced 
stage where the demand for assistance is technically more complex and where other aid 
organisations (such as bilateral DPs, the WB, ADB or UNDP/UNCDF) are comparatively 
more interested and/or competent to provide assistance. The World Bank for instance has a 
relative significant portfolio of support to decentralisation reform in Asia that is by far more 
significant than EC support9. It is also noteworthy that the two largest direct contributions to 
decentralisation from the EC in Asia are found in two countries with rather poorly developed 
public sector structures and with no significant degree of fiscal decentralisation (Cambodia 
and Afghanistan).  
                                               
9
 For a discussion of World Bank support to decentralisation in South Asia, see: 
http://go.worldbank.org/K37R9BFSE0  
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A further geographical emphasis appears within Africa on the Francophone countries (both in 
terms of financial volume and in terms of the lead role of the EC in supporting 
decentralisation compared to other development partners). This particular focus appears to 
have been reinforced in recent years (see box 1). The reasons for this pattern are 
combinations of several factors and not explicitly articulated as part of an EC strategy. 
Discussions with EC staff involved in programme design as well as other DPs involved in 
decentralisation support at a global level suggest: 
 The larger EC programmes for support to decentralisation (e.g. Mali, Benin and 
Madagascar) grew to a large extent out of past experiences with EC support to rural 
development programmes and coincided with the relative recent political support for 
decentralisation reform in these countries. This also explains the relative emphasis of 
EC support to rural local governments (whereas e.g. the World Bank‘s direct support 
to local governments primarily is targeting urban local governments). The support to 
decentralisation in these ―newly decentralising‖ countries is closely related to the 
establishment of wider public sector presence in rural areas in particular. Such 
programmes obviously become quite resource demanding. 
 Other countries and regions that have tended to start decentralisation earlier,10 
received significant support from other donors in these periods – the EC came 
relatively late as a supporter of ―local governments reforms‖ and has in these 
countries less of a comparative advantage in supporting decentralisation. This is 
evident in particular in Asia where ADB, World Bank and various bilateral donors 
(such as US, Australian, British etc all have significant decentralisation reform 
programmes), but also in several of the early decentralised countries in Anglophone 
Africa such as Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana. 
Table 1 Comparison with the whole EC co-operation by region 
Region 
 
EC direct support to 
decentralisation in m€ 
(Commitment) 
All EC support in the 
region in m€ 
(Commitment) 
Ratio 
Africa 586   25.203 2,3% 
Latin America 78   3.196 2,4% 
Asia 33   6.024 0,6% 
ENP 61   9.587 0,6% 
Caribbean 26   2.095 1,2% 
Pacific 4   589 0,7% 
Gulf -   133  0,0% 
Source: CRIS and Particip analysis (2010) 
The analysis of the inventory data furthermore suggests the following: 
 Entry points evolve over time: In several countries, EC approaches to supporting 
decentralisation and local governance have gradually become more sophisticated as 
decentralisation processes have advanced and the EC has learned from experience. 
 Strategic versus piecemeal approaches: Desk analysis of existing support 
programmes reveals that some EC strategies are well conceived and properly 
coordinated. In other countries, assistance is less comprehensive and appears 
somehow more fragmented. 
                                               
10
 For overview of global trends in decentralisation see United Cities and Local Governments 2008: 
Decentralisation and local democracy in the world and United Cities and Local Governments 2010: Local 
Government Finance – the Challenges of the 21
st
 Century (First and Second Global Report on Decentralisation 
and Local Democracy).  
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 Diversity of support modalities: Although the project approach through Grant/EC 
procedures remains the most common support modality during the evaluation period, 
some countries display a mix of modalities to feed strategically into partner country‘s 
development processes. In other cases, this mix is not evident or clear. It is 
noteworthy that the EC is increasingly promoting, whenever possible, the use of 
sector budget support in governance related processes (e.g. interventions in South 
Africa). The main reason is the potential ―trigger-effects‖ that budget support may 
bring along in terms of enhancing ownership; facilitating dialogue; improving public 
financial management (at both central and local level); and increasing transparency 
and accountability. Budget support is always accompanied by some criteria in terms 
of public finance management issues.11 
Figure 3 EC financial contributions - Breakdown 
 
Source: CRIS and Particip analysis (2010) 
Finally, the EC provides support to decentralisation through different financial instruments. 
As described in the Annexe 3 (Volume II), most financing is provided through geographical 
instruments. But a significant part is funded through a variety of thematic instruments 
including the following budget lines: Rehabilitation, Decentralised Co-operation, Non-State 
Actor and Local authorities, NGO-co-financing, EIDHR, etc.  
The thematic budget line ―Non-State Actor and Local authorities‖ is by some stakeholders 
seen as the most significant EU funding modality for support to local governments and was 
for instance most frequently referred to in the recent ―2nd Assises of Decentralised Co-
operation for development‖ meeting held in Brussels end March 201112. However, it is only 
around 13% of this programme that is targeting "local authorities" (rather than NSAs). In the 
evaluation period a total allocation of 56mEUR were allocated in support to local authorities 
(frequently in partnership with NSAs) and only around 18mEUR of these funds were in a 
meaningful way related to ―decentralisation reforms‖13. 
                                               
11
 Under the 9
th
 EDF budget support was increased to about 20% of total aid delivery and is expected to rise even 
more during the present 10
th
 EDF. 
12
 http://portal.cor.europa.eu/atlas/en-US/Pages/Assisesondecentralisedcooperation.aspx  
13
 CRIS data base. 
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1.1.2 Ind1.1.2 - Existence of elements related to decentralisation in the context 
analysis carried out during programming and prioritisation in RSP, CSP/NIP 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The inventory showed that, over the last decade, a growing number of Country and Regional 
Strategy Papers include programmes directly or indirectly related to decentralisation and 
local governance: increasing from 30 CSPs for the period 2000-2007 to 42 CSPs in 2008-
2013.  
The Guidelines for implementation of the Common Framework for Country Strategy Papers 
2001 did not mention decentralisation as an issue, but subsequent revisions have 
increasingly underscored the need for analysis of decentralisation issues. The most detailed 
guide is given in the 2009 programming fiche on decentralisation.  
A further analysis of CSPs in the countries selected for desk analysis14 indicated that the 
analyses detailed in the "national context" section of the CSPs generally include some 
elements related to Decentralisation. Yet, the analyses are often quite limited to general 
aspects related to decentralisation. 
The overview covers the two strategic periods: CSP 1 (2002 – 2006 or 2007) and CSP 2 
(2007 or 2008 – 2013). 
As shown in the table below, almost all CSPs provide elements of analysis on the 
decentralisation context in the partner countries (all 22 countries analysed except 2 in the 
first period – increasing to all 22 CSPs in the second period).  
However, these analyses often cover very general aspects. For instance, the Honduras CSP 
for the second strategic period only mentions: 
"After decades of centralised military rule the current momentum towards 
decentralisation could instil a new democratic culture and usher in a new political class. 
At local level, the partnership between the civil society and the authorities should help 
the country bridge the traditional fault-line between the populace and those in power. 
Besides its primary purpose – which is development - the PRSP can also play a 
political role, as a powerful catalyst for consensus and confidence-building. (…)" 
About half of the CSPs provide a detailed analysis of decentralisation issues in the national 
context section (11 in the first period and 12 in the second). 
In several cases, even if there is a detailed analysis, the CSP does not provide an exhaustive 
overview of the various dimensions of decentralisation (political, administrative, fiscal) and of 
the various stakeholders involved in the process. 
The information provided is often far from what is required in the EC Common Framework for 
Country Strategy Papers (adopted in 2006) which stipulates that "Particular attention should 
be given to reforms in the fields of political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation" and 
that the national context section of the CSPs should examine "The organisation of 
government, including where appropriate the effectiveness of decentralisation and the 
interaction between central, regional and local authorities". 
There are some notable exceptions such as Benin or Mali: for instance, the CSP 1 for Mali 
contains a comprehensive analysis of decentralisation issues in the annex section.15  
Table 2 Analysis of decentralisation in the national context section of the CSPs  
 CSP 1 CSP 1 CSP 2 CSP 2 
Country Exist Is detailed Exist Is detailed 
Benin Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cambodia Yes Yes Yes No 
                                               
14
 See Annex: CSP Analysis in Volume II of this report for details. 
15
 Actually, the case of Mali is very particular. The emphasis on decentralisation is so important in the CSP1 that 
the different aspects of the support to decentralisation are often described in detail while elements related to other 
sectors are often just listed without further explanation. 
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Colombia Yes No Yes No 
Congo (Democratic Republic of) Yes No Yes Yes 
Guatemala Yes No Yes Yes 
Honduras Yes Yes Yes No 
Jordan No No Yes No 
Kenya Yes Yes Yes No 
Lebanon No No Yes No 
Madagascar Yes No Yes Yes 
Mali Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nicaragua Yes No Yes No 
Papua New Guinea Yes No Yes No 
Philippines Yes No Yes Yes 
Peru No No Yes Yes 
Rwanda Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Senegal Yes Yes Yes Yes 
South Africa Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tanzania Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Uganda Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total Exist in 15  Is detailed in 11 Exist in 22 Is detailed in 12 
 
Except in a few cases, decentralisation does not seem to figure prominently in the CSPs.  
The CSP Analysis (see Volume II - Annex 6) gives an overview of the status given to 
decentralisation in the "EC response strategy" section of the CSPs analysed. The overview 
covers the two strategic periods: CSP 1 (2002 – 2006 or 2007) and CSP 2 (2007 or 2008 – 
2013). 
 Decentralisation was considered as an "important component of the focal areas16 of 
both country strategy papers (CSP 1 and CSP 2)" in only 3 countries out of the 20 
analysed (Guatemala, Madagascar and Mali). In these cases, decentralisation is well 
mainstreamed in the whole co-operation strategy. 
 Over the two strategic periods, decentralisation appears as a major component of a 
focal area of co-operation in less than half of the CSPs analysed (12 out of the 40 
strategy papers analysed). 
 In 3 cases (Colombia, Jordan and Lebanon), the response strategies detailed in the 
CSPs do not mention anything related to decentralisation (or almost anything) in 
neither the first nor the second strategic period. 
 In a number of cases, the CSPs refer to decentralisation in the sections "cross-cutting 
issue" (sometimes under the heading "good governance") or "non-focal areas". But, 
decentralisation is usually not necessarily clearly integrated in the other sections of 
the CSPs.  
 Some notable exceptions where decentralisation is strongly mainstreamed in the 
CSPs even if it is not explicitly considered as a major component of a focal area are: 
Nicaragua, South Africa and Uganda. 
                                               
16
 In the analysis made, decentralisation is considered as an important component of a focal area where the text 
describing the EC strategy under this focal area explicitly mentions the support to the decentralisation process in 
the partner country as an objective of the strategy. 
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Finally, it appears that the CSPs often provide very few information on the strategy to adopt 
to support to decentralisation. For instance, in the case of Cambodia, the most recent CSP 
only mentions a very general list of areas of co-operation:  
"The EC will also fund activities to support to co-operation and dialogue in the field of 
governance and human rights in order to promote constructive dialogue and stimulate 
co-operation between the RGC and the EC in a wide range of areas of mutual interest, 
in particular in the areas of: governance, legal and judicial reform (…), institution 
building, administrative reform (including the fight against corruption), decentralisation 
and deconcentration, support for the election process, (…)". 
1.1.3 Ind1.1.3 - Existence of elements that address or identify decentralisation related 
issues in CSEs, MTRs, JARs and Thematic Evaluations  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The team has undertaken a systematic analysis of all CSEs undertaken for the 22 countries 
indentified for the desk phase and is in process of analysing MTRs and JARs. The detailed 
findings are included in separate annexes (see Volume IIb). 
One main conclusion from the review is that decentralisation issues frequently are given 
some consideration in the analysis but it is rarely very significant. For instance less than 30% 
of the CSEs have a specific evaluation question directly related to decentralisation, although 
70% have a JC related to the topic17. For the CSEs, most emphasis on decentralisation was 
given in the evaluations of Benin, Mali and the Philippines.  
In some countries where the Governments undertake rather sophisticated decentralisation 
reforms (such as Tanzania and Uganda that have some of the highest sub-national 
expenditure shares in Africa) it is striking that decentralisation issues do not feature strongly 
in the CSEs. 
The most recent relevant and major thematic evaluations have increasingly taken 
decentralisation issues into consideration. 
The thematic Evaluation of the EC support to the water and sanitation sector18 did not have a 
particular EQ that focused on decentralisation aspects or the role of local governments in the 
sector. However, the evaluation did reflect on how institutional aspects of support were 
handled by the EC supported interventions. The evaluation was in this regard overall rather 
critical of how decentralisation issues had been addressed (been ―neglected, or applied 
incorrectly‖ page 7) – however, the evaluation provided few details or further explicit 
recommendations for how to address decentralisation issues in the water and sanitation 
sector. 
The thematic Evaluation of the EC support to Good Governance19 (2006) analysed four 
clusters of governance support: (1) rule of law and administration of justice, (2) civil society, 
(3) public administration reform, and (4) decentralisation. The evaluation noted that support 
to decentralisation was an emerging area of support where several promising experiences 
could be noted (Mali being highlighted as such a case). However, the evaluation also 
concluded that ―The EC faces the challenge to further clarify its vision, intervention strategies 
and operational approaches in support of local governance and decentralisation, both as a 
self standing governance cluster and as a means to achieve broader development objectives 
(such as poverty reduction, conflict prevention, sustainable development). 
The thematic Evaluation of the EC support to the education sector20 (2010) included 
decentralisation specifically as a key issue to explore (two judgement criteria).  
Key conclusions from the report related to decentralisation were:  
                                               
17
 Indeed, decentralisation issues are sometimes tackled as a dimension of a general EQ on Good Governance). 
Decentralisation also sometimes appears (but to a smaller extent) as cross-cutting issues in an independent 
question on CCI or in sectoral EQs. But in both cases, the consideration given to decentralisation issues turns out 
to be rarely very significant. 
18
 (Ref. 965) http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2006/965_docs_en.htm  
19
 (Ref. 884) http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2006/884_docs_en.htm  
20
 (Ref. 1282) http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/2010/1282_docs_en.htm  
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 JC63: Linkages between education sector reform and broader national reforms, 
decentralisation, civil service reform and public finance management reform are 
emerging, but complicated to manage (and) 
 JC72: EC support increasingly manages to strengthen the role and active 
involvement of NSAs and civil society in education sector management processes, 
but progress regarding decentralisation of sector management seems to be stalling.  
The report concludes:  
“EC support for decentralisation of education sector management processes has had a 
mixture of successes and difficulties. In particular, the creation of School Management 
Committees at local level has been enhanced by EC support linked to local-level 
democracy, but has had mixed results”. 
Box 2 Extract from the Thematic Global Evaluation on EC support to education 
(conclusions on decentralisation) 
4.6.3 JC63: Linkages between education sector reform and broader national reforms, 
decentralisation, civil service reform and public finance management reform are 
emerging, but complicated to manage 
Education sector reforms often happen parallel to decentralisation processes. However, the 
degree to which both arenas (educational policy and decentralisation) are linked varies 
significantly. In Indonesia, for example, the government, with EC support to Basic Education-
Sector Capacity Support Programme (BE-SCSP) 2, created clear linkages between both, 
with the intention of ensuring that the local authorities can and will take on their new roles in 
planning or service delivery. For example, line ministries, including the Ministry of Education, 
are asked to provide sub-national entities with Minimum Service Standards (MSS) to make 
certain that service delivery at local level continues to adhere to nationally-sanctioned 
criteria. Pakistan, however, provides an example where deficiencies at sub-national level, 
with regard to available skills and other aspects of organisational capacity, have prevented 
decentralisation efforts from really becoming meaningful for the delivery of education 
services on the ground. However, this problem is being addressed by the SBS decentralised 
support to the provincial government of Sindh Province and the provincial government of the 
North Western Frontier Province. 
In countries where decentralisation is sufficiently advanced, budget support offered by 
the EC can, in fact, benefit the education system at local levels. In Uganda, a 
combination of public sector reforms − including performance assessment, a sound sector 
policy, and an effective intergovernmental fiscal transfer system − are forming a reasonably 
effective system that is trusted by donors and the government. The example of Tanzania 
shows that public sector reform can result in the decentralisation of responsibility for the 
implementation of primary education, as the functions of the Tanzanian Ministry of Education 
and Culture are now confined to policy making. However, the complex procedures introduced 
seem to be taking time to be fully understood and implemented effectively and efficiently at 
local level. In the Dominican Republic, past reforms also have developed government 
structures that can form the basis for future EC support to a decentralised education system. 
Even in traditionally highly-centralised systems, such as in Tunisia, the sub-national 
structures have gained in stature over the last few years. 
1.1.4 Ind1.1.4 - Evolution over time of EC concepts and approaches (in EC policy 
documents) towards a more comprehensive and elaborated approach to the 
support to decentralisation processes 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The development of EC concepts and approaches for support to decentralisation emerged 
slowly in response to a general paradigm shift that questioned the ―single actor approach‖ 
to development (focused exclusively on central governments) and invited donor agencies to: 
rediscover the local level of development; define clear strategies towards the unfolding 
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decentralisation processes; involve and support local governments; and introduce more 
decentralised and multi-actor forms of development co-operation. 
It took some time for multilateral and bilateral donor agencies to translate these changes into 
strategic and operational documents and mechanisms. The Lomé IV Convention (1990-95) 
was still focused on dealing with central government agencies and not so much on the 
development of policy dialogue with other actors. However, it opened a small window for the 
strengthening of local development initiatives through the use of the micro-project approach 
and the introduction of the concept of ―decentralised co-operation‖. Even if central 
governments remained in full control, as they had to agree with the project proposals, it was 
the first attempt to extend partnership to a broad range of decentralised actors including 
local governments. The purpose was to promote participatory approaches to development 
(particularly at the local level) by decentralising the design and implementation of 
development projects. Direct collaboration with Non State Actors could be supported by 
some budget lines (managed directly by the EC staff in Brussels) such as the NGO-co-
financing budget line and the decentralised co-operation budget line. 
The emergence of ―good governance issues‖21 in the development arena has also led to a 
change towards the integration of ―new actors‖ in the development process22. 
The Lomé IV bis Convention reinforced the political part of the co-operation and underlined 
the necessity to include other actors, especially the civil society. 
Although it failed to create new opportunities for participation of decentralised actors, many 
experiences have been made to enlarge the use of the multi-annual micro projects 
instrument within the EDF. 
Several factors contributed to this slow pace of change, including:23 
 the lack of conceptual and operational clarity of the whole approach; 
 political and bureaucratic resistance;  
 the limited demands from decentralised actors (as most of them were not aware of 
the existence of this scheme); 
 a culture of centralised management; 
 inadequate procedures;  
 and limited ―internalisation‖ of the approach by official parties (including EC staff in 
the EUDs). 
Drawing the lessons from this experience, the Cotonou Agreement for the ACP countries 
(signed in June 2000) and its revision in 2005 clearly stipulated the importance of a multi-
actor approach in development processes. Beside the government, it enlarged the 
partnership to Non State Actors, including Local decentralised authorities24, for which a 
specific share of the co-operation budget has been planned25. It created new opportunities for 
an active participation of NSA and local governments in the formulation and implementation 
of national, sectoral and increasingly also local development plans and related co-operation 
programmes. It also included a mutually agreed definition on governance, which is 
considered as a fundamental element underpinning the partnership. It has a fairly elaborated 
and balanced framework for dialogue between the EU and the ACP countries covering all 
development issues and especially local governance.  
                                               
21
 Within the EC it encompasses (1) the rule of law; (2) public administration; (3) civil society, (4) human rights, (5) 
democracy and (6) decentralisation/support to local governments) 
22
 This can be for instance seen in the various policy/ strategic framework established by the EC with partner 
countries at regional level (see Annex ―Reference to decentralisation in regional policy/ programming documents‖ 
of this inception report). 
23
 2007 SDLG reference document. 
24
 The expression ―local decentralised authorities‖ has been introduced in the 2005 revision. 
25
 Originally, 15% of the budget was foreseen for the NSAs budget line.  
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Although the participation of NSA and local governments in the formulation and 
implementation of development plans was also promoted in the other non-ACP regions26, this 
evolution was not backed by a clear orientation at policy level.  
The analysis of references to decentralisation or local governance in EC regional 
policy/programming documents in non-ACP regions carried out in this evaluation27 lead to 
following main results: 
 For the Asian region, several regional policy documents identify the need to 
contribute to the promotion of democracy, good governance and rule of law28. Various 
documents also advocate for an increasing work with local authorities, especially with 
the aim to enhance local (economic) development. Though, in almost all cases no 
specific reference is made to decentralisation or local governance. In fact, the only 
reference to decentralisation is found in a recent programming document related to 
the Central Asia sub-region (Indicative Programme 2007-2010). It is stated that one 
objective of co-operation should be to ―strengthen capacities of local public authorities 
and self-government bodies‖ in order to foster local development. Moreover, it is 
recognised in this document that the ―decentralisation of political power and budget to 
local level is just beginning‖ and that bottom-up approaches promoting, among 
others, ―public participation in the political, economic and social spheres‖ should 
complement top-down measures aiming at strengthening ―national administrative 
capacities‖.  
 In Latin America, decentralisation has been an important component of a transition 
to democracy (J. Manor 1999). Most regional policy and programming documents 
related to the EC co-operation with this region recognise the promotion of ―democratic 
governance and social cohesion‖ as key areas of co-operation. However, it is 
noteworthy that none of these documents (incl. regional policy documents and the 
EU-LAC declarations) mention decentralisation as an element of the co-operation 
between the EU and LAC countries. Yet, decentralisation seems to be a key issue in 
the discussions that take place between EU and Latin American actors involved in 
development programmes. Indeed, the conclusions of the 2007 EU-LAC forum on 
local authorities point out the fact that local authorities should ―urge national 
governments to promote democracy, foster decentralisation processes and enhance 
local governance, for they are key elements to achieve social cohesion‖. 
 In the co-operation with ENP countries, reference to decentralisation seems to be 
even weaker although several documents highlight the importance of ―democratic 
consolidation and public governance‖ and the involvement of the civil society and 
local authorities in the development process.29 
 Decentralisation is only explicitly mentioned in EC programming documents. This 
hints that the EC has adopted in these regions a pragmatic approach focusing on 
individual interventions without a strong mandate to engage in co-operation in the 
field of decentralisation. 
Contrary to the policy frameworks for the co-operation with other regions, the Cotonou 
Agreement provided the EC with a broad and explicit legal mandate to engage in co-
operation in the field of decentralisation in the ACP regions. Indeed, compared to the 
previous Lomé Convention, this new ACP partnership agreement placed much more 
                                               
26
 For instance, the Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 laying down general provisions establishing a European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument explicitly mentions that the EC assistance shall be established in 
partnership between the EC and beneficiaries that involves ―as appropriate, national, regional and local 
authorities, economic and social partners, civil society and other relevant bodies‖. 
27
 See Table 11 in the Annex ―Reference to decentralisation in regional policy/ programming documents‖ of this 
inception report 
28
 For instance, see the EC Communication on "A strategic framework to strengthening Europe-Asia partnership" 
(Com(2001)469) 
29
 For instance, in the 2008 Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, participants have underscored 
―the importance of the active participation of civil society, local and regional authorities and the private sector in 
the implementation of the Barcelona Process‖ 
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emphasis on the political dimension of development, as reflected in the principle of good 
governance (article 9). Moreover, it recognised local and regional governments as potential 
partners in co-operation (article 6), introduced a focus on institutional development and 
capacity building, and mentioned ―support for political, administrative, economic and financial 
decentralisation‖ as one strategic area in this field (article 33). 
Together with the first compendium of programming guidelines, the Cotonou Agreement 
became an important pillar of the nascent policy framework for the EU support to 
decentralisation. It also triggered more strategic reflections on the objectives, instruments 
and aid modalities for supporting decentralisation processes and (good) local governance in 
partner countries (Loquai 2001).  
Although there is no specific EC communication (and Council resolution) on decentralisation 
and local governance yet, that presents a coherent policy framework, the EC commitment to 
supporting decentralisation and local governance is consequently backed by several recent 
policy documents and various guidance documents that incorporate elements and issues 
related to decentralisation processes and local authorities roles and responsibilities. These 
documents contain guidance and constitute elements of a nascent policy framework for this 
area of co-operation: 
 The EC Communication on Governance and Development (COM(2003)615) 
recognises the importance to ―decentralised power sharing‖ as well as the need to 
involve ―municipal and other decentralised authorities in national dialogue processes 
on governance‖. 
 Although not a policy document, the EC Draft Handbook on Governance (2004) 
considers decentralisation and local governments as one of the six ‗governance 
clusters‘ and provides guidance on how to provide support. 
 The EC Communication on the EU Strategy for Africa: Towards a Euro-African pact to 
accelerate Africa‘s development (COM 2005, 489 final) puts governance at the centre 
of the partnership relation. In this framework, it recognises the governance challenge 
at local level and calls for a ―systematic dialogue with national governments and local 
authorities [...] on how best to support decentralisation processes‖. 
 The EC Communication on Governance in the European Consensus on 
Development. Towards a harmonised approach within the European Union 
(COM(2006)421) recognises the existence of ―different levels of governance (local, 
national, international)‖ as well as ―the key role that local authorities can play in 
achieving the MDGs‖.  
 The ―Governance Profile‖ for ACP countries (which will be key to accessing the 
Incentive Reserve for governance) also includes some indicators related to 
decentralisation. 
 The EC Reference Document (no 2, 2007): “Supporting Decentralisation and 
Local Governance in Third Countries‖ is the most comprehensive guidance 
document on decentralisation. It ―seeks to provide strategic and operational guidance 
on: (1) how best to support processes of decentralisation and local governance in 
third countries, (2) how to ensure that EC sector strategies (e.g. in health and 
education) take into account and (indirectly) reinforce ongoing decentralisation 
processes. The document discusses the rationale for support to decentralisation, 
main concepts and definitions of terms, dimensions of decentralisation, guiding 
principles for design and implementation of support programmes, key issues in 
design of interventions, key issues for implementation of support, assessing 
outcomes and impact and finally a discussion of how to enable the EC to work more 
effectively with decentralisation and local governance issues.  
 The EC Communication "Local authorities: Actors for Development" (2008) 
underlines that local authorities in the partner countries are also of paramount 
importance as they can be key actors for enhancing local governance and in 
delivering public services, in particular in the context of decentralisation. ―Areas where 
LA's could have a comparative advantage range from implementing local democracy 
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(entailing the devolution of powers to elected local bodies enjoying relative autonomy) 
and local governance (involving a shift from an only vertical accountability dimension 
to a horizontal and downward accountability, connected with principles of 
participation, transparency and accountability, in which civil society plays a crucial 
role) to a new paradigm of local (economic) development (in which local governments 
play a catalytic role) and territorial (regional) planning which integrates local 
development into a broader spatial context and stimulates synergies between 
different actors from private and public sector.”  
 The document emphasises the potential role of local authorities in EU countries and 
recommends further twinning as well as strengthening of local government 
associations in partner countries: ―The reinforcement of cultural and institutional 
twinning between LAs in the EU and partner countries has a long history of achieving 
successful partnerships. Many of the partnerships on which Decentralised Co-
operation is based originated in the twinning process. The Commission proposes that 
the EC supports more extensive exploitation of these development partnerships 
(twinning), to enhance the exchange of experience and build closer and more long-
term partnerships for development. The EU and EU LAs should support the role of 
national associations of LAs in partner countries, in order that they can participate in 
their national political dialogue (for instance during the elaboration, with the European 
Commission, of Country Strategy Papers) in line with the principles of ownership and 
mutual accountability. Support for national associations of LAs in the EU and partner 
countries is also important in order to advance internal mutual accountability between 
local and central governments.” (paragraph 3.3.4) 
 The “European Charter on development co-operation in support of Local 
governance” (2008) sets out principles and modalities for better effectiveness in co-
operation in support of local governance and decentralisation in partner countries. It 
was launched during the European Development Days of Strasbourg on 16 
November 2008. The Charter proposes a framework for more coherence and 
complementarily in the actions of the different actors supporting local governance. It 
also gives guidelines on applying the Paris Declaration at local level. The Charter has 
been promoted by the EC in various ways: it was attached to COM 2008 mentioned 
above and it was subsequently promoted by the EC in the ―structured dialogue‖ with 
non-state actors and local authorities on their involvement in development.30 The 
Charter includes the following main recommendations: 
 Support a democratic local governance 
 Look for the development of a coordinated, complementary and coherent 
system among the different actors. 
  Encourage dialogue at every level of governance. 
  Support synergies between local and regional authorities and civil society. 
 Look for a balance between economic development, social equity and 
environment. 
 Adapt funding to local specificities. 
 Help local and regional authorities to dialogue and to act. 
 Acknowledge the primacy of national and local governments. 
 Align local development actions on national policies. 
 Promote a territorial development approach in coherence with sustainable 
development. 
 Develop planning, follow up and evaluation system that improve transparency. 
 Maintain the principle of shared responsibility. 
                                               
30
 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/partners/civil-society/structured-dialogue_en.htm  
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 PLATFORMA, the European platform of local and regional authorities for 
Development, has taken this Charter as a document of reference and argues for its 
principles to be promoted at EU level. To this end PLATFORMA has ensured the 
technical secretariat of the Charter since February 2010, with the financial support of 
the French Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs. 
 Finally, the recent EC programming guide for strategy papers (programming fiche 
on decentralisation issued January 2009) gives guidance on how to address 
decentralisation in strategy papers. The guide presents a very clear definition of 
decentralisation that emphasises decentralisation to elected local governments. It 
refers to the three interlinked dimensions of decentralisation (political, administrative 
and fiscal) and suggests six ―critical pillars‖ for a successful support to 
decentralisation processes: 
 political will;  
 the existence of a basic legal framework which clearly stipulates the division of 
roles, responsibilities and resources between actors of different tiers of 
government;  
 financial resources to undertake assigned functions;  
 human resources in local governments;  
 mechanisms for political accountability;  
 existence of central institutional arrangements to steer the decentralisation 
process. 
 The programming guide includes guidance for how to assess partner countries‘ 
degree of decentralisation by analysis of three themes (a) autonomy in decision 
making, (b) adequacy of resources and (c) subsidiarity, efficiency, accountability and 
service delivery aspects. 
Table 3 Analysis of major regional policy/ programming documents  
Policy / programming 
documents 
Reference to decentralisation or local governance 
Asia  
The EU and Central Asia: 
Strategy for a New Partnership 
(European Council, 2007) 
No specific reference to decentralisation or local governance.  
A new Partnership with South 
East Asia (COM(2003)399) 
It is mentioned that ―democratic principles and good governance 
should be promoted in all aspects of EC policy dialogue and 
development co-operation, through building constructive 
partnerships with ASEAN and national governments based on 
dialogue, encouragement and effective support.‖ 
But, except one reference to the involvement of local authorities in 
regional programmes, no specific reference to decentralisation or 
local governance. 
A strategic framework to 
strengthening Europe-Asia 
partnership (Com(2001)469) 
The Communication identifies the need to contribute to the 
promotion of democracy, good governance and rule of law. 
One reference is made to the importance of involving the civil 
society (―promote a strengthening and broadening of civil society 
partnerships between our two regions whether among our 
parliamentary representatives, local authorities, NGOs, youth 
associations, consumer groups, or professional associations‖). But 
no specific reference is made to decentralisation or local 
governance. 
Regional Strategy Paper for 
EU-Asia Co-operation (2007-
2013) 
The Strategy paper identifies the need to contribute to the 
promotion of democracy, good governance and rule of law but no 
reference is made to decentralisation. 
Regional Strategy Paper for 
EU-Central Asia Co-operation 
(2007-2013) 
The Paper highlights the importance of developing capacities at 
local level to enhance local development. 
E.g., in the section related to the objective: ―Reduce poverty and 
increase living standards in the context of the MDGs‖, the Paper 
mentions: ―The Strategy proposes that the EC focus continue to be 
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Policy / programming 
documents 
Reference to decentralisation or local governance 
on tackling poverty in the field and assisting rural populations by 
local development schemes. The objective is to assist local 
communities in their efforts to increase living standards and tackle 
poverty, particularly amongst the most vulnerable sections of the 
rural populations, through measures designed to improve local 
governance, food security, social protection…‖ 
NIP for EU-Asia Co-operation 
(2007-2010) 
The document mentions that one of the objectives of the Asia-
Europe Foundation (ASEF) is to ―foster links between 
governments and civil society groups in Asia including regional 
and local authorities‖, one of the core priority of ASEF being: ―good 
governance, democracy and human rights‖. 
NIP for EU-Central Asia Co-
operation (2007-2010) 
As in the RSP, the NIP points out the importance of developing 
capacities at local level to enhance local development with an 
objective of increasing living standards and reducing poverty 
(―Capacity of local public authorities to develop, implement and 
monitor programmes aimed at improving living standards and 
ensuring access to social services by the poor in accordance with 
the MDGs will be supported‖). 
The 1
st
 focal priority (esp. for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan) concerns ―Regional and local community 
development‖ and an expected result is: ―Strengthened capacities 
of local public authorities and self-government bodies and 
participation of civil society for effective governance‖. 
The 3
rd
 focal priority concerns ―support for good governance and 
economic reform‖. In particular, it is mentioned that ―top-down 
measures will be accompanied by a bottom-up approach 
promoting citizens‘ rights, effective implementation of core labour 
standards and public participation in the political, economic and 
social spheres, leading in turn to a strengthening of citizen 
participation in public life, in particular in the control of institutional 
bodies and law-implementing agencies and services, including at 
local level.‖ 
―The process of decentralising political power and budget to local 
level is just beginning and building on current support for these 
reforms might be an important component of the approach.‖ 
Regional Strategy Paper and 
Indicative programme for EU- 
Asia Co-operation (2005-2006) 
A reference is made to regional programme Asia Urbs which ―aims 
to promote local government partnerships to undertake urban 
development projects‖ and an environmental management 
programme which focuses ―on establishing and strengthening 
networks of institutions, including local authorities, working on 
environment.‖ But no specific reference is made to local 
governance and decentralisation. 
Regional Strategy Paper for 
EU-Central Asia Co-operation 
(2007-2013) 
The Paper recognises ―the weakness of local administration and 
technical capacity‖ and consider the possibility that EC-funded 
programmes could assist with ―rationalisation and restructuring of 
public administrations‖; in particular it is mentioned that: ―priority 
will be given to FSP beneficiaries in order to improve governance, 
public expenditure management and public services efficiency, 
including government transfers from the central to the 
regional/local level.‖ and ―A long-term EC approach will also allow 
for the development of relations with all relevant actors 
(national/local authorities and locally established NGOs) and for 
work to further increase the capacity of local groups and 
communities as they address their own problems and increase 
their participation in policy-making.‖ 
ASEAN - Nuremberg 
Declaration on an EU-ASEAN 
Enhanced Partnership (2007), 
and related Plan of Action 
No reference to decentralisation or local governance. 
ASEM - Helsinki Declaration on 
the future of ASEM (2006) 
No reference to decentralisation or local governance. 
ASEM - The Asia-Europe Co-
operation Framework (AECF, 
2000) 
No reference to decentralisation or local governance. 
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Policy / programming 
documents 
Reference to decentralisation or local governance 
Latin America  
VI EU-LAC summit (Madrid 
Declaration and Action plan - 
2010) 
No reference to decentralisation or local governance. 
The European Union and Latin 
America: Global Players in 
Partnership (COM(2009)495/3) 
No reference to decentralisation or local governance. 
V EU-LAC summit (Lima 
Declaration - 2008) 
It is mentioned that: ―A second phase of EUROsociAL that aims to 
improve social cohesion has already been planned, and the new 
URB-AL III programme, starting in 2008, will pursue territorial co-
operation through the promotion of social cohesion policies at local 
level‖.  
Moreover, issues related to ―democratic governance‖ are 
mentioned but no reference is made to decentralisation or local 
governance. 
IV EU-LAC summit (Vienna 
Declaration - 2006) 
No reference to decentralisation or local governance. 
A stronger partnership between 
the European Union and Latin 
America (COM(2005)0636) 
Issues related to ―democratic governance‖ are mentioned but no 
reference is made to decentralisation or local governance. 
III EU-LAC summit 
(Guadalajara Declaration - 
2004) 
Issues related to ―democratic governance‖ are mentioned but no 
reference is made to decentralisation or local governance. 
Regional Strategy Papers 2007-
2013 
Programmes such as URB-AL which promotes ―exchanges 
between local authorities‖ are mentioned in the paper. 
Moreover, the priority 1 of the regional strategy (―Support for social 
cohesion and reduction of poverty, inequalities and exclusion‖) 
refers to local authorities as relevant actors or potential 
beneficiaries of the EC-funded interventions.  
Yet, no specific reference is made to decentralisation or local 
governance 
Regional Strategy Papers 2002-
2006 
But no specific reference is made to decentralisation or local 
governance. 
EU-LAC Forum: Local 
authorities (Paris, 2007) 
The participants stated that: ―democracy, decentralisation and 
good governance are key elements for social cohesion‖ and that 
local authorities have a key role to promote democracy. Moreover, 
local authorities participating in the forum committed themselves to 
―urge national governments to promote democracy, foster 
decentralisation processes and enhance local governance, for 
they are key elements to achieve social cohesion.‖ 
ENP-all sub-regions  
Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 
laying down general provisions 
establishing a European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument 
The regulation specifies that ―decentralised bodies in the partner 
countries, such as regions, departments, provinces and 
municipalities‖ can be financed under this instrument. Moreover, it 
is stated that EC assistance ―shall normally be established in 
partnership between the Commission and the beneficiaries. The 
partnership shall involve, as appropriate, national, regional and 
local authorities, economic and social partners, civil society and 
other relevant bodies‖. 
COM(2004) 373 - European 
Neighbourhood Policy 
Strategy paper 
The paper refers several times to co-operation between local 
authorities (―decentralised co-operation‖) but no specific reference 
is made to decentralisation or local governance. 
ENP-MEDA  
Declaration of the Paris Summit 
for the Mediterranean (2008) 
―Heads of State and Government underscore the importance of 
the active participation of civil society, local and regional 
authorities and the private sector in the implementation of the 
Barcelona Process‖ 
Council Regulation 2698/2000 
(27/11/2000) 
It is recognised in the document that: ―Good governance shall be 
promoted by supporting key institutions and key protagonists in 
civil society such as local authorities‖. 
Barcelona declaration (1995) The participants agreed to encourage ―co-operation between local 
authorities‖ and ―contacts between parliamentarians, regional 
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Policy / programming 
documents 
Reference to decentralisation or local governance 
authorities, local authorities and the social partners‖ but no 
mention was made to decentralisation or local governance. 
Regional Strategy Papers 2007-
2013 
The paper underlines the importance of strengthening the civil 
society in partner countries but no reference is made to 
decentralisation or local governance. 
Regional Strategy Papers 2002-
2006 
No reference to decentralisation or local governance. 
ENP-Tacis  
Eastern Partnership 
(COM(2008)823final) 
It is recognised that ―EU expertise and networks can assist in 
building up administrative capacity at national and local level and 
support national development plans‖ but no reference is made to 
decentralisation or local governance. 
TACIS Regulation 99/2000 Expect the fact that ―the reform of public administration at national, 
regional and local level‖ is identified as a potential area of co-
operation, no reference is made to decentralisation or local 
governance. 
Eastern regional programme 
Strategy paper 2007 - 2013 
The document recognised that: ―the Region is characterised by 
varying degrees of democratic consolidation and public 
governance‖ but no reference is made to decentralisation or local 
governance. 
ACP  
2
nd
 revision of the Cotonou 
Agreement (Brussels, 2010) 
Several mentions are made to decentralisation processes and 
decentralised actors. In particular, a special emphasis is put on 
multi-actors approaches and the development of the capacities at 
the central and local levels. 
1
st
 revision of the Cotonou 
Agreement (Luxembourg, 2005) 
Several references to decentralisation. For instance, the document 
underlines the necessity of a deepening of participatory 
approaches including a more important role given to local 
authorities. 
 
Cotonou Agreement (2000) The agreement places an emphasis on the political dimension of 
development, as reflected in the principle of good governance 
(article 9). 
Moreover, it recognised local and regional governments as 
potential partners in co-operation (article 6), introduced a focus on 
institutional development and capacity building, and mentioned 
―support for political, administrative, economic and financial 
decentralisation‖ as one strategic area in this field (article 33). 
1.2 JC1.2 EC policies, programming guides and reference documents are 
comprehensive and coherent 
Main findings at JC level 
The EC commitment to support decentralisation and local governance issues has gradually 
become more explicit over the years since 2003. The discussion of decentralisation in EC 
policies and guidelines is cognisant of the fact that the term is interpreted differently in 
different contexts. The official statements are at the same time clearly emphasising ―local 
authorities‖ and the decentralisation of functions, mandates and resources to local 
governments/local authorities. The EC is in this regard clearer in its emphasis on a particular 
form or type of decentralisation than many other development organisations that frequently 
emphasise alternative interpretations such as ―community participation‖, ―community driven 
development‖, etc. The emphasis on ―local authorities‖/―local governments‖ is to a large 
extent the result of the significant involvement of European local authorities in the 
development dialogue – this includes regular consultation with The Committee of the 
Regions31 and was for instance reflected in the recent second edition of the Assises of 
                                               
31
 The Committee of the Regions (CoR) is the political assembly that provides the regional and local levels with a 
voice in EU policy development and EU legislation. The Treaties oblige the Commission, Parliament and Council 
to consult the Committee of the Regions whenever new proposals are made in areas that affect the regional or 
local level. The CoR has 344 members from the 27 EU countries, and its work is organised in 6 different 
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Decentralised Co-operation for development that brought together local and regional 
authorities' representatives from the EU and developing countries to exchange their views 
and hold a political dialogue with the European institutions on development co-operation32.  
However, although the existing overall guidance is fairly coherent, clarity in definitions 
sometimes differs from one key document to another. The 2007 reference document is the 
most widely distributed EC document on support to decentralisation, but definitions and 
concepts are not as clear in that document as in later work. For example, the 2009 EC 
Decentralisation Programming Fiche and the 2008 European Charter on Development Co-
operation in Support of Local Governance are much clearer and deserving wider 
dissemination among EC staff (both at HQ and EUD). 
Furthermore, EC staff interviewed (both at HQ and EUD) note that the specific guidance on 
decentralisation is not yet fully internalised in programming guides or fully supported by other 
operational procedures and guides.  
1.2.1 Ind1.2.1 - Coherence and comprehensiveness of documented policy statement, 
goals, and objectives  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
EC Policy documents, programming guides and reference documents have gradually 
developed over the evaluation period into more comprehensive sets of documentation. The 
major regional policy/programming documents summarised in Table 3 above, are all fairly 
general in their statements but open up for various forms of EC support to local governments 
and decentralisation in the concerned regions. The references to decentralisation and local 
authorities are more pronounced in ACP than other regions. Even where decentralisation is 
not an area for support, following the revision of the Cotonou Agreement in 2005, local 
decentralised authorities should be involved as actors of the partnership (see Cotonou 
Agreement, article 4). 
In summary, the EC commitment to support decentralisation and local governance issues 
has gradually become more explicit over the years since 2003. The guidance is fairly 
coherent but not yet fully internalised in programming guides or fully supported by other 
operational procedures and guides. 
In terms of coherence: the discussion of decentralisation in EC policies and guidelines is 
cognisant of the fact that the term is interpreted differently in different contexts. However, the 
more official statements are at the same time clearly emphasising ―local authorities‖ and the 
decentralisation of functions, mandates and resources to local governments/local authorities. 
The EC is in this regard clearer in its emphasis on a particular form or type of 
decentralisation than many other development organisations. The EC clearly focuses on 
decentralisation to elected local governments – rather than e.g. decentralisation to various 
forms of community groups (a form of decentralising that e.g. the World Bank has been 
advocating for long, in partial conflict to its simultaneous support for decentralisation to local 
governments). 
The EC 2007 reference document underscores the fact that decentralisation can be 
interpreted in many different ways and to a certain degree that leads to a loss of coherence. 
In particular because the document after reviewing various interpretations never clearly 
suggest one specific definition of the core concept ―decentralisation‖ to be utilised by the EC. 
The same document also confuses terminology slightly because it mixes the use of 
―dimensions‖ and ―types‖ of decentralisation. This is most clear in its definition of 
administrative decentralisation (page 16):  
                                                                                                                                                   
commissions. They examine proposals, debate and discuss in order to write official opinions on key issues. See 
http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/HomeTemplate.aspx  
32
 The meeting included more than 100 delegates and was held end March 2011. The ultimate aim was to 
contribute to reinforce development aid effectiveness towards the full integration of local and regional authorities 
into the development cooperation policies and to build a genuine EU partnership between the different actors 
active in the field of development. For details see http://portal.cor.europa.eu/atlas/en-
US/Pages/Assisesondecentralisedcooperation.aspx  
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“Administrative decentralisation aims at transferring decision-making authority, 
resources and responsibilities for the delivery of a select number of public services, or 
functions, from the central government to other (non-elected) levels of government, 
agencies or field offices of central government line agencies. Administrative 
decentralisation is associated with three possible variants, each having different 
characteristics: (i) de-concentration, (ii) delegation and (iii) divestment, which relates to 
the privatisation of functions and services. Administrative decentralisation … is 
generally perceived as the narrowest form of decentralisation because local institutions 
to which tasks are transferred are not based on political representation controlled from 
below.”  
A much clearer definition is provided in the recent 2009 Decentralisation Programming Fiche 
that also more clearly is in line with the 2008 European Charter on development co-operation 
in support of local governance. For future work it is recommended to use the definitions 
adopted by the Charter (and also used in this evaluation):  
Box 3 Key definitions adopted by the 2008 European Charter on Development Co-
operation in support of local governance 
Decentralisation: a process involving the delegation of a range of powers, competences and 
resources from the central government to elected local (sub-national) governments. 
Decentralisation entails three inextricably linked dimensions: 
 Political: it involves a new distribution of powers according to the subsidiarity principle, 
with the objective of strengthening democratic legitimacy 
 Administrative: it involves a reorganisation and clear assignment of tasks and functions 
between territorial levels to improve the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of the 
administration over all national territory 
 Fiscal: it involves a reallocation of public expenditure to local and territorial authorities and 
enables them to generate their own revenue according to their assigned tasks 
Local democratic governance: decision-making and implementation process of public policy 
that, around local governments (elected in contexts of decentralisation), encourages an 
equal participation of all stakeholders of a territory (state, citizen, civil society, private sector), 
reinforces accountability towards citizens and responsiveness to social demands in seeking 
for the general interest. 
In terms of comprehensiveness it can be concluded that guiding documents discuss support 
to decentralisation fairly comprehensively in the sense that a wide range of different entry 
points and support strategies are considered. However, the reference documents are without 
specialised guidance in key areas such as: 
 Fiscal decentralisation (including guidance on functional assignments and how to 
work with core elements such as local government taxation, fiscal transfer systems, 
and  
 Analyses of politics of decentralisation reforms, 
 Decentralised human resource management, 
 Sector specific decentralisation issues. 
However, this type of more specialised reference material is not necessarily required to be 
developed as EC specific guiding documents, but is currently increasingly being developed 
as part of the joint Development Partners Working Group on Local Governance and 
Decentralisation (DPWG-LGD).33 
                                               
33
 See annex 1 section 2.3.2 for detailed discussion of this.  
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1.2.2 Ind1.2.2 - Coherence between documented EC policy statement, goals, 
objective and international efforts for coordination and harmonisation 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The 2008 European Charter on development co-operation in support of local governance 
(discussed above) is probably the most explicit ―international‖ commitment of EC and its 
member states on how to support decentralisation and local governance in third countries.  
The EC has, in addition, primarily worked through the Informal Development Partners 
Working Group on Local Governance and Decentralisation (DPWG-LGD) for harmonisation 
of aid to decentralisation and local governance. In both of these forums there is an emerging 
clear conceptualisation of what decentralisation entails, how its main dimensions should be 
understood and analysed and how to work with the theme. These are to a large extent also 
reflected in the most recent general EC document on decentralisation (the 2009 
programming fiche). 
Box 4 Guiding Principles for Enhancing Alignment and Harmonisation on Local 
Governance and Decentralisation 
After the approval of ―General Guiding Principles for Enhancing Alignment and 
Harmonisation on Local Governance and Decentralisation‖ in 2008, the DPWG-LGD 
embarked upon the elaboration of drafting ―specific guidelines for enhancing aid 
effectiveness‖ that will apply to specific country contexts that include 12 main principles, well 
developed in the document:  
Regarding Ownership: 
1. Act strategically to strengthen the national framework and key actors in fostering 
decentralisation and local governance 
2. Taking the decentralisation and local governance context as a starting point 
3. Strengthening the domestic capacity development for planning, implementing and 
adjusting decentralisation and local governance reforms at all levels 
Regarding Alignment: 
4. Designing aligned response strategies according to the degree of ownership, commitment 
and political will to decentralisation and local governance 
5. Development partners committing to ensure synergies and consistency between support 
to the national decentralisation framework and sector support 
6. Strengthening fiscal decentralisation and local authorities financing  
Regarding Harmonisation: 
7. Building on and strengthening nationally driven DLG policies with harmonised strategic 
responses from DP to different degrees of and commitment to decentralisation and local 
governance 
8. Implementing division of labour amongst DP‘s so that the mix of support programmes and 
aid modalities covers the key issues and actors in the country specific DLG process 
9. Harmonising approaches to DLG capacity development in sector support programmes 
10. Adopting incentive systems in donor agencies that work in favour of harmonisation efforts 
Regarding Managing for Results: 
11. Supporting the establishment and strengthening of domestic monitoring and evaluation 
systems of decentralisation and local governance reforms 
Regarding Mutual Accountability: 
12. Building on and supporting decentralisation and local governance reforms that strengthen 
accountability on both, the supply and demand sides. 
1.3 JC1.3 EC policies provide clear orientation and guidance to its 
interventions in support of decentralisation processes 
Main findings at JC level 
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The survey indicates that almost half of the EUDs find that the EC policy framework is 
unclear. Among the different guidelines on decentralisation support, there is only one 
document (the 2007 Reference Document) that is fairly well known. It is also evident that 
staff find themselves overwhelmed with the many different guidelines and instructions from 
HQ. Many staff members expressed need for improved guidance in several areas – but 
preferably through increased interaction with experienced colleagues rather than in the form 
of many added guidelines.  
EC policy framework for support to decentralisation gives significant discretion to EUDs for 
interpretation on whether or how to support decentralisation processes in partner countries. 
In some countries (e.g. Tanzania and Rwanda), the delegations have had to make an explicit 
choice and ―exit‖ from direct decentralisation support as part of aid harmonisation efforts. In a 
few countries, EC remains as significant lead donor in support of decentralisation/local 
governance (e.g. in Mali, Lebanon and Benin), but in most countries the EC is seen as an 
only relative minor player. 
Although the overall policy framework and the general orientations of the EC in relation to 
decentralisation are not well known, it appears that national stakeholders and other 
development partners usually have a good knowledge of the specific objectives and 
orientations of EC-funded interventions in the partner country.  
National stakeholders generally recognised the clear position of the EC in terms of its focus 
on local authorities. In this regard the EU is seen clearer than other development 
organisations that frequently support other competing approaches to decentralisation (such 
as World Bank and UN support to ―community driven development‖ etc). 
Other development partners, in particular countries, foremost understood and appreciated 
the position of the EC when it actively engaged in joint ―local government sector working 
groups‖ or related fora for donor harmonisation in support of decentralisation.  
1.3.1 Ind1.3.1 - Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to 
national stakeholders in partner countries 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
In some cases, national stakeholders recognised the clear position of the EC in terms of its 
focus on the role played by local authorities. However, in this case the EC 
"decentralisation strategy" is often not as clear. 
 In Lebanon, national stakeholders and other development partners recognised the 
clear position of the EC in terms of its focus on local authorities when supporting local 
development interventions. This is also well communicated by the EUD, e.g. in its 
recent newsletter (issue 3, 2010) where ―strengthening the role of local authorities‖ 
was the major theme. However, it is well recognised by all stakeholders that the 
Government of Lebanon doesn't have a clear vision or strategy for decentralisation 
reforms – the EC approach has therefore hitherto been guided by a general 
recognition of the potential role of local authorities in development and inclusion of 
municipalities as local partners rather than specific decentralisation strategy. 
In a few cases, the EC support is not seen as guided by a strong internal strategy but rather 
by the evolution of national priorities.  
 In Honduras, officials from the Ministry of Interior and Population pointed out the fact 
that during the formulation of PROADES in 2004, no specific strategies of the EC for 
decentralisation were discussed. The concern was actually to formulate a programme 
that would support the national decentralisation programme (PRODDEL) without 
necessarily linking it to EC specific priorities and discussions were apparently 
focusing on the financing modality (budget support).  
That said, generally, a good knowledge of the specific objectives and orientations of EC-
funded interventions in the partner country can be observed. 
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 In Benin, the various national stakeholders interviewed find that the EC policy 
interventions on decentralisation and local governance have been pertinent and very 
clear but that the actual policy documents are less well known. 
 In Rwanda, all national stakeholders met during the field visit had a clear 
understanding of the EC approaches to decentralisation/local governance (as 
pronounced under the DPRPR). However, there was not a wider knowledge of any 
specific strategies or documentation that the EC has developed. 
In some countries, the EC has been a significant lead donor in support of 
decentralisation/local governance. This situation has significantly contributed to increasing 
the clarity of the orientations of the EC strategy in the partner country.  
 For instance, in Benin, it appeared during the field visit that the mere fact that the EC 
has consistently been playing a lead role in the decentralisation and local governance 
field over the past 5 years, has also meant an increased visibility and also a shared 
vision for work with other key development partners (DPs). 
 Similarly, in Mali, the leading role played by the EC in decentralisation, with clear 
choices from the start, gave good visibility to its action. The field visit showed that the 
EC orientations on decentralisation appear to be clear for both, national authorities 
and other partners.  
As seen in EQ4, national stakeholders have generally appreciated the position of the EC 
when it actively engaged in ―local government sector working groups‖. 
1.3.2 Ind1.3.2 - Clarity of EC policy/strategies on decentralisation according to other 
international donors 
Other donors have rarely a ―global picture‖ of EC support to decentralisation but make 
assessments based on country specific interventions. There is great diversity in the extent to 
which they perceive EC as a strong and committed supporter of decentralisation.  
In Honduras, the development partners met were not aware of specific EC strategies for 
decentralisation. Some (BID, WB) have however recognised the active role taken by the EC 
as recently illustrated in the participation in the formulation of the new Government's policy, 
but also in 2003 and 2004 during the formulation of the national programme for 
decentralisation PRODDEL. 
In Mali, Lebanon and Benin, the EC is generally perceived as being among the leading 
development partners supporting decentralisation reforms and the EC is to a varying degree 
taking the lead also in donor coordination of decentralisation support. 
In some countries, as a result of deliberate ―division of labour‖ among donors, it has been 
decided that the EC should focus on other areas of development assistance. This is for 
instance the case in Tanzania and Rwanda. However, even in these countries it is found by 
some development partners, that since the EC is a very significant partner in decentralised 
sectors (e.g. health and education), it should take a stronger interest in decentralisation 
issues and continue its engagement in ―local government sector working groups‖. The EU 
has demonstrated that this can be done. Thus, even though the EC only marginally works 
directly with decentralisation reforms in the Philippines (but focus on health sector in a 
decentralised context), then other DPs are well informed about EC efforts for supporting 
decentralised service delivery and are appreciative of its efforts because the EC engages 
actively in the local government sector working group. 
International DPs working with decentralisation and local governance have in recent years 
sought to share experiences and coordinate efforts through the informal Development 
Partners Working Group on Local Governance and Decentralisation (www.dpwg-lgd.org). 
From 18/05 to 20/05/2011 the Working Group held its 6th annual meeting in Brussels, hosted 
by EuropeAid and co-hosted by the Swiss Development Agency (SDC). 
A total of 47 participants from 24 organisations clearly indicated the continued interest in the 
working group: that it continues to play an important role as a knowledge sharing platform for 
enhanced donor harmonisation and aid effectiveness in the field of decentralisation and local 
governance. The group has not progressed on significant clarification on possible further 
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division of roles and responsibilities and the role of the EC is among its member states 
broadly seen as complimentary. 
1.3.3 Ind1.3.3 - EC policy framework relative to decentralisation provide clear 
guidance to its interventions in support of decentralisation processes 
according to EC policy and operational staffs 
In the survey, almost half of the respondents perceive the EC policy framework on 
decentralisation as not very clear (47%). Although the EUDs are broadly aware of general 
guidelines, they would appreciate more specific and detailed explanations for specific cases 
(e.g. regarding the use of SBS or ―basket programming‖ in relation to decentralisation 
support or guidance on how to act when decentralisation ceases to be a government priority, 
guidance for different modalities of implementation or guidance tailored to specific country 
contexts, guidelines and resources for more extensive country specific analysis etc).  
Figure 4 Clarity of the EC policy framework, as perceived by the EUDs 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
Table 4 Perceived constraints of the EC policy framework (EUD survey) 
Answer 
Number of 
respondents 
Yes 3 15 % 
No 17 85 % 
 
Only few of the delegations (15%) found in the survey that EC policy framework as such is 
directly constraining their work – the main challenge for EUDs appears to be the extent to 
which they can access detailed context specific guidance, just as some in the survey 
expressed concerns over the (e.g. EDF) financial procedures that prevented them from 
certain types of programming (e.g. Rwanda EUD wanted to establish sub delegation of 
Financial Agreement to Local authorities).  
During the field phase, these broad assessments were confirmed especially regarding issues 
related to aid modalities (use of basket funds and SBS etc) in relation to decentralisation. 
For instance:  
 In the Philippines, four EUD staff members were interviewed: in general they were not 
aware of most of the specific official EC communications/strategy documents on 
decentralisation. However, several staff members were aware of the 2007 reference 
document, but didn't find any specific guidance on how to approach decentralisation 
reforms in the Philippines generally or within the health sector in particular. Staff felt 
that orientations towards aid modalities, like sector budget support (and SBS) and 
PFM issues, had been given attention within the EC and facilitated the programming 
in the health sector – however, they didn't find that existing EC guidance was 
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particularly clear on supporting decentralisation reforms or health sector reforms in a 
complex and relatively decentralised context as in the Philippines.  
 In Honduras, the reference document on decentralisation from 2007 has been 
consulted in many occasions by the EUD, especially in 2009 and 2010 during the 
discussion around the extension of the PROADES programme up to 2013. However, 
the staff see the document as very general without specific guidelines for 
interventions in decentralisation and in particular in a SBS modality. In particular, the 
EUD would need more precise guidance on the way to define indicators for 
decentralisation as conditions for releases of tranches. 
 In Mali, EUD staff interviewed considered the strategic framework as satisfactory and 
useful (including the reference document on "supporting decentralisation and local 
governance in Third Countries"). However, a Programme Officer at the EUD 
highlighted the fact that the "recent evolutions decided at HQ level regarding the 
continuous assessment of the three general eligibility conditions for budget support 
prove to be inconsistent with the existing guidelines and with the contents of the 
signed financing agreements. It would thus be useful to indicate the new position of 
the HQ and amend the current financing agreements in order to avoid different 
understandings which would induce delays in the implementation of sector policies." It 
thus appears necessary to continue discussing and refining the EC approach on 
sector budget support and certain practical issues related to the implementation of the 
strategy to support decentralisation. 
Finally, several EUDs felt overwhelmed with the amount of instructions and guidelines from 
HQs and therefore mainly appreciate guidance in the form of opportunities of dialogue with 
experienced staff from HQ or other delegations. However, such experiences were also 
considered relatively rare. 
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2 EQ2: Institutional capacity 
Evaluation Question 2: To what extent has the EC developed its overall institutional 
capacity to support decentralisation processes? 
2.1 JC2.1 The overall institutional environment at the level of the EC is 
suitable for appropriate support to decentralisation 
Main findings at JC level 
The survey indicates that more than half of the EUDs find that EC Policy Framework was 
“not very clear” in providing guidance on programming in support of decentralisation. 
Qualitative interviews point to the following key constraining factors: 
 The relative limited in-house technical expertise available in the delegations which 
limits the professional engagement in programming in relation to support of 
decentralisation reforms. 
 Limited opportunities for drawing on HQ expertise. 
 Limitations in flexible use of consultancy services – this refers to a relative rigidity 
of procurement rules that makes it more difficult to ask for the right experts or the right 
service.  
 Occasionally, EUDs experience very long delays in clarification on types of funding 
agreement and whether it is allowed to use these types of funding agreements. For 
example, the EUD in Tanzania waited two years for the permission to enter into a 
basket funding arrangement.  
This lack of flexibility of EC operational procedures has been underlined during the field 
phase for instance in South Africa and Tanzania. EC procedures have been considered as 
very cumbersome and bureaucratic particularly in Benin, Peru, Haiti and Rwanda. In 
Honduras, Lebanon, Mali, Sierra Leone and in the Philippines, EC procedures were 
perceived as being more flexible. 
The survey indicates that 43% of the EUDs perceived ―the level of communication and 
coordination between staff directly dealing with decentralisation and sector staff in your 
Delegation‖ as ―low” or “quite low‖. However, the same survey also indicates that in 45% of 
the EUDs surveyed there has been an improvement over the evaluation period (while it has 
worsened in 5% of cases only). The fieldwork confirmed that the dialogue between staff in 
charge of decentralisation and those dealing with other sectors has generally improved. The 
dialogue is described as very active in Lebanon, the Philippines, Rwanda and South Africa. 
But this dialogue seems to remain quite informal in most of the cases, as for example in 
Benin, Honduras, Peru and Sierra Leone. In a few cases only, such as in Mali and Tanzania, 
this internal dialogue still appears to be rather limited. 
During most of the evaluation period there has been a gradual increase in the number of 
specialised staff working with decentralisation issues. Thus, by the end of the period (2009) 
2-3 professionals were full-time dedicated to decentralisation issues at HQ level within the 
Governance Unit (E4). However, from mid 2011 (not included in the evaluation period) after 
the reorganisation of EC External DGs, responsibility at HQ level for the topic 
―Decentralisation and Local Governance‖ is now placed within ―D2: Civil Society, Local 
Authorities‖. The organisational structures are still in transition, but the evaluation team found 
that by September 2011 only one permanent staff member was designated to work full time 
on ―decentralisation‖. The organisational restructuring has thus led to a decrease of staff 
resources dedicated to ―decentralisation‖. The new structure also seems to place particular 
emphasis on the thematic funding instrument ―Civil Society and Local Authorities‖ rather than 
anchoring decentralisation clearly within the topic of ―state reform or public sector reform‖.  
The evaluation team found, that there have been only few incentives for innovation in the 
field of decentralisation. The following factor might hinder the inclusion of innovative 
approaches in the support decentralisation reforms: 
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 EUDs recognise the significant political sensitiveness that is attached to 
decentralisation and prefer to let the choice for a any decentralisation reform to the 
partner government in order to respect the national sovereignty. 
 Examples of decentralisation are diverse and contrarily to other governance reforms 
there is a low consensus on what can be defined as model or as ―good practices‖, 
exceptions being the desirability of national elected parliaments, on systems based 
on multi party democracy, the universality of Human rights).  
 Decentralisation reforms are also considered to be very technical (in particular related 
to fiscal aspects of the reform) and EUDs frequently feel that other DPs are better 
suited to take the lead in the process. Consequently, EUDs of the sample of countries 
under evaluation, rarely take the risk to spearhead DPs in the area of decentralisation 
reforms.  
 In addition it can be noted that many EUD staff feel that they work under significant 
pressure with limited time and resources to ―think strategically‖. 
2.1.1 Ind2.1.1 - Adequacy of EC operational procedures to: pro-active and flexible 
approach to promoting decentralisation, rapid responses or long-term process 
support, identification and selection of adequate strategic partners and/or 
implementing agencies 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The "Thematic evaluation of the EC support to Good Governance in third countries" (2006) 
emphasised in its recommendation the need for "a change of culture as well as new 
toolboxes" in order for EC support to be effective and adequate to the great variety of country 
contexts. The same evaluation also highlighted the critical importance of flexible 
management approaches (attuned to the often unpredictable nature of governance 
processes) as well as quick response capacities (allowing the EC to seize windows of 
opportunity). 
The D-group discussions34 on EC Support to decentralisation in third countries conducted by 
ECDPM35 in 2006 concluded that the European Commission increasingly sought to adapt its 
managerial approaches, processes and procedures to deliver effective support 
accordingly. There was in particular general support within the EC to move ―beyond 
traditional project approaches to supporting decentralisation and to embrace, if conditions 
allow, a sector-wide approach supported with budget aid‖36. However the D-group 
discussions at that time also confirmed the existence of a number of institutional constraints 
to an effective delivery of decentralisation support: 
 Compartmentalisation remains a relatively important constraint for many EUDs. Most 
EUDs consider dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing 
with sectors to be ―ad hoc‖ and ―limited‖; 
 Operational guidance on innovative funding mechanisms to support local 
governments is not yet readily available. This holds particularly true for the instrument 
of Municipal Investment Funds; 
 Strategies and procedures do not always match. Effective support to hugely complex 
political reforms like decentralisation and local governance requires ‗process 
approaches‘ for designing and implementing suitable donor intervention strategies. 
This, in turn, puts a premium on having flexible procedures (adapted to process 
approaches) and financing tools, as well as the possibility for joint funding 
mechanisms or ―delegation‖; 
                                               
34
 In April 2006, the EuropeAid launched a decentralisation discussion group (D-group) aiming at reviewing EC 
decentralisation and local governance experiences, challenges and realities in its support to 20 countries. 
35
 European Centre for Development Policy Management. 
36
 EC 2007, page 78. 
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 The administrative workload for staff in EUDs is heavy, reducing the time available for 
content work and direct engagement in decentralisation and local governance 
processes.  
Interviews in EUDs and the documentary review clearly indicate that many EUDs have 
increasingly moved away from “traditional projects” towards various forms of “sector 
wide approaches”. This has led to overcome several of the above-mentioned constraints. 
EUDs have also shown a great deal of variations in approaches with regards to the selection 
of partners, funding modalities, etc. Examples that demonstrate the use of different and 
context-specific approaches, include: 
 Support to decentralisation in Mali in the form of sector budget support – with the 
involvement of many DPs and led by the EC, 
 Support to decentralisation through a capacity building programme in Sierra Leone 
using World Bank trust modality, 
 Support to decentralisation in Cambodia with joint UN management. 
The variation of approaches is documented in detail in the project inventory (Volume II – 
Annex 3).  
These new approaches, have further contributed to overcome some of the above mentioned 
challenges. 
However, the survey conducted among the selected 22 EUDs indicates that a significant 
percentage (56% of respondents) find that EC Policy Framework is “not very clear” in 
providing guidance on programming in support of decentralisation. Qualitative interviews37 
point to the following key constraining factors:  
 The relative limited in-house technical expertise available in the delegations which 
limits the professional engagement in programming in relation to support of 
decentralisation reforms. 
 Limited opportunities for drawing on HQ expertise. 
 Limitations in flexible use of consultancy services – this refers in part to relative 
rigidity of procurement of experts; the EUDs cannot procure consultants as flexible as 
many other DPs. It also refers to the nature of work that can be procured – many 
EUDs felt that other organisation were much better resources to undertake in-depth 
analytical work for their internal use – e.g. World Bank and DfID funding ―political 
economy analyses‖ or ―drivers of change studies‖. 
Occasionally, EUDs experience very long delays in clarification on types of funding 
agreement and whether it is allowed to use these types of funding agreements. For example, 
the EUD in Tanzania waited two years for the permission to enter into a basket funding 
arrangement. This lack of flexibility of EC operational procedures have also been highlighted 
during the field phase. IEC procedures have been considered as very cumbersome and 
bureaucratic, particularly in the following countries: 
 In Benin for instance, the procedures were often found to be both bureaucratic and 
excessive in the early process of the project implementation. Many of the 
implementing partners found EC procedures were very cumbersome and 
bureaucratic with many externally set and driven audits and reporting formats. 
However, over time, a number of programmatic and sector budget support initiatives 
have been developed and interviewed donor found them to qualified to be more 
flexible and useful to DLG issues further. For example, one of the components of the 
PACTE programme implemented with the help of a specific programme unit was 
delegated to GTZ (GIZ) as they were found to be technical sound in the capacity 
building area and the focus of the component was the capacity building of the 
deconcentrated services in the regions. 
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 To date only from HQ interviews and from one delegation (Ghana)  
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 According to the EUD of Peru, it seems that governmental institutions find EC 
guidelines and procedures during the evaluation period rather bureaucratic, 
resulting in the fact that some funding opportunities were not used. An example is the 
Programme for Modernisation of the State (PMdE), for which the implementation has 
been very slow as the state institutions needed to present their budgets and 
operational plans before funds could be released. Although approved in 2007, 
activities only started in 2010 in the Decentralisation Secretariat (Secretaria de 
Descentralizacion, SdD) linked to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers 
(Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, PCM)38.  
Staff changes within regional and local governments, ministries and implementation 
agencies involved in the EUD programmes39 makes it difficult for the EUD to establish 
stable strategic partnerships for decentralisation. In recent years, the main national 
partner seems to have been the MEF. Among the development partners no specific 
partnership exists.  
 In Rwanda, looking at the implementation of the DPRPR programme, it is clear that 
the EC tried to respond to the needs of the national partners and redesigned the 
programme in 2005/6 in order to channel the funds through the CDF. What is clear is 
the fact that EC procedures in terms of auditing, accounting and use of funds proved 
to be very cumbersome for the national partner and almost jeopardised the 
intervention. A solution was found, as the national partner developed sufficient 
capacities to better cope with procedural demands of the EC. However, in the 
process of moving towards the 10th EDF, it seems that DLG is NOT any more a 
strategic issue for the EC as a result of the division of labour exercise. Thus, the EC 
is not necessarily actively seeking out strategic partners in the DLG field any more. 
 In the context of conventional projects in South Africa, the very limited flexibility of 
some procedures and rules for contracting continues have seriously hampered the 
quality of the overall implementation of the reform, detracting from a results-oriented 
approach. To avoid micro-management, an appropriate balance needs to be found 
between procedures that safeguard the EC‘s financial interests and fair competition 
and the need to facilitate a smooth implementation of projects with the necessary 
flexibility. In particular, the rigidity of Financing Agreements (often drafted some years 
before the actual implementation starting date) prevents EUD staff from adapting 
implementation modalities to field realities and focusing on results. This was a 
constant topic in the discussions with partner organisations.  
 In Tanzania, it is made clear from the fieldwork, that some parts of the institutional 
environment have to a large degree constrained EC support to decentralisation in 
Tanzania. This is made evident when looking at the way how direct EC support was 
formulated and developed: the EC decided as early as 2004 that the most appropriate 
entry point for support to the reforms would be to contribute to the LGDG. But signing 
of the programme document could only take place in 2007 because of HQ concerns 
regarding the use of basket funding arrangements. ―Support to Local Government: 
The FP for the support to the decentralization process in Tanzania was submitted in 
May 2005. It has been pending the approval of the Director of EuropeAid to include 
Tanzania on the list of pilot countries to allow basket funding for 9th EDF funds. This 
was confirmed in June and the FP was presented at the September EDF committee. 
The signing ceremony will take place early February 2007‖40. Within the EUD 
decentralisation was given rather limited priority from around 2006-7 on, as it became 
likely that other DPs would be designated to lead the sector. However, it was still 
                                               
38
 The PMdE was also delayed due to changes in staff in the PCM administration and some political obstacles 
from the government as the programme was agreed upon with the former government (2001 to 2006).  
39
 "Programa de Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria" (PASA), "Apoyo a la Modernización del Sector Salud y su 
Aplicación en una Región del Peru" (AMARES), "Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo Socioeconimico y a la 
Descentralizacion den las Regiones de Ayacucho y Huancavelica" (AGORAH), "Programa Articulado Nutricional" 
(Euro-PAN). 
40
 Source: External Assistance Management Report 2006 
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recognised that decentralisation reforms in Tanzania were important for the 
successful implementation of sectoral programmes at local levels in sectors such as 
education, health, roads, agriculture and infrastructure..  
In other countries, EC procedures appeared to be more flexible: 
 In Honduras, some flexibility exists in EC procedures with the possibility for quick 
responses to national need and also to select relevant partner, but in terms of aid 
modality it is clear, that the HQ prefers the SBS modality. This preference for SBS 
resulted in less flexibility in 2004 when the EC supported by a consultancy formulated 
the Decentralisation Support Programme (PROADES) which supported the national 
decentralisation programme (PRODDEL). The EUD and the consultants suggested 
(in coherence with the national partner government) a modified SBS modality linked 
up to certain sub-sectors, but this was changed by EC Headquarters to a normal 
budget support modality for decentralisation. In 2010 when an opportunity to prolong 
PROADES was seen by the EUD and an addendum to the financial agreement from 
2005 was signed with the GoH, again a sector budget support (SBS) modality to 
decentralisation was chosen.  
 In Lebanon, the overall institutional EC environment is broadly considered by the 
EUD as suitable for appropriate support to decentralisation. It has enabled the EUD 
to design and implement a number of responses in support to ―local development‖ 
that ultimately may lead to ―decentralising‖ through a bottom up approach. However, 
the EUD realises the relative lack of strategic direction in the past interventions such 
as e.g. the relative ad-hoc approach to the selection of partners. 
 In Mali, EC procedures have allowed to adjust aid modalities and to be flexible. The 
project and budget support approaches could have been combined. 
 In the Philippines, the EC operational procedures are generally considered adequate 
by EUD staff for programming relevant interventions in support of ―sector support in 
decentralised context‖.  
 In Sierra Leone, the EUD analysed various options how the support should be 
allocated in the preparation for the EC "DCBP". During that process it was realised 
that the WB already had implemented a large reform programme with the GoSL and 
funding was needed to prolong the programme. The operative EC procedures did not 
hinder the EC to join this new arrangement within a trust fund with the WB, DfID and 
GoSL as partners. EC procedures have also permitted the establishment of a 
partnership with the DfID which resulted in a joint EU/DfID CPS 2008 to 2013.  
2.1.2 Ind2.1.2 - Dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those 
dealing with sectors 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
In the framework of D-group consultations, conducted by ECDPM in 200641, most EUDs 
considered dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing with 
sectors to be ―ad-hoc and limited‖42.  
Interviews from EC HQ indicate that the situation has improved since then. Specific 
evidence of improved interactions includes: 
 The participation of various sector staff in EC training courses on decentralisation, 
 The engagement by sector staff in development of sector specific concept papers on 
decentralisation issues (health, education and environment). 
The survey conducted among the selected 22 EUDs indicates that 43% find that ―the level of 
communication and coordination between staff directly dealing with decentralisation and 
sector staff in your Delegation‖ is ―low‖ or ―quite low‖.  
                                               
41
 Supposedly covering "more than 100 delegation staff in all regions as well as key experts from DG Relex", 
EuropeAid, and DEG DEV (EC 2007, page 2). 
42
 EC 2007, page 78. 
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Table 5 Perceived quality of communication and coordination in the EUDs 
Level of communication and 
coordination 
Number of 
answers 
% 
High  5 23.8 % 
Quite high 6 28.6 % 
Quite low 5 23.8 % 
Low 4 19.0 % 
N/A 1 4.8 % 
However, the same survey also indicates that for 45% of the EUDs there has been an 
improvement over the evaluation period, while it has worsened in 5% of cases only. 
Figure 5 Change in the quality of communication and coordination from 2000 to 2009 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
Those EUDs that pointed out specific problems related to internal communication with 
respect to decentralisation usually ascribed it to heavy workload that prevents 
decentralisation issues to be discussed horizontally among sections.  
These general patterns found in the desk survey were generally confirmed during the ten 
field visits.  
The dialogue between staff in charge of decentralisation and those dealing with other sectors 
has generally improved and is often described as very active in the countries visited: 
 In Lebanon, staff within the EUD has had a fairly active dialogue on decentralisation 
related issues – this has also been facilitate by the fact that staff has been organised 
in a section ―Infrastructure and Local Development‖ where ―decentralisation‖ is 
defined beyond a ―governance issue‖. 
 In the Philippines, decentralisation and Local Government issues are recognised by 
the EUD as of obvious importance in the Philippines. Staff working on various aspects 
of the health sector programme as well as staff working on PFM and the local 
governance programme interact significantly and e.g. share participation in the sector 
working group on decentralisation and local governance. 
 In Rwanda, the dialogue internally at the EUD is very clear and active. It seems that 
the EUD often shares information of relevance to the various sectors and 
decentralisation issues.  
 In South Africa, the Evaluation Team was informed that frequent meetings internally 
in the EUDn were used to coordinate and exchange information from various sectors. 
However this dialogue seems to mostly remain quite informal: 
 In Benin, the issues of decentralisation and local governance are actively discussed 
within the EUD and with the government partners. The on-going dialogue within the 
EUD and with external partners is intensive in terms of DLG issues.  
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The Evaluation Team did not have specific meetings with the sector staff, nor did the 
sector staff attend the debriefing during the mission. However, the EUD has internal 
weekly management meetings where heads of sections discuss all relevant 
developments in the various key support areas and therefore a lively exchange of 
information is ensured through these meetings. Often sector staff invites the DLG 
focal points to various sector specific meetings of a wider relevance. 
 In Honduras, no formal procedures exist within the EUD for coordination of sector 
programmes with decentralisation. It is done informally between the staff members at 
occasional meetings or staff meetings.  
 In Peru, communication between staff for decentralisation and staff with 
responsibilities for sectors take place at staff meetings and informal meetings. No 
formal mechanism is established to coordinate actions related to decentralisation. 
The coordination is however still well articulated according to the survey to the EUD. 
 In Sierra Leone, the coordination is mainly done by the relevant staff, who arrange 
meetings or have informal sessions, when necessary. Within the EUD no formal 
mechanism is established to secure coherence between different EC interventions in 
sectors and decentralisation.  
However, in Mali and Tanzania, this internal dialogue is still rather limited: 
 In Mali, there is a dialogue between the teams of the EUD, but, specifically on 
decentralisation issues, the dialogue is more linked with the team working on 
"economic" issues. Operating methods actually differs at the EUD unit in charge of 
infrastructures in terms of the respect of the code of local governments (esp. for the 
management of services or "maitrise d‟ouvrage" by the regions). 
The transfer of knowledge related to other sectors supported by the EC in Mali is 
difficult as the exchange within EUD staff is not institutionalised. Exchanges are thus 
rather ad-hoc and conflict of objectives or synergy potential are only discovered by 
chance. To illustrate this situation, the WatSan programme (PACTEA) does not 
respect the principles of decentralisation as it goes against the idea of a management 
("maîtrise d‟ouvrage") by the LGs themselves. After some parallel developments, 
some links could be established with ARIANE, a support programme to CSO on the 
strengthening of the capacity of users' associations. Interviews with EUD staff has 
revealed that the lack of communication between the EUD staff can be explained by 
time constraints and the absence of institutional exchange platform such as regular 
meeting and presentation of the work carried out in the different sectors. 
 In Tanzania after an agreement on the LGDG modality was reached, the 
responsibility for dealing with decentralisation issues was within the EUD and given to 
a young and relative inexperienced staff member. She was also given responsibility 
for other governance projects. In addition it was soon afterwards agreed (around 
2007-08) that other DPs than the EUD should be lead donors in the ―local 
government sector‖. The EUD gave subsequently relative limited attention internally 
to decentralising issues. However, within the specific sectors, such as infrastructure, 
education and agriculture, the EUD engaged in dialogue on decentralising issues. In 
The EUD was not leading any of the decentralising specific discussions – this was left 
to DPs more engaged in the core local government reforms (among EU member 
states: the Dutch, the German, The Finnish, - as well as the World Bank and JICA). 
2.1.3 Ind2.1.3 - Existence of specialised thematic units/ staff dealing with 
decentralisation. 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
During the evaluation period, EC staff specialised on  decentralisation issues has been 
concentrated within E4 Unit (Governance, Security, Human rights and Gender) in the sub-
section ―Public administration reform and decentralisation‖. This section included (end 2010) 
four permanent staff of whom two have decentralisation as their main thematic focus. In 
addition one staff member assigned to ―public Administration Reform‖ has worked in practice 
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also on decentralisation issues. Thus in total 2.5 staff members were dedicated to the 
support of ―decentralisation‖. The unit was at the time of interviews (in 2010) considered to 
be relative new as it was created in 2005. It is only since 2008 that it had its present level of 
staffing established. The mandate of the unit/section is to provide thematic support to the 
entire EC including the all delegations. 
The section is relatively small compared to what is established within other international 
organisations such as UNDP or World Bank that have a range of sub-sections each with 
several more professionals specialised in various decentralisation issues (e.g. the World 
Banks Urban Sector, the WB PREM, the WB CDD43 section etc and the various regional 
UNDP local governance offices/hubs and specialised organs such as the UNCDF). However, 
while some of the above offices in e.g. World Bank are well known to interpret 
decentralisation very differently (e.g. the CCD/Social Action Fund approaches compared to 
the local government approaches supported by the urban sector etc), the smaller office of the 
EC gives more coordinated guidance to EC operations. The 2007 Reference document44 is 
considered as an overall guiding document. 
Staff in the EU Delegations (see Volume annex 4 for the survey results) generally finds that 
they receive "very limited" direct support from HQ within this thematic area. E4 staff 
also expressed in interviews that the task of providing "global advice" was enormous and that 
they generally considered themselves ―understaffed‖ compared to the broad mandate and 
number of support-requests from EU Delegations. Staff expressed in particular need for 
expanding expert capabilities in the area of fiscal decentralisation (if resources would allow 
it). 
However, from mid 2011 (after the evaluation period) the two Development Generals (DG 
AIDCO and DG Development) were merged into one. The final overall organisation of the 
Directorate General was decided on 1st June 2011. Within the new structure, the 
responsibility at HQ level for the topic ―Decentralisation and Local Governance‖ is now 
placed with ―D2: Civil Society, Local Authorities‖. The organisational structures are still in 
transition, but by September 2011 only one permanent staff member was designated full time 
to work on ―decentralisation‖. The mandate is still very wide and includes policy, 
management and quality support. This includes missions to countries where the delegations 
are in critical stages of programme formulation and general guidance to work on the topic in 
all delegations. Further, participation in global donor networks for information sharing and 
donor harmonisation are also in the scope of tasks. The organisational restructuring has thus 
led to a decrease of staff resources dedicated to ―decentralisation‖. The new structure also 
seems to place particular emphasis on the thematic funding instrument ―Civil Society and 
Local Authorities‖ rather than anchoring decentralisation clearly within a theme of ―state 
reform or public sector reform‖. 
2.1.4 Ind2.1.4 - Existence of institutional incentives (e.g. space for risk-taking and 
innovative actions) or disincentives to effective and efficient action in the field 
of decentralisation (e.g. the possible negative effect of disbursement 
pressures). 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
ECDPM‘s consultations in 2006 indicated that staff in EUDs clearly requested incentives ―to 
take risks and adopt a learning-by-doing approach‖45. In the web survey, only 14% of the 
respondents consider that ―the institutional environment within the EC allow space for risk-
taking and innovative actions in the field of decentralisation in your country‖. The 
underlying reasons for this assessment are further discussed below.  
Incentives to innovate are few. Specifically with regards to support for decentralisation 
reforms it can be observed that EUDs generally takes the position that any choices of 
reforms must remain an issue of national sovereignty and recognise the significant political 
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sensitivities involved. Models of decentralisation are diverse and contrarily to other 
governance reforms there is less consensus on ―good practices‖ (e.g. wide consensus on 
desirability of national elected parliaments, on systems of multi party democracy, the 
universality of Human rights etc). Decentralisation reforms is also on various levels , in 
particular in relation to fiscal aspects of reforms, considered to be very technical and EUDs 
frequently feels that other DPs are better suited to take lead. Consequently risks regarding 
spearheading DP work in support of decentralisation reforms are rarely taken in sample 
countries of the survey. In addition it can be noted that many EUD staff feel that they work 
under significant pressure with limited time and resources to ―think strategically‖.  
Figure 6 Extent to what EC allows for space for risk-taking and innovative actions in 
the field of decentralisation in your country 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
Staff of the EUDs indicates that in general there is limited room of manoeuvre, although 
reasons differ substantially, e.g.: 
 Some countries find that decentralisation reforms are fairly well established and that 
the EUD‘s sole option is to join existing (basket or similar funded) national programs: 
this is the case in e.g. Tanzania, and to a certain extent Peru, Madagascar and Benin. 
 Other countries are facing almost the opposite situation as decentralisation reforms in 
their countries are at such an early stage and government direction to reforms is 
almost non-existent. Therefore only more traditional project support for local capacity 
building is perceived as a possible way of support (e.g. Lebanon). 
 Some countries find the exploration of ―innovative strategies ―too (politically) 
sensitive‖ (DRC) or too demanding in terms of internal capacities within the EUDs. 
 Several EUDs point out that the internal assessment procedures of EUD performance 
and staff performance place emphasis on issues like disbursement, ―EU visibility‖, 
general program delivery and progress on aid harmonisation. Only so far as work on 
decentralisation reforms ―scores‖ on those mentioned criteria, work on the sector 
carry incentives for both the EUDs as well as individual staff.  
 A high number of EUDs also finds the EC procedures to be a constraining factor 
(Guatemala: In general, the EC does not promote risk-taking because of, amongst 
others, strict procedures and disbursement pressures) – see also box from PNG 
below. 
The perception of a rigidity of contractual and financial procedures is illustrated by the 
Papua New Guinea Survey response: ―For instance, an important component of the 
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programme consists in grants to district administrations. The Call for Proposals modality is 
extremely complex in a poor-capacity environment such as PNG. In addition, it is impossibe 
to use local audit/accounting/reporting/procurement systems, even in provinces, which are 
rather well performing, as it is very badly perceived, particularly since another main donor, 
AusAid, resort to local systems when they are performing‖46. 
The only EUD in the survey that really stands out as being comfortable with taken a clear 
innovative and risk taking role is Mali: ―Decentralisation is essentially a process of long-
term reform that allows for experimentation, to implement the powers transferred in 
connection with the devolution of the state, to contribute to the fight against poverty and 
promote the regional and local economic development. The use of sector budget support for 
sectoral policies in support of decentralisation, the challenge of regional economic 
development and local support for centres of regional development and urban development 
of cities are important innovations in this area‖47. 
In the Philippines, concerns over lack of opportunities for “strategic thinking” have been 
highlighted: ―The EUD has been encouraged by HQ to focus on fewer areas – the 
prioritisation of Health was encouraged from HQ. Significant support to decentralisation 
“outside” the sector is not encouraged beyond what can be managed by smaller 
interventions like the SPF. Several staff members felt that time wasn't sufficient for “strategic 
thinking” – but that “innovation” certainly was welcomed – disbursement pressure was e.g. 
not considered an impediment.” 
2.2 JC2.2 The EC has adequately adapted the staffing levels required to deal 
with governance and decentralisation issues 
Main findings at JC level 
Overall, the findings from the desk and the field phases indicate that human resources in 
EUDs and HQ dedicated specifically to decentralisation and local governance are scarce. 
Staff in EC Headquarters dealing specifically with decentralisation increased during the 
evaluation period to three to four persons within E4. However, with the recent reorganisation 
(2011) it has been dramatically reduced to only one person. In addition a number of persons 
were during the latter part of the evaluation period assigned as ―focal points‖ within offices 
working on geographic coordination such as AIDCO B1, C1 and D1.  
The results of the survey indicate that staff resources in EUDs assigned to work on 
decentralisation issues have increased over the evaluation period. Overall levels of staffing 
were however still modest. Furthermore the assigned staff has rarely been more than one 
person in the EUD, with limited time dedicated to these issues (e.g. in Honduras, Mali, Peru, 
the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Tanzania). Fieldwork highlighted that staff 
resources dealing with decentralisation issues were higher in Benin and in Lebanon. 
Staff within EC has a variety of backgrounds and many have worked with various forms of 
public sector reforms where decentralisation has featured as an element. However, the field 
visit to Philippines confirmed the fact that knowledge of decentralisation issues did not 
feature as significant elements in staff recruitment. 
The EUD survey indicated that the vast majority of responsible staff was acquainted with the 
2007 reference document, but only few were aware of other relevant EU documentation. 
Staff had generally not been exposed to in-depth technical knowledge of specialised areas of 
decentralising reforms. Staff in EUDs have frequently made significant efforts to acquaint 
themselves with the specific local government systems and decentralisation reforms in their 
countries off work. Overall, a good knowledge on decentralisation issues has been found in a 
number of countries visited (e.g. in Benin, Mali, Peru, Rwanda and South Africa). However, 
the consequence of EUD staff turnover on institutional knowledge has been underlined in 
South Africa, Honduras and Sierra Leone. Systems for ―handing over‖ knowledge on 
decentralisation reforms to new staff in EUDs appeared rather informal. 
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Since 2006, Aidco E4 has arranged, together with the European Centre for Development 
Policy Management (ECDPM) approximately one major training event per year on 
decentralisation reforms. The content of the training has been participatory and participants 
are encouraged to use their own experiences. The reference document (EC 2007) has been 
a key resource used in all of these training events. Interviews with staff that have attended 
the courses, the results of internal training evaluations as well as field visits in Mali, Lebanon, 
the Philippines and Rwanda, indicate a positive assessment by participants. According to the 
survey to EUDs, around 30% of the staff dealing with decentralisation attended such 
training., meaning that still70% of staff directly involved in management of decentralisation 
programmes did not attend such training, as confirmed in Honduras, Peru, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa and Tanzania.  
In addition to the training courses conducted by Aidco-E4, decentralisation also figures as 
minor elements of training courses conducted by other units. The training conducted to date 
has given participants a broad introduction to the topic. E4‘s own assessment of the training 
conducted to date is positive, but they also see the need to focus in future trainings more on 
operational aspects of EC work by using diagnostic tools and linking them to aid modalities, 
project/programme cycle management and instruments. 
2.2.1 Ind2.2.1 - Availability of adequate human resources in EUDs and HQs to deal 
specifically with decentralisation and local governance  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The web survey to 22 EUDs indicates that increasing staff resources are allocated to work on 
support of decentralisation: the number of EUDs having assigned at least one person to work 
on decentralisation increased from 47% to 83% over the evaluation period. However, the 
responsibility for decentralisation is typically managed by one person who also is responsible 
for a number of other issues (governance and sector issues). Assigned staff will rarely spend 
more than 25% of their time on decentralisation issues. Only in two EUDs it was indicated 
that one person would spend more than 75% of his/her time on decentralisation issues. The 
allocation of staff resources at EUD level for decentralisation issues is thus modest – but 
nevertheless the survey also indicates an increase in staff allocation over time.  
Table 6 Internal resources for decentralisation at Delegations 
Period Yes  No 
In the period 2000-2006 11 55 % 9 45 % 
In the period 2007-2009 18 86 % 3 14 % 
Staff in EC Headquarters dealing specifically with decentralisation increased during the 
evaluation period to three-four persons within E4. However, with the recent reorganisation it 
has been dramatically reduced to only one person (see indicator 2.1.3).  
In addition, a number of persons were during the latter part of the evaluation period assigned 
as ―focal points‖ within units working on geographic coordination such as AIDCO B1, C1 and 
D1. However, responsibilities of ―focal points‖ have been vaguely defined and their activities 
mainly based on personal interest rather than clear organisational guidance.  
It has been confirmed by the fieldwork that human resources in EUDs and HQ dedicated 
specifically to decentralisation and local governance are scarce. Most of the time, there is 
only one person assigned to decentralisation in the EUD, with limited time dedicated to these 
issues: 
 In Honduras, one person in the delegation is in charge of decentralisation and only 
limited time (10%-20%) is dedicated to this area. Staff member in the EUD express 
that it is difficult to get adequate support from the EC HQ. The EUD has recently 
communicated with the EU HQ on decentralisation approaches via personal contacts 
about the prolongation of PROADES – but the HQ has not been able to guide the 
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EUD on new and better indicators for the development in decentralisation in 
Honduras48.  
 In Mali, only one person is in charge of decentralisation (covering the monitoring of 
the policy of decentralisation and the state reform, the management of related 
projects, the coordination with donors and the dialogue in this sector). Tasks are 
carried out in a context of heavy workload and only possible through a strong 
personal commitment. 
 In Peru, one person in the EUD is responsible for decentralisation – less than 25% 
of her time is spent on decentralisation. Before 2007, more time was spent i.e. up to 
50% as the EUD at that time was dealing with a specific programme (AGORAH). 
Another two/three persons deal with the programme for non state actors and local 
authorities (NSA-LA); they mainly spend time on the evaluation of project applications 
and monitoring (about six projects with local or regional governments are 
implemented currently but these persons are in charge of many other projects 
involving Non State Actors in a variety of sectors).  
 In the Philippines, within the EUD in the Philippines there is not one person 
designated to 100% to work on ―decentralisation‖, but several staff members work 
with the health sector programme. Three persons are significantly involved in work on 
institutional and finance issues of the health sector programme just as one staff 
member working on governance spent significant time in projects working in support 
of local governance/ decentralisation (the SPF).  
 In Rwanda, the EUD has had throughout the last 5-6 years a number of staff dealing 
with rural development, PFM and Governance issues. In the last 1½ year one person 
has been dedicated to decentralisation issues.  
 In Sierra Leone, the EUD has no specific unit dealing with decentralisation – this is 
done by an individual. The present staff member with responsibilities for 
decentralisation started in 2011 and since the former decentralisation staff member 
left in early 2010, no staff member has been fully responsible for decentralisation 
during that time. The EUD‘s human resources are too scarce to follow the IRCBP 
closely and once funding is provided to the WB managed trust funds, the EUD has 
decided not to follow-up the day-to-day implementation of the fund.  
 In Tanzania, the EUD decided around 2005 to assign the responsibility for 
―decentralisation‖ to a junior programme officer.  
In a few cases, staff resources specifically dealing with decentralisation issues are higher: 
 In Benin, the Governance portfolio is important to the EUD and support to DLG issues 
have increased over the evaluation period. Accordingly, the EUD has dedicated more 
staff resources to DLG over the period with 1 full time workforce from 2006 onwards 
and now 1.5 full-time-employee. The EUD-DLG focal point has been lead donor for 
several years over the evaluation period and appreciated by stakeholders. Some of 
the staff in the EUD have attended trainings/workshops for DLG issues offered by the 
EC in 2007/8. 
 In Lebanon, support to decentralisation is managed by the section ―Infrastructure and 
Local Development‖ with one head of section and two programme officers and is in 
this manner relatively well staffed. 
2.2.2 Ind2.2.2 - Overall knowledge and capacity of staff about different dimensions of 
decentralisation 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Staff members within EC have a variety of backgrounds and many have worked with various 
forms of public sector reforms where decentralisation has featured as an element. However, 
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knowledge of decentralisation issues does not feature as significant elements in staff 
recruitment and systematic training of staff on decentralisation issues is also only 
undertaken at modest levels (see section 2.2.4). 
The field visit to Philippines confirmss the fact that knowledge of decentralisation issues does 
not feature as a significant elements in staff recruitment: 
 Staff within the EUD Philippines, have been recruited according to their knowledge og 
the Philippines local government system and related local governance issues, 
institutional and finance issues as these issues were widely recognised to be of key 
importance to e.g. the health sector reform programme. However, staff had not 
explicitly been recruited on the basis of knowledge or expertise in local government 
reforms or decentralisation issues. In contrast, staff has recently been recruited with 
PFM expertise. 
Staff felt that internal EC resources and knowledge on decentralisation issues are 
very weak: ―We would don't know who to ask in HQ on decentralisation – now the 
health specialist for Asia has also left… Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World 
Bank (WB) are much better equipped with knowledge and can more easily engage 
various studies – they have therefore accumulated significant insight into 
decentralisation reforms over they years – we draw on their knowledge in the sector 
working group‖. 
The various focal points in headquarters and at EUDs are not required to have specific prior 
knowledge about decentralisation issues, just as some interviewed focal points had not yet 
undergone basic training (in programmes discussed in section 2.2.4) or even having 
acquainted themselves with the EC Reference Document on Decentralisation and Local 
Governance.  
The staff at HQ level expected to provide expert guidance on decentralisation issues have 
not directly been recruited on the basis on such expertise. 
The survey among the 22 EUDs indicate that the vast majority of responsible staff are 
acquainted with the 2007 reference document, but only few are aware of e.g. the 
decentralisation programming fiche (see figures below). Only 50% of the staff acquainted 
with the 2007 Reference document find it really useful (50% consider its usefulness as low or 
relatively low). The few who have been acquainted with the 2009 programming fiche 
consider it relatively more useful.  
Staff member in delegations frequently make significant efforts to acquaint themselves with 
the knowledge on the specific local government systems and decentralisation reforms in the 
countries where they work. However, systems for “handing over” knowledge on 
decentralisation reforms to new staff in delegations appear rather informal. 
Figure 7 Perceived usefulness of the 2007 reference document49 (EUD survey) 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
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Figure 8 Perceived usefulness of the 2009 programming fiche (EUD survey) 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
Overall, a good knowledge on decentralisation and local development issues has been found 
in a number of countries visited: 
 In Benin, the overall knowledge and capacity of the staff in terms of DLG issues is 
excellent and staff members have played a major role in the last 3-4 years in 
coordination and harmonisation of activities. Recent additional staff resources have 
bolstered the DLG section under the Governance umbrella. 
 In Mali, the person in charge has the necessary skills and has developed real 
expertise/ know-how through the implementation of various programmes and the 
leadership role among Development Partners (DPs). 
 In Peru, the staff member responsible for decentralisation has good knowledge of 
the issue by a long experience in decentralisation in Peru including in the EUD since 
2006. She participates in the ―Mesa de Descentralización‖ (the decentralisation group 
of the donors).  
 In Rwanda, various meetings with the delegation staff dealing with decentralisation, 
rural development and PFM issues showed that they have an active team with 
many staff with knowledge of the issues relating to DLG. The issue of local PFM 
problems and relating to the decentralisation reform process were discussed actively 
in the group. 
 In South Africa, there seems to be good knowledge and understanding of local 
development issues of the staff met. During the evaluation period a number of staff in 
the EUD have been occupied with rural development projects, area based municipal 
projects, LED projects and capacity building projects all focusing on the local levels. 
However, the Government has never had an overall support programme for 
decentralisation, as it is a sensitive area and one jealously guarded from too much 
donor influence. This means that the EUD has first and foremost concentrated on 
LED as a vehicle for local development.  
However, the consequence of EUD staff turnover on institutional knowledge has been 
underlined several times: 
 In the case of South Africa, the EUD has had a number of staff dealing with LED and 
local development over the period – maybe 2-3 at any given time. The turnover of 
EUD staffs every two or three years means that institutional knowledge is not always 
retained. 
 In Honduras, the responsible person has achieved knowledge about decentralisation 
during the 4-5 years he has been in charge of decentralisation in the EUD. Other 
development partners expressed the risk of the EUD losing the capacity for 
decentralisation, once the person in charge with decentralisation leaves the EUD.  
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 In Sierra Leone, the staff members in the EUD have only limited knowledge about 
decentralisation support programmes, their design and functioning. When the former 
staff member with responsibilities for decentralisation, who had gained capacity on 
decentralisation by working with the WB missions and the IRCBP, left in 2010, 
knowledge was lost and the EU Delegation needs now to build up the knowledge 
about decentralisation again. 
2.2.3 Ind2.2.3 - Availability and use of training opportunities related to 
decentralisation issues 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Several training opportunities related to decentralisation issues exist for EC staff members. 
The development of a reference document50 marked the start of EC‘s efforts to strengthen 
EC staff capabilities on this topic. The reference document was in itself developed in a highly 
participatory manner involving EUDs, headquarters‘ units, other donor agencies and (to a 
lesser extent) various local actors. The European Centre for Development Policy 
Management (ECDPM) was in charge of the development of this reference document and 
has since then been the sole provider of training to the EC on decentralisation issues (as 
conducted by Aidco E4). 
The completion of the reference document included a workshop for EUD staff held in 
Brussels 4-6th October 2006 (representatives from 18 countries and HQ staff were present). 
Since then, another six major training/workshop events have been conducted for similar 
audiences by ECDPM – the details are summarised in Table 7: approximately two events per 
year each over 3-5 days and with approximately 35 participants. The contents of the training 
are participatory meaning that participants are encouraged to use their own experiences. 
Furthermore, the reference document (EC 2007) is a key resource used in all of these 
training events. Additional EC notes on sector specific decentralisation issues are under 
development by Aidco E3 and E6 for selected sectors, such as education (concept note), 
health (concept note) and environmental sectors (reference document on Environmental 
SWAPs). These notes may in future be used for training interventions.  
In addition to these training courses conducted by Aidco E4, decentralisation also feature as 
minor elements of training courses conducted by other units, e.g. a PFM training course and 
training conducted by Aidco E3 Social Protection. 
From 2010 on, the EC has sought to undertake such training as a collaborative effort with 
other Development Partners. From January 24th to 28th 2011 the first pilot training course on 
Harmonisation, Decentralisation and local governance took place in Brussels hosted by the 
EC (DG DEVCO). This initiative of the Development Partner Working Group on Local 
Governance and Decentralisation (DPWG-LGD) was born in 2008 in order to use a joint 
training tool as an instrument to move towards a more harmonised approach on 
decentralisation and local governance amongst DPs. The course is based on the DPWG-
LGD general and specific guiding principles and builds on literature and case studies as well 
as on the experiences of the participants themselves.51 
The training conducted to date has given participants a broad introduction to the topic and 
orientation to issues are presented in the EC 2007 reference document. The background 
knowledge of participants has varied (as indicated in the table). 
The Unit E4's own assessment of the trainings conducted to date is positive, but they also 
see the need to focus future interventions more on operational aspects of EC work by using 
diagnostic tools and linking them to aid modalities, project/programme cycle management 
and instruments, as well as increased integration of  in-depth technical issues related to 
fiscal decentralisation. 
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Table 7 AidCo E4 Commissioned Staff Training on Decentralisation Issues52  
N. Name of training Length Place and 
date 
N. of participants Target group / participants Language 
1 Atelier régional d‘échange 
d‘informations, d‘expériences et 
de réflexions sur la thématique de 
la décentralisation et du 
développement local en Afrique 
de l‘Ouest 
3 days Bamako (Mali) 
November 
2007  
 27 participants, all of 
them from EuropeAid 
or Delegations 
Permanent and contractual staff of EUDs in Africa, some 
representatives of MS implementation agencies working on 
decentralisation in Mali, selected technical assistants involved in 
the implementation of programmes, all participants were experts 
in decentralisation (sound knowledge)  
FR 
2 Descentralización, gobernanza 
local y desarrollo local en 
América Latina 
3 days Managua 
(Nicaragua) 
October 2007 
34 participants: 12 
nationals 19 from 
EuropeAid or 
Delegations, 2 from 
UNDP 
Permanent and contractual staff of EUDs in Latin America, some 
representatives of MS implementation agencies working on 
decentralisation in Nicaragua, selected technical assistants 
(government and private sector) involved in the implementation of 
programmes  
SP 
3 Séminaire sur la décentralisation 
et la gouvernance locale 
5 days Brussels 
(Belgium) 
 
July 2009 
38 participants, all of 
them EuropeAid or 
EUDs 
Mainly permanent staff of EUDs (heads of units, advisors dealing 
with governance), some contractual staff from EUDs, 1 
representative of InWEnt, no representatives from MS, beginners 
and experts in decentralisation. 
Most sessions 
in FR, some 
material in EN 
4 Developing and implementing 
social sector programmes in Asia 
and Central Asia in a 
decentralized context 
5 days Kathmandu 
(Nepal) 
September 
2009 
23 participants, all of 
them EuropeAid or 
EUDs 
Mainly sector experts from EUDs in Africa and some from HQ EN 
5 Workshop on budget support 5 days Burkina Faso) 
March 2010 
Around 35 Permanent and contractual staff of EUDs dealing with macro-
economic issues and budget support  
FR 
6 Workshop on themes of 
relevance to the aid modality of 
budget support 
5 days Indonesia 
September 
2010  
n.a. Permanent and contractual staff of EUDs dealing with macro-
economic issues and budget support 
EN 
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 Based on information from ECPDM December 2010, interviews and email communication. 
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Interviews with staff members having attended the courses and the results of the internal 
training evaluations indicate a positive assessment by participants and confirming that the 
training was relevant and of high quality.  
Figure 9 Perceived usefulness of training on decentralisation (EUD survey) 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
The field visits also  confirm a rather positive assessment of staff who attended training on 
decentralisation issues: 
 In Mali, EUD Mali staff has participated in two workshops out of three organised by 
the EC headquarters on decentralisation. These workshops are considered very 
useful in terms of exchanges of experiences between programme managers from 
different EUDs. 
 In Lebanon, staff had sought on their own initiative to orient themselves in 
understanding of the ―local governance sector‖. Some staff members have made use 
of the ―decentralisation training course‖ and found it ―useful” although not of 
immediate operational use. 
 In the Philippines, one staff member had participated in training (January 2011) on 
decentralisation issues and found it ―interesting” but also “a bit too general‖. In 
contrast, staff found it more useful to gain insight into various models for performance 
based grant systems – it was felt that in particular Australian Aid and WB have been 
useful to disseminate relevant experiences. ―The support from Brussels on 
decentralisation issues has in general not been so useful – this can be contrasted 
with Brussels support to Budget Support modalities where lots of useful inputs have 
been received. It was noted that within budget support seminars brief mentioning on 
local government/ decentralisation issues were made – but not in manner that was of 
direct operational relevance in the Philippines‖. 
 In Rwanda, it was not clear how many of the staff had attended training in 
decentralisation related issues but some had been involved in the earlier forum on the 
Internet (2006) and found it an interesting exercise with good overall discussions.  
The online survey indicates that training in decentralisation has been well appreciated by the 
respondents, and a reasonable number (30%) have participated in such events. For 
instance, in Benin, the field visit shows that training opportunities have been used in the past 
as well as wider participation in dialogues and regional workshops with headquarters. 
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Table 8 Training opportunities related to decentralisation at the EUDs (EUD survey) 
Answer 
Number of 
answers 
% 
Was available but wasn't used 4 20 % 
Was available and used 6 30 % 
Was not available 8 40 % 
Do not know 2 10 % 
It should however be noted that the number of staff that have NOT attended training is very 
high (70%) in the view of the fact that all the respondents supposedly are the EUD‘s main 
focal point for support to decentralisation and local governance issues in their respective 
countries. This has been confirmed by the field visits: 
 In Honduras, an event was arranged in Brussels in June 2009 for EUD staff with 
responsibilities for decentralisation. The EUD in Honduras could however not 
participate at the event due to the Coup in Honduras during the same month and the 
necessity to redefine activities. 
 In Peru, the EUD staff has not participated in any particular training on 
decentralisation. They plan to participate in a regional EC training on budget support 
or a similar training, which might also relate to decentralisation.  
 In Sierra Leone, the present and former staff members with responsibilities for 
decentralisation in the EUD have not received specific straining on decentrali-
sation53 – it is a learning-by-doing process. Nor have other staff members in the EUD. 
 In South Africa, none of the staff met had had any training in DLG issues and they 
had no information on this issue of the staff pre-2008/9 when they joined the EUD in 
South Africa. 
 In Tanzania, staff had not participated in the EC courses on decentralisation issues 
– but reform issues in Tanzania were probably also of a more advanced nature than 
what EC courses could offer (with need for staff for more in-depth exposure to details 
of e.g. LG fiscal decentralisation issues). 
2.3 JC2.3 Improved framework for monitoring and internalisation of 
experience related to EC support to decentralisation  
Main findings at JC level 
EC support to decentralisation is generally monitored at project/programme level using the 
ROM system. ROM reports focus on the degree of achievement of specific project objectives 
and are generally considered by EUD staff as ―not bringing significant new insights‖, but are 
―useful in dialogue with HQ in particular when discussion f programme adjustments‖; the 
level of details in ROM reports on qualitative aspects of wider decentralisation reforms is very 
limited. The M&E systems applied internally in programmes were criticised by some national 
stakeholders for being overly concerned with “implementation and disbursements according 
to time schedules rather than the substance of the work‖. 
In Honduras, Tanzania and South Africa, the M&E of decentralisation and local governance 
is also present in the framework of general budget support or basket funding. At sector 
level, the M&E has been organised via sectoral working groups and annual sector reviews in 
Benin, Rwanda, South Africa and the Philippines. Country specific analyses of wider political 
processes and development of the decentralisation reforms are typically reviewed as part of 
various joint Government-Donor assessments. The quality of these assessments varies and 
is, not surprisingly, most comprehensive and regular in those countries, in which an 
extensive reform programme has been put in place by the national government.  
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 The EUD staff had not participated in capacity building for sectors either. All EUD staff members agreed that it 
is a learning-by-doing experience within the sectors and decentralisation.  
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Staff in EUDs make a rather self-critical assessment in the survey regarding the extent to 
which EUDs find that systems are in place for ―building up the institutional memory on work 
with decentralisation and local governance‖. 65% find that such systems are not in place. 
Staffs in the EUDs are in particular critical about the capacities at HQ level to adequate ly 
monitor. However, HQ has initiated a number of initiatives aiming at learning from 
decentralisation support initiatives, including: 
 Local government participation in ACP-EC cooperation (ACP-LG, 2005). 
 Thematic Evaluation of EC Support to Good Governance‖54. 
 A decentralisation discussion group (D-group) launched in April 2006 by the 
EuropeAid with the aim of reviewing experiences, challenges and realities of EC 
support to 20 countries in decentralisation and local governance.  
 The 2007 SDLG reference document that gave a qualitative (self-) assessment of key 
lessons from experiences with decentralisation for the period 2000-2006.  
The EC has since 2006 increasingly sought to work through the “Development Partners 
Working Group on Local Governance and Decentralisation (DPWG-LGD)‖ that was 
established as a joint DP initiative in recognition of the prominent role these issues play in 
overall Public Sector Reforms and Poverty Reduction Strategy processes in many 
developing countries. A first planning Workshop took place in 2006 at KfW Headquarters, as 
a joint initiative with the European Commission. The objective of the group was to promote 
strategy coherence and harmonisation among development partners in order to improve the 
effectiveness of local governance and decentralisation operations. Meetings are attended by 
an increasing number of DPs (both EU member states as well as non-EU member states). 
The group has undertaken various joint assessments of experiences and seems to provide a 
constructive way forward for both joint learning/monitoring as well as harmonisation.  
However, active participation of the EC is increasingly constrained by lack of ―expert cadres‖ 
in the field of decentralisation. At present it is difficult to identify one particular office within 
the EC structures that can act as ―driver of change‖.  
2.3.1 Ind2.3.1 - Existence and quality of monitoring & evaluation tools and processes 
in relation to results and impact achieved with decentralised strategies and 
programmes  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The EC has since 2005 undertaken several activities to generate lessons from its support to 
decentralisation.  
In 2005 ACP-LG study55 was completed presenting a range of initiatives carried out during 
this period and clustered in 5 main categories: 
 Support to local development; 
 Support to the decentralisation process; 
 Decentralised cooperation under the Lomé Convention; 
 EC budget line on decentralised cooperation; 
 Strategic dialogue between the official parties and local government associations. 
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 EuropeAid, June 2006 
55
 ―Local government participation in ACP-EC cooperation - An initial assessment and prospective‖ (ACP-LG, 
2005). 
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Figure 10 The 5 clusters of EC support presented in the 2005 ACP-LG study 
  
Source: “Local government participation in ACP-EC cooperation” (ACP-LG, 2005) 
It is interesting to see that this first categorisation focusing on local authorities is very similar 
to the current one on decentralisation and local development. 
In 2006, EC/EuropeAid carried out a thematic evaluation of support to good governance56. 
The EC support to decentralisation was considered as one of the clusters of the support to 
good governance. The main findings of this evaluation on the issue of decentralisation and 
local governance are: 
 The need for ―a change of culture as well as new toolboxes‖ for EC support to be 
effective in the great variety of country contexts. 
 The critical importance of flexible management approaches (attuned to the often 
unpredictable nature of governance processes) as well as quick response capacities 
(allowing the EC to seize windows of opportunity). 
 The recognition of the efforts made in a significant number of countries to invest in 
decentralisation processes, either as an objective in itself or as a means to achieving 
wider objectives.  
 The role of local governments in these programmes, as service delivery agents and a 
catalyst for local development. 
 The identification of several push factors for decentralisation processes: (1) the 
engagement of partner countries in a form of decentralisation; (2) the recognition of 
the role of local governments; (3) the identification of effective approaches to 
sustainable local development; (4) the need for addressing different development 
dimensions with coherence and complementarity and with attention to the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
In April 2006, EuropeAid launched a decentralisation discussion group (D-group) with the 
aim to review EC decentralisation and local governance experiences, challenges and 
realities in its support to 20 countries. The underlying aim with the exercise was to come up 
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 ―Thematic Evaluation of EC Support to Good Governance‖ (EuropeAid, June 2006) 
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with a concept paper or operational guideline and to conduct a workshop on EC support to 
decentralisation and local governance in developing countries. The reason for this initiative 
was a growing need for guidelines on how best to engage in support of decentralisation and 
local governance at the country level. In 2007, a ―Reference Document on Supporting 
Decentralisation and Local Governance in Third Countries‖ was produced with the practical 
purpose to:57 
 Present the rationale for investing in decentralisation and local governance. 
 Address the conceptual confusion that often characterises the field of decentralisation 
and local governance. 
 Give a guide to the decentralisation arena, which is to see decentralisation as part of 
a wider ―system‖ of reforms, to address country specific context, to identify different 
actors for decentralisation. 
 Highlight challenges to identifying and formulating a proper EC response strategy. 
 Give the nuts and bolts necessary for proper implementation. 
 Deal with the issues of effective monitoring and evaluation of progress. 
 Identify the role of EuropeAid as an effective ―change agent‖ in decentralisation and 
local governance. 
The 2007 SDLG reference document presents a first overview on the characteristics of 
the financed programmes and their evolution overt  time: 
 A variety of policy objectives. Most EC support programmes seek to achieve a 
multiplicity of (interlinked) objectives. However, in essence two major motivations 
stand central: (i) poverty reduction through improved social service delivery and (ii) 
governance reforms. 
 A relatively high variety of possible ―entry points‖. EC support is provided under 
different umbrellas or ―entry points‖. Sometimes the support is provided under the 
label ―policy support to decentralisation‖ or under the broader concept of ―good 
governance‖. In other cases, it is focused on ―decentralisation of services‖, integrated 
into ―rural development‖ or specified as ―urban management‖. In several countries, 
one finds a combination of entry points to the subject (e.g. ―local governance‖ and 
―support to decentralisation in specific sectors‖), targeting a diversity of actors (central 
government agencies and local governments, as well as their associations and civil 
society). 
 Entry points evolve over time. In several countries, EC approaches to supporting 
decentralisation and local governance have gradually become more sophisticated as 
decentralisation processes have advanced and the EC has learned from experience. 
In some countries support has evolved from pilot projects and micro-project 
programmes in local development (7th and 8th EDF) to programme support to 
decentralisation (8th and 9th EDF), while the ongoing programming process (10th 
EDF) considers the use of budget support modalities for decentralisation and local 
governance. 
 Alignment of EC support to national agendas can be tricky. The European 
Commission quite consistently seeks to align its support to national (PRSP) agendas, 
including when it uses project/programme approaches. This works rather well in 
countries displaying a genuine commitment to decentralise. In most countries, 
however, alignment is not evident, either because a national decentralisation strategy 
is missing, emerging, blocked or not truly supported by the political and administrative 
elites. 
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 This document provides a lot of valuable information and analyses on processes supporting decentralisation 
and local governance. This document has been thoroughly used in our report and referred to as the ―2007 SDLG 
reference document‖. 
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 Strategic versus piecemeal approaches. Desk analysis of existing support 
programmes reveals that some EC strategies are well conceived and properly 
coordinated. In other countries, assistance is less comprehensive and appears 
somehow more fragmented. 
 Diversity of support modalities. Some countries display a well-considered mix of 
modalities to feed strategically into partner country‘s development processes. In other 
cases, this mix is not evident or clear.‖ 
The 2007 SDLG reference document provided inter alia the following key lessons from 
experiences with decentralisation for the period 2000-2006: 
 Lesson 1: Politics is central to the process. Decentralisation and local governance 
are profoundly political processes. They touch upon the core foundations of a polity 
and a society, relate to the distribution of power and control of (scarce) development 
resources and are at the heart of the accountability system for delivering essential 
services to populations. Engaging with decentralisation then requires a fairly 
sophisticated capacity to deal with the politics of such a transformation process. 
 Lesson 2: Commitment for reform is a key question. In some countries, a major gap 
is observed between stated policies on decentralisation reforms and commitment to 
their effective implementation. In some cases one can even speak of ‗virtual‘ 
decentralisation processes. This limits the role and influence of donors in advancing 
reforms. Experience shows how difficult it is to influence the deep structures and 
norms in society, which are instrumental in perpetuating inequitable power relations. 
 Lesson 3: There are no ready-made blueprints. A wide range of variables determines 
the extent, pace and consequences of decentralisation, as well as the effectiveness 
of external support to these processes. The same degree of decentralisation is not 
uniformly desirable across, or even necessarily within, countries or sectors. This puts 
a premium on the elaboration of customised and well-sequenced intervention 
strategies. 
 Lesson 4: The knowledge base is relatively thin. There is a great deal that we do not 
know about decentralisation. Evidence of impact and benefits (in terms of improved 
efficiency, governance, equity, development and poverty reduction) is still 
fragmentary. The growing body of multidisciplinary research on various aspects of 
decentralisation (e.g. the link with poverty-reduction strategies) shows a mixed picture 
of the potentials and possible positive impacts of decentralisation processes. 
 Lesson 5: There are several universal requirements for effective decentralisation. 
Despite cross-country differences, there are several universal requirements for 
progress towards decentralisation: (i) some broad vision of what the decentralised 
system should be and what it is expected to accomplish over time, (ii) an initial 
framework that defines – in an adequate and enforceable way – key components of 
the system and the linkages among them and (iii) a pragmatic strategy for bringing 
the system into existence and for adjusting and supporting its evolution over time. 
That last requirement is often neglected, even though it is probably the most vital 
element of successful reform. 
According to the findings of the survey to EUDs, the majority (63%) of respondents felt that 
―resources allocated at HQ level for monitoring the effects of the EC support to 
decentralisation in the partner country‖ were inadequate, whereas around 41% argued for 
the same problems at EUD levels.  
With respect to resources for monitoring the effects of the EC support to decentralisation in 
the partner country, the EUDs assess the their own resources as more adequate than those 
of the HQ, with 60% of high or quite high assessment, as opposed to only 40% of the same 
assessment for HQ monitoring resources. 
Even though most EUD view the HQ resources as low or quite low for the task, some 
respondents at the EUDs note that they are not aware of the resources at the HQ level, or 
are not in a position to assess their adequacy. 
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While the adequacy of resources at the EUDs themselves is viewed more favourably in 
general, various insufficiencies, such as limited number and high turnover of staff or 
fragmentation of information between staff, are mentioned at the EUD level as well.  
Figure 11 Adequacy of Resources for monitoring of support to decentralisation, as 
perceived by the EUDs 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
The same critical self-assessment emerges from survey questions regarding the extent to 
which EUDs find that systems are in place for ―building up the institutional memory on work 
with decentralisation and local governance‖. 65% find that such systems are not in place.  
The survey indicates overall that the EUDs are unclear about the expected HQ support but 
also request stronger HQ support in these areas.  
Table 9 Systems for building up of the institutional memory 
Answer 
Number of 
answers 
% 
Yes 7 35 % 
No 13 65 % 
The fieldwork mostly confirmed that the ROM reporting has constituted the main monitoring 
tool at project/programme level, completed by evaluations and mid-term reviews: 
 In Honduras, the ROM reporting constitutes one M&E tool. According to the EUD, the 
ROM system is not able to cover programmes implemented in a SBS modality and 
from 2010, the ROM system will not be applied for SBS and GBS.  
 In Lebanon, the main emphasis on results oriented monitoring (ROM) and monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) systems for ongoing EC support to local development has been 
on the achievements of planned outputs/disbursement strictly related to the specific 
projects rather than wider monitoring / assessment of decentralisation/sector 
development. Many basic issues in the sector have during most of the evaluation 
period been poorly analysed in the sector generally: e.g. overall staffing capacities 
and the local government fiscal framework (the latter is recently well studied by MOIM 
2011 op.cit). More specifically, the EUD were criticized by some external observers 
familiar with the projects for being overly concerned with “implementation and 
disbursements according to time schedules rather than the substance of the work‖. 
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 In Peru, no specific monitoring instrument exists in the EU delegation. Almost all 
projects and programmes are monitored by the results oriented monitoring (ROM) 
system.  
 In the Philippines, programmes are generally monitored through ROM system. In the 
Philippines, various recent evaluations and mid-term reviews have been undertaken 
very recently, including a general Country Strategy Evaluation (2011). 
―Decentralisation issues‖ have in various ways and to a varying extent been analysed 
as part of these systems. In general it can be observed that ROM reports focus on the 
degree of achievement of specific project objectives and is generally considered by 
EUD staff as ―not bringing significant new insights‖, but ―useful in dialogue with HQ in 
particular when discussion of programme adjustments‖; the level of details in ROM 
reports is very limited. 
 In Mali, EC HQ organise a monitoring mission to Mali annually (or sometimes bi-
annually). A 2-page summary note is produced and is used as a framework of 
discussion between the EUD and HQ for the management of the programmes.  
 In Sierra Leone, there is no specific monitoring system for decentralisation within the 
EUD. Monitoring of the EU DCBP (which provides all its funds to the IRCBP) is done 
via the EC Result Oriented Monitoring (ROM) system. While the IRCBP is monitored 
with the aide memoires from the IRCBP implementation support missions and the 
progress reports from the IRCBP secretariat. These documents are read and 
archived in the EUD. The four projects financed by the budget line for Non 
government Organisations (NGOs) and local authorities are not monitored by the 
delegation.  
At sector level, the M&E has been organised via sectoral working groups and annual 
sector reviews in the following countries: 
 In Benin, the M&E of decentralisation and local governance is both present in the 
general budget support framework as well as in the sector. The annual sector review 
for DLG functions as the main M&E framework for monitoring progress within the 
national policy (PONADEC) and relates to issues of administrative, human resources 
and fiscal decentralisation at national, regional and local levels. Sectoral coordination 
is ensured within the Working Group. This Working Group is the natural forum for 
donor coordination and alignment of external support on national sectoral priorities. 
The dialogue culminates in the annual sectoral review of decentralisation and the 
joint review of the PRSP between the Government and donors (in June). In 2009 and 
2010, the EUD is leading development partners in the overall sector and therefore 
assumes responsibility for the secretariat. The presentations at the annual review by 
the Ministry (MDGLAAT) are fairly comprehensive in terms of giving the latest overall 
information on capacity building issues at LG level as well as fiscal decentralisation 
indicators and implementation over the past year. 
 In Rwanda, the decentralisation donors have through the working group developed 
an M&E system where key aspects of the DIP are monitored every year.  
 In South Africa, engagements with other donors have been frequent and at times 
more in-depth than at the moment; however, not in the Decentralisation Working 
Group but rather under the Governance Working Group. Therefore very little, if any, 
joint Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems have been implemented, and mainly 
M&E linked to individual donor supported projects/programmes.  
 In the Philippines, the sector-working group on decentralisation and local 
government has a general working plan and undertakes some general M&E of 
activities within the field. A Mid Term Policy Review of the health Sector has been 
conducted. The most detailed assessment of ―decentralisation issues‖ that brings 
significant new insights are found in the general health sector policy review and more 
specific decentralisation studies (primarily funded through ADB TA). 
In some countries visited, the M&E of decentralisation and local governance is also present 
in the framework of general budget support or basket funding: 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
51 
 In Honduras, the EC and GoH agreed on 5 indicators for the fixed tranches for 
PROADES and 9 indicators to calculate the release of the flexible tranches. The 
indicators are presented below: 
Table 10 Indicators for PROADES 
Indicator 
number 
Indicators for fixed trances (14 mEUR) Indicators for flexible tranches (18mEUR) 
1 Positive Evaluation by the EU of the macro-
economic, tax and budgetary environment in 
Honduras 
GOH expenditures on salaries relative to 
GNP 
2 Establishment of indicators and base line for 
monitoring the improvement in PFM 
The development partners view on the 
execution of the national PRSP  
3 Positive appreciation by the ―Foro Tripartito de 
Descentralizacion‖ of the implementation of 
PRODDEL  
Share of municipalities with a development 
plans with focus on territorial organization 
4 The Foro Tripartito de Descentralizacion 
(Decentralisation Forum) is functioning permanently 
in order to establish a dialogue between GoH, civil 
society and development partners 
Share of municipalities with a social audit 
carried out 
5 Establishment of a base line with the budget lines 
corresponding to the principal activities of PRODDEL 
with a 3 years projection considering two scenarios, 
with and without PRODDEL. The differences 
between the two would demonstrate a value added  
Positive view of CE for advances in public 
financial management 
6  Timely presentation of PRODDEL annual 
work plan 
7  The increase in local governments‘ revenue 
collection 
8  Share of municipalities audited by TSC 
9  GoH presentation of M&E for development 
in decentralisation 
Source: EUD  
As can be seen in the table above, indicators do not focus on the results (outputs or 
outcomes) of decentralisation. For the fixed tranches they deal with macro-economic and tax 
performance, the functioning of the Decentralisation Forum and are centred around setting 
up a rather advanced system for measuring PROADES‘ value added. The indicators for the 
flexible tranche are too many, not focused on decentralisation and oriented toward processes 
e.g. existence of municipal development plans and social municipal audits and subjective 
views on PRODDEL‘s annual work plans and the execution of the national PRSP58.  
For the fixed tranches the first and second were released, while the third and fourth were 
cancelled due to the macro-economic situation (indicator 1), while the variable tranches were 
released partly: 
                                               
58
Indicators for the SBS with more focus on results could be the municipalities‘ share of the total public 
expenditures and the size of the national transfers to municipalities.  
The GoH has promised a gradual increase in the transfers to municipalities to 11% of the central government‘s 
own revenues in 2014, which could be incorporated in new indicators.  
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Table 11 Releases from PROADES 
Tranches Budget 
mEUR 
Real mEUR 
Fixed tranche 1 4,0 4,0 
Fixed tranche 2 4,0 4,0 
Fixed tranche 3 3,0 0 
Variable tranche 1 7,0 4,55 
Variable tranche 2 7,0 3,85 
Variable tranche 3 4,0 0 
Total 32,0 16,4 
Source: SGJ and EU (2010); Evaluacion Global de PROADES. 
 In Tanzania, due to the nature of the direct support to decentralisation – a basket 
funding of a LG fiscal transfer system - the EUD relied on the commonly agreed 
(among all participating DPs and GoT) M&E system that was quite elaborated. This 
included the following feature, related to the LGDG support: 
 An elaborated system for annual benchmarking of all 114 LGs in areas 
such as PFM, planning, procurement, local accountability, and other ―good 
governance indicators‖59 – the results from these assessments were used to 
reward (and penalise) LGs with adjustments of their LGDG allocations – this 
provided a major incentive for LGs to improve their performance and gave a 
thorough overview of progress and challenges in building the capacities of the 
LGs,  
 Quarterly progress meetings held in the field (in one of the 21 regional 
HQs on a rotating basis) with the joint participation of key ministries (PMO-
RALG, Finance, Education, Health, Roads etc), LG officials and DPs, 
 Quarterly and annual progress reporting – reporting on progress compared 
to planned activities, expenditures compared to budgets etc, 
 External reviews of overall programme every three years, 
 External reviews of selected areas of concerns e.g. the annual 
assessment procedures, value for money audits, procurement audits. 
In addition, wider assessments of decentralisation reform issues took place annually 
(or bi-annually) in relation to review of the overall MKUKUTA (the national poverty 
reduction strategy) and in relation to the annual GBS reviews where decentralisation 
was one among several key areas to be assessed.  
EUD staff highlighted in particular the positive experiences with the quarterly LGDG 
progress meetings held in field; they provided a rare opportunity for staff to gain field 
experience with implementation of local government service delivery in a broad sense 
(and not only narrowly implementation of LGDG) and therefore relevant for e.g. GBS 
staff. There was no ROM reporting found of LGDG support in CRIS. 
 In South Africa, there is a common results framework and indicators under the 
General Budget Support (GBS). 
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 The manuals and annual results of the assessments is available at http://www.logintanzania.net/documents.htm  
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2.3.2 Ind2.3.2 - Existence of joint learning systems (across sectors, themes, 
countries and regions) or systems to ensure an institutional memory (e.g. 
exchange of information, working groups, issues papers…) 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The Development Partners Working Group on Local Governance and Decentralisation 
(DPWG-LGD) was established as a joint DP initiative in recognition of the prominent role that 
these issues play in overall Public Sector Reforms and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
processes in many developing countries. A first planning Workshop took place on the 26th of 
April, 2006 in Frankfurt at KfW Headquarters, as a joint initiative with the European 
Commission. The objective of the group was to promote strategy coherence and 
harmonisation in order to improve the effectiveness of local governance and decentralisation 
operations. To date, five meetings have taken place – the latest was held in Washington, DC 
in June 2010, the first hosted outside of Europe. Its aim was strengthening the dialogue with 
American based partners, in particular. 
Since its inception, membership of the DPWG has grown significantly.60 At its start in 2006, 
the group commissioned a desk study to generate a basic overview of DPs‘ support to 
decentralisation and local governance. The survey covered seven organisations,61 surveying 
each organisations‘ mandate in the area, the organisational structure, the approaches to 
decentralisation (including individual strategy papers), and specific country support. The 
findings of this initial study were presented and discussed during the second DP Workshop, 
which took place on in November 2006 in the premises of EuropeAid in Brussels. As a result 
of the Brussels meeting, the DP group decided to initiate a field study in four selected 
countries (Benin, Nepal, Nicaragua and Tanzania) in order to analyse DPs‘ practices of aid 
harmonisation and effectiveness in the context of national decentralisation programmes more 
thoroughly. The overall findings of this field study were presented to the DP Working Group 
and representatives of the case study countries in Berlin in September 2007.  
Since February 2008, the group has been supported by a Secretariat hosted by 
InWent/Germany, supported by the German Federal Ministry for Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ). At the meeting in Paris in 2008, the working group adopted a mode of 
operation emphasising the informal character of the group. During this meeting, the members 
also adopted the ―General Guiding Principles for Enhancing Alignment and Harmonisation on 
Local Governance and Decentralisation.‖ In 2009, the group focussed on the topics ‗Fiscal 
Decentralisation and Capacity Development‘ and presented desk studies with regards to 
these topics during the meeting in Bratislava (hosted by UNDP).  
The most recent topics discussed have been ―the political economy of decentralisation‖ 
where World Bank funded analyses have been shared among participants. 
The group has established a well organised website62 where key documents – both jointly 
prepared and papers prepared by individual members are shared. Since 2011, this forum 
also provides joint training for development partners on decentralisation issues.  
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2.3.3 Ind2.3.3 - Existence of "drivers of change" within the EC structures with a 
mandate to promote the effective implementation of decentralisation strategies 
and programmes 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The assessment from the desk review, interviews in HQ and EUDs is that EC support for 
decentralisation features as significant area of support in several EUDs, however core 
expertise has been limited to the assigned staff within AidCo E4.  
The mandate of AidCo E4 and its capacities to act as ―driver of change‖ was discussed 
earlier (indicator 2.1.3). It has gradually developed during the evaluation period, but the 
recent reorganisation has dispersed this emerging hub of knowledge.  
EUDs have in few countries only worked very proactively with larger programmes for support 
to decentralising (mainly Mali and Benin), but, as discussed earlier, the staff members that 
have build up certain expertise in support of decentralisation reforms will typically be 
assigned work in other parts of the organisation where such expertise may not be required. 
Thus no ―expert cadres‖ are established. At present it is difficult to identify one particular 
office within the EC structures that can act as ―driver of change‖.  
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3 EQ3: National context 
Evaluation Question 3: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes been 
conceived in the way that it is responsive to national contexts and aligned with national 
regulations and policies?  
3.1 JC3.1 The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have 
been aligned with national regulations and the partner Governments' 
priorities / activities 
Main findings at JC level 
The analysis carried out for the 22 countries selected for the desk analysis shows that 
virtually all CSPs (especially the ones from the second period) mention that the EC response 
strategy is aligned with the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or equivalent 
institutionalised documents. In some cases, the CSPs also explicitly make reference to the 
section on decentralisation of the relevant PRSP. The elements related to policy dialogue 
with the partner Government in the CSPs analysed remain however very general. Standard 
formats for analysis of decentralisation issues (as, for instance, presented in the 2009 
Country Programming Fiche referred to earlier) have not (yet) been consistently applied. 
Project financing agreements and other project documentation generally make relatively 
deeper analysis of partner Governments policies with respect to decentralisation. From 
the review it is made clear that all programmes have undertaken some analysis of 
government policies, strategies and operational procedures related to decentralisation 
reforms – although the quality and depth of analysis differs.  
The analysis is most straightforward in countries where an explicit decentralisation reform 
policy and strategy is in place (e.g. Tanzania, Mali, Benin etc), but naturally more challenging 
when the policy is either not in place (e.g. Kenya) or when the policy is unclear (e.g. 
Cambodia). While it can be noted that some political analysis has been undertaken, it must 
also be noted that the depth of the political analysis is limited. None of the EUDs has, for 
instance, undertaken an explicit ―political economy and governance analyses‖ of 
decentralisation reforms. This has earlier been undertaken by other donors (in particular 
World Bank, DfID, and selected other bilateral) and is now increasingly recognised as good 
practice – also by the EC63. Partly as a consequence of lack of such analyses, shifts in 
Government‘s orientations sometimes come as a surprise to the EC.  
An increasing number of EC interventions in support of decentralisation are in the form of 
Sector Budget Support (SBS) that by definition are using country financial management 
systems and national transfer systems to local governments.  
The EC supported interventions are also in several cases explicitly aiming at developing or 
improving the national transfer mechanism, this is for instance the case in Sierra Leone, 
Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Cambodia. This is done partly through SBS (e.g. Mali) but also 
as contributions to basket funds (e.g. Tanzania), UN funded projects (e.g. Cambodia) or 
World Bank Trust Funds (e.g. Sierra Leone). Therefore one cannot conclude that use of 
national systems and funding through local government grant systems is something 
exclusive of SBS support. 
In some cases it has been decided NOT to use national transfer systems but allocate funds 
in a project managed system, e.g. in the North of Uganda targeting selected local 
governments, in Kenya to transfer directly to ―communities‖, in Lebanon this applies to 
funding of local projects within individual or clusters of municipalities through project specific 
set-ups. In some specific projects, it has  been tried to transfer funds to local governments to 
be used for innovative modalities of Local Economic Development, such as for instance in 
South Africa. The effectiveness of the various arrangements to improve service delivery is 
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further discussed in EQ8, but generally it can be concluded that such project specific 
interventions have had various local benefits (e.g. in terms of local service delivery) but has 
not led to wider reforms of the relationship between central government and LGs. Moreover, 
some interventions are project interventions with clearly no major transfer mechanisms to 
local governments (supporting capacity building at central level, capacities of NGOs, etc) – 
this is for instance typically the case for all projects funded through the thematic budget line 
―Non State Actors and Local Authorities‖. 
The dialogue with government and other stakeholders has increased over the evaluation 
period. Essentially, two distinct phases of dialogue with government can be identified 
(Indicator 3.1.2):  
 The first phase relates to situations in which decentralisation is not a clear policy that 
has been adopted by the national government. In those cases, EUDs typically embark 
on various projects in support of ―bottom-up‖ development of local government that 
ultimately may inspire the Government to take a more explicit stand on 
decentralisation and local government reforms.  
 The second phase relates to countries with a declared decentralisation policy, where 
the dialogue takes a more structured approach. In most of these countries, EC 
support will be explicitly based on such declared government decentralisation 
strategies (with some exceptions, such as Uganda and Rwanda). Upon such 
formalisation, the quality of dialogue may improve in terms of intensity and clarity, but 
not necessarily in terms of ―cordiality‖.  
Although the conditions of dialogue on specific issues related to decentralisation have 
improved, it appears that the results of the dialogue are often mixed. In particular, there are 
a number of cases in which the EUDs express concerns about government commitment to 
implementing its declared decentralisation policies (which underpin larger sector 
programmes or even General Budget Support). Some of the concerns in the dialogue occur 
on repetitive basis without resolution and lack of appropriate agreed strategic actions.  
In addition to allocating adequate resources to engage in policy dialogue, it appears that two 
elements are critical for successful dialogue:  
1. the existence of active ―decentralisation sector working groups‖ and similar 
institutional arrangements for co-ordination of support among donors and government 
(see also EQ4);  
2. the quality and realism of a government‘s decentralisation reform programmes.  
3.1.1 Ind3.1.1 - Evidence of EC analysis of Government policies, strategies and 
operational procedures related to decentralisation reform, including 
assessment of risks and constraints.  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
EC project financing agreements and other project documentation generally make some 
analysis of partner governments' policies with respect to decentralisation. From the desk 
review, it is made clear that all programmes have undertaken some analysis of government 
policies, strategies and operational procedures related to decentralisation reforms – although 
the quality and depth of analysis differ. Standard formats for analysis of decentralisation 
issues (as, for instance, presented in the 2009 Country Programming Fiche referred to 
earlier) have not (yet) been consistently applied.  
The analysis is most straightforward in countries where an explicit decentralisation reform 
policy and strategy is in place (e.g. Tanzania, Mali, Benin, etc).  
The analysis is naturally more challenging where the national policy is either not in place 
(see Kenya case, Box 5 below) or unclear (see Cambodia case, Box 6 below).  
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Box 5 Assessments of policy opportunities and risks: Kenya 
“This 21 million GBP Rural Poverty Reduction and Local Government Support Programme 
(RPRLGSP) represents the main intervention in the focal area of rural development under the Kenya 
9th EDF NIP. The project seeks to support the Government of Kenya's efforts to reduce poverty 
through support to the demand side of decentralised governance (empowerment of communities) in 
addition to the supply side (institution building support to local government). 
The Local Government sector in Kenya, 'comprising 175 elected Local Authorities (LA), has been 
largely neglected for over twenty years with most service delivery responsibility and capacity 
progressively transferred to central government bodies. This centralised system has proved to be 
ineffective in delivering pro-poor services and suffers from lack of accountability. The Rural Poverty 
Reduction and Local Government Support Programme seeks to enhance the downward 
accountability of LAs by enriching the interaction between rural LAs (as service providers) and their 
communities (as clients). At the same time, an important result to be achieved through the 
implementation of this programme will be the lessons learned and support that can help further 
develop' the Government's evolving decentralisation policy.”  
Source: Kenya RPRLGSP Financing Agreement. 
Box 6 Assessment of policy opportunities and risks: Cambodia 
"At the policy level, the lack of a clear strategic vision (by Government of Cambodia) has had a 
negative impact on the implementation of the decentralisation and deconcentration process. The result 
has been a multiplicity and duplication of donor-driven actions that suggest that the donor coordination 
has not been optimal to-date.  
While the decentralisation process has achieved some results, the implementation of the 
deconcentration process has been adversely affected by the absence of appropriate legislation. An 
organic law, clarifying the roles and functions of the provincial and district administration, still remains 
to be adopted. In this context, projects are often undertaken in a moving environment, which makes it 
difficult to assure the long-term sustainability of the activities.  
In recent months, a number of initiatives have been taken to remedy some of these problems. In 
March 2004, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) established a Working Group tasked to draft 
a single strategic framework on decentralisation and deconcentration. In the same context, the donor 
community also set up a technical donor sub-working group to discuss common approaches and 
coordination modalities. The proposed EC measure, which will be implemented through a Contribution 
Agreement with UNDP, also contributes to this new spirit of coordination. The proposed measure will 
address the decentralisation process by focussing on the commune needs. Since the legislation is 
already in place at this level, the project will not suffer from further evolution of DD policy at the district 
and province level". 
Source: Proposal Strengthening democratic and decentralised local governance in Cambodia: building local 
capacity through networking and local-local cooperation (Asie/2004/16856) 
In several cases, it is practical experiences from recent years rather than general studies that 
inform EC on appropriate entry points for support to decentralisation. The case of Lebanon is 
informative: several years of project specific funding at local level had led to useful local 
projects but no broader reforms of service delivery mechanisms – this informed the design of 
a new programme that both delivers local projects and seeks to reform the overall 
government system of municipal finance.  
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Box 7 EC new project in support of municipal finance reform in Lebanon 
The EC is currently planning a new project in support of municipal finance reform – the formulation of 
the project was based on stocktaking of the past ten years experiences in support for local 
development and is summarised below.  
"The EC has been active in the last 10 years in the local governance sector and targeted unions or 
clusters of municipalities, giving them an active role in the management of their own grants. Major 
actions in the sector include, among others: 
 The Local Governance Project (LOGO), supports 12 Unions of Municipalities (UoMs) throughout 
Lebanon in the field of local development planning, capacity building and funds the 
implementation of priority local development projects. 
 The Local Development Programme in North Lebanon adopts a regional approach and focuses on 
poverty alleviation in the most vulnerable region of Lebanon. The programme will help local actors 
to diversify their economy and will initiate a land use planning approach at regional level. 
 The Economic and Social Fund for Development, has been supporting clusters of municipalities to 
address unemployment and poverty through grants for the implementation of projects (income 
generating activities, social infrastructure). 
The Project complements and builds on the lessons learned from these projects in that it continues to 
support UoMs (given the small average size of municipalities and the need to realise economies of 
scale) but it moves towards a more competitive approach, promoting performance-based municipal 
grants to UoMs and recognises that capacity building activities on project management should 
continue as most of UoMs are not yet fully able to formulate, design and implement local development 
projects. 
Another lesson is that the lack of involvement of central government stakeholders prevented the past 
projects from addressing the structural problem of chronic, insufficient funding of the municipalities. 
Thus great importance will be given to (i) MoIM‟s ownership of the Project to ensure long term 
sustainability ; (ii) municipal finance reform to strengthen the relation between the central and local 
levels, by reforming the Independent Municipal Fund (IMF), enhancing local revenues and ensuring 
performance-based fiscal transfers from central government and donors to municipalities." 
Source: EC Action Fiche for Lebanon (ENPI) - Support to Municipal Finance Reforms. 
While it can be noted that some political analysis have been undertaken in most cases, it 
must also be observed that the depth of political analysis is often limited.  
For instance, none of the EUDs has undertaken an explicit ―political economy and 
governance analyses‖ of decentralisation reforms over the evaluation period. This has 
earlier been undertaken by other donors (in particular World Bank, DfID, and selected other 
bilateral donors) and is now increasingly recognised as good practice64. 
Partly as a consequence of the lack of such analyses, significant changes in governmental 
policies, come sometimes as a surprise to the EC. An illustrative example is Mali where the 
EC has supported a rather ambitious governmental decentralisation programme for years but 
has experienced recent backlashes. (See box below and further discussion, in EQ5, on the 
progress of the decentralisation process in Mali).  
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Box 8 The EC and the evolution of national policy orientations in Mali  
The EC support in Mali had well integrated l the policy orientations of the national government in the 
late 1990s. These orientations were defined in the national conference held after the fall of General 
Moussa Traore‘s regime. This conference laid the bases of a new society and decentralisation was 
meant to be at the heart of the reform. That is why the principle of decentralisation was actually placed 
in the forefront of the Constitution adopted in 1992. The new regime considered it as a central topic 
and made special efforts to create conditions for establishing local governments. This work culminated 
in 1999 with the first local elections. These elections established the deliberative and executive bodies 
of 761 local governments which covered the entire national territory (703 "Communes", 49 "Cercles", 8 
"Régions" and the District of Bamako). A corpus of texts was developed for this purpose and the 
development of LG was integrated in the various policy and strategy documents defined during this 
period. 
The strategy documents of the EC (the framework documents of the EC-Mali partnership, the Country 
Strategy Papers 2003-2007 and 2008-2013) clearly reflect the analysis of the government‘s policy 
directions by the EUD and the choice to contribute to their implementation. The idea was clearly to 
consider the EC support as an accompanying measure to the decentralisation process and thus the 
choice was made for a long-term support.  
That said, a shift at central governmental level occurred in recent years and decentralisation 
disappeared from the political agenda. This has not been foreseen as a risk in earlier analyses and 
actually came as a surprise to the EUD.  
Several elements illustrate the decline in interest of the national government for decentralisation 
issues. Decentralisation does no longer appear in the programme document of the current President 
of the Republic since the last elections. Moreover, the level of transfer of resources to local authorities 
stagnates and even declines in some sectors. In addition, the transfer of powers has never really been 
implemented despite the fact that LG have assumed the new powers and functions from the start of 
the process. Central government departments have in their vast majority tried to slow or block these 
transfers.  
Overall, from 2007 onwards, dialogue between the EC and national authorities has been less fruitful 
and more "confrontational", focusing on commitments which have not been realised. 
 
In the Philippines, the EC action includes significant background analyses on 
decentralisation reforms on all its health sector interventions as well as in the SPF support. 
The level of details in the analysis tends to be more sophisticated over time and there is a 
clear ―learning from experiences‖ in working within a highly decentralised context. This is well 
exemplified by the recent formulation of the ―Support to Local Government Units for more 
effective and accountable Public Finance Management‖65 where e.g. past relative narrow 
institutional focus is rectified. The quality of analysis is guaranteed by the fact that it relies on 
TA provided within the health sector programme as well as the use of decentralisation sector 
analyses from other DPs such as ADB and WB, but less on a own EC decentralisation 
analyses. 
The case of Tanzania illustrates a situation in which the EC has actively sought to 
understand the national priorities in a context of enhanced dialogue and coordination with 
other DPs (see box below). 
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Box 9 Alignment with national strategies - the case of Tanzania 
The EC support to decentralisation has generally been well aligned with GoT policies and procedures, 
and had been made on the basis of a sound understanding of national priorities. The decision made 
by the EC to support the merging national system for LG development funding through the LGDG was 
made at a critical time when most funding for ―local level development‖ issues towards LGs were 
undertaken with by using multiple individual project interventions by various DPs. The support to the 
LGDG consisted at the beginning (2005) in a largely DP funded, discretionary non-sector specific 
development grant to LGs. However, the system rapidly gained popularity and became the backbone 
of a general fiscal transfer system for all local development funding. In addition the annual 
performance systems incentivised LGs‘ adherence to GoT regulations (in particular in areas of PFM).  
The analyses of GoT procedures and strategies that lead to the LGDG were primarily driven by the 
World Bank and various EU member states active in the LGRP basket 2003-04. EC independent 
analysis initially suggested an alternative strategy (supporting a funding mechanism that would focus 
only on lower level LGs) – but this was rejected internally by EC in an effort to harmonise with other 
DPs.  
The later decision by the EC to exit from directs decentralisation support and focus largely on GBS 
(and Infrastructure and Trade) is fully in line with GoT strategy for aid harmonisation (see also next 
indicators under this EQ). 
In the context of Trust Funds managed by other donors, the use of other DPs‘ analyses is 
obviously made.  
In Sierra Leone, EC support to decentralisation has followed the approach suggested by the 
WB in the IRCBP including the analysis of national strategies and policies when the 
programme was prepared. The EC did not carry out its own in-depth analysis of 
decentralisation in the country.  
In some cases, it appears that EUD has found it necessary to design decentralisation 
projects that operate outside national main modalities (even when relatively explicit national 
decentralisation policies and local government grant systems are in place).  
This is for instance a case in Uganda, where a project was designed to support some of the 
Northern (poorer) Local Governments (see box below for a description). The project targets a 
sub-set of local governments and provides them with additional earmarked funding that are 
channelled in parallel to the central government fiscal transfers. The project also supports 
additional ―project management units‖. The project agreement still claims that it ―is fully in line 
with the National Indicative Programme and with the Government of Uganda's poverty 
eradication strategy, including their policy for political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation.‖ The extent of ―alignment‖ can of course be discussed. In Uganda, other 
alternative approached could have been applied, for instance, co-financing the LG fiscal 
transfer system through a SBS arrangement and, if necessary, provide help to reform the 
overall system in order to increasingly target poverty66.  
Box 10 The case of the Acholi Programme in Uganda 
The Acholi Programme covers the districts of Gulu and Kitgum in Northern Uganda. 
The programme is fully in line with the National Indicative Programme and with the Government of 
Uganda's poverty eradication strategy, including their policy for political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation. 
The EC intervention is well in line with the national policies of the Government of Uganda, both in the 
area of decentralisation and in the specific field of support to the North. This is ensured by the fact that 
the Minister of State for Northern Uganda Rehabilitation and a representative from the MoLG 
participate to the National Coordinating Committee (NCC). Furthermore, specific investments under 
the programme will be implemented under the overall guidance of the Government's sector policies 
and guidelines issued by line ministries. 
The overall responsibility for the implementation of the programme lies with the local governments of 
Gulu and Kitgum districts. Support will be provided through the Programme Advisory and Community 
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Mobilisation Unit. The implementation modalities of the programme allow for effective co-ordination 
with sector policies and other Government and donor interventions. This is achieved at national level 
through the National Co-ordination Committee, chaired by the Minister of State for Northern Uganda 
Rehabilitation and at district level through the Inter-district Co-ordination Committee. 
More than 50% of the 4 million Euros will be used as direct support to district budgets as prioritised by 
local communities. 32% will be shared between capacity building and community mobilisation. The 
remaining budget will cover long and short term Technical Assistance, administration costs, 
equipment, reviews/evaluation and contingencies.‖ 
3.1.2 Ind3.1.2 - Alignment of EC interventions to national transfer mechanisms in 
channelling funds to LA  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
A significant number of EC interventions in support of decentralisation are in the form of 
Sector Budget Support (SBS). , By definition, SBS is using country financial management 
systems and national transfer systems to local governments.  
The EC supported interventions are also in several cases explicitly aiming at developing or 
improving the national transfer mechanism, as it is for instance the case in Sierra Leone, 
Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Cambodia.  
This objective is supported, partly through SBS (e.g. Mali), as well as through contributions to 
basket funds (e.g. Tanzania), UN funded projects (e.g. Cambodia) or World Bank Trust 
Funds (e.g. Sierra Leone). Therefore one cannot conclude that use of national systems and 
funding through local government grant systems is something exclusive of SBS support. 
Box 11 The EC support and national mechanisms of transfer in Mali 
From the start of the EC support programme to local governments, the choice of the EUD was to use 
national transfer mechanisms of funds: 
 funding planned for the local governments went through the National Agency ANICT ("Agence 
Nationale d‟Investissements des Collectivités Territoriales"), a perennial national mechanism for 
collecting all funding for local governments‘ investments (Investment Fund of Local governments - 
FICT
67
); the ANICT has seen its mission widened in 2007 and is now also in charge of the 
attribution of the funds to local governments for technical support and operating expenses; 
 funding intended for the technical support were directed towards the national system of support to 
local governments the "council centres" (CCC – "centres de conseil communaux") and a national 
coordination unit (CCN – cellule nationale de coordination). 
It is also important to point out the fact that the mechanism of investments funding corresponded to a 
direct support to LG's budget with a special system of drawing rights. These rights were initially multi-
annual (3 years) but became annual due to a lack of visibility of the ANICT on the volume of available 
funding. 
It is also interesting to note that, in Peru, a number of sector interventions (e.g. AMARES or 
EURO-PAN), although not designed to support explicitly and directly decentralisation, aimed 
at using national transfer systems and at strengthening/further developing national 
structures. 
The SBS modality is by nature strengthening national transfer mechanisms but it is not a 
guarantee to have a sound national transfer formula applied. In Honduras, field visit 
interviews at the Ministry of Interior and with selected Development Partners showed that, 
once new funds are available, specific municipalities are often selected by the SEIP 
("Secretaria de Interior y Poblacion") without using the official transfer formula and projects 
are even regularly implemented at municipal level by the SEIP itself.  
The EC support consists also of a number of "project" type interventions with no major 
transfers to local governments (supporting capacity building at central level, capacities of 
NGOs, etc). This is for instance typically the case for all projects funded through the thematic 
budget line ―Non State Actors and Local Authorities‖. The main issues related to possible 
alignment are therefore found within project interventions financing investments for service 
                                               
67
 Fonds d‟Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
62 
delivery through in local governments. A notable exception concerns the ACORDS project in 
Madagascar. In this intervention of important size (more than 65mEUR were committed to 
the intervention under the 9th EDF), the EC experimented with a performance based system 
to finance local governments (through call for proposals) which inspired the development of a 
national intergovernmental fiscal transfer mechanism in 2008 (Fonds de développement 
local), today supported by both the EC and the World Bank. Moreover, the project allowed 
the development of a number of guidelines on mechanisms and procedures to finance local 
investment programmes in the targeted regions which were then used at national level. For 
instance, the guidelines developed for the health sector related investment projects were 
eventually adjusted and adopted at national level. A similar experience could be found in the 
field of procurement: the systems developed for the project intervention was widely 
disseminated to all stakeholders and, in 2010, after a 9-month joint effort with the ACORDS 
project, the national institution in charge of procurement even started to test the system on a 
national scale. 
In several cases, it has been decided not to use national transfer systems but allocate 
funds in a "project managed system", such as e.g. in the North of Uganda targeting selected 
local governments, in Kenya in order to transfer directly to ―communities‖, in Lebanon to 
apply project funding through project specific set-ups within individual or clusters of 
municipalities. In some specific projects, it has been tried to transfer funds to local 
governments to be used for innovative modalities of Local Economic Development, such as 
for instance in South Africa. The effectiveness of various arrangements to improve service 
delivery is further discussed in EQ8, but generally it can be concluded that such interventions 
have had various local benefits (e.g. on local service delivery) but have not led to wider 
reforms of the relationship between central government and LGs.  
During the evaluation period, the existing national transfer systems were rather limited in 
some cases, and the EC, has often tried to support further developments of the national 
system.  
For instance, in Benin, municipalities only disburse about 5% of the national budget and this 
is in most of the cases used to cover salaries and administrative costs.  Very little is used for 
infrastructure development. A more systematic and encompassing sectoral transfer system 
from central to local government does not exist at the moment. The situation is currently 
evolving and this evolution has been first and foremost pushed by donors present in the DLG 
area, including the EC. 
The EC support to decentralisation includes other situations such as:  
 The experience with SBS in Durban Municipal Council, South Africa:  SBS gave the 
Council the necessary funds to implement local development action in strategic areas 
and this in a flexible way while being highly aligned to Integrated Development 
Planning of the municipality. However, the fund transfers to the municipalities have 
never been part of a general "central government – LG" transfer system. 
Furthermore, the programme never intended to reform the broader Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Transfer (IGFT) system. 
 In the Philippines, the EC modalities for the transfer of funds in the health sector have 
evolved from a project approach to a SBS modality with funds channelled directly 
through the national treasury. The project approach included transfers to selected 
provinces – however, the transfers from central government to the provinces were not 
really part of a permanent government system for financing health services in the 
provinces, as they were tied to the project period.  
3.1.3 Ind3.1.3 - Quality of dialogue with partner country and beneficiaries 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The survey to the EUD indicates significant improvements in the quality of dialogue with 
government and other stakeholders over the evaluation period. Most EUDs still find that the 
dialogue with other EU members is of highest quality. 
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Figure 12 Change in the quality of dialogue and coordination on decentralisation 
between the two strategic cycles – „high‟ or „quite high‟ responses 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
Essentially, two distinct environments for dialogue with government can be identified: 
 Countries in which decentralisation is not a clear policy and adopted by the national 
government; 
 Countries with a declared decentralisation policy. 
In situations where decentralisation is not a clear policy which has been adopted by the 
national government, the EC typically embarks on various projects supporting ―bottom–up‖ 
development of local governments. This support might ultimately inspire the Government to 
take a more explicit stand on decentralisation and local government reforms.  
A typical example among the countries analysed in the desk phase is Lebanon where the EC 
identified a clear need to strengthen decentralisation processes and local governments and 
to reform the sector, but opportunities for wider national reforms were considered too limited 
as the Government faced other critical challenges. Hence, the EC response was to support 
selected municipalities with capacity building and investment grants to improve their 
capacities to deliver local services and demonstrate potential for wider reforms and EC 
support to this reform in the future. At the stage of writing this report, a municipal fiscal 
reform programme is under consideration and is discussed with Government).  
A similar situation was found in Jordan, but here the EC decided to take a very different 
approach - as well as some risk - by moving straight into a sector budget support modality to 
assist the implementation of the decentralisation reform68. Jordan does not have an explicit 
decentralisation reform policy, but the overall assessment of the EUD pointed out a genuine 
interest of the government to engage in a reform process, which was reflected, for instance, 
in a recent consolidation of the number of municipalities and in a general commitment to a 
wider public sector reform69. 
In countries with a declared decentralisation policy, the dialogue takes a more structured 
approach (see also sections on donor/ government coordination modalities in EQ4-JC4.1).  
For instance: 
 In Benin, the dialogue between the national government and the DPs is strong and 
has become even stronger over the evaluation period. While one might argue that the 
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 Support to poverty reduction through local development in Jordan (MED/2004/006-221) that essentially is 
composed of a large sector budget component (29 million EUR) and 0,8 million EUR for M&E. 
69
 See Financing Agreement for Support to Poverty Reduction Through Local Development in Jordan 
(MED/2004/006-221) 
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decentralisation/local governance agenda is mainly pushed and supported by donors 
(and to a lesser degree by the government itself, evidenced by a very weak sectoral 
responses at local level), the dialogue is strong and evolving. This is has been 
already the case in the past, but has emphasised since 2009 with the launching of the 
PONADEC programme, which enables a more targeted and strategic discussion of 
decentralisation issues and the use of joint annual review of decentralisation taking 
place between the donors and national government. 
 In the Philippines, the dialogue between the EC and national stakeholders generally 
appears well developed (an example is the significant engagement of the Philippines' 
stakeholders in the dialogue on the CSP preparation70) and is generally well 
documented (see the recent country level evaluation). 
 In Rwanda, the quality of the dialogue is high and very intense. This can be seen from 
the very active sector-working group on decentralisation and local governance and 
other relevant sector working groups especially for PFM issues and general 
governance. 
In general, it is noteworthy that active ―decentralisation sector working groups‖ and 
similar institutional arrangements for coordination of support among donors and government 
are critical for a successful dialogue. This has been well illustrated in the various field visit 
carried out (see field visit country notes in Volume II - Annex 11). This aspect is further 
analysed in EQ4.  
Upon formalisation, the quality of dialogue may improve in terms of intensity and clarity but 
not necessarily in terms of ―cordiality‖. There are a number of cases where the EUDs 
express concerns on government's commitments to implementing its declared 
decentralisation policies, which often underpin larger sector programmes or even General 
Budget Support. For instance in Tanzania, part of the GBS has been withheld because of 
perceived lack of progress on decentralisation reform.  Serious concerns on the progress 
and Government commitment have also been noted in Uganda and Senegal.  
In Mali, the EC had y a continuous close dialogue with the government during the evaluation 
period. This is in particular illustrated by the relevance of a number of strategic choices made 
by the EC in Mali (see field visit country note for more details). However, as described in 
Indicator 3.1.1, Mali experienced a shift in policy priorities regarding decentralisation in 
recent years. Moreover, from 2007 onwards, it turned out that the dialogue between the EC 
and national authorities has been less fruitful and more "confrontational", often focusing on 
"commitments which are not implemented". 
In Tanzania, the added value of the policy GBS dialogue is difficult to asses: no progress has 
been made on the supposed introduction of formula based recurrent grant system or the 
devolution of HRM to LGs, however it must be noted, that issues related to donor 
harmonisation in the sector (through LGDG modality) as well as overall levels of fiscal 
resources allocated to LGs have improved. 
The case of Peru presents a quite particular situation. There, the dialogue between the EC 
and the government has overall been positive, but the extent to which this dialogue has 
actually focused on decentralisation seems to have been quite limited. This is actually to be 
put in parallel with the low level of direct support to decentralisation on the one hand, and a 
high priority put on PFM and health issues on the other hand. Some exchanges related to 
decentralisation may have taken place in the framework of the recent sector budget support 
programmes in the health sector (e.g. EURO-PAN "Programa Articulado Nutricional") and the 
Group on Public Finance (Mesa de Finanzas Públicas) in which the dialogue has been of 
high quality. Moreover, the EUD has established interesting platforms of dialogue with Non-
State Actors (and to a certain extent Local Authorities) by establishing regular meetings with 
the aim to inform NSAs about EC funding opportunities and to draw lessons learnt from past 
experiences. This dialogue certainly makes the EC more responsive to the national context 
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 Mid-Term Review Consultation of the Philippines Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 with civil society and local 
development partners on 23/02/2009 (Cebu), 27/02/2009 (Davao) and 9/03/2009. 
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in general and should be further encouraged. However, there is no strong evidence that this 
dialogue has lead to tangible results in terms of EC responsiveness regarding 
decentralisation reform. Moreover, the participation of the EC in the working group on 
decentralisation (Mesa de Descentralización) is considered to be limited also because the 
setting-up of this working group gives only few opportunities to dialogue with the government. 
In general, it appears that the EC has had a more limited role than several other EU Member 
States (e.g. Spain, Germany) or non-EU Development Partners (e.g. the WB) in terms of 
dialogue with the Government and Non-State Actors on issues related to decentralisation. 
Overall, it appears from the evidence gathered in the desk phase and the field visits that, 
although the dialogue with partner countries' governments and other national stakeholders 
has intensified and has become increasingly structured, the results of the dialogue on 
specific issues related to decentralisation have often remained contrasted. This is partly due 
to the complex nature of decentralisation reform, the difficult and changing national contexts 
or, in some cases, is a result of the competing priorities in the EC strategy in the partner 
country, leading to fewer resources allocated for policy dialogue on decentralisation issues. 
The quality and realism of decentralisation reform programmes are also critical for good 
quality of dialogue. In Tanzania for instance, a very detailed reform programme was put in 
place as early as 2000. However it was based on a reform policy that in part was not truly 
―owned‖ by the Government – in particular with regards to the policy intentions of completely 
devolving the right to hire and fire to LGs. The implications of this policy might initially not 
have been clear to the government. As a result, a few years into the implementation stage, 
the government started to manage public servants in an increasingly centralised manner. In 
retrospect, the particular elements of the decentralisation reform policy dealing with HRM 
were never truly owned by Government and especially expectations in that regard were 
unrealistic. This policy incoherence led to a number of conflicts between DPs and 
Government and is reflected in e.g. downgrading of Government performance in the GBS 
PAF. Overall the EUD has attempted to progress on these issues in a more moderate 
manner than some of the lead donors, arguing for a strict adherence to the LGR policy 
principles would have liked to see.  
3.1.4 Ind3.1.4 - References in relevant CSP sections on decentralisation and local 
governance 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
A systematic assessment has been undertaken for the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) of 
the 22 countries included in desk phase (see Volume II – Annex 6). Two key issues were 
explored:  
 The extent to which the CSPs makes explicit reference to alignment with particular 
government strategy papers and policies, 
 The type of policy dialogue emphasized in the CSPs. 
Alignment 
Most CSPs (especially the ones from the second period) mention that the EC response 
strategy is aligned with the national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or 
equivalent institutionalised documents.  
Benin (CSP2): "Development partners and the government annually meet to discuss 
the implementation reports related to the PRSP and the various budget supports, and 
assess the progress in the ongoing reforms, including measures to strengthen 
governance.”  
Cambodia (CSP2): "All interventions within the bilateral programme will fall within the 
framework of the National Strategic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction (NSDP) 
for the period 20062010, prepared by the RGC in co-operation with development 
partners."  
Honduras (CSP2): "EU assistance is in line with the country‟s poverty reduction 
strategy and closely coordinated with the other donors. (…) In selecting the 
recommended focal areas, the principle of concentrating aid in sectors where the EC 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
66 
offers an added-value and a series of considerations pertaining to the EU Development 
Policy, the EU priorities in the region, donor harmonisation and alignment with the 
domestic agenda have prevailed." 
Lebanon (CSP2) "The EU will seek to adapt its strategy to the needs presented by the 
government during the International Conference (scheduled for the second half of 
January 2007). Close cooperation between the Lebanese government and all donors 
will be needed to establish an effective structure of coordination and to prioritise the 
needs of the country."  
In some cases, the CSP explicitly highlights the fact that the PRSP (to which the response 
strategy is aligned) has indeed a section on decentralisation. 
Benin “Decentralisation, the consolidation of democracy and social dialogue in the 
country, the strengthening of the judiciary system, the actions promoting community 
development, are some of the most important reforms of the PRSP”. 
The use of General Budget Support (GBS) seems to contribute to enhance alignment of 
the EC response strategy to the national regulations and partner Governments priorities. 
Cambodia (CSP2): "EC assistance is seen as taking the form of budget support in the 
framework of the World Bank-led Poverty Reduction Support Operation (PRSO), 
together with technical assistance in key fields focused on by the PRSO, in particular 
Public Financial Management. The provision of aid through budget support is in 
keeping with the EC‟s keenness to use modern means of aid delivery that ensure 
strong government ownership, effective, policy dialogue and strong donor co-
ordination, wherever possible. The provision of budget support through the PRSO will 
allow the EC to give much-needed policy advice to the government through continuous 
involvement in dialogue on key reform agenda issues, while at the same time making 
available funds to enable the reform agenda to be implemented". 
Overall, there are very few explicit elements on alignment to national regulations in the 
specific framework of decentralisation (e.g. alignment to national procedures or 
legislations specifically related to decentralisation).  
The elements identified, rather refer to the alignment to general elements of the Government 
agenda. 
Guatemala (CSP1): "Local development and decentralisation of government will need 
to rely on the progress in decentralising and strengthening the National Development 
Council system." 
Yet, it is important to notice that decentralisation interventions are often by nature aiming at 
strengthening national regulations and priorities. This appears quite clearly in some of 
the CSPs analysed.  
For instance, the CSP1 for Uganda describes that the capacity building activities supported 
at local level through Budget Support will foster the implementation of national policies: 
Uganda (CSP1): "The support identified in the framework of the 9th EDF will mainly 
consist of capacity building at district and lower-level local government by providing 
local governments primarily through budget support with tools to enable them to handle 
decentralised services and ensure good governance by increased accountability and 
democratic participation. Such support will increase the resources available to existing 
GoU programmes such as the Local Government Development Programme (LGDP) 
and the Economic and Financial Management Programme (EFMP II)". 
A similar situation is found in South Africa where the EC provides a package of capacity 
building activities to local governments which clearly aims at strengthening the national 
procedures, regulations and policies related to decentralisation. 
South Africa (CSP2): "EU partners will work with the government on policy issues by 
helping the government to develop policies and see their implications, rather than by 
trying to influence the content of the policies directly. (…) Coordination between donors 
and with government (central and sectoral) needs to be reinforced. This requires a 
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strong emphasis on working with the government to improve alignment with policies 
and procedures." 
Moreover, some exceptions could be found in Madagascar, Mali, Peru and Tanzania where 
the CSPs do explicitly mention some forms of alignment with the Government priorities, 
specifically in the field of decentralisation. 
Madagascar (CSP2): "Consistent with the Challenge 6 'decentralise public 
administration' of the commitment 1 (Responsible Governance) of the Madagascar 
Action Plan, the EC support to territorial administration will support the decentralisation 
process and the implementation of the National Plan for Decentralisation and 
Deconcentration (PN2D)" . 
Mali (CSP1): "Decentralisation is one of the major public administration reforms set up 
by the Malian government. This process leads to changes at all levels of the 
administration in Mali. The aim is to support this process, first by allowing its effective 
implementation and, secondly, by helping the adequate development of the institutional 
structures that are being created". 
Peru (CSP2): "European cooperation strategy should: fit in with the framework policies 
of the State, in particular the National Agreement and its developments contributing to 
the processes of State modernisation and decentralisation by means of support for 
administrative capacity building". 
Tanzania (CSP1): "The donor community has made considerable efforts to support the 
decentralisation process and to ensure that resources are devolved to the school and 
community level. However, as a substantive part of these aid inflows do not pass 
through the Government budget, government's capacity to carry out policy formulation, 
planning and implementation of its development programs is reduced. Further, given 
the complexities and delays involved in decentralisation, donor-supported efforts are 
not yet fully harmonised with the government's decentralisation policy and programs. 
Some projects are too donor-driven, costly and unsustainable and appear to favour 
districts with better-established capacities. Additionally, each donor has unique 
processes and modalities, making donor coordination a taxing task for government 
agencies. Establishment of clear procedures for managing the delivery of education at 
the decentralised level with respect to funds allocation, utilisation and auditing would 
also facilitate better use of donor resources and bring these within the regular 
government and administration structure." 
Policy dialogue 
There are often general elements related to policy dialogue with the partner Government in 
the CSPs analysed.  
Cambodia (CSP2): "The EC is very likely to propose to the Cambodian authorities the 
creation, within the framework of the EC-Cambodia Co-operation Agreement, of a sub-
group on “co-operation in institution building, administrative reform, governance and 
human rights”. This sub-group could provide suggestions for co-operation activities in 
this area". 
Guatemala (CSP2): "An ad hoc consultative forum has in the past served as a forum 
for dialogue between the EU (Commission and Member States) and Guatemala 
(Government and non civil society) on EC cooperation ("mesodiálogo”). It ceased its 
activities in 2005." 
Guatemala (CSP1): "To have greater impact and to ensure that its operations are more 
sustainable and more in line with its objectives, the European Commission should take 
the following steps: (…) • Develop relations with the different stakeholders of organised 
civil society in Guatemala and Europe, with the government and with the Member 
States through the dialogue mechanism (mesodialogue) implemented by the EC and 
aimed at coordinating EU aid strategies in Guatemala. 
Rwanda (CSP1) "Dialogue with the Government throughout the development process 
of the response strategy has helped to enrich the process of designing the monitoring 
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and performance indicators in areas that are central to the political dialogue between 
the EU and Rwanda". 
South Africa (CSP1) "A structured political dialogue between SA and the EU will be 
established within the framework of Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement and after its 
entry into force also in accordance with Article 4 of the TDCA . Annual meetings within 
the TDCA framework will take place and the agenda will include issues of common 
interest such as SA and EU developments, regional peace and security issues, social 
and economic developments, AU and Nepad." 
In a very few cases, the CSPs describe the mechanisms / spaces for policy dialogue to  
discussing specifically issues related to decentralisation. 
Madagascar (CSP2) "Seven meetings of political dialogue have been held so far on 
issues such as decentralisation, elections, anti-corruption, judicial reform, regional 
integration, etc." 
Uganda (CSP2): "In the framework of the political dialogue under Article 8 of the 
Cotonou Agreement, regular meetings are held with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
other ministers. The agreed subjects of the dialogue include democratisation (transition 
to multiparty democracy, elections), good governance (rule of law, human rights, press 
freedom, corruption, decentralisation), and conflict resolution (in Northern Uganda and 
in Karamoja)." 
3.2 JC3.2 The choice of entry points (including their sequencing or 
combination) reflects national contexts 
Main findings at JC level 
The EC support to decentralisation has increased in terms of overall financial volumes as 
well as in terms of number of countries with decentralisation support over the evaluation 
period. It appears that an increasing number of countries now provide support through the 
entry point ―direct support to national decentralisation reform programme (―top down‖ – up 
from 30% to 38% in surveyed countries) rather than through ―bottom up support‖ (down from 
45% to 38%). This is indicative for a general maturation of reform processes in the partner 
countries and EC subsequent alignment. There are also some exceptions, such as Rwanda 
and Uganda where the EC is less aligned with national reform policies than other DPs. The 
reasons for the relative lack of ―alignment of entry points to national contexts‖ in such cases 
are found in the relative emphasis of additional objectives (addition to decentralisation 
support). For instance, the support in Uganda also included specific intensions for 
geographical targeting that could not have been achieved through support for national 
decentralisation support programmes.  
Decisions on particular entry points are not based on extensive independent and in-depth 
analyses such as ―political economy of decentralisation studies‖. Programme documents 
rarely have a forward-looking perspective beyond the design of the concerned interventions. 
These documents typically have a section with ―lessons learned from past interventions‖ that 
justify the proposed intervention. EC assessments of such past experiences are frequently 
quite thoughtful and self-critical and have proven to be very useful as inputs to formulation of 
the interventions, thus illustrating that internal learning processes are going on.  
The EC (incl. EUDs) has indicated that countries, in which support to decentralisation is 
made through sector approaches have increased significantly over the evaluation period. 
However, as discussed further in EQ5-8, these programmes rarely have objectives directly 
related to the enhancement of decentralisation reforms per se but are primarily sector 
programmes implemented in a decentralised context.  
3.2.1 Ind3.2.1 - Evidence of sequencing of approaches/ entry points according to 
national contexts  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The EC support to decentralisation has over the evaluation period increased in more than 
90% of the surveyed countries (20% did not render any support to this extent before 2007). 
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Programmes in direct support to decentralisation have increased in importance as support 
through ―bottom-up approaches" has in a similar manner declined. Among the sample, the 
countries that support decentralisation through sectoral approaches have significantly 
increased over the evaluation period.  
Figure 13 What was the main type of approach adopted by the EC to support 
decentralisation in your country? 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
The shifts in various approaches are typically undertaken as reflections over the national 
government policies to decentralisation. This is illustrated in the trend towards direct support 
to decentralisation reform programmes based on emerging national policies (with some 
notable exception as in Tanzania where, in the first programming cycle, the EC could have 
supported the existing policy reforms).  
For instance, in Nicaragua, the EC decided to lower prioritisation of direct support to 
decentralisation regarding declining Government support.  
In Kenya, the EC initiated, in 2006, direct support to an emerging local government reforms 
programme, however the political climate for reform was not very favourable and, in the 
second programming cycle, a bottom-up (more community focused) programme was 
initiated. In 2011, the prospects for substantive local government reforms look very promising 
(after the Constitutional Amendments in 2010).  
In Madagascar, the experience of the EC-funded interventions ACORDS (2004-2010)71 laid 
the foundations for the design of a wide national programme supported by both the EC and 
the World Bank in 2007 (one of the component of the new programme was based on the 
development of a new IGFT system around a national fund for LG "Fonds de Développement 
Local" - FDL). However, the 2009 political crisis led to the abortion of the intervention which 
has been launched in 2008. The ACORDS example illustrates an interesting situation in 
which a "bottom-up" approach project by allowing for experimentation and awareness raising 
on decentralisation issues at both national and local level, has developed a favourable 
ground for the launch of a wider intervention going in the direction of a "top-down" 
programme approach with multi donor support. 
The table below gives an overview of the changes of approaches that occurred in the 22 
desk countries during the evaluation period. The need for adapting to changing political 
contexts is clear. In countries where decentralisation reforms are mature and explicit policies 
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are declared, it becomes possible to move from ―bottom up‖ approaches to ―top down‖ direct 
support of national decentralisation reform efforts. This typically also entails a change from 
project modalities to sector programme support.  
Table 12 Overview of changes in the EC support to decentralisation between the two 
programming cycles 
Country 
Type of approach for 
supporting decentralisation Reasons for change (with responses from the survey to 
the EUD) 
1
st
 Cycle  2
nd
 Cycle  
Benin Bottom up Direct support
72
  
National policy of Benin changed which enabled shifting 
towards sector budget support 
Cambodia Direct support Direct support 
Same approach (direct), moving from projects to a more 
comprehensive programme. 
 
Colombia Bottom up Bottom up 
The same approach has been followed: support to local 
authorities in the frame of the peace laboratories. 
Congo 
(Democratic 
Republic of) 
No significant 
support 
Direct support 
No support to decentralisation in the 1
st
 cycle, now direct 
programme support. 
There was no decentralisation in DRC before 2006. Now we 
are starting up a programme 
Guatemala Direct support Bottom up 
Direct programme support from 1
st
 cycle still not closed, in 
addition some local development activities in the 2
nd
 cycle
73
. 
Haiti Bottom up Direct support 
Complex socio-political situation. 
The passage towards a Direct support to a decentralisation 
reform programme remains a challenge today as after-
earthquake context has provoked a fragmentation of the 
political will to carry on State reform. EUD approach may need 
to be slightly revised to secure implementation success. 
Honduras Direct support Direct support 
No change, direct support in both cycles, even though not 
mentioned in the second CSP + Sectoral projects in 
environment sector
74
  
Jordan 
No significant 
support 
Bottom up 
In the process of devising the form of support to 
decentralisation. 
 
Actually we are in the process of devising it. The approach has 
not been decided yet. 
Kenya Direct support Bottom up 
Change from support to local governments to CSOs and 
communities. 
 
The 2006/07 cycle include the support to an ongoing Local 
Government reform called KLGRP, in association with 
supporting a number of physical projects in 60 Local 
Authorities. In 07/08, the local governance will be mainly 
sustained through support and empowerment of CSOs and 
communities to play the role of watchdog. 
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 to national decentralisation programme 
73
 Under the CSP 2002-2007 a comprehensive intervention on decentralisation - Proyecto decentralizacion del 
estado/Municipios democraticos - was designed in response to the favourable country context (in 2002 the 
Guatemalan state approved a far-reaching legal framework on decentralisation). Under the second cycle no new 
decentralisation support programme was designed because of the already important financial amount dedicated 
to the decentralisation project (24 mio EUR) - which only ended activities in 2008 and is still not fully closed - and 
the difficulties of the project in reaching its objectives. 
74
 The PROADES is a Budget Support program to the Decentralisation in Honduras signed in 2004 with the 
Government on the basis of National Program of Decentralisation. The CSP 2007-2013 doesn't mention direct 
support to Decentralisation but the PROADES is still going on at this stage and various projects complete the 
direct approach by sectoral interventions mainly for the decentralisation of the environmental sector. 
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Country 
Type of approach for 
supporting decentralisation 
Reasons for change (with responses from the survey to 
the EUD) 
Lebanon Bottom up Bottom up 
Support to local levels will be complemented by building 
capacities at both levels. 
 
No decentralisation agenda but large regional disparities and 
weak capacity of local actors, so supporting municipalities was 
seen as a way to improve service delivery at local level. Now 
we will also target national authorities to build capacity of both 
local and central levels. 
Madagascar Bottom up Bottom up 
No change during most of the period (the new programme 
PDLD programme launched in 2008 was eventually stopped 
just a few months later due to the political crisis) - support to 
local authorities. 
 
The approach has mainly been through the 9th EDF 
Programme in support to decentralised authorities (267 
communes) in the southern areas of Madagascar (programme 
named ACORDS, website: http//www.acords.org) 
Mali Direct support Direct support 
No change, direct support SBS. 
 
Les programmes de soutien aux politiques sectorielles de 
décentralisation et réforme de l‟Etat constituent des 
programmes à part entière et utilisent les modalités de l‟appui 
budgétaire sectoriel et les appuis institutionnels y afférents. 
Nicaragua 
Through 
sectoral 
interventions 
No major 
support to 
decentralisation  
The policy of Nicaragua changed – with partial abolishment of 
decentralisation policies 
Papua New 
Guinea 
No significant 
support 
Bottom up 
Both bottom up and direct support implemented. 
The support is twofold: both direct support to a decentralisation 
reform programme (implementation of the Organic Law, dealt 
with by the corresponding department), and bottom-up 
approach. 
Peru Bottom up 
Through 
sectoral 
interventions 
Shift from bottom up to sectoral support due to geographic 
focus. 
During the first period, the EUD has prioritised a local support 
in order to improve local capacities in a context of return to 
democratic system and implementation of a National 
Agreement to fight against poverty. the shift between first and 
second period has been done concerning geographic focus, 
but supporting State Budget Planning from "budgeting by 
means" to "budgeting by results" for social sectors (health, 
education and small agriculture, mainly). 
The 
Philippines 
Bottom up 
Through 
sectoral 
interventions 
Shift from bottom up to sectoral support, due to inadequate 
use of the support in the local governments and good sector 
experience at the EUD. 
Rwanda Bottom up Bottom up 
No change, bottom up approach. Complemented by sectoral 
support. 
Senegal Direct support 
No significant 
support 
Direct support in the first cycle, no support to decentralisation 
since the 8th EDF – not a priority any more. 
Sierra 
Leone 
Direct support 
(through WB 
trust fund) 
Direct support 
(through WB 
trust fund) 
No change. 
South 
Africa 
Bottom up 
Through 
sectoral 
interventions 
Shift from bottom up to sectoral support, due to seeking better 
aid effectiveness and reducing the cost of aid. 
Tanzania 
No significant 
support 
Direct support 
EUD had earlier supported various rural development project 
interventions – among Government and Donors it emerged in 
2004 as priority to mainstream all past and ongoing ―local 
development‖ projects into local government planning and 
financing modalities. The ―Local Government Development 
Grant‖ (LGDG) system was agreed as an appropriate 
mechanism that subsequently was co-funded by Government, 
World Bank, various bilateral donors and the EUD.  
Uganda n/a Direct support n/a 
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The table below presents the complementary information that emerged from the field visits 
(see Volume II – Annex 11 for more details on the field visit country notes). 
Table 13 Evolution of entry points to support decentralisation – complementary 
information from field visits 
Country Complementary information 
Benin 
The approaches to supporting Decentralisation and local governance in Benin have 
evolved considerably over the past 10 years and have gone from the scattered project 
approach focusing only on limited districts/ municipalities to a more national and 
programme approach through the PONADEC. However, the donors still favour district-
based programmes that only target a limited number of municipalities/communes per 
donor, and the support to e.g. capacity building is still scattered and not well coordinated. 
Attempts are being made under the PONADEC for MDGLAAT to design a more strategic 
approach to capacity building of LG. The overall importance of GBS and SBS has also 
grown considerably during the evaluation period. SBS is now in principle the modality for 
support to FADeC and should increase over the coming years in line with GoB funding 
priorities for local government investments. The GBS support framework has indicators 
that are aligned to the PONADEC and the FADeC. 
Honduras 
The entry point in 2005 was a top down approach with  budget support to 
decentralisation. The EC proposed in 2004 a more gradual approach to SBS by starting 
with a modified SBS with some budget lines, but this was not approved by EC HQ. To a 
certain extent, the final modality chosen was not appropriate to the national context as, 
according to the EUD and other stakeholders met, the GoH did not understand the 
modality.  
Lebanon 
Most of EC support has applied a ―bottom up approach‖ – working mainly with ―local 
development‖ as main objective and limited attention to how this can be linked to wider 
state reforms/decentralisation. The EC is now planning for a different kind of entry point – 
where municipal fiscal reform is at the core of the project design although experiences 
from earlier phases of local development support (such as the emphasis on Unions of 
Municipalities) are maintained. This transition of support was not foreseen in earlier local 
development programmes. 
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Country Complementary information 
Mali 
The sequencing of EC interventions shows how the EC has rapidly expanded its 
intervention to take into account the institutional environment of decentralisation and then 
the related economic issues (regional economic dimension). The sequences of 
interventions have been: 
 7th FED: support for the preparation of decentralisation and the design of tools; 
 8th FED: support for the start-up of the "Communes",  
 9th FED: support for the state reform and continued support for decentralisation, and 
integration of a focus on the northern regions: 
 10th FED: continued support for state reform and decentralisation, and integration of 
the regional economic dimension. 
During the 7th FED, the EC has supported the national authorities to create the 
necessary conditions for the implementation of decentralisation: preparation of the legal 
and institutional framework, support for the establishment of the consultative framework 
for the administrative division, preparation of technical and financial tools to support the 
local governments to organize elections. The point of entry was a direct support to the 
national body responsible for preparing the implementation of the decentralisation 
process: the "Mission de Décentralisation et de Réformes Institutionnelles" (MDRI). 
During the 8th EDF, the EC has provided the resources to finance the start up of the 
"Communes". This involved (i) the financing of the investment of the "Communes" 
through the "Agence Nationale d‘Investissements des Collectivités Territoriales" (ANICT) 
and (ii) the financial support of a mechanism to provide technical support to local 
governments. This contribution proved to be decisive as it allowed LGs to establish 
themselves and invest in several areas including basic social services. The entry point 
was the financial support to the "Communes" through: 1/ the funding of the national 
system which channelled funds to LG, and 2/ still the support to the national structures in 
charge of piloting the decentralisation process and providing technical support. 
During the 9th EDF, the EC has sought to address one of major obstacles to the progress 
of decentralisation which was the non-implementation of the planned state reform. The 
institutional development program (PDI) established in the state reform was giving no 
result. The contribution of the EC aimed at supporting the authorities more consistently 
and to establish a "stronger link between decentralisation and deconcentration". This is 
the essence of the PARAD programme. The entry points are a financial support to the 
national system financing the LG and a contribution to support the state reform process at 
national level.  
In parallel, the EC has chosen to provide support to the development of the Northern 
regions. The "regions" are a key step in territorial planning and the territorialisation of 
public policies. Choosing to work also directly with that level, the EC strengthened their 
role and allowed them to acquire tools for consultative planning process for public 
investments with on the one hand the lower level LG, "Cercles" and "Communes", and, 
on the other hand, the local state services. The entry point was a support at regional 
level.  
With the 10th EDF, the EC pursues the same interventions with still as guiding thread the 
combination of support to state reform and decentralisation as well as the support to 
regions but also the integration of economic development dimensions. It is noteworthy 
that the support to the regions (through ADERE and PARADER) has been made in the 
form of specific commitments and not of budget support. 
Peru 
Since 1997, the EC together with the GoP have implemented four large programmes with 
some indirect support to decentralisation (PASA, AGORAH, AMARES and EURO-PAN). 
PASA started in 1997 with the support to education, health, agriculture and economic 
development, thereafter the focus for the EC programmes has been eventually narrowed 
to health in AMARES and EURO-PAN, while AGORAH was a regional programme for 
support to regional governance & economic development. All programmes have taken 
into account parts of the decentralised structures in their implementation i.e. regions, 
provinces and districts. 
The EUD‘s approach to decentralisation in AGORAH and in six projects financed from the 
NSA-LA programme is bottom-up with regions and local governments as implementers of 
various sector activities.  
There is no top down approach to support decentralisation and there is actually no direct 
support given to the development of the decentralised structures.  
The approach of the EC sector interventions follows the national context well. And the 
PASA with its early start in 1997 may have played a role in the evolving structures for 
decentralisation.   
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Country Complementary information 
The Philippines 
The EC interventions of relevance to this assignment have over the evaluation period 
encompassed health sector interventions and the ―micro project‖ type of interventions 
lately supported under SPF.  
The type of entry points have included special initiatives to support the conflict areas of 
Mindanao as well as modalities for wider health sector support which are gradually 
developing into general SBS. In realisation of the problems of addressing wider PFM 
issues within the health sector programme, the EC has recently decided to support a 
specific PFM intervention.  
Direct support to decentralisation remains limited with the various small projects under the 
Strategic Project Facility (SPF). The SPF was designed as follow up to the Small Projects 
Facility (2004-2007) under which the mid term evaluation endorsed the continuation of ―a 
more focused governance programme and specific instrument in the CSP 2007 – 2013‖. 
However, the question remains as to how exactly focused or strategic the instrument is. 
Annex 4 presents a description of 14 ongoing projects under the SPF – each with their 
own merits: piloting multiple initiatives for improved local governance in various areas 
(with relative emphasis on environmental management but also wider LG policy issues). 
The Strategic Projects Facility (SPF) is a demand-driven governance instrument for which 
local stakeholders formulate applications for typically two or three year interventions. 
The approach of the EC to decentralisation support is pragmatic and in line with national 
context – Government appetite for additional major ―decentralisation‖ reforms is limited. 
The World Bank informed that they have undertaken a ―political economy analysis of 
decentralisation reforms‖ (kept confidential within WB) that had convinced them that 
scope for major reforms was limited and that WB instead should work on a more 
piecemeal approach to reforms within specific sectors. The EC approach is sound within 
this context although not based on significant independent assessments. 
Rwanda 
Under the DPRPR there was a focus on both, top-down approach of support to selected 
districts and, bottom-up approach via the Ubudehe to local communities and based on 
local community priorities. This became more obvious when the funding modality was 
changed under the DPRPR to better fit with the GoR‘s preferred transfer mechanism to 
local governments under the CDF. 
Sierra Leone 
By supporting a comprehensive reform managed by the WB, the EC has followed the top-
down entry point to decentralisation. The programme is well designed according to the 
national context, whereat the decentralisation system was not defined until the approval 
of the LG Act in 2004 and it was necessary to continue the comprehensive reform 
process with gradual devolvement of functions to LCs. 
Elements of bottom-up entry are also seen by the projects in specific districts financed by 
the EC budget line for Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in development with direct 
applications to the EUD. The EUD particularly mentioned three projects (see table 3 
below) with districts as project implementers. The EUD sees these projects as a good 
supplement to the top down approach. In contrast, MLG&RD would like to be more 
involved/ informed during the implementation of all projects at district level to coordinate 
these with government programmes.   
South Africa 
The approaches and entry points have changed over the time according to the national 
context and increasingly been driven by the need for national implementing agents to 
have more flexibility and control over the funding and results. 
Tanzania 
Prior to LGDG support, the EC had supported local level interventions (micro projects) 
with some semblance of ―bottom up support‖ to decentralisation, just as the EC initially 
(2003) considered an intervention piloting Village level funding rather than supporting the 
wider national decentralisation reforms (the LGRP) or pilot for national LG development 
grant system (the LGDG). In the end (around 2004-5) a decision was made that LGDG 
was the most appropriate.  
The decision was largely made as a reaction to the wider developments of the LGRP and 
other DPs agreement to stop various bilateral interventions in favour of a common 
supported national system rather than as a deliberate EC strategy. 
 
3.2.2 Ind3.2.2 - Key questions such as “How should existing interventions best 
evolve?” are addressed in Programming/ Identification / Formulation phases 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Except in very few cases (for instance, Mali), no evidence was found in the countries 
reviewed of the EC having an explicit long term strategy to accompany the national 
decentralisation process. Moreover, programme documents do generally not have a forward-
looking perspective beyond the design of the concerned interventions. They typically have a 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
75 
section with ―lessons learned from past interventions‖ that will justify the proposed 
intervention. 
The case of Lebanon illustrates a situation where the decision on the evolution of the EC 
support was made on a step-by-step basis: 
 In Lebanon, most of EC support has applied a ―bottom up approach‖ – working mainly 
with ―local development‖ as main objective and limited attention to how this can be 
linked to wider state reforms/decentralisation. The EC is now planning for a different 
kind of entry point – where municipal fiscal reform is at the core of the project design, 
although experiences from earlier phases of local development support (such as the 
emphasis on Unions of Municipalities) are maintained. This transition of support was 
not foreseen in earlier local development programmes. 
 In Tanzania, prior to LGDG support, the EC has supported local level interventions 
(micro projects) with some semblance of ―bottom up support‖ to decentralisation, just 
as the EC initially (2003) considered an intervention piloting Village level funding 
rather that supporting the wider national decentralisation reforms (the LGRP) or pilot 
for national LG development grant system (the LGDG). In the end (around 2004-5) a 
decision was made that LGDG was the most appropriate. The decision was largely 
made as a reaction to the wider developments of the LGRP and other DPs agreement 
to stop various bilateral interventions in favour of a common supported national 
system rather than as a deliberate EC strategy. 
The question of the evolution of the intervention strategy is thus actually addressed during 
the implementation of a programme (in the discussions carried out with the national 
stakeholders and other development partners, or in mid-term reviews, evaluations and other 
specific studies carried out during the implementation phase). 
3.3 JC3.3 The choice of aid delivery methods (including their potential 
combination) has been appropriate to national contexts 
Main findings at JC level 
An overview of the main EC interventions in support to decentralisation in the 22 desk 
countries indicates wide variation in type of aid delivery methods - adapted as response 
to the country contexts as perceived by the EUDs. The evolution of aid delivery methods has 
been closely associated with the development of ―entry points‖ discussed above. In several 
countries a mix of different aid modalities is applied. When support is provided as direct 
support to decentralisation reforms (―top-down‖), then the aid modality increasingly takes the 
form of sector budget support (SBS) to the national governments with the ministry in charge 
of local governments as main responsible for implementation. When support is provided as 
“bottom up‖ support, it normally takes the form of project support – generally with the 
national government as a main partner, but in some cases (e.g., South Africa) also with local 
governments as the direct partners. In South Africa a special permission was sought to grant 
―budget support‖ directly to local governments. Only in Tanzania, it is indicated that EC 
General Budget Support also includes explicit decentralisation targets and triggers. 
From the analysis, it appears that the EC has demonstrated capacity for adaption to local 
conditions in several countries by adopting a range of aid modalities already applied locally, 
such as UNDP implementation in Cambodia, World Bank Trust Fund implementation in 
Sierra Leone, and the use of basket funding modalities in Tanzania. This has been done in 
order to harmonise with other development partners in the concerned countries. 
Support to decentralisation reforms is a dynamic process: government policies may open 
up for new opportunities – or earlier commitments to reforms are reversed – relevant 
programmes should preferably respond to these developments in a timely manner. The 
evaluation found some examples of how slowly EC procedures can prevent significant 
adjustments during programme implementation. However, especially in the early phases of 
programme formulation, the EC showed to be relatively open to make very significant 
adjustments. For instance, in both Tanzania and Sierra Leone it was decided to completely 
reject early concepts – although significant efforts have been made in initial programme 
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designs – in favour of more promising opportunities that arose partly because of Government 
initiatives and partly because of other joint donor programming.  
Project documentations (financing agreements) rarely provide an explicit discussion of pro-
and cons of different aid delivery methods.  
The debate on ―aid modalities‖ occasionally takes precedence over discussion of the 
―substance‖ (the objectives, institutional arrangements etc) of programme interventions.  
SBS is indicated as a preferred financing modality and several of the larger new programmes 
have adopted SBS as the aid delivery method. The underlying risk analysis is not always 
very complete and often the project documentation includes very brave assumptions for the 
successful implementation of SBS.  
It should also be noted that SBS to decentralisation in reality covers a very wide range of de-
facto aid management arrangements that rarely are ―full SBS‖. For instance, in Mali, the SBS 
through PARAD is accompanied by a large share of project funds for technical assistance 
(13 mEUR). In South Africa, the funds are earmarked to specific local governments (rather 
than central government) and broadly earmarked as a ―menu of investments‖ (for LED etc). 
In Tanzania, the LGDG aid modality is considered as ―basket support‖ by the EC – however 
in a recent global ODI evaluation of SBS it was included as a case study of SBS modality for 
support to decentralisation.  
The evaluation explored what types of aid delivery mechanism are most suitable for 
achieving various forms of decentralisation related objectives. Overall, it emerged that the 
relative effectiveness of different programme interventions is influenced by several factors 
but in particular the relevance of the supported activities and the overall institutional 
framework for management of these. Aid modalities per se are not decisive factors. That 
said, a number of specific observations can be made: 
 Decentralisation support is highly political – and progress on development of 
conducive government policies, legislation, appropriate assignment of responsibilities 
and corresponding resources (see also EQ5) depends on well designed programmes, 
proper analysis and institutional arrangements for reform management including 
donor coordination mechanism. The fieldwork included some cases with success in 
this field that had been implemented with different aid modalities: Mali (SBS), Sierra 
Leone (World Bank Trust Fund), Tanzania (basket fund). The expectations regarding 
supposed superiority of SBS in sector dialogue cannot be confirmed.  
 Support for capacity building of various stakeholders (see also EQ6) has been 
provided through many different aid modalities. As discussed further in EQ6, the 
support from EC has been most effective for strengthening LG capacities (rather than 
central government officials). It appears that project modalities are more effective 
than SBS – it is also noteworthy that, in some cases like in Mali, support for capacity 
building is provided through a separate project modality and not as part of the SBS. 
However, there are more important factors than aid modalities that explain relative 
successes in this area. (see also EQ6) 
 Support to capacity building of NSA and several aspects of ―local governance‖ are 
typically addressed through smaller projects. There is some evidence that this type of 
support can best be undertaken in ―project modality‖ (as illustrated in the desk survey 
and confirmed during the field phase). 
3.3.1 Ind3.3.1 - Evidence on the evolution of the type of approaches used to support 
decentralisation and how they supported national specificities 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
An overview of the main EC interventions in support to decentralisation in the 22 desk 
countries (see table below) indicates wide variations in types of aid delivery methods.  
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Table 14 Overview of major financing aid modalities for main EC support interventions 
in desk countries  
Country Region 
Start date: Title of main 
interventions - Budget (Decision#) 
Financing and Aid modality 
Benin Africa 
2003: PRODECOM - Programme 
d'appui au démarrage des communes 
8,1 m€ (#15861) 
Grant to the GoB
75
 - Project  
    
2008: PACTE - Programme d'appui à 
la décentralisation - 13,7 m€ (#19049) 
Mixed of Grant and Budget support 
Cambodia Asia 
2004: Strengthening of pilot city 
administrations Battambang and 
SiemReap: Revenues and budget, 
transparency and peoples participation 
– 0,7 m€ (#5732/90688) 
Grant (to a European association) 
– project  
    
2004: Strengthening democratic and 
decentralised local governance in 
Cambodia: building local capacity 
through networking and local-local co-
operation - 10 m€ (#16856) 
Contribution agreement to UNDP 
(with un-earmarked funds) - Project 
Colombia 
Latin 
America 
2004: II Laboratorio de Paz – 32,7 m€ 
(#5757) 
76
 
Grant to the GoC – project  
    
2006: III Laboratorio de Paz – 23,7 m€ 
(#17668) 
Grant to the GoC – project  
Guatemala 
Latin 
America 
2003: Décentralisation de l'Etat – 18,7 
m€ (#3061) 
Grant to the GoG – project 
Haiti Caribbean 
2003: Formation à la décentralisation 
des collectivités territoriales, des 
décideurs publics, et des membres des 
organisations et institutions de la 
société civile – 0,4m€ (#5002) 
Grant to Private company, NGO or 
local association
77
 
  
2005: Renforcement du processus de 
décentralisation dans les départements 
d'Haïti (Etablissement de plans 
communaux de concertation dans la 
commune de Belladère au travers 
d'une démarche institutionnelle, 
participative et focalisée) – 0,1 m€ 
(#x17047/112845) 
Grant to Private company, NGO or 
local association
78
 
  
2005: Projet d''appui à la gouvernance 
locale – 0,1 m€ (#17047/112734) 
Grant to Private company, NGO or 
local association
79
 
  
2005: Programme d''appui au 
développement décentralisé – 0,08 m€ 
(#17047/112733) 
Grant to Private company, NGO or 
local association 
Honduras 
Latin 
America 
2004: PROADES - Programa de apoyo 
a la descentralización en Honduras – 
33,7 m€ (#16807) 
SBS to GoH 
Kenya Africa 
2000: Community development 
programme phase 2 (CDP 2) - 14,5 m€ 
(#15011) 
Grant to a Community 
Development Trust Fund (CDTF) – 
project  
    
2004: Rural poverty reduction and local 
government support programme - 15,9 
m€ (#17379) 
Grant to GoK – project  
                                               
75
 Contracting body: NAO (Ministère charge des Finances et de l'Economie, Ordonnateur national); Implementing 
body: Project Management Unit (PMU). 
76
 ACCI - Agencia Colombiana de Cooperacion Internacional; implementation by 3 "Regional project units" 
(Entidades Coordinadoras Regionales: CONSORNOC, PRODEPAZ, ASOPATIA). 
77
 Association (NGO) Frères des Hommes 
78
 Association ACTED 
79
 Association (NGO) CONCERN 
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Country Region 
Start date: Title of main 
interventions - Budget (Decision#) 
Financing and Aid modality 
Lebanon ENP 
2005: Support to reforms and local 
governance – 4,8 m€ (#17554) 
Grant to the GoL – project 
Madagascar Africa 
2004: Programme d'appui aux 
communes et organisations rural pour 
le développement du sud (ACORDS) 
phase I – 29,9 m€ (#16611) 
Grant to GoM (NAO + PMU) 
    
2006: Programme d'appui aux 
communes et organisations rurales 
pour le développement du Sud 
(ACORDS) - phase II – 32,7 m€ 
(#17939) 
Grant to GoM (NAO + PMU) 
Mali Africa 
1999: Appui au démarrage des 
communes au Mali – 40,2 m€ (#14626) 
Grant to GoM 
    
2006: PARAD - Programme d'appui à 
la réforme administrative et à la 
décentralisation - 71,8 m€ (#17914) 
SBS + Grant for capacity building 
Nicaragua 
Latin 
America 
2004: Education sector policy 
programme and its decentralization 
(PAPSE) – 50,7m€ (#5749)  
SBS 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Pacific 
2006: Strengthening of districts and 
local level governments - 4,3 m€ 
(#18704) 
Grant to GoPNG 
Peru 
Latin 
America 
2003: Programme d'appui au 
développement socio-économique et a 
la décentralisation dans les régions 
d'Ayacucho et de Huancavelica – 13,0 
m€ (#5758) 
Grant to GoP, with a component of 
Budget Support to the two 
beneficiary Regions
80
 
Philippines Asia 
Philippine Health Sector Policy Support 
Programme – 24,3 m€ (#17638) 
 SBS 
Rwanda Africa 
2004: Decentralised programme for 
rural poverty reduction (DPRPR) – 40 
m€ (#16357) 
Grant to GoR 
Senegal Africa 
1999: Soutien aux initiatives de 
développement local - 10,8 m€ 
(#14414) 
Grant to GoS 
    
2004: Programme d'appui au 
programme national de Bonne 
Gouvernance (PAPNBG) - 26,1 m€ 
(#16952) 
Grant to GoS 
Sierra 
Leone 
Africa 
2006: Decentralisation capacity 
building programme – 9,1 m€ (#17038) 
MDTF (WB) 
South 
Africa 
Africa 
2001: Local economic development in 
Northern province – 29,5 m€ (#4712) 
Grant (budget support) to selected 
Local Governments  
    
2002: Urban development support to 
the Ethikwini municipality – 35,0 m€ 
(#4555) 
Grant & Budget support to GoSA/ 
eThikwini Municipality Authority  
    
2002: Local economic development 
support programme in Kwazulu Natal – 
33,7 m€ (#4557) 
Grant to GoSA
81
 
Tanzania Africa 
2005: Poverty Reduction through the 
Participation of Vulnerable People in 
Decentralised Development Planning 
and Budgeting in Tanzania – 0,7 m€ 
(#17215/118910) 
Grant to Private company, NGO or 
local association 
                                               
80
 Implementation by Consejo Nacional de Descentralizacion (CND) and "Gobiernos Regionales" (in Ayacucho 
and Huancavelica) 
81
 Implementing authority: Department of Economic Development and Tourism 
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Country Region 
Start date: Title of main 
interventions - Budget (Decision#) 
Financing and Aid modality 
    
2007 Support to Education Sector 
Reform – 43,3 m€ (#19633)  
Grant to GoT 
    
2007 Support to the Local Government 
Grant Scheme- 22,7m€ (#18888) 
Common basket fund (financing 
sector budget support) 
  
General Budget Support with specific 
indicators on decentralisation (and 
associated variable tranche)  
GBS 
Uganda Africa 
2000: ACHOLI programme 
(decentralised co-operation programme 
north of Uganda) – 3,9 m€ (#15264) 
Grants to GoU 
    
2005: Support to decentralisation 
programme – 9,2 m€ (#17857) 
Grants to GoU
82
 
 
The evolution of aid delivery methods has been closely associated with the development of 
―entry points‖ discussed above.  
When support is provided as direct support to decentralisation reforms (―top-down‖), then 
the aid modality increasingly takes the form of sector budget support to the national 
governments with the ministry in charge of local governments as main responsible for 
implementation. The use of SBS has the clear advantage of making use of country systems 
and generally conforms to the Paris Aid Harmonisation Agenda.  
Only in Tanzania, it is indicated (in the EUD survey) that General Budget Support also has 
explicit decentralisation targets and triggers (see also section 4.3.4). In the project 
documentation from Uganda, an argument is made for targeted project support to selected 
Northern local governments in order to supplement the mainstream financing of local 
governments that is viewed as supported through GBS.  
When support is provided as “bottom up” support, it normally takes the form of project 
support – generally with the national government as main partner, but also, for instance in 
the case of South Africa, with local governments as the direct partners. In South Africa a 
special permission was sought to grant “budget support” directly to local governments. As 
discussed in later chapters, this has led to some results in LED etc – however, it did not lead 
to any general changes in intergovernmental fiscal relations.  
In Cambodia it was decided by the EUD to work through the UNDP for implementation of its 
main intervention in support of decentralisation. In Sierra Leone a similar decision was made 
regarding financing decentralisation through a World Bank Trust Fund. These decisions were 
made with regard to the relative comparative advantages of working through such multilateral 
institutions with well-established reform programmes and the risks and problems associated 
with designing stand-alone EC project interventions. In Haiti, support is rendered through 
NGO project.  
In Madagascar, as already mentioned in Indicator 3.2.1, the project supported by the EC led 
to the formulation of a wider programme jointly designed with the partner government and 
the WB. The project approach allowed experimenting with new forms of delivering aid to LG 
and new forms of financing their development (based on the idea of "performance based 
grant systems") but also helped raising awareness on decentralisation issues at both local 
and national level. Several lessons were drawn from this approach and these were 
disseminated at both national and international level (at EC level, this was done through 
various mechanisms such as seminar at HQ, the Capacity4Dev forum, etc.). The box below 
illustrates some of the observations and lessons learnt regarding the approach of the 
                                               
82
 The programme is implemented in collaboration with Ugandan public institutions (e.g. the MoLG, Local 
Governments and the Uganda Local Government Association, ULGA) through programme estimates and with 
civil society actors through grants contracts, selected through a local call for proposals. 
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intervention which are pointed out in the project documentation (further information on the 
ACORDS programme is presented in Indicator 6.2.1). 
Box 12 Some major observations on the approach adopted in the ACORDS 
programme 
The project documentation of ACORDS describes a number of tangible positive results, 
such as improved capacities of LG (as illustrated in the financial audits carried out in both 
supported and not supported LG during and at the end of the programme) or the actual 
implementation of numerous local development projects in the southern region (local projects 
supported by the intervention turned out to be well in line with broader goals such as the 
MDGs83). Moreover, the project documentation highlights the fact that the project has 
contributed to an improved national dialogue, including multi-actors‘ public discussion on 
state reform, and local/national awareness on decentralisation and local governance issues. 
However, the experience of the ACORDS programme also illustrates some potential pitfalls 
associated to this type of approach (which are not necessarily only related to "project type 
approach). The TA final report "Rapport final de l‘assistant technique auprès de l‘Unité de 
Gestion Projet ACORDS (Novembre 2010)" underlines at least three major observations 
related to the implementation of the intervention: 
 Going through call for proposals: a competition that took place before any real 
sound capacity is developed. The capacity building system put in place for 
accompanying eligible LG was expected to support the development and implementation 
of PAT in 189 pre-selected LG while it maybe would have needed to support all the 660 
LG in the target regions. Going through a system of calls for proposals resulted in a 
competition between LG before any real capacity building had taken place, forcing certain 
actors to demonstrate knowledge that they did not have. The programme still provided 
some support to the LG through technical support facilities (10 to 20 per region) for the 
preparation of the proposals. However, this support did not allow for an understanding of 
the approach adopted by the LG for the development of their PAT.  
 A much higher number of LG was selected than originally planned. In practice, the 
regional bodies involved in the selection process favoured equalization by increasing the 
number of eligible LG. As a result, following the completion of two waves of calls for 
proposals, all "eligible LG" were selected. 267 LG eventually signed a grant contract with 
the PMU, which represents 40% more than the originally planned number. 
 Evaluation criteria that actually are the intended results of the programme. Some of 
the assessment criteria for the selection of proposals (see above) are in fact the intended 
"results" of the ACORDS programme. The procedure for call for proposals has proved 
inadequate in that it assumes that the applicants had already the "capacity to do" while 
the aim was actually to make them "learn how to do" during the implementation of the 
project. 
In several countries, a mix of different aid modalities is applied. In Tanzania, 
decentralisation reforms are both supported through GBS, a basket funded local government 
grant (the basket is essentially provided by sector budget support as all funds are transferred 
on a formula based grant allocation to local governments through the Tanzanian treasury), to 
the education sector as well as project support to NGOs/NSA.  
The field phase (carried out in 10 countries) has provided complementary evidence on the 
evolution of the type of approaches used to support decentralisation and how they supported 
national specificities. This information is summarised in the table below. 
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 In determining their three-year investment plans, LG have focused on local infrastructure and facilities having a 
significant "social dimension": 27.55% of the projects are related to education, 17.34% to health, 8.67% to water 
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Table 15 Evolution of EC approach – complementary information from field visits 
Country Complementary information 
Benin 
The EC response strategies in the area of decentralisation have been aligned with 
national policies, first to kick-start the capacity building of the municipalities and then in 
more programmatic and SBS forms. The partners are responding to the Governments' 
priorities / activities in the field of DLG.  
The choices of entry points and aid delivery methods have been appropriate to national 
contexts. This can be seen foremost in the extent of emphasis on DLG issues as one of 
the prominent and specific indicators being monitored under the GBS.  
Regarding the DLG agenda pushed by donors: it is not clear how much this policy is 
based on political reality and priorities or whether it is only a statement which is not 
actively pursued by Government. 
Honduras 
EC started out with an SBS modality to support decentralisation in Honduras in 2005 and 
this approach has continued since then. Some projects are also financed through the 
NSA-LA programme.  
Lebanon 
The basic aid delivery methods have not changed substantially over the evaluation period 
– aid has been in the form of ―projects‖ with no serious consideration of Sector Budget 
Support (SBS). The political and institutional situation throughout the period has been too 
uncertain and the ―sector‖ obviously too undeveloped for SBS to be considered. 
Mali 
The EC support has evolved from a "project / programme" support to a sector budget 
support. In 2006, Mali was the first country where the EC launched a sector budget 
support to decentralisation. The sector budget support has always been combined with 
direct support in the form of programmes or specific commitments. 
The first support consisted of commitments essentially in favour of the MDRI to prepare 
the legal and institutional framework and other actions prior to the elections. In 2000, the 
programme supporting the start up of the "communes" was also in the form of a project 
including several components, one of these actually corresponded to an indirect budget 
support to municipalities (contribution to the FICT - Investment Fund of Local 
Governments managed by the ANICT). In 2005, in line with the logic of accompanying the 
decentralisation policy that had been implemented for several years by national 
authorities and due to the existence of a clear policy in this area and encouraging results 
in the first years of the process, the EC has decided to move towards sector budget 
support (SBS). The pre-requirements in terms of policy documents and sector 
programmes existed with: the 2006-2015 framework document of national 
decentralisation policy ("Document Cadre de la Politique Nationale de Decentralisation" – 
DCPND), the national programme of support to the "Communes" (PNACT II 2006-2010) 
and the Institutional Development Programme (PDI 2003-2013). Furthermore, there was 
a mid-term expenditure framework - MTEF ("Cadre des Dépenses à Moyen Terme" – 
CDMT) for decentralisation and the state reform. Nevertheless, these MTEF were 
considered to be weak. 
59 mEUR of the 72 mEUR PARAD programme were used for SBS (75% to 
decentralisation and 25% for the state reform) and 13 mEUR were set aside for specific 
activities related to institutional support. It is noteworthy that the PARAD corresponds to 
8,6% of the budget support received by Mali for that period (2006-2009) and almost 22% 
of the volume of SBS. 
The weight of PARAD in financing the decentralisation and state reform is crucial 
because it represents 30% of contributions for decentralisation (contribution of state and 
development partners) and 48% of contributions for the state reform.  
The ADERE programme was implemented as a "project". 
The new PARADER programme continues within the same logic as for the PARAD, 
combining sector budget support and project support for institutional aspects. 44 mEUR 
were allocated to SBS and 31 mEUR were allocated in the form of "project‖, of which 7 
mEUR for structuring investments for regional development (support to decentralisation - 
DER component), 12 mEUR for the support of regional assemblies (DER), 5mEUR for 
institutional support for the state reform and 3 mEUR for the support to decentralisation 
(DNCT, ENA / CFCT). 
A significant part of the SBS within PARAD and PARADER was directed towards the 
ANICT. 
Peru 
Apart from AGORAH and specific small projects funded by the NSA-LA programme, the 
EC is not supporting decentralisation directly. The indirect support is provided through 
sectoral interventions. 
Philippines 
Within the health sector support, the aid delivery methods have gradually developed 
towards SBS in line with national as well as global EC priorities. However, for direct local 
governance support, the SPF instrument has remained a ―demand driven‖ project facility. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
82 
Country Complementary information 
Alternative instruments have not been significantly explored (or at least not explicitly 
discussed in e.g. SPF Action Fiche etc). 
Rwanda 
A move from Project to Programme and Sector Budget Support in the EC support to the 
decentralisation process has taken place over the last 10 years. In particular, the funding 
modality has been changed under the DPRPR to better fit with the GoR‘s preferred 
transfer mechanism to local governments under the CDF. 
Sierra Leone 
No particular evolution. The EC has supported decentralisation since 2004 and followed 
the WB approach in the IRCBP. The approach has evolved during the implementation 
following recommendations from the IRCBP implementation support missions, which 
have been carried out annually or semi-annually. According to MLG&RD the responses 
have been appropriate.  
South Africa 
The following extract from an External Assistance Monitoring Report (EAMR) report of 
2006 clearly demonstrates that the EUD is constantly trying to adapt its approaches to the 
national context and the problems faced.  
"In 2005 all disbursement targets on SBS were fulfilled. This modality certainly increases 
the efficiency of the work of the Delegation. However, new skills not previously required 
by Delegation project officers will need to be acquired. Furthermore, the learning process 
in many South African (SA) departments is slow and considerable effort needs to be 
made in the initial stages to come to a common understanding. Close contact with the 
thematic support unit on budget support (BS) in EuropeAid Co-operation Office (AIDCO) 
is therefore necessary".  
This was confirmed in the interviews with national stakeholders carried out in the country. 
Tanzania 
In 2004, it was decided by the EC that support to LGDG would be the most appropriate 
direct support to decentralisation reforms. A Financial Proposal was prepared the same 
year and submitted June 2005 to HQ, however rejected because of the proposed aid 
modality (financing the LGDG through LGRP basket funding). Annex 6 provides details on 
the formulation timeline, where internal EC discussion focused mainly on aid delivery 
methods with concerns in HQ about basket funding. These problems prevented the EC to 
take more of a lead role in decentralisation support and delayed funding decisions. 
Like other DPs, EC has also started increasing GBS while it was commonly agreed that 
some earmarked funding was required for a number of years to establish the LGDG 
system before it ultimately would be fully financed by GoT (through GBS and own 
revenue generation). Most bilaterals preferred to provide such funding through a pooled 
arrangement using the existing LGRP basket fund mechanism. For the World Bank it was 
necessary to establish a separate project. In theory, it would have been possible to fund 
the LGDG in an earmarked manner through SBS – but this would have been an added 
institutional arrangement that couldn't be agreed upon given the earlier engagement by 
bilaterals and WB. From GoT perspective, (and from several of the participating bilateral 
DPs) the agreed basket funding arrangement was effectively seen as SBS since the 
funds after pooling in the basket were transferred to Treasury and from there disbursed 
directly to all 114 LGs using GoT accounting procedures only . 
 
3.3.2 Ind3.3.2 - Occasions where efficiency has been lost because of the inability of 
the programme to be adjusted because of changed country circumstances 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Support to decentralisation reforms is a dynamic process: government policies may open up 
for new opportunities – or earlier commitment to reforms is reversed – relevant programmes 
should preferably respond to these developments in a timely manner.  
In Rwanda, there were no examples found where inflexibility has led to non-adjustment to 
changing situation within DLG. The DPRPR was revised to accommodate the changing 
funding surrounding districts. First, the programme only targeted some few districts but 
changes to the approach midway meant that a countrywide approach was adopted for the 
community support part (Ubudehe).  
Yet, some ―lost opportunities‖ were identified.  
In Honduras, the SBS modality proved to be a modality that has difficulty to adjust to the 
changing context of the country. The final evaluation of the PROADES programme points out 
that only 4.4 million EUR out of the 16.4 mEUR released to SEFIN (Ministry of Finance) has 
actually been "transferred" to the Ministry of Interior (SEIP – Secretariat in charge 
decentralisation). Moreover, the GoH‘s policy on decentralisation changed in 2006 with 
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decentralisation not being a priority any longer. This affected the release of funds of budget 
support and the use of the technical assistance (it also appears that the staff at SEIP have 
only limited knowledge of the outputs of the technical assistance). 
In Mali, the support to regions was not adequately included in the programme although, later 
clearly identified as a priority. The support to regions under the ADERE and the PARADER 
programme was partly done through specific funding allocations outside the common ANICT 
channel. Moreover, regions were not fully involved in the allocation decisions, the 
management and the implementation of the activities financed by these funds (this has lead, 
for instance, to over emphasis on road infrastructure development projects). Finally, 
although, it appears that the SBS programmes have presented a number of strengths in the 
support to decentralisation in Mali (see country visit note in Volume II - Annex 11), there have 
been serious limitations regarding the decentralisation sector dialogue that took place in the 
context of these programmes in recent years. 
Box 13 Limitations of the sector dialogue in the context of SBS in Mali 
Budget support programme requires the identification of the relevant mechanisms for political 
dialogue and consultation between the national government and pooling partners, and the 
identification of the relevant bodies in charge of the implementation and monitoring of the 
national policies. In Mali, the system related to the state reform, the decentralisation process 
and the monitoring of relevant programmes shows a superposition of six bodies having in 
theory different functions and are of different nature. The analysis carried out in this 
evaluation shows that there are often overlaps with monitoring responsibilities. 
Overall, this leads to a fragmentation of responsibilities and a situation characterised by the 
fact that the body most be highly placed in terms of monitoring and supervision, the 
Monitoring Committee of the State Reform (CSRE), which was supposed to decide on 
potential trade-offs and to suggest reorientations, is practically not functional. 
In particular, the evaluation team has observed that: 
 The CSRE was set up within the framework of the dialogue between the government and 
its partners with the goal of having a national authority at the highest level that would 
ensure this coordination of reforms. The CSRE is under the supervision of the Prime 
Minister. The implementation of this committee was one of the specific target indicators of 
SBS. In fact, it took time to meet the target (2006 to 2009). Given the fact that this 
situation could create the suspension of disbursement, partners had to meet several times 
with the national authorities and engaged in extensive discussions. 
 The institutions responsible for the implementation reform (CDI – "Commissariat au 
Développement Institutionnel") and the National Directorate of Local Governments (DNCT 
"Direction Nationale des Collectivités Territoriales") have weaknesses in terms of 
"institutional positioning" which limits the scope of their actions. The Commission for 
institutional development (CDI) does not really play a guiding role due to an ambiguous 
institutional positioning. More specifically, it is in fact placed on a level with the Ministry 
responsible for the state reform, although it could be attached to the Prime Minister in 
order to be heard in other departments because of the cross-cutting of involved issues.  
 The DNCT remains rather marginalized within its department and the MATCL is without 
any real autonomy of action and without representation in the regions. It has few qualified 
human resources and low capacity to influence the choice of policy directions. It is 
expected to be transformed into a General Directorate, which would give the institution 
more scope for making decisions. 
 A general weakness of all the committees established concerns the fact that the meetings 
are not prepared, the members come without having taken note of the questions to be 
addressed or bringing the point of view or proposals of their structures. 
 The panel of decentralisation appears as a place for exchange between partners and the 
authorities, but it is the CDI and DNCT who participate at the governmental level and it 
appeared that their weight was limited. The recurrent questions asked by partners on 
points that are not resolved in the process of decentralisation (transfer of powers and 
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resources to LG, reform of local taxation, monitoring of decentralisation, technical support 
to LG...) illustrates the limitations of this panel. 
 Within the established monitoring system, an "annual review" allows to analyze the 
situation of the indicators jointly between nationals and partners. This review appears to 
be an interesting place for debate on the progress and constraints but it always stays at a 
level of "technicians". 
In summary, it appears that actually there has not been a real political dialogue after 2006. 
This is a typical case of absence of real support of the reforms by the government: the 
conditionalities related to the SBS modalities are fulfilled under pressure of the development 
partners without any real initiatives from the government. The existence of a "multiple bodies" 
set up is questionable in the absence of political support. What comes out clearly is that if the 
institutions in place and in charge of the relevant areas would assume their responsibilities, 
these ad hoc and parallel bodies (CSRE, Panel of decentralisation, annual review) would not 
be necessary. 
This lack of support at national level seems to be rooted in the unwillingness of central 
administrations to adjust their policies and actually implement the necessary transfers of 
functions and resources related to the decentralisation process. In the absence of strong 
political will to induce changes in these central administrations and absence of obligation in 
this area at the level of the National Assembly, the whole process is affected and sectoral 
dialogue related to the SBS is naturally hampered. 
 
In Peru, the AGORAH programme was not adjusted after the CND ("Consejo Nacional de la 
Descentralización") has been closed in 2006, which resulted in a de-linking of the AGORAH 
programme to the central government.  
In Tanzania, finalisation of the EC programme support of the (already designed and agreed 
LGDG system) dragged on for two years because of EC HQ being concerned over the 
nature of funding agreement (basket funding arrangement). EC procedures can thus lead to 
a slow process (see also Box below on the history of EC Formulation of Support to LGDG in 
Tanzania).  
Moreover, to undertake significant adjustments during programme implementation appears in 
general difficult for the EC to implement.  
However, especially in the early phases of programme formulation, the EC is relatively open 
to make very significant adjustments. Thus, in both Tanzania and Sierra Leone, it was 
decided to completely revise early concepts – although significant efforts have been made in 
initial programme design – in favour of more promising opportunities that arose partly 
because of Government initiatives and partly because of other new joint donor initiatives.  
Box 14 History of EC Formulation of Support to LGDG in Tanzania84 
2003: formulation of Capacity Building for Participatory Development to support Lower Local 
Government in limited districts, however, LGCDG under development by LGRP and other 
donors → decision to await this process and ensure consistency. 
2004: update of FP (rename to Local Capacity Building Programme) to include support to 
LGRP through basket modality.  
June 2005: Submission of PIF. Decision not to allow basket funding. Reformulation to only 
support LGCDG through co-financing agreement with WB, however concern from NAO‘s 
office on fees. 
July/August 2005: Possible re-orientation from HQ to allow for basket. Decision to revise 
again, although maintaining the option of WB until official notice from HQ on basket issue. 
October 2005: No indication from HQ that this will be allowed any time soon, decision to 
move ahead to be able to commit the money. This is communicated to AIDCO E4. 
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November 2005: Submission of revised PIF. 
January 2006: Comments are uploaded on intranet, subsequently all addressed in FP. 
However, PIF is rejected. 
February 2006: email from AIDCO that note which may allow basket funding is still soon to 
come. 
March 2006: Complete u-turn from Commission, now contribution agreements are no longer 
acceptable and we should go for basket-option on a ‗case-by-case basis‘.  
May 2006: First submission of FP, QSG in June asks for clarifications. 
July 2006: Second submission of FP, QSG again asks more questions. 
July 2006: Third submission of FP, QSG in August approves. Scheduled to presented at the 
October EDF Committee.  
 
Options pursued: 
Basket funding: preferred option, however, is also not ―for free‖ – LGRP also has 
administrative costs just for operating the programme. In addition, included in the cost of 
implementing the LGCDG system are service costs paid to LGRP and LGSP, which amounts 
to approx. 5%. 
Sector budget support: criteria have been analyzed and assessed and for several of the 
seven criteria specified by the HQ guidelines, it would be premature and at the same time 
overhasty in this context: the LGCDG system is new and only fully operational from the fiscal 
year starting 2011 on. Furthermore it would be adding funding streams/transaction costs at a 
time when PO-RALG is preoccupied with considerable institutional changes. 
Through World Bank: was not the preferred but the feasible option. Administration fee of 
2% is very low compared to other organisations, UN for comparison operates with between 
10-15%. 
The time left for commitments of 9th EDF is also important to consider in this context. 
3.3.3 Ind3.3.3 - Key questions on the choice of the most adequate aid delivery 
methods (such as “When and how to use sector budget support?” or “what are 
the risks related to the aid delivery method”) are addressed in project 
documents 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
It appears from the desk review that project documentation (financing agreements) rarely 
provide an explicit discussion of pro-and cons of different aid delivery methods. SBS is 
indicated as a preferred financing modality and several of the larger new programmes have 
adopted SBS as the aid delivery method. 
The underlying risk analysis is not always very complete and often the project documentation 
includes very brave assumptions for the successful implementation of SBS. For instance, in 
the case of Jordan: 
Box 15 SBS and Risk Assumptions – The case of Jordan 
The following principal assumptions for the achievement of the support programme's 
objectives have been identified: 
• The continuation of the decentralisation process with appropriate competencies and 
capacities for municipalities.  
• Successful coordination between stakeholders, including public sector, civil society and 
private sector, at national and local level to agree on common objectives and strategies and 
sufficient operational coordination.  
• Given the current highly centralized institutional environment, acceptance by central and 
regional authorities of the primary role of municipalities and local communities in defining 
development needs priorities.  
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• Acceptance by all stakeholders of participatory principles for local development.  
• Sufficiency of envisaged additional investment at local level to launch development 
dynamics and obtain significant impact on poverty levels and living conditions. 
 
The debate on ―aid modalities‖ occasionally takes precedence over discussions on the 
―substance‖ (the objectives, institutional arrangements etc) of programme interventions. For 
instance, in Tanzania, this issue on its own delayed decisions for programming for two years 
although the basic design (to support Government of Tanzania with introducing a ―block 
grants system‖ for development funds (the LGDG)) was agreed.  
Indeed, the general preference for SBS frequently leads to that the EC takes this as the 
overall preferred entry point for support – rather than engaging in more general assessments 
of the development challenges and issues in the sector – and then subsequently explores 
what aid modalities would be most relevant. Some countries have prudently decided not to 
engage with SBS – e.g. Lebanon, but others have, in similar challenging situations (e.g. 
Jordan), decided to proceed with SBS.  
It should also be noted that SBS to decentralisation in reality covers a very wide range of de-
facto aid management arrangements that rarely are ―full SBS‖.  
For instance, in Mali, the SBS is accompanied (e.g. through PARAD) by a large share of 
project funds for technical assistance (13 mEUR). In South Africa, the funds are earmarked 
specific local governments (rather than central Government generally) and broadly 
earmarked as a ―menu of investments‖ (for LED etc). In Tanzania, the LGDG aid modality is 
considered as ―basket support‖ by the EC – however, in a recent global ODI evaluation of 
SBS it was included as a case study of SBS modality for support to decentralisation.  
Box 16 Selection of indicators of SBS in Mali 
For the PARAD, 12 indicators were selected (see also field visit country note). Nine 
indicators concerned specifically decentralisation and three the state reform. Some indicators 
are decomposed into sub-indicators, leading, once disaggregated, to the total number of 21 
indicators. 
Indicator selection has proven to be difficult. It combines some of the indicators related to the 
MDGs and also some of other objectives of the PDI and of the national policy document on 
decentralisation (DCPND - "Document cadre de politique nationale de decentralisation" 
2005-2014). These areas are well targeted: 
 Public access to basic services covered by the LG; 
 Decentralisation Policy; 
 Interdependence of decentralisation-deconcentration; 
 State reform. 
The indicators themselves seem to be justified even though some can be discussed. In 
particular one must notice the difficulties in fulfilling them. The reasons of these difficulties 
are rooted in the formulation phase of the indicators which reveals a lack of accuracy in the 
definition of the calculation procedure and the obstacles to gather the right data for the 
indicators in the implementation phase. This difficulty is explained in order to calculate the 
fulfilment of the indicators, the specific supporting documents have first to be generated 
which then causes delays in the original deadlines. Furthermore, there is a lack of accurate 
definition of certain indicators (e.g. one indicator is the existence of water points, which then 
does not take into account the operational water points85) or questioning about construction 
of the indicators (e.g. for the deconcentration of the budget: "is the progress in the transfer of 
the resources consistent with the needs of deconcentrated services?"), the fact that the 
databases non-functioning (SIGMA, OISE and DGMP) are not any more in use or not 
                                               
85
 The external audit of spending in the decentralization process of Mali revealed several misleading indicators 
which hide a very poor quality of some infrastructures or procedures in the decentralization sector.  
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
87 
updated. In some cases, the reliability of data is questioned by certain observers (as 
indicators of the number of sessions and the PV of the municipal executive). 
The target set for the indicators can be considered as little demanding. Indeed, the expected 
improvements appear very realistic, even low regarding the example of the indicator on the 
resources of local governments per inhabitant to increase from CFAF 850 in 2004 to 1032 
FCFA in 2009 if we refer to the low level of recovery. The calculation of those indicators, 
verified during an annual joint review, raises every time lively discussions between the 
parties. 
But the basic problem, which appeared with hindsight, concerns the reality that covers those 
indicators. It does not seem that these indicators are revealing true dynamics of change in 
the field as noted by recent evaluation of budget support (see quote below). 
"As for the indicators themselves, with hindsight of four years of operating SBS, and despite 
their average rate of satisfactory achievements (in the range of 10/12, the figures for 2009 
are still to be verified), it appears that this attack is not always revealing an improvement in 
the situation described by the indicator. Without challenging their relevance point by point, 
we can address them with the critic of having been designed without sufficient consideration 
of their specific modalities of implementation86. While stimulating aimed performances they 
remain punctual and do not necessarily have a positive impact on their context. Their 
appreciation does not sufficiently take into account the current dynamics, as it was stressed 
during the meeting of the Focus Group MoEF87. " 
The difficulty in producing the indicators was a source of delay in the disbursements of 
variable tranches, which had a negative impact on the results. The mechanism measured: 
the release of tranches for the year N is done in the N-year analysis of the indicators for the 
year N-1. Now this problem is solved in N years analyzing the indicators of the year N-1 for 
disbursement in year N +1. 
This problem of intelligence of indicators is linked to a deficit of more general information.  
Who talks about monitoring a sector, talks about an "information system" to produce reliable 
data about the situation in the sector. This system is particularly important in the context of 
budget support based, as we have seen, on indicators that determine the start for payment of 
tranches. In Mali, this system fails. The EC has funded the implementation of a database 
(OISE), unfortunately it is practically no longer functional since its attachment to 
deconcentrated territorial administration. Only few elements of the base are fulfilled to inform 
about two or three indicators for SBS rather than producing information for controlling the 
sector. 
Source: Analysis of evaluation team based on information gathered in the desk and field phases 
3.3.4 Ind3.3.4 - Assessment of relative strength and weaknesses of various aid 
delivery methods 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The web survey to the EUDs explored the EUD perceptions of what type of aid delivery 
mechanism they found most suitable for achieving various forms of decentralisation related 
objectives. Details are provided in the figures below.  
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87
 Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; February 2012; Particip GmbH 
88 
Figure 14 EUD's perception on the appropriateness of specific aid delivery mechanisms for support to local governance and support to 
national policy and legislative framework (scale 1: low – 4: high) 
Support to local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability 
and transparency 
 
Support to national policy and legislative framework related to decentralisation 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
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Figure 15 EUD's perception on the appropriateness of specific aid delivery mechanisms for different types of capacity building support (scale 
1:low – 4:high) 
Support to capacities of the local governments for decentralised administrative, 
fiscal and political responsibilities/powers? 
 
Support to capacities of the non state actors (e.g., Local government 
associations, etc.) involved in the decentralisation process? 
 
Support to capacities of the key central government bodies involved in 
decentralisation policy formulation and implementation? 
 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
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Many of the EUDs stated in the responses to the survey that it was difficult to make 
generalisations, since the choice of aid modality has to be contextualised. Nevertheless, it 
can be concluded from the survey that respondents consider: 
3. Project support secondly SBS as most effective for supporting ―local governance; 
transparency and accountability, 
4. SBS as most effective for supporting national policy and legislative framework related 
to decentralisation, 
5. Project support (and SBS) as most effective for strengthening the capacities of the 
local governments for decentralised administrative, fiscal and political 
responsibilities/powers, 
6. Project support as most effective for supporting the capacities of the non state actors 
(e.g., Local government associations, etc.) involved in the decentralisation process, 
7. SBS as most effective for supporting the capacities of the key central government 
bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and implementation. 
The above propositions were tested during fieldwork. Details on results related to impact on 
policy development are discussed in EQ5, results related to stakeholder capacities are 
discussed in EQ6, and results related to ―local governance‖ are discussed in EQ7. 
The overall conclusions from the fieldwork are: 
 The relative effectiveness of different programme interventions is influenced by 
several factors but in particular by the relevance of the supported activities and the 
overall institutional framework for management of these. Aid modalities per se are not 
decisive factors. 
 Decentralisation support is highly political – and progress on development of 
conducive government policies, legislation, appropriate assignment of responsibilities 
and corresponding resources (see also EQ5) depends on well designed programmes, 
proper analysis and institutional arrangements for reform management including 
donor coordination mechanism. The fieldwork included some cases with success in 
this field that had been implemented with different aid modalities: Mali (SBS), Sierra 
Leone (World Bank Trust Fund), Tanzania (basket fund). The expectations regarding 
supposed superiority of SBS in sector dialogue cannot be confirmed (see box below).  
 Support for capacity building of various stakeholders (see also EQ6) has been 
provided through many different aid modalities. As discussed further in EQ6, the 
support from EC has been relative most effective for strengthening LG capacities 
(rather than central government officials). It appears that project modalities are 
relative more effective than SBS – it is also noteworthy that, for instance in Mali, 
support for capacity building is provided through a project modality and not as part of 
the SBS. However, there are more important factors than aid modalities that explain 
relative successes in this area.  
 Support for CB of NSA and several aspects of ―local governance‖ are typically 
addressed through smaller projects. There is some field evidence that this type of 
support can best be undertaken in ―project modality‖. This confirms the suggestions of 
EUD staff in the desk survey.  
Box 17 Elements gathered during the field phase in Mali on strengths and 
weaknesses of SBS 
In Mali, the EUD draws a mixed picture of the SBS: positive in terms of disbursement and 
direct support to the "communes", more limited in the removal of obstacles to the reform 
process of the state and decentralisation.  
The recent situation is characterised by delays in the effective transfer of functions and 
power to the local level as well as the fact that local governments does not benefit from a 
strong political and financial support from the central government (viability of the system is 
strongly sustained by the development partners) raises a number of questions about the 
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need to continue the support in the form of SBS. The evaluation team tries to illustrate some 
elements of the answer below. 
On the one hand, there are tangible results from the support provided so far via SBS: local 
governments are operational , deliver services and the democratic process has taken place. 
After ten years of progress (which is a relatively short time period given the context of Mali), 
decentralisation is now strongly rooted in the institutional landscape and does not seem 
reversible. The EC has contributed greatly to this success and the current SBS has certainly 
been instrumental in maintaining the decentralisation in the agenda of state reform and 
ensuring the financial support to the "communes" using national systems. 
On the other hand, the weak political support undermines one of the conditions of the SBS. It 
is clear that without the contribution of partners and the EDF in particular, the "Communes" 
would not have reached this point. Moreover, the introduction of SBS has also lead to a new 
form of dialogue between the EC and national authorities focused on results (despite some 
weaknesses related to this dialogue and the imperfections of the current system).  
Three elements support the idea of continuing the SBS to decentralisation rather than to go 
back to the initial point: 
 The policy environment can change in the near future and the political support to the 
decentralisation process may evolve positively. It makes more sense to position the 
cooperation strategy over the long run regardless of political vicissitudes, rather than to 
change its mode of action based on them (and this is what the EC seems to have decided 
to do). 
 Decentralisation is a cross-cutting dimension of the state reform. To provide continuous 
support facilitates the fact that it is taken into account in the various sectors. In addition, 
the improvement of basic services delivery which helps achieving the MDGs requires the 
capacity development of local governments over the long run. 
 The SBS can provide a minimum level of predictability of the resources available to 
implement a national policy; moreover, if adequately designed as a tool for dialogue, the 
SBS can be a useful tool to induce certain necessary changes. 
The experience of the EUD and national authorities should help to better frame the coming 
budget support, the "conditionalities" and the choice of indicators. A key to success will 
certainly be to better ensure the link between the different supports (financial and non 
financial support and, more generally, non budget support), to accelerate the transfer of 
functions and powers at sectoral level, to take into account the cross-cutting dimension of 
decentralisation and to enhance the capacity development at local level. In particular, the 
increase in resources at local level, including the level of the national budget allocated to 
local governments, should be one of the main points in upcoming discussions about the 
future SBS. 
 
3.4 JC3.4 The EC use of multi-actor/level approach is responsive to national 
contexts 
Main findings at JC level 
The EC has in its support to decentralisation in third countries worked with a very wide range 
of actors in support of decentralisation.  
However, there are some clear patterns: 
 The most common partner is the national government with the ministry in charge of 
local governments as the lead (see also JC5.1). 
 Local Governments are always involved as participating stakeholders but are also in 
some cases the main partners – in particular for interventions targeting selected local 
governments such as in South Arica.  
 A less common key partner (for bigger projects) represents the NGOs and other NSA. 
It is noteworthy that NGOs turned out to be key partners especially in the context of 
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fragile states (e.g. in Haiti or Madagascar). NGOs are very frequent partners in 
smaller specific interventions related to local democratic governance or specific 
service delivery, although, it appears that this type of support often lacks a systematic 
and strategic link to wider reform programmes involving central & local authorities. 
 In a few cases, there is significant involvement of local government associations (in 
particular Cambodia, but also Honduras and Benin), see also Indicator 6.3.1. it 
appeared from the evidence gathered in this evaluation that LGA could play a much 
more predominant role in the EC support (in particular, to make it more responsive) 
but experience shows that this option should be envisaged with care as it implies 
dealing with a quite highly politicised environment (see failed attempts in Mali and 
difficulties faced in Peru). 
 It is rare to find significant involvements of other core ―decentralisation stakeholders‖ 
(except by their representation in Steering Committees) such as Local Government 
Finance Commissions, Audit institutions, Ministry of Public Service, etc. 
Programme formulations include some stakeholder analyses. However, the description of 
various actors are typically limited to the particular actors involved in the intended 
programme and their specific anticipated role in the programme rather than a wider political 
and institutional analysis that, for instance, would have determined the likely support or 
resistance to reforms from various stakeholders. The realisation that more in-depth ―Political 
Economy and Governance Analyses‖ are required for design of appropriate interventions in 
support of decentralisation is fairly recent, but increasingly recognised within the EC (see 
also JC3.1). 
3.4.1 Ind3.4.1 - EC strategy papers and programmes include a political and 
institutional analysis of the role of the different actors in decentralisation and 
governance processes 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The team has to date not identified a fully-fledged ―political and institutional analysis of the 
role of different actors in the decentralisation and governance processes‖ undertaken by the 
EC in its development of country strategies and programmes. 
As discussed in further details in the analysis of Country Strategy papers (Volume II - Annex 
6): the discussion of decentralisation is normally not very elaborated and do not contain 
detailed stakeholder analysis. However, it is noteworthy that in some countries like Benin, 
formal consultation mechanisms were established for the drafting of the CSP2 under which 
decentralisation/local development was one main topic of the consultations with Non State 
Actors. During this consultation it emerged that: 
Benin (CSP2) "Non-State Actors (NSAs) recognize the importance of local 
development and decentralisation as a development priority area (on which EU aid 
may be concentrated in the five years of the next financial protocol ACP-EC). They 
placed particular emphasis on (a certain number of) points and aspects (…)". 
The analysis in various project documentation differs, but in general the description of 
various actors are limited to the particular actors involved in the programme and their specific 
anticipated role in the programme rather than a wider political and institutional analysis that 
e.g. would have determined the likely support or resistance to reforms from various 
stakeholders.  
Project agreements with slightly more elaborate analysis of stakeholders‘ position include 
e.g. Jordan (analysis of potential role and position of municipalities, regions and central 
government institutions on decentralisation reforms), probably because the project proposes 
a new intervention and the use of sector budget support as the main modality of support.  
The realisation that more in-depth ―Political Economy and Governance Analyses‖ are 
required for design of appropriate interventions in support of decentralisation is fairly recent. 
In 2010 both the World Bank and Danida developed a guide to political economy and 
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governance analysis of support to decentralisation – now shared on a website supported by 
the EC88. The EC has only recently started developing such tools89. 
EUDs frequently make use of locally produced stakeholder analysis, independent work 
commissioned by the EUDs are rare. As long as other stakeholder‘s produce relevant 
analysis this is considered as unproblematic. However, during the fieldwork several EUDs 
have expressed their concerns over the limited possibilities they had for undertaking 
separate quality studies. 
EUDs situational analyses are often based on reflections on past programme experiences 
rather than on stand alone analytical work. The reflections of the EUD in Lebanon (see 
below) are illustrative in this context. 
Box 18 The various levels of the EC support in Lebanon 
The EC has supported local development in Lebanon through a variety of national 
institutional entry points. The challenge for the EC has been that the ―sector‖ was ill defined 
by both national government and donors: ―local development‖ was by the EUD clearly 
associated with ―local authorities‖, but these were in turn very weak and there was no clear 
designation of a government institution to oversee their development. In hindsight, the EUD 
provided the following reflections on past interventions90: 
"These projects have been carried by different institutions, having no real mandate to support 
municipalities, and were not intended to accompany a national vision, which affects the 
sustainability of results. There has been no approach to reconciliation between central and 
local levels. These activities are unfortunately not addressing the structural problems of the 
municipalities (financial resources, degree of autonomy)‖.  
The implementing organisations ESFD, CDR and OMSAR had no particular mandate to work 
with ―local government reform‖. ESFD and CRD were established to work with ―local 
development‖. OMSAR‘s core mandate was to work on overall public sector reforms, yet 
because of having to take responsibility for unspent EU funds it had to take responsibilities 
for e.g. local solid waste management. 
At the local level, OMSAR worked with projects for clusters of local governments (similar to 
but not identical with the unions), whereas ESFD mainly worked with projects implemented 
by the individual municipalities. 
It is only in the proposed future municipal finance reform project that MoIM is given a lead 
status for implementation of local development activities. Under the new programme, focus 
for local level project implementation will be at ―union‖ level. 
In the Philippines, the analysis of decentralisation and local governance issues at CSP level 
is fairly general with no in-depth stakeholder analysis (see also annex 5 of the field visit 
country note). The EC generally relies on other DPs analyses rather than initiate independent 
assessments.  
The main partners in the health sector support have primarily been the DoH, DBM and 
Provincial Governments. The recent PFM support includes broader stakeholder involvement 
,as shortcomings have been recognised under past PFM support within the health sector 
(see box below). 
                                               
88
 Available on the web at http://www.dpwg-lgd.org. 
 
89
 See e.g. ―Using Political Economy Analysis to improve EU development Effectiveness‖ – a DEVCO Concept 
paper – by Sue Unsworth and Gareth Williams (Final Drfat September 2011).  
90
 Overview based on the memo from the EUD: "Projets UE en cours dans le secteur du développement local".  
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Box 19 Lessons learnt from PFM Support in the Philippines (extract from Action 
Fiche) 
The analysis is strongly confirmed by reports under the PFM component of the recently 
completed EU-funded HSPSP (2007-2010), which have specifically identified the following 
issues constraining local service delivery and governance: 
 Need to involve the other oversight agencies as PFM responsibilities are not exclusively 
within DBM mandate. 
 Need for involvement of Local Chief Executive and awareness creation at that level. Weak 
political awareness concerning the need for a more solid, coordinated and aligned PFM-
LGU system. PFM reform is a political process and involvement of the Sangunian 
Palawan
91
 (SP) should be pursued.  
 Need for PFM leadership within LGUs. It is difficult to pin down leadership accountability 
as PFM is lodged with the Local Finance Committee (LFC) or PFM Committee, which are 
collegial bodies. 
 Ineffective/out-dated administrative set-up at LGUs. The current set-up should be re-
structured to promote better work efficiency, avoid proliferation of unnecessary positions 
and enhance a more professional, career-oriented, responsive and stable corps of LGU 
employees.  
 Lack of effective internal control and monitoring & evaluation. Reluctance to establish 
these new functions because of personnel services limitation, non-appreciation of the 
value of an internal audit service (IAS), or differences in appreciation / understanding of 
internal audit. 
Source: Support to Local Government Units for more effective and accountable Public Finance Management -
CRIS reference: DCI-ASIE/2011/022-691 
In Tanzania, the EC includes in its CSPs political and institutional analysis of the role of the 
different actors in decentralisation and governance processes, however, analysis is largely 
based on work led by other DPs (leading the LGR). The EC decided to join the LGDG and in 
this manner works mainly with PMO-RALG and MOFEA as lead partners. EC did not engage 
significantly with NGOs as, for instance, the NGO working group on LG reforms and ALAT 
were supported by other DPs more actively engaged in LGR. However, ALAT currently 
seeks assistance from a global EU Call for proposals to support LG association. 
3.4.2 Ind3.4.2 - Mix of actors that the EC has chosen to work with in order to achieve 
established decentralisation objectives 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The global inventory indicates that EC frequently combines different approaches in the same 
country (see Volume II – Annex 3, and summary table below). For instance, in Guatemala, 
Honduras and Mauritania, it has directly supported decentralisation (with Government as 
lead actor) and, in parallel, has financed programmes aimed at strengthening civil society to 
participate in local governance (with civil society organisations as lead actors). 
The pattern is similar within the 22 desk countries analysed: the EC has in its support to 
decentralisation in third countries worked with a very wide range of actors in support of 
decentralisation.  
However, there are some clear patterns: 
 The most common partner is the national government with the ministry in charge of 
local governments as the lead. 
 Local Governments are always involved as participating stakeholders but are also in 
some cases the main partners – in particular for interventions targeting selected local 
governments such as it is the case in South Arica.  
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 A less common key partner (for bigger projects) are the NGOs – e.g. in Haiti and to a 
certain extent in Madagascar (both illustrating well the case of fragile states). 
However, NGOS are very frequently partners in the smaller NSA specific 
interventions. 
 In a few cases, there is significant involvement of local government associations (in 
particular Cambodia, but also Honduras and Benin). 
 It is rare to find significant involvements of other core ―decentralisation stakeholders‖ 
(except by their representation in Steering Committees) such as Local Government 
Finance Commissions, Audit institutions, Ministry of Public Service. 
Table 16 Overview of partners and stakeholders per country 
Country Region 
Start date: Title of main 
interventions - Budget 
(Decision#) 
Main partner  
 
Other participating 
local stakeholders  
Benin Africa 
2003: PRODECOM - 
Programme d'appui au 
démarrage des communes 8,1 
m€ (#15861) 
MDGLAAT LGs/NGOs 
    
2008: Programme d'appui à la 
décentralisation - 15 m€ 
(#19049)  
MDGLAAT/ANCB 
LGs and Local 
Government 
Association (ANCB) 
  
2009: SBS – EUR 45 Million for 
local development 
MDGLAAT/CONA
FIL 
LGs 
Cambodia Asia 
2004: Strengthening of pilot city 
administrations Battambang and 
SiemReap: Revenues and 
budget, transparency and 
peoples participation – 0,7 m€ 
(#5732/90688) 
City local 
governments and 
LG association 
City  
    
2004: Strengthening democratic 
and decentralised local 
governance in Cambodia: 
building local capacity through 
networking and local-local co-
operation - 10 m€ (#16856) 
Ministry of Interior 
National League of 
Commune/Sangkat 
(NLC/S) and its 
network of Provincial 
Associations of 
Commune/Sangkat 
(PAC/S), the Senate 
Colombia 
Latin 
America 
2004: II Laboratorio de Paz – 
32,7 m€ (#5757) 
92
 
Regional and local 
governments and 
NGOs  
 
    
2006: III Laboratorio de Paz – 
23,7 m€ (#17668) 
 Regional and 
local governments 
and NGOs 
 
Guatemala 
Latin 
America 
2003: Décentralisation de l'Etat – 
18,7 m€ (#3061) 
 Government   
Haiti Caribbean 
2003: Formation à la 
décentralisation des collectivités 
territoriales, des décideurs 
publics, et des membres des 
organisations et institutions de la 
société civile – 0,4m€ (#5002) 
 LGs and NGOs  
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 ACCI - Agencia Colombiana de Cooperacion Internacional; implementation by 3 "Regional project units" 
(Entidades Coordinadoras Regionales: CONSORNOC, PRODEPAZ, ASOPATIA). 
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Country Region 
Start date: Title of main 
interventions - Budget 
(Decision#) 
Main partner  
 
Other participating 
local stakeholders  
  
2005: Renforcement du 
processus de décentralisation 
dans les départements d'Haïti 
(Etablissement de plans 
communaux de concertation 
dans la commune de Belladère 
au travers d'une démarche 
institutionnelle, participative et 
focalisée) – 0,1 m€ 
(#x17047/112845) 
Commune de 
Belladere and 
NGOs 
The deconcentrated 
administration  
  
2005: Projet d''appui à la 
gouvernance locale – 0,1 m€ 
(#17047/112734) 
Département de 
l‘Ouest : 
Commune de 
Pointe à 
Raquettes (Ile de 
la GONAVE) 
Département du 
centre : Commune 
de Saut D‘eau 
CONCERN/NGO 
  
2005: Programme d''appui au 
développement décentralisé – 
0,08 m€ (#17047/112733) 
Département du 
Centre, 
Communes de 
Mirebalais et 
Lascahobas 
NGOs 
Honduras 
Latin 
America 
2004: PROADES - Programa de 
apoyo a la descentralización en 
Honduras – 33,7 m€ (#16807) 
Secretaria de 
Gobernacion y 
Justicia, Ministerio 
de Gobernacion  
El Foro Tripartido 
including the 
Association of 
Municipalities of 
Honduras (AMHON) 
Kenya Africa 
2000: Community development 
programme phase 2 (CDP 2) - 
14,5 m€ (#15011) 
Community 
Development 
Trust Fund 
(CDTF) 
 
    
2004: Rural poverty reduction 
and local government support 
programme - 15,9 m€ (#17379) 
GoK, Ministry of 
Local Government 
 
All local governments in 
the country 
Lebanon ENP 
2005: Support to reforms and 
local governance – 4,8 m€ 
(#17554) 
 OMSAR (Ministry 
for administrative 
reform)  
15 selected 
municipalities 
Madagascar Africa 
2004: Programme d'appui aux 
communes et organisations rural 
pour le développement du sud 
(ACORDS) phase I – 29,9 m€ 
(#16611) 
LGs Ministries, NGOs 
    
2006: Programme d'appui aux 
communes et organisations 
rurales pour le développement 
du Sud (ACORDS) - phase II – 
32,7 m€ (#17939) 
LGs Ministries, NGOs 
Mali Africa 
1999: Appui au démarrage des 
communes au Mali – 40,2 m€ 
(#14626) 
MATCL LGs, NGOs 
    
2006: PARAD - Programme 
d'appui à la réforme 
administrative et à la 
décentralisation - 71,8 m€ 
(#17914) 
MATCL, Central 
Ministries, 
ANICT/FICT 
Local Political 
Committees, LGs and 
NGOs 
Nicaragua 
Latin 
America 
2004: Education sector policy 
programme and its 
decentralization (PAPSE) – 
50,7m€ (#5749)  
Ministerio de 
Educacion, 
Cultura y 
Deportes 
Selected municipalities, 
Autonomous Regional 
Governments (RAAN, 
RAAS) 
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Country Region 
Start date: Title of main 
interventions - Budget 
(Decision#) 
Main partner  
 
Other participating 
local stakeholders  
  
2003: Local Development and 
Food Security Programme 
(PRODELSA) 2004 to 2009, 
budget: 13 m€ 
INIFOM  
Instituto 
Nicaragüense de 
Fomento 
Municipal  
15 municipalities and 
two regional 
associations: AMUNSE 
and AMUPNOR.  
Papua New 
Guinea 
Pacific 
2006: Strengthening of districts 
and local level governments - 15 
m€ (#18704) 
DPLGA  LGs, NGOs 
Peru 
Latin 
America 
2003: Programme d'appui au 
développement socio-
économique et a la 
décentralisation dans les régions 
d'Ayacucho et de Huancavelica 
– 13,0 m€ (#5758) 
Grant to GoP, with 
a component of 
Budget Support to 
the two 
beneficiary 
Regions
93
 
 
Philippines Asia 
Philippine Health Sector Policy 
Support Programme – 24,3 m€ 
(#17638) 
Government – 
Ministry of Health 
(Sector Budget 
Support) 
 
Rwanda Africa 
2004: Decentralised programme 
for rural poverty reduction 
(DPRPR) – 40 m€ (#16357) 
 MINALOC 
Beneficiaries of local 
projects, CSO and 
communities 
Senegal Africa 
1999: Soutien aux initiatives de 
développement local - 10,8 m€ 
(#14414) 
National and 
regional Level 
coordination 
committees 
LGs and NGOs 
    
2004: Programme d'appui au 
programme national de Bonne 
Gouvernance (PAPNBG) - 26,1 
m€ (#16952) 
 Ministries of 
Justice and 
Finance. National 
Assembly and 
National Statistics 
Agency  
LGs and NGOs 
Sierra 
Leone 
Africa 
2006: Decentralisation capacity 
building programme – 9,1 m€ 
(#17038) 
Ministry of Internal 
Affair, Local 
Government and 
Rural 
Development, 
Ministry of 
Finance  
 
South 
Africa 
Africa 
2001: Local economic 
development in Northern 
province – 29,5 m€ (#4712) 
Northern province  
 
NGOs 
    
2002: Urban development 
support to the Ethikwini 
municipality – 35,0 m€ (#4555) 
Grant & Budget 
support to GoSA/ 
eThikwini 
Municipality 
Authority  
NGOs 
    
2002: Local economic 
development support 
programme in Kwazulu Natal – 
33,7 m€ (#4557) 
Grant to GoSA; 
Implementing 
authority: 
Department of 
Economic 
Development and 
Tourism 
 
 
NGOs 
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and Huancavelica) 
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Country Region 
Start date: Title of main 
interventions - Budget 
(Decision#) 
Main partner  
 
Other participating 
local stakeholders  
Tanzania Africa 
2005: Poverty Reduction through 
the Participation of Vulnerable 
People in Decentralised 
Development Planning and 
Budgeting in Tanzania – 0,7 m€ 
(#17215/118910) 
NGO  
 
Local governments  
    
2007 Support to Education 
Sector Reform – 43,3 m€ 
(#19633)  
Government of 
Tanzania: Ministry 
of Education  
PMO-RALG Local 
Governments  
    
2007 Support to the Local 
Government Grant Scheme- 
22,7m€ (#18888) 
Government of 
Tanzania: PMO-
RALG  
(through a 
Common basket 
fund) 
Local Governments 
 
Representation of 
various ministries in 
steering committee 
Uganda Africa 
2000:ACHOLI programme 
(decentralised co-operation 
programme north of Uganda) – 
3,9 m€ (#15264) 
Ministry of Local 
Government 
LGs 
    
2005: Support to 
decentralisation programme – 
9,2 m€ (#17857) 
Ministry of Local 
Government 
Local Governments 
and the Uganda Local 
Government 
Association, ULGA) 
through programme 
estimates and with civil 
society actors through 
grants contracts, 
selected through a local 
call for proposals. 
The field visits provided following complementary information. 
In Benin, the DLG sector is subject to good collaboration between the EC, France, Germany, 
Denmark and the Government, although all partners are actually involved. The preparation of 
the PONADEC was launched with the support of Belgium and in collaboration with 
MDGLAAT and of course the municipalities. The EC was leader in 2007, Germany and 
France took over in 2008, the EC again played the lead role in 2009. Under PACTE, a full 
component targeting capacity building of the de-concentrated provincial level of 
administration was delegated and implemented by GTZ (later GIZ) with very good 
collaboration between the two institutions. 
In Honduras, in addition to the budget support programme involving central government 
bodies, the EC has approved six projects94 with municipalities as project implementers from 
the world-wide programme for non state actors and local authorities (NSA-LA). Other major 
partner is the Inter-American Development Bank (BID), which also supported the national 
decentralisation programme (PRODDEL) and development partners in the sub-group for 
decentralisation (Mesa de la Descentralizacion). 
In Lebanon, the implementing organisations of EC interventions (ESFD, CDR and OMSAR) 
actually had no particular mandate to work with ―local government reform‖. ESFD and CRD 
were established to work with ―local development‖. OMSAR‘s core mandate was to work on 
overall public sector reforms, yet because of having to take responsibility for unspent EU 
funds it had to take responsibilities for e.g. local solid waste management. At the local level, 
OMSAR worked with projects for clusters of local governments (similar to but not identical 
with the unions), whereas ESFD mainly worked with projects implemented by the individual 
municipalities. It is only in the proposed future municipal finance reform project that MoIM is 
given a lead status for implementation of local development activities. Under the new 
programme, focus for local level project implementation will be at ―union‖ level. 
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 A detailed list of the projects could not be provided by the EUD during the field phase. 
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In Mali, the EC operates at three levels: municipal, regional and central level. The first two 
levels involve LG, the central level concerns the institutions in charge of the state reform and 
decentralisation. The guiding documents of the EC take fully into account the role of central 
institutions (DNCT, CDI) and the need to strengthen them. Yet, the approach does not really 
consider LG elected officials at the national level nor does it take into account the National 
Assembly. Attempts to work with the association of elected officials had not given convincing 
results. Associations of elected officials have taken little initiative to boost the 
decentralisation process and to actively engage in lobbying. Civil society has not been 
significantly involved into these processes. It is more at a lower level that links can be 
established between civil society and other actors of the decentralisation process, in 
particular in the planning of public investments and the co-management of facilities financed 
by LG. 
In Peru, the EC works with different actors in the decentralised government structures 
(ministries, regions and municipalities) mainly in the framework of sector programmes. The 
EC also involved the NSA and LA in small local projects in a number of regions. There is, 
however, no explicit and systematic link made between all these interventions and different 
levels. 
In the Philippines, the main partners in the health sector support have primarily been the 
DoH, DBM and Provincial Governments. The recent PFM support includes broader 
stakeholder involvement in realisation of shortcomings under past PFM support within the 
health sector (see also previous indicator). 
In Rwanda, the main actor for the DPRPR was the MINALOC, which is the responsible 
ministry for decentralisation and local governance issues. The focus on funds for districts and 
UBUDEHE being transferred through CDF focused on the local actors at district level and 
involved also CSOs, and communities.  
In Sierra Leone, the WB was the obvious partner as it had already started the IRCBP with 
similar objectives as the EC programme (DCBP). EC had also established cooperation with 
DfID as other major donor in decentralisation and it was therefore logical to join DfID in the 
IRCBP. The UNDP/UNCDF also suggested that EC could support their programmes at 
district level, but support to the national decentralisation process was more important for EC 
as the IRCBP would have been halted from 2008 on without the support from EC and the 
DfID. Regarding EC support channelled through NGOs, three local councils (BO, Bombali, 
Kailahun) are supported by the EC from the budget line for Non-State Actors and Local 
Authorities in development with specific projects. Other projects financed from this budget 
line likewise involved some LCs to some extent but not as implementer of the project. 
In South Africa, the EC has chosen to work with both national and provincial administration to 
introduce LED. This is the right entry point for decentralisation and local governance issues. 
LGs have also been the recipients of this support through the programme funding but it‘s the 
provincial authorities that work directly with the LGs. The focus on funds for districts on Area 
Based Management and LED was good but alignment to national procedures was difficult 
(lack of robust M&E systems, auditing and procurement requirements). 
In Tanzania, the EC includes in its CSPs political and institutional analysis of the role of the 
different actors in decentralisation and governance processes, however analysis is based on 
work led by other DPs (leading the LGR). The EC decided to join the LGDG and in this 
manner work mainly with PMO-RALG and MOFEA as lead partners. EC didn't engage 
significantly with NGOs as, for instance, the NGO working group on LG reforms and ALAT 
were supported by other DPs more actively engaged in LGR. However, ALAT currently 
seeks assistance from a global EU Call for proposals to support LG associations. 
  
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
100 
4 EQ4: 3Cs 
Evaluation Question 4: To what extent has the EC ensured coordination and 
complementarity with other donors, active in the decentralisation arena, and ensured 
coherence with EC policies and activities? 
4.1 JC4.1 The EC has contributed to establishing and implementing 
coordination mechanisms with EU Member States and major donors (on 
decentralisation support programmes at different levels) 
Main findings at JC level 
The EC has actively been working to establish and implement coordination mechanisms 
for decentralisation support in partner countries. The EUDs engagement with other EU 
Members States and other major donors has significantly improved over the evaluation 
period and is probably an outcome of EC general emphasis on aid harmonisation efforts  
Several levels of dialogue and coordination have been identified but most of these 
coordination mechanism are not EU specific (EC/MS) but also include other donors, such as 
the WB. The most current mechanism has been the establishment of a working group, as 
for example in Benin, Honduras, Mali, Peru and the Philippines. Joint DP efforts such as 
joint strategies, identification and formulation processes have been other coordination 
mechanism used in the countries under evaluation. In particular, the EUDs have proved very 
open to the use of analytical work supported by other development partners but have rarely 
been leading in preparing such analyses.  
Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its cooperation programmes and member 
states/other donor‘s programmes in decentralisation have remained marginal. In West Bank 
and Gaza Strip an interesting example was observed whereby some EU Member States 
worked with the EUD to ensure greater harmonisation by development of an ―EC Fiche on 
Sector Strategy Fiche Municipal Development and Local Governance‖. 
In general, the EC has encouraged the national government to play a leading role in 
donor coordination and to support this where necessary. However, in many countries where 
the national governments are inactive in donor coordination it will be necessary for the EC (or 
other donors) to play a more proactive role. The EC has actively sought to resolve aid 
harmonisation issues in some countries where it is taking a lead role (e.g. Mali).  
EUDs have actively taken a lead role in 30% of the 22 desk review countries and have been 
in most of the other countries actively engaged in existing working groups established to 
coordinate development assistance in support of decentralisation. The survey and fieldwork 
gave some indication of what it requires to take on a lead role: 
 Potential of delivering significant funding in a predictable manner, 
 The potential ability of the EC to use a wide range of aid modalities – and SBS in 
particular (highlighted in particular in Senegal, the Philippines, Mali, and Peru), 
 A significant local level knowledge of the sector (with Mali as a clear case, also 
mentioned in Senegal, Lebanon and Rwanda - less so expressed in other countries), 
 Global experiences and access to experiences from a variety of EU countries could 
be a potential strength of the EC – however, EUDs widely recognise that knowledge 
management is so poor at present, that this largely constitutes a potential rather than 
a real strength of the EC. 
There have been several cases where the EC has adapted to processes led by other donors 
when relevant, as for example in Sierra Leone, in the Philippines, in Cambodia and in 
Tanzania. This especially took place in the framework of trust funds and basket funds. 
At a ―global level", EC contribution to the informal Development Partners Working Group on 
Local Governance and Decentralisation is highly appreciated by other partners – however, 
the work on coordination and information sharing has not (yet) led to significant progress on 
more precise defining, more distinct division of labour among EU Members States and the 
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EC or vis-à-vis various specialised multinational organisations (see indicators 1.3.2 and 
2.3.2). 
4.1.1 Ind4.1.1 - Sharing of information and policy analysis on decentralisation and 
governance issues among EC and EU Member States at the level of partner 
countries 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
According to the answers to the survey to EUDs, the quality of dialogue and coordination on 
decentralisation has improved between the two strategic cycles with respect to all main 
stakeholders, with the exception of EU Member States, where the ratio of High and Quite 
high assessments stayed the same (and relatively highest) between the cycles (75%).  
The perceived importance of other donors‘ support to decentralisation increased between the 
two strategic cycles (assessed high or quite high by 58.8% and 78.9% of EUDs respectively). 
The complementarity between the EC support and other donors‘ support also rose, assessed 
high or quite high by 50% and 84:2% between the two cycles.  
Figure 16 Change in the quality of dialogue and coordination on decentralisation 
between the two strategic cycles – „high‟ or „quite high‟ responses 
 
Figure 17 Change in perceived importance of other donors‟ support and the 
complementarity between EC support and other donors' support between the 
two strategic cycles – „high‟ or „quite high‟ responses 
 
Survey to the EUDs, Particip analysis 
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According to the findings from the field phase, the coordination of EC with EU Members 
States and major donors is generally assessed as being increasingly good. 
 In the Philippines, EC coordination with Member States (MS) is generally assessed 
as good. EU coordination meetings between MS and the EC take place on a monthly 
basis at Heads of Mission, Development and Commercial Counsellors meetings. 
There are various thematic coordination mechanisms that have gained momentum in 
the preparation of the Philippine Development Forum. The Strategic review felt that 
―(EC) dialogue with the Government is good and healthy” and that “the Delegation 
has reinforced the dialogue with MS on development co-operation” while “bilateral 
dialogue with multilateral institutions is on an operational level.‖ 
 In a more general way, Peru has been characterised by an increasingly well 
coordinated donor community illustrated by the recent initiative of various UN 
agencies to start a ―Joint Programme‖95 under the leadership of the PCM96. Various 
donor coordination mechanisms have been established over the years. In addition to 
the traditional international organisations active in the region such as the World Bank 
(WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), a number of other 
international organisations have played a significant role in the development 
landscape of Peru during the period 2000-2010. These include: United Nations (UN) 
agencies such as UNDP, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the EC, the Andean Development Corporation 
(CAF)97 and various co-operation agencies from ―bilateral‖ donors such as USAID, 
Economic Co-operation and Development Division at the Swiss State Secretariat for 
Economic Affairs (SECO)98, Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA), GIZ & 
German Bank for Reconstruction (KfW), CTB99. 
In the countries visited during the field phase, several levels of dialogue and coordination 
have been identified. The most current mechanism is the establishment of a working group, 
as for example in Benin, Honduras, Mali, Peru and the Philippines. However, most of them 
are not EU specific (EC/MS) but are also gathering other donors. 
 In Benin, there is a very active working group on decentralisation and good 
governance, which meets regularly to harmonise their activities and ensure 
compliance with the national framework for decentralisation. This group is one of the 
most operational working groups in Benin.  
 As for Honduras, the development partners established a decentralisation group 
(mesa de la descentralizacion) in 1998 after the Mitch natural disaster, with all the 
development partners in decentralisation (EU, WB, GTZ, Jica, etc.). The group meets 
once a month to coordinate actions and share information. The chair is changed 
every six months. Government institutions and CSOs are invited at particular events 
to discuss certain issues. The actors share information, views and analyses in the 
meetings, but the actual programme implementation on the ground is not coordinated 
well, according to the several persons met during the mission. "La coordinación? - 
Está funcionando en las mesa, si, pero en el terrano, no”100. 
 In Mali, Development partners (DPs) involved in decentralisation have created a Task 
Force on "decentralisation and institutional development." The working group can 
trade on the implementation of the decentralisation process and a degree of 
harmonisation of interventions. 
                                               
95
 Programa conjunto de las naciones unidas ―mejorando la nutrición y la seguridad alimentaria de la niñez del 
Perú: un enfoque de desarrollo de capacidades‖ 
96
 Secretaría Técnica de la Comisión Interministerial de Asuntos Sociales (ST-CIAS) de la Presidencia del 
Consejo de Ministros. 
97
 Corporación Andina de Fomento. 
98
 Economic Cooperation and Development Division at the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. 
99
 Coopération Technique Belge. 
100
 former government official 
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 In Rwanda, regular meetings with other donors take place in the framework of the 
Budget Support Harmonisation Group, the Development Partners Coordination 
Group, the annual Development Partners Retreat and Development Partners 
Meeting, monthly EU Heads of Co-operation and Heads of Mission meetings, ad hoc 
Political Officers meetings and at different sectoral working groups (the EC is 
particularly active in the transport, justice, public financial management, agriculture, 
and decentralisation working groups). 
 In Peru, there are two working groups working at different levels: 
 Mesa de Finanzas Públicas: this working group focusing on Public Finance 
Management (PFM) was created shortly after the 2008 Public Expenditure 
and Financial Accountability (PEFA) exercise. It is lead by the MEF with active 
participation of a number of donors such as: WB, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), CAF, KfW/GiZ, SECO, USAID, CTB, JICA and the EC. In this donor 
group, the GoP (via the MEF) take an active (leading) role and the group has 
created a space of policy dialogue between donors and the GoP. 
 Mesa de Descentralización: this working group on decentralisation was 
established shortly after the creation of the ―donor group on governance‖ and 
the related ―sub group on modernisation of the state‖ in 2002.This donor 
group has a more technical focus and the dialogue with the GoP is reduced to 
introductory meetings organised when a new Secretary is appointed at the 
National Secretary of Decentralisation. It appears that this group has initiated 
some direct dialogue with the Assembly of president of regional governments 
to discuss the main challenges of the decentralisation process in Peru.  
 In the Philippines, a Working Group on Decentralisation and Local Government 
has been established. 
Box 20 Working Group on Decentralisation and Local Government in the Philippines 
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and WB are conveners of the 
working group. It meets regularly with active participation of all member DPs (including EUD). 
―The group is among the most active and the overall plan captures to a large extent all DP 
funded activities in the sector – we are generally aware of what we do and know each other – 
better than other groups‖. It has developed an overall work plan that captures different donor 
funded interventions in support of decentralisation and local governance. All activities of e.g. 
EC support through SPF are captured here. Information is shared through the working group 
– the ADB and the WB have probably been the most proactive players, actively engaged in 
various core decentralisation studies, whereas EUD has been more of a ―silent partner‖. The 
EC is seen primarily active through its health programmes (and health sector issues are not 
discussed in the group), the SPF and (in particular, in future) PFM support at LGU levels. 
Through the working groups, the Government and DPs have shared information for 
coordination but not developed substantive co-financed programmes. 
In South Africa, a broader dialogue between Government and donors on aid effectiveness 
has been launched. Especially the follow up to the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), has 
continued with several meetings in 2009. Development partners are encouraging the 
Government to take forward the AAA through a national action plan for 2010 onwards. South 
Africa has been co-chairing (together with Germany) the Cluster C working group on aid 
effectiveness in the OECD DAC. 
Joint DP efforts such as joint strategies, identification and formulation processes are other 
coordination mechanism used in the countries under evaluation. These joint donor efforts are 
not EU specific (EC/MS) and also include other donors, such as the WB. 
 For example in Lebanon, there are few if any co-financed projects supporting local 
development and local governance. However, the new municipal finance reform 
project was subject to a joint identification/formulation process with the Italian 
Government. The Italian Government will grant additional funds to the component 2 of 
the program through a parallel funding to the Government of Lebanon. Related to this 
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process the World Bank financed a major analytical work on municipal finance that 
feeds directly into the new EUD project. 
 In Sierra Leone, DfID and EC have established a close co-operation during the last 
10 years, which materialised fully with the publication of the Joint CSP for 2008 - 
2013101. During the programming of the CSP 2008 to 2013, the EC had regular 
contacts with the DfID and this ended up with a joint CSP: “The Joint Country 
Strategy (JCS) for Sierra Leone (SL) has been drafted jointly by the government of 
Sierra Leone (GoSL), the European Commission (EC) and the United Kingdom (UK) 
Department for International Development (DfID) with inputs from in-country EU 
Member States. The joint exercise in Sierra Leone sets a unique example of joint 
programming and marks an important step towards fulfilling the EU‟s commitments on 
harmonisation of donors‟ activities, as expressed in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness in March 2005”102. Apart from this co-operation with DfID, the EC fully 
accepts that the WB leads all coordination on decentralisation. 
 In Benin, the coordination and general harmonisation of approaches has been seen 
and the Joint Annual Reviews have become institutionalised, which shows a degree 
of maturity, coordination and collaboration between the various stakeholders. 
 In Rwanda, the harmonisation of donor activities is more clearly prominent but it is still 
a long way to go in terms of joint action plans, revised fiscal decentralisation strategy 
with less earmarked or conditional funds at local level, and more programmable or 
unconditional funds. 
 In South Africa, the EUD launched a number of preparatory studies in order to set the 
ground for the conceptual discussion among stakeholders. These preparatory studies 
were carried out in areas likely to become ―focal‖ in 2005/6: the economic cluster, the 
social cluster, and human rights/governance, the latter two including the burning 
issues of service delivery capacity at local level. The first one of these studies, on the 
economic cluster, was delivered in November 2005, and the other ones were 
delivered during the first quarter of 2006. All studies were validated during workshops 
with DPs, GoSA and other partners, including Non State Actors. This is just an 
example of the analytical work carried out by the EUD but there seems to be frequent 
exchange and interaction between key stakeholders. 
 In Tanzania, the decision by various DPs to fund the LGDG system provided them 
with an exit strategy from previous bilateral projects and enabled substantive aid 
harmonisation.  
The analytical works that led to the LGDG were the outcome of major joint DP efforts: 
in 2003 the LGRP basket decided to finance the required analyses that initially would 
lead to WB support for the LGDG. The WB managed the consultancies in co-
operation with participating bilateral DPs.  
The EC proved flexible (after extensive administrative delays) to adapt to the jointly 
agreed LGDG approach. The EC financial contribution was significant (22mEUR) and 
enabled the nationwide scale up of the system. 
4.1.2 Ind4.1.2 - Records of EC resolving inconsistencies between its co-operation 
programmes and member states ones or other donors ones 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
In most countries, such as Benin, Honduras, Lebanon, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone and Tanzania, the evaluation team has not identified any record of EC resolving 
inconsistencies between its cooperation programmes and member states/other donor‘s 
programmes in decentralisation. 
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 In spite of the fact that the CSP is a joint document both parties have their individual implementation plan. 
102
 Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2008 to 2013, EUD (introduction). 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
105 
One interesting instrument adopted in West Bank and Gaza Strip for donor coordination was 
the EC Fiche: ―Sector Strategy Fiche Municipal Development and Local Governance 
(MD&LG) 2010 – 2013‖ - a document initiated by EU Member States supporting 
decentralisation who felt frustrated over the lack of coherence in the sector. The document 
provides an analysis of all ongoing support to decentralisation by EU Member States (and 
other donors) and seeks to establish a common response for EU members regarding future 
programming and support to decentralisation and local governance in the country. 
The EUDs generally emphasise donor coordination either as a lead or ―follower‖ (see section 
below). In general the EC will as a stakeholder seek to encourage the national government 
to play a leading role in donor coordination and support this where necessary. However, 
in many countries where the national governments are inactive in donor coordination it will be 
necessary for the EC (or other donors) to play a more proactive role. 
In Mali, the EUD has been instrumental in encouraging other partners to meet national 
mechanisms in place (ANICT device and technical support). The EUD has not hesitated to 
play its political weight to influence the choice of the World Bank. The latter has been forced 
to take account of these devices, but did so only marginally. The World Bank has always 
remained outside the system of decentralisation focusing on a community approach. 
4.1.3 Ind4.1.3 - Lead role played by the EC in coordinating EC policy positions on 
decentralisation in partner countries 
Detailed evidence at indicator level  
In 30% of the countries analysed during the desk phase, the EC has taken a leading role in 
coordination of aid and support to decentralisation and local governance in the 
respective countries. A lead role will necessarily require some ―comparative advantages‖ of 
the EC. 
Table 17 EC‟s coordination efforts (EUD survey) 
Answer 
Number of 
respondents 
Leading 6 30 % 
Important, but not leading 5 25 % 
Taking part in the efforts 5 25 % 
Not very much involved 4 20 % 
The survey gave some preliminary indication of what it requires to take on a lead role: 
 Potential of delivering significant funding in a predictable manner, 
 The potential ability of the EC to use a wide range of aid modalities – and SBS in 
particular (highlighted in particular in Senegal, the Philippines, Mali, and Peru) 
 A significant local level knowledge of the sector (with Mali as a clear case, also 
mentioned in Senegal and Rwanda - less so expressed in other countries), 
 Global experiences and access to experiences from a variety of EU countries – 
however, also realisation that knowledge management is so poor at present, that this 
largely constitutes a potential rather than real strength of the EC, 
 In some countries the EUDs clearly indicated that the EUDs had no strong 
comparative advantages compared to other donors (e.g. in Uganda, Tanzania, 
Nicaragua) 
In many countries, the EC has had a lead or active role among donors during the 
evaluation period. 
 In Benin, the EUD has played a lead role in the dialogue on DLG with the GoB over 
the past 3-4 years and this has been very much appreciated by all stakeholders. The 
EC actively participates and contributes to the annual sector review in the field of 
decentralisation.  
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The activity of the working groups (WGs) for sectoral and thematic coordination has 
been uneven and the GoB leadership has been lacking in many WGs. E.g. in 2007, 
the EUD had the lead for Groups (1) Monitoring PRSP and Budget Support, (2) 
Decentralisation, (3) Justice (4) Transportation and (5) Aid Harmonisation and was 
also active in Health, Water and Energy, and the private sector WGs.  
The EC actively participates and contributes to the annual sector review in the field of 
decentralisation, and financially supports the FADeC/CONAFIL. During sector 
reviews, debate and criticism are very objective, sincere and constructive. 
 In Honduras, the EU participates as a member in the decentralisation group, but 
some development partners (i.e. BID, WB) see the EUD taking an active role in 
decentralisation in the present situation, where the Government of Honduras has just 
formulated policies on decentralisation but also in 2004 during the formulation of the 
national programme for decentralisation PRODDEL. 
 In Mali, EUD is the leader among DPs since the start of decentralisation. This role 
was reflected in two ways: (i) being the "voice" of donors involved in discussions with 
the authorities and (ii) ensuring an overall consistency to finance the technical support 
and financial facility. Indeed, the majority of donors have targeted their interventions, 
including geographically. The EC has agreed that its funds are not targeted and can 
thus meet the needs in areas not supported. With this choice the equalisation system 
could be effective. 
There is an ad hoc structure for coordination among donors and government called 
the "Panel de la decentralisation". This coordination platform is lead by the EUD. The 
majority of partners recognise the leading role played by the EC, although some 
believe that the EC tries to always first consider its own point of view. 
 In Rwanda, the EUD played a key role in the harmonisation and alignment area. It 
participated actively in the two Joint Budget Support Reviews and is leading a task 
force to develop a new multi-donor partnership framework for budget support. It co-
chairs the Transport sector working group with GoR. It coordinated policy dialogue 
through joint EU policy statements at the Development Partners meetings, and by 
regularly convening EU meetings to coordinate political dialogue in accordance with 
Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement. The EC is a financing partner in four basket 
funds but will face some challenges as basket funds are increasingly managed by 
and in accordance with recipient's procedures, where EC participation would require 
four-pillar audits. However, there is no basket funding in the DLG area.  
The EC-chaired informal network of donors on elections met on a very regular basis 
for the 2008 elections and the issuing of a draft electoral code for the forthcoming 
elections. 
 In South Africa, the EUD has often taken the lead in coordination and 
complementarities of donor interventions also in the DLG field, which has fallen 
under the Governance working group. The six EU working groups (S&T, health, 
education, employment, governance, housing) have ensured a platform for exchange 
of information and sharing of good practices between main partners (EU and non-EU 
incl. UN system, World Bank etc). The EUD has encouraged regular participation of 
lead departments in those groups.  
 In Lebanon, the EUD has played a major active role in establishing a "Working 
Group on Local Development". The group initially met in April 2008 at the Embassy of 
France whereby EU Member States approved to establish a lead donor structure in 
three key sectors: Water, Local Development and Environment. Consequently, 
Germany agreed to assume the overall coordination of the Water Sector, while Italy 
agreed to provide overall coordination in relation to Local Development and 
Environment. As a first step, the Embassy of Italy organised a conference on 
governance and local development intended to clarify and harmonise diversified 
views on approaches. Recognising that non-EU Member States countries and 
international organisations are dynamically involved in the local development process, 
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the EU working group was broadened to encompass a wider representation of donors 
and multilateral organisations.  
"To avoid previous interventions fragmentation and lack of sufficient coordination 
between Government, donors, agencies and numerous non-governmental 
organisations, the Working Group (WG) on Local Development has drafted "Common 
Donors Guidelines on Local Development". Moreover, as the MoIM is recognised as 
the key institutional partner in this area, the project should support the MoIM to 
manage and chair the WG in order to ensure ownership and overall coordination. The 
Ministry has developed in 2009 a Local Development Master Plan with the purpose of 
listing and coordinating local development activities in Lebanon."103 
However, MoIM has expressed uncertainty about whether it has the resources (time 
and staff) to lead such a process (interview) and all stakeholders interviewed 
expressed frustration about the continued lack of common approaches among 
donors. 
However, in some other countries, the EC has not had a leading role among donors during 
the evaluation period. 
 In Sierra Leone, the EC has not taken a leading role, instead co-operation has been 
established with the only other major donor in decentralisation from (WB, DfID) and 
UNDP. Furthermore, the EC has adjusted fully to the WB approach in the IRCBP and 
has left the leading role for decentralisation and programme management to the WB.  
 In Peru, it seems that the EC has taken part in various coordination mechanisms but 
has not contributed to actively develop these coordination mechanisms with EU 
Member States and major donors on decentralisation. 
 In Rwanda, the EC local development/governance portfolio is important and 
increasing support to DLG issues over the evaluation period can be seen. The EUD 
did not initially dedicate specific staff resources to DLG (shared) but at a later part of 
the evaluation period, one full time staff member was assigned to this area. The EUD 
has not been a focal point in the sector working group established in 2005/6 but has 
attended meetings sporadically and even though not a decentralisation donor in 
division of labour exercise recently conducted EUD DLG focal point attends meetings 
more regularly now. 
Box 21 The lack of leadership of EC in coordination mechanisms in Peru 
In Peru, the EC has not had a lead role among donors during the evaluation period. For 
instance, the group on decentralisation has been lead by GiZ (Germany) for more than two 
years and opinions on the EC participation in this group range from ―quite active‖ to ―not very 
active‖. Moreover, on matters related to PFM, it seems that the EC has followed the WB 
although it seems much more active in this area than in the area of decentralisation. The EC 
has a more limited role in the platform of exchange on decentralisation compared to other EU 
Member States such as Spain and Germany. The latter consider that ―EU bilateral donors 
have played a much more important role than the EC in the area of decentralisation in Peru‖ 
and they point out at the same time that ―support from bilateral donor is not sufficient to 
address the needs of Peru in terms of decentralisation. For instance, the EU could play a 
complementary role to bilateral donors in crucial areas such as the development of the civil 
service framework‖.  
The limited role played by the EC in decentralisation has been confirmed by the various 
actors interviewed (Government, other non-EU donors, EUD itself). One interviewee (a non-
EU bilateral donor) pointed out the fact that because of its internal rules and despite regular 
participation in the regular meetings: ―the EU cannot compromise itself when a decision is 
taken by the group‖. Moreover, the EUD does not have the possibility to quickly mobilise 
funds to participate in initiatives launched by the working groups.  
Two cases illustrate this situation: 
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  In 2005, a group of experts was mandated to analyse the situation of the country in terms 
of Human Rights, Justice and Decentralisation and to organise a forum to discuss the 
results. The EC could not contribute directly to the organisation of the event. 
  In 2010, a group of experts was mandated by the working group on PFM to provide new 
ideas and high level analysis to improve PFM in the country. The EC was not able to 
contribute to the joint efforts of MEF, GIZ, CTB and SECO. 
4.1.4 Ind4.1.4 - Evidence that the EC has the necessary flexibility to adjust to other 
donor approaches, when other donors lead mutual efforts to support 
decentralisation 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
There have been several cases where the EC has adapted to processes led by other donors 
in the area of decentralisation and local governance. This especially took place in the 
framework of trust funds and basket funds. 
 In Sierra Leone, the EUD decided to allocate all funds from the EC decentralisation 
and Capacity Building programme into a WB managed trust fund for the Institutional 
Reform and Capacity Building Programme. The EC and DfID coordinated their action 
on decentralisation from 2004, when DfID decided to support the trust fund for the 
IRCBP and DfID recommended the EC to follow this approach during the formulation 
phase of the EU DCBP. The alignment with the WB programme shows a high level of 
flexibility for reducing transaction costs and improves efficiency and willingness to 
lose control of the programme‘s implementation.  
 In the Philippines, a dialogue fund has been established as WB trust fund. It is funded 
by AUSAID and CIDA and managed by the WB with involvement of all DPs and the 
league (agreement assigned last week of 2009). Because of different financing 
agreements and rules of donors it is difficult to co-fund activities – at present the trust 
fund is with 1.5mUSD and just started to fund one activity. 
 In Cambodia, the EC channels its support through an UNDP led programme in 
realisation of the significant local knowledge the UNDP has established within this 
area in Cambodia. 
 In Tanzania, coordination of support to decentralisation and local governance has 
since 2000 primarily been coordinated through the basket funded LGRP – led by 
GoT and basket funding partners but with the inclusion of non-basket funding DPs. 
The EC joined funding of the LGDG immediately after the WB had started to fund the 
grant on a pilot basis (in 2005). The WB had initially considered funding only some 
30% of the local governments on a ―pilot basis‖ – but the Government was keen to 
have the system adopted on a more rapid scale and several donors, including the EC, 
were at the same time exploring modalities for more effective coordination of local 
level development funding, that until then had been funded through several separate 
―area based projects‖. EC support enabled the Government of Tanzania to roll out the 
system to all LGs simultaneously. 
Box 22 The basket funded LGRP in Tanzania 
The LGRP supported (up to 2004) mainly the ―soft‖ aspects of the decentralisation reforms: 
capacity building, institutional development etc., whereas donor funding for local service 
delivery at that time was primarily channelled through various sector programmes (with 
basket or sector budget support arrangements in health and education and later also in 
agriculture, water and roads). The budget allocations for the LGRP were therefore modest 
and below 10mUSD annually. In addition to the LGRP, various DPs supported up to 2004 a 
range of bilateral program support for ―local governance‖, in particular in the form of various 
―Area Based programmes‖: i.e. programmes that targeted selected districts with a 
combination of development funding for services (typically earmarked various capital 
investments in areas such as school construction, health centres, roads etc. – but also 
frequently with some elements of ―budget support‖ to selected LGs).  
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The decision by various DPs to fund the LGDG system provided them with an exit strategy 
from previous bilateral projects and enabled substantive aid harmonisation.  
The analytical works that led to the LGDG were the outcome of major joint DP efforts: in 
2003 the LGRP basket decided to finance the required analyses that initially would lead to 
WB support for the LGDG. The WB managed the consultancies in co-operation with 
participating bilateral DPs.  
The EC proved flexible (after extensive administrative delays) to adapt to the jointly 
agreed LGDG approach. The EC financial contribution was significant (22mEUR) and 
enabled the nationwide scale up of the system. 
In other countries, as for example in Benin, Honduras, Lebanon, Mali, Peru, Rwanda and 
South Africa, the evaluation team did not find any evidence of EC flexibility to adjust to 
other donor approaches: 
 In Honduras, the EC follows its own approach with the government with some 
flexibility, it has not adjusted to others donors‘ approaches to decentralisation e.g. 
within mutual programmes. 
 In Lebanon, an alternative approach to co-financing projects, by supporting the UNDP 
Governance and Local development (GOLD) project, was internally rejected by the 
EUD. The rejection was partly based on assessment of the overall soundness of the 
UNDP project and partly on principle concerns about financing UNDP. 
 In Mali, the EC is a lead donor and driving force of decentralisation. There is a 
consensus among donors on the approach developed by the EC. In the future 
decentralisation support (programme PARADER) the EC plans to use a new co-
operation modus with EU Member States (―convention de delegation‖) which allows 
delegating a part of the programme implementation to EU Member States. In this 
case it will be Germany (GIZ) and Belgium (CTB-BTC). Interviews with EU Member 
State representatives revealed that the EC procedures are demanding and rather 
inflexible and that this is the reason for a negotiation phase taking more than one 
year. The agreement should be finalised in the current of 2011. 
 In Peru, the evaluation team has not find any evidence of an important co-operation 
project or activity where the EC has joined efforts with other donors to support 
decentralisation in the country. This is likely also because of the limited role played by 
the EC in the coordination of activities within decentralisation.  
 In Rwanda, funding for decentralisation is ad hoc and linked to various area-based 
programmes of donors and/or capacity building funds used in a strategic way 
especially by GIZ. The question is why the EC has not selected to fund a 
programmatic approach to decentralisation process through the DIP. But other donors 
have consistently taken the lead on decentralisation issues – earlier on it was DfID 
and the Dutch and the Germans, now it‘s the Dutch and the Germans still taking the 
lead. 
4.2 JC4.2 There is complementarity between the interventions of the EC, the 
EU Member States and other donor agencies active in the decentralisation 
arena 
Main findings at JC level 
It is clear that dialogue with donors always occurred at some level during programming 
stages. All project documents made some reference to other donors‘ interventions. It 
appeared that the quality of the dialogue has differed from country to country and has been 
strongest when it is part of various joint works: joint analyses, joint programming etc. 
Consultations and dialogue could be rather superficial in absence of such joint work and 
would then merely result in ―information sharing‖, as for example in Rwanda and Honduras.  
Division of labour among donor agencies has been most explicit in countries where (a) 
the aid harmonisation agenda is significantly developed at a general level and (b) where 
elaborate government policies and strategies for decentralisation reforms are in place. Useful 
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examples of division of work has been for instance found when some donors fund these 
government programmes and others focus on related complimentary support to civil society 
to enhance their capacities for demanding services and accountability of local governments 
(Philippines, Peru). In some cases, the division of tasks has not been arranged but resulted 
de facto. 
It has been very common that the EC jointly financed programmes with other donors: it is 
a general rule for all the major programmes in direct support to decentralisation and where 
SBS is applied. In addition, the EC has also in several cases joined programmes led by other 
development partners. Of the ten countries included in the field review, jointly financed 
programmes have been found in Benin, Lebanon, Mali, Sierra Leone and Tanzania.  
It appeared that the participation of EC policy officials and EU Delegations' personnel in 
policy forums (both internationally and nationally) has been active in Benin, Honduras, 
Lebanon, and Mali. 
However, it is clear that staff generally has felt very time constrained but has still tried to 
engage in relevant policy forums wherever relevant. In recent years a number of high-level 
forums of either ad-hoc or permanent nature have been established to debate issues related 
to decentralisation reforms and local governance in third countries. The involvement of EC 
staff in these forums has not been very significant. These forums included for instance: 
 The Global Forum on Local Development,  
 ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability United Cities and Local Governments 
(UCLG) The Council of European Municipalities  
 The European Platform of Local and Regional Authorities for Development 
(PLATFORMA)104  
The interaction between EC staff working with decentralisation issues (in HQ or in 
delegations) and the various global forums – including the European PLATFORMA appeared 
to be very limited and appeared to be an area for the EC to explore further. 
4.2.1 Ind4.2.1 - Existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC 
programming process 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
It is clear that dialogue with donors always occurs at some level during programming stages. 
All project documents make some reference to other donors‘ interventions.  
The existence of dialogue with other (EU) donors during the EC programming process has 
been identified by the evaluation team in the following countries: 
 In Lebanon, the EUD consult with other EU Member States in programming – the 
French complained about a lack of dialogue but Italians were very satisfied 
(interviews) – the EUD has undertaken joint analytical work with Italy. 
 In Mali, the dialogue was ongoing with the other DPs supporting decentralisation. 
The main partners were CTB, UNCDF, GTZ, SNV and AFD (now with limited 
support). These partners all finance the PNACT (national support programme to local 
authorities), like the EU. The EUD has consulted these stakeholders during the 
programming process. 
 In Peru, it appears from interviews with the EUD and other donors that the EUD 
regularly exchanges with other donors and key stakeholders during all stages of 
the programming and implementing process. As mentioned above, the main 
platform for dialogue between donors on programming are the donor working group 
on decentralisation (Mesa de Descentralización) and the Group on Public Finance 
(Mesa de Finanzas Públicas) chaired by the MEF. 
 In Sierra Leone, during the programming of the CSP 2008 to 2013, the EC had 
regular contacts with the DfID and this ended up with a joint CSP: “The Joint 
Country Strategy (JCS) for Sierra Leone (SL) has been drafted jointly by the 
                                               
104
 http://www.platforma-dev.eu/en/homepage.htm  
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
111 
government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), the European Commission (EC) and the United 
Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DfID) with inputs from in-
country EU Member States. The joint exercise in Sierra Leone sets a unique example 
of joint programming and marks an important step towards fulfilling the EU‟s 
commitments on harmonisation of donors‟ activities, as expressed in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005”105. Coordination for decentralisation 
with other EU donors is minimal. 
 In Benin, the sector of local development, decentralisation and devolution is subject to 
collaboration between the EC, France, Germany and the Government, although other 
partners are also involved. The EUD was the lead donor in 2007, Germany and 
France took over in 2008, and the EUD then took over again in 2009 as lead donor in 
the decentralisation working group. The preparation of the PONADEC was 
launched with the support of the Delegation of Belgium and, in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Decentralisation, Local Governance, Administration and Spatial Planning 
(MDGLAAT). The development of PONADEC was also supported by the EUD.  
In some countries, the dialogue remained limited to ―information sharing‖: 
 In Rwanda, the dialogue is anchored around the DIP and is conducted mainly 
through the decentralisation sector working group with the GoR but mostly in terms of 
exchange of information. 
 In Honduras, the EUD informs the other donors at the decentralisation group 
meetings about its interventions in decentralisation, but the real dialogue is with the 
government on the actions in the programmes. 
4.2.2 Ind4.2.2 - Existence of a task division agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies 
in relation to the decentralisation agenda in a given partner country 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Division of labour among donor agencies is most explicit in countries where (a) the aid 
harmonisation agenda is significantly developed at a general level and (b) where elaborate 
government policies and strategies for decentralisation reforms are in place.  
Existence of a task division agreed upon among (EU) donor agencies in relation to the 
decentralisation agenda in many respective partner countries has been identified by the 
evaluation team: 
 In South Africa, donor coordination and division of labour is there, but no specific 
sector working group on decentralisation/local governance. It falls under both 
Governance and Economic Cluster groups. The GoSA is not keen on the usage of 
decentralisation as a concept – it prefers local government and the three spheres of 
government (Unity principal). A recent Mid-Term Review (MTR) of CSP/MIP 
examined aid effectiveness and EU coordination issues and concluded that there is 
good complementarity and improving division of labour between EC and member 
states programmes. It was also in this connection recommended that donors should 
maintain a judicious mix of budget support and project based approaches at EU level, 
seeking stronger dialogue at EU level on poverty reduction, in particular with the new 
Government. 
 In Tanzania, the aid harmonisation agenda is in a very advanced state with significant 
emphasis on the use of GBS and elaborate institutional arrangements for division 
of labour among DPs. The aid harmonisation agenda has taken issues of 
―complementarity‖ further, as each main sector (including ―decentralisation‖) 
preferably is to be supported by only one lead DP and limited supporting DPs. As part 
of this aid harmonisation agenda the EC left decentralisation as a ―sector‖ and only 
indirectly follows sector developments through other lead DPs. 
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 In Benin, donor practices and efforts have been undertaken over the last three to four 
years to improve the coordination of partners and the alignment with national 
procedures. Development partners seek to uphold the principles of the Paris 
Declaration on alignment and harmonisation. The programming support of their 
projects is most often in connection with the preparation of budget proposals. But the 
predictability of aid is still insufficient. Development partners also aligned on national 
procedures for procurement, but still refer to their own procedures for accounting 
records and payments, audits and monitoring. 
In some cases, the division of tasks has not been arranged but resulted de facto.  
 In Sierra Leone for example, within decentralisation only a limited number of 
development partners are active and therefore the coordination is not complicated. 
Three donors have agreed to support the reform process with the IRCBP and other 
donors (JICA, GTZ, UNCDF etc) work with district programmes. This is not an 
organised division task, but more a result of different interests by the donors.  
 In Mali, the majority of partners recognise the leading role played by the EC, 
although some believe that the EC tries to always first consider its own point of view. 
The current issue of targeting funds, geographically and by sector, now called a new 
dialogue between donors and between donors and the central government (the 
current trend leads to a questioning of the equalisation system and equity in access to 
funds). 
 In Peru, there is complementarity between the EU action and other donors support in 
the area of decentralisation but this is more due to the limited direct support to 
decentralisation provided by the EU rather than a clear strategy to divide tasks and 
responsibilities among donors in the area of decentralisation. 
Useful examples of division of work are also found when some donors fund government 
programmes and others focus on related complimentary support to civil society to enhance 
their capacities for demanding services and accountability of local governments. 
 In Peru, one interview with a key actor in the region of Ayacucho showed there was, 
during 2006-2009, an informal division of roles in terms of activities related to the 
development of capacities at local level: USAID was focusing on civil society 
participation and local governance; the EC was focusing on technical aspects of 
decentralisation (such as planning) at the level of the regional government; UNICEF 
and CTB were directly looking at sectoral aspects related to poverty reduction. Yet, 
this division seems rather fortuitous than planned. Interviews showed that, in general, 
the knowledge of the various stakeholders on the EC co-operation activities was 
actually rather limited.  
A donor matrix exists and seems to help avoiding overlaps between donors. In 
general, the various actors interviewed underline a good coordination and 
complementarity in the area of the support to decentralisation. Yet, a clear and formal 
division of tasks and roles among donors in this area does not seem to exist.  
 In the Philippines, EC support to decentralisation is captured in the overall sector plan 
and agreed with other partners. 
In some other countries, as Honduras and Lebanon, there is no evidence of task division 
among (EU) donor agencies in the decentralisation area. 
 In Honduras for instance, there is no evidence of clear agreements between 
development partners on a division of tasks. The practical arrangement is that EUD 
and BID work at the central level with the key ministries in decentralisation (the 
Ministry of the Interior and Population (SEIP) and the Ministry of Finance (SEFIN), 
while other donors are more involved at the municipal level. 
 In Lebanon, there is not yet a very explicit division of tasks among DPs in relation to 
support to the ―decentralisation agenda‖. The reason is primarily that there is no 
consensus on any government led strategy. Different ministries within the government 
pursue different approaches to local development. 
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4.2.3 Ind4.2.3 - EC jointly finance decentralisation programmes with Members States 
and major donors 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
It is very common that EC jointly finances programmes with other donors: it is a general rule 
for all the major programmes in direct support to decentralisation and where SBS is applied. 
In addition, the EC has also, in several cases (see EQ3 and EQ 5 to 7), joined programmes 
led by other development partners. 
For interventions implemented as projects in support of elected local governments (rather 
than national programmes) it is as a general rule NOT co-financed with other donors and 
potential coordination issues can arise. This includes for instance issues related to equality of 
resource allocation (if the EC decided to focus on a few local governments). 
Examples of EC jointly financed decentralisation programmes with Members States and 
major donors have been identified by the evaluation team in the following countries: 
 In Mali, there is a joint funding of the PNACT, including joint financing of the national 
fund to support local authorities FNACT (see also the FICT). The table below 
summarises the financial contributions to the FNACT over the period 2001-2010: 
  Amount in Fcfa % 
Government  16 467 193 064 11% 
EDF 49 972 885 896 34% 
Other DPs 80 276 394 493 55% 
Total - DT 146 716 473 453   
It is noteworthy that the support from the EDF was actually larger in the early years, 
reaching 73% in 2003. A gradual introduction of other donors in the system and the 
transfer of part of the sector funds reduced the proportion represented by the EDF 
contributions. 
 In Sierra Leone, the IRCBP and the new DSDP are financed jointly with DfID and 
the WB. This has maximised coordination between the EC and other donors – minor 
overlaps exist with activities in some districts funded by JICA and UNDP/UNCDF.  
 In Tanzania, the LGDG is co-financed by several bilateral EU Member States, the EU 
and World Bank. Support to decentralisation reforms is primarily coordinated through 
the basket funded LGRP, although some separate projects are continued (by WB 
mainly in direct support to urban sector; by USAID and various bilateral DPs mainly 
supporting NSAs).  
 In Lebanon, there are few if any co-financed projects supporting local development 
and local governance. However, the new municipal finance reform project was 
subject to a joint identification/formulation process with the Italian Government. The 
Italian Government will grant additional funds to the component two of the 
programme, through a parallel funding to the Government of Lebanon. 
However, in many other countries, such as Benin, Honduras, Lebanon, Peru, the Philippines, 
Rwanda and South Africa, there are no EC jointly financed decentralisation programmes 
with Member States and major donors: 
 In Honduras, there is no joint financing of programmes, i.e. PROADES is only 
financed by the EC. 
 In Peru, as described above in JC4.1, the EC does not jointly finance decentralisation 
programmes with Member States and major donors. 
 In the Philippines, the Government and DPs have shared information for coordination 
through the working groups but not developed substantive co-financed programmes. 
A Dialogue fund has been established as WB trust fund. It is funded by AUSAID and 
CIDA and managed by the WB with involvement of all DPs and the league 
(agreement assigned last week of 2009). Because of different financing agreements 
and rules of donors it is difficult to co-fund activities – at present the trust fund is with 
1.5mUSD and just started to fund one activity. 
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 In Rwanda, there is some coordination but not a basket funding of the DIP. This is 
clearly the wish of some donors and the GoR, but until now it has not been possible 
to establish such a system. There is more incremental funding and donors with 
programmes/projects as vehicles of support.  
4.2.4 Ind4.2.4 - EC policy officials and EU Delegations' personnel participate in policy 
forums (both internationally and nationally) 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
From interviews at EC HQ and the survey, it is clear that staff generally feel time constrained 
but seek to engage in relevant policy forums wherever relevant. From EC HQ, participation of 
EC staff in international forums in support of decentralisation is mainly restricted to the key 
staff from AidCoE4. They have actively engaged in e.g. the work of the Informal 
Development Partners Working Group on Local Governance and Decentralisation (DPWG-
LGD). 
In recent years a number of high-level forums of either ad-hoc or permanent nature have 
been established to debate issues related to decentralisation reforms and local governance 
in third countries. The involvement of EC staff in these forums has not been very significant. 
These forums include for instance: 
The Global Forum on Local Development: Pursuing the MDGs through Local 
Government (Kampala 2010) – it was a high-level event being convened by the United 
Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the Government of Uganda, and supported by a wide range of partners – 
including the EU106. The Global Forum brought together Heads of state and Government 
Ministers, as well as representatives of the donor community, international organisations, 
local governments, local government associations, academia, civil society and the private 
sector for three days of discussion and debate. 
ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability is an association of over 1200 local 
government members who are committed to sustainable development. They arrange various 
policy forums – EC is not a direct member or supporter107 
United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) represents and defends the interests of 
local governments on the world stage, regardless of the size of the communities they serve. 
Headquartered in Barcelona, the organisation‘s stated mission is: ―To be the united voice 
and world advocate of democratic local self-government, promoting its values, objectives and 
interests, through co-operation between local governments, and within the wider international 
community‖. The organisation is present in 136 of the 191 UN Member States in seven world 
regions, UCLG‘s members include individual cities and national associations of local 
governments, which represent all the cities and local governments in a single country. Over 
1000 cities across 95 countries are direct members of UCLG. They arrange a multitude of 
policy forums related to decentralisation and local governance. For development work, they 
partner specifically with World Bank and UN institutions.  
The Council of European Municipalities (CEMR - www.ccre.org) was founded in Geneva 
in 1951 by a group of European mayors; later, it opened its ranks to the regions and became 
the Council of European Municipalities and Regions. Today, it is the largest organisation of 
local and regional governments in Europe; its members are over 50 national associations of 
towns, municipalities and regions from 39 countries. Together these associations represent 
some 100,000 local and regional authorities. At the head of its political structure is its 
President, the mayor of Stuttgart, Wolfgang Schuster. It has a staff of about 20 persons, 
headed by its secretary general Frédéric Vallier. CEMR's budget is about 2mEUR, the main 
part of which comes from the membership fees of its national associations. The rest (about 
10%) consists of an annual grant from the EC in the framework of the "Active European 
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citizenship" programme. CEMR is the European section of the new worldwide organisation 
United Cities and Local Governments (see above). 
The European Platform of Local and Regional Authorities for Development 
(PLATFORMA)108 has been launched during the European Development Days of Strasbourg 
in November 2008. Coordinating the voice of local and regional authorities and of their 
representative organisations to the European institutions, PLATFORMA is committed 
towards three major objectives: 
 A better acknowledgment of the action of local and regional authorities in 
development co-operation, 
 The set up of a solid dialogue between European local and regional authorities and 
EC institutions in charge of development policy 
 The promotion of an efficient decentralised co-operation. 
The interaction between EC staff working with decentralisation issues (in HQ or in 
delegations) and the various global forums – including the European PLATFORMA appears 
to be limited and might be an area for the EC to explore further.  
According to evidence collected during the field phase, it appeared that the participation of 
EC policy officials and EU Delegations' personnel in policy forums (both internationally and 
nationally) has been active in the following countries: 
 In Benin, participation is there in both, national reviews and international conferences. 
 In Honduras, the EUD is active at events in the SEIP and with other actors in the 
decentralisation process at the national level, according to the EUD and other 
development partners (WB and BID). 
 In Lebanon, EUD staff has participated in the recent workshops on future direction of 
local government reforms – but not co-financed arrangements. 
 In Mali, interviews with EUD staff as well as government representatives confirmed an 
active participation of EUD staff in national decentralisation fora, such as the ―revue 
conjointes annuelle‖ between EC and the government and the ―Assises de la 
decentralisation‖. 
However, less evidence has been found in the Philippines, Rwanda, Peru and South Africa. 
 In Peru, the evaluation team did not find evidence of the EC policy officials and EUD 
personnel participate in joint programmes and policy forums (both internationally and 
nationally), except training programmes organised by the EC Head Quarters.  
 In Sierra Leone, from the interviews held, it appeared that that the EUD since 2010 
has had limited participations in activities and meetings about decentralisation in 
MLG&RD, while presence was larger up to early 2010, i.e. during coordination 
meetings and missions of the IRCBP. Many in MLG&RD encouraged the EUD to be 
more active in the activities of the MLG&RD. 
The EUD staff has only participated in a limited way in the semi-annual/annual imple-
mentation support missions for the IRCBP. The staff member responsible for 
decentralisation from 2005 to 2010 participated normally in the wrap up meetings by 
the end of the mission and sometimes also in a few other meetings during the 
mission.  
4.3 JC4.3 EC support to decentralisation processes is coherent with other 
policies, programmes and activities 
Main findings at JC level 
Within EUDs it is clear that coherence between decentralisation support and sector 
support generally has improved over the evaluation period. However, incoherence between 
general decentralisation policies and sector policies and practices has remained a persistent 
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issue in many countries. The problems have been most challenging in countries where 
responsibilities and resourced for large social sectors (such as health and education) were in 
the process of being decentralised to local governments. The EUDs have generally not taken 
a very pro-active role in seeking to support resolution of such inconsistencies, but largely left 
such coordination problems to national governments who in turn, on some occasions, have 
been supported by other donors in this regard.  
Crosscutting issues have always been referred to in general terms in project documents. 
The large and comprehensive joint Government - DP supported decentralisation reform 
programmes have often addressed very fundamental issues, such as female representation 
in LG elections and general gender and environmental guidelines in LG planning and budget 
processes. This appeared as very relevant interventions. Programme documentation has 
been generally weak in monitoring effectiveness of these activities. Several of the smaller 
project based interventions that support NGOs in relation to local governments, have gender 
and environment as key issues. They appeared often to pilot innovative and interesting 
approaches, however, up scaling of activities appears challenging.  
Experiences with inclusion of decentralisation issues in GBS were reviewed in Tanzania, 
Ghana and Sierra Leone. Overall, it has been observed that when decentralisation is 
included in GBS dialogue, then it has become more likely to have a serious discussion of 
decentralisation with stakeholders in Government beyond the normal lead partners (typically 
the Ministry responsible for local governments or Ministry of Interior) and in particular 
broaden the discussion to include the Ministry of Finance and sector ministries. However, the 
review of experiences in the three countries have also suggested that it has been difficult to 
establish meaningful, objective and commonly agreed indicators as basis for dialogue on 
decentralisation policy issues. 
The most useful indicators were typically related to the IGFT – i.e. the size of LG fiscal 
transfers, the extent to which they gradually increase as percentage of total public 
expenditures, the extent to which transfers are reliable, formula based, transparent, timely, 
accurate etc. It has proved more challenging to include indicators for more qualitative 
aspects of wider decentralisation policy reform issues. A general lesson from this is to focus 
on outcome based conditionalities, as opposed to policy-based conditionalities and triggers.  
4.3.1 Ind4.3.1 - Coherence between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to 
larger sectors such as health, education, road infrastructure… 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The 2007 Reference document identified lack of coherence between strategies for support 
to decentralisation and larger sectors such as health, education, road infrastructure etc. as a 
key concern. The EC has since then started to work on sector specific guidelines and 
reference documents on how to work with decentralisation (in education and health sectors). 
However, these documents are not yet official or translated into operational guidelines.  
The findings from the field visits highlighted this lack of coherence between EC strategies 
related to decentralisation and to larger sectors, such as health, education, road 
infrastructure, as shown by the following examples: 
 In Benin, there was no evidence of this having taken place to any larger degree. Of 
course the other sector programmes follow developments within the decentralisation 
sector but there is generally speaking a lot resistance to decentralisation in the larger 
sector ministries.  
 In Mali, the infrastructure sector is a focal sector of the EC co-operation with Mali109, 
and in this sector, the "communes" level is barely taken into account. In particular, it 
is not planned that the projects of infrastructure development related to the functions 
of the LG are managed by the LG themselves. This would actually be contrary to the 
law. This contradiction also appears in the programme ADERE and now PARADER 
regarding the financing of regions.  
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 In the Philippines, the support to SPF and health sector is not very complementary. 
The SPF currently supports some 14 initiatives – mainly related to piloting of 
innovative general governance issues (general LGU planning and capacity building) 
or support to local governance issues where environment is a special focus. There is 
no initiative supporting local governance in relation to health, which is probably a 
missed opportunity. 
 In Tanzania, the role of the EC in work related to ensuring coordination between 
sectors and decentralisation reforms has, however, been relatively limited and 
largely lead by other DPs more active in the decentralisation reforms.  
Box 23 The coordination between sectors and decentralisation reforms in Tanzania 
Coordination between various sectors and decentralisation reforms has for long 
constituted a major issue in Tanzania. However, with the establishment of the LGDG system, 
it became possible to address many of these issues in a practical manner by mainstreaming 
sector funding into the LGDG system. In 2005 PMO-RALG produced a policy paper on how 
sector funding could be integrated into LGDG system, and the same year it was designed 
and later implemented for the agricultural sector (as part of the ASDP). The EC participated 
constructively in the design process but has not lately been active in the ASDP basket. An 
evaluation has recently been conducted and has a very positive assessment of 
achievements of local agricultural development through the ASDP/Agricultural window of the 
LGDG. 
In the education sector funding to LGs continued for long to be slightly parallel to the LGDG 
system (a crash programme for class room construction was for instance implemented under 
PEDP), but from 2007 funding for infrastructure development was largely integrated into 
LGDG system. The education sector is the financially most important for LGs; major issues 
persists in the sector related to facilitation of LGs including continued major inequalities of 
teacher allocations (that currently is centrally managed but from the LGR has been 
advocated as fully devolved and subject to equitable formula based financing) and 
inadequacies in capitation grant allocations to schools through the LGs. 
In the road sector districts and municipalities have been provided with approximately 30% of 
the nationally collected road funds for maintenance of roads under the responsibility of LGs. 
The financing modality is not fully integrated into LGDG system but does provide a fairly 
reliable and equitable level of funding for LGs to maintain (and upgrade) local roads. 
More consistency between EC strategies related to decentralisation and to larger sectors 
has been found in the following countries: 
 In Peru, a number of sector interventions integrate components on decentralisation. 
Therefore it can be stated that the EC support to decentralisation in Peru is fully 
coherent with co-operation strategies in other sectors (such as Health, Education, 
Rural development, etc.). 
 In Rwanda, the coherence has become more evident when the funding of DPRPR 
went through CDF and as SBS. The latest developments are that the EUD has 
generated a fiche for SBS for the agricultural sector with funding through the CDF and 
for all districts. The EUD has been part of the DLG coordination mechanism with 
major donors and GoR, but not as the most active partner. The EC DPRPR was a 
district and area based programme from the beginning and only later in 2006 did 
aspects of the UBUDEHE become more national in approach. But other aspects of 
DPRPR support to districts labour-based infrastructure development where only for a 
limited number of districts. However, the EC support to UBUDEHE was seen as 
crucial and significant for the survival of this countrywide initiative. Aspects of the 
programme had sector focus as well, especially within agriculture and health where 
the limited amounts to communities could be used for improvements for the 
community in these fields.  
 In Sierra Leone, apart from decentralisation, the EC mainly supports sectors i.e. 
agriculture in SL. The team has not come across larger inconsistency between 
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different EC programmes in sector and decentralisation areas. A recent example is 
the new EC agriculture programme, where the mission did not observe 
inconsistencies based on an interview with the responsible in the EUD, who informed 
that the new agriculture programme is coordinated with the EC intervention in 
decentralisation. 
 In South Africa, EC support to local development processes is generally coherent 
with other (sector and GBS) activities. The harmonisation of donor activities is now 
more clearly prominent but still long way to go in terms of joint action plans and 
linkages between sectors and local economic development. 
 In Honduras, stakeholders met from the government and development partners 
(decentralisation, education and health) do not find inconsistency in the EC actions 
between sectors and decentralisation. For environment, the programme 
PROCORREDOR‘s actions are coordinated with the participating municipalities in the 
Caribbean, while for education and health the EUD does not make a particular effort 
to assure coherence with decentralisation. In general it is expected that the GoH 
coordinates different activities in sectors with decentralisation. 
 In Lebanon, local governments are not significantly involved in sectors such as health 
and education – but mainly ―municipal infrastructure‖. The EUD has organised its own 
work in a manner that integrates “decentralisation and local infrastructure” – the 
EC support is mainly supporting local infrastructure development but with a view of 
including local authorities in the work for sustainability and governance reasons. 
Regarding conflict prevention strategies in difficult partnerships, it is clear from the desk 
review that programming in support of decentralisation is particular challenging in countries 
in (post) conflict situations: the potential for direct support to decentralisation and 
corresponding use of SBS is limited. In Haiti the main interventions have been working 
through NGOs, in Lebanon a relative cautious project and bottom-up approach has been 
adopted. The EC responses appear sound and not in conflict with long-term development 
responses.  
4.3.2 Ind4.3.2 - Integration of crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and 
environment into decentralisation programmes 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Crosscutting issues are referred to in project documents, but documentation in ROM 
database etc. is insufficient for making firm conclusions regarding the effectiveness. Findings 
from the field phase highlighted that crosscutting issues such as gender mainstreaming and 
environment have been integrated into decentralisation programmes, in the following 
countries: 
 In Honduras, gender mainstreaming and environment are included in the national 
programme for decentralisation (PRODDEL) and with the support to decentralisation 
in a SBS modality, the EUD does not have means to assure that the crosscutting 
priorities are followed. However in environment evidence exist on the decentralisation 
of certain functions e.g. through the PROCORREDOR. 
 In Lebanon, gender issues are mainly addressed by including stakeholder 
consultations with women in identification of the various local development projects. 
However, there is no evidence of projects seeking to support a more permanent 
gender balanced participation in local governance structures. Environment is more 
clearly and prominently mainstreamed in the projects: this is reflected in the 
prevalence of specific environmental sub-projects financed in particular in the recent 
LOGO. 
 In Mali, gender is generally included in the decentralisation programmes. One of three 
key indicators on the improvement of service delivery (in both PARAD and PARADER 
budget supports) is the enrolment ratio for girls. The environment is taken into 
account with the possibility for LG to finance environmental activities within the funds 
received; environmental management is one of the functions transferred to LG. 
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 In the Philippines, various crosscutting issues are included in the SPF – in particular 
environment and support to indigenous groups. Gender issues are less profiled but 
included in e.g. the projects piloting more participatory planning processes at LGU 
levels.  
 In Sierra Leone, a gender strategy has been developed by the MLG&RD (IRCBP RF 
indicator 2.3). EUD has not promoted any specific EC priorities during revisions of the 
IRCBP. According to the MLG&RD, DfID has promoted some DfID priorities 
occasionally. 
 In Tanzania, crosscutting issues like gender and environment have been integrated 
into the overall LGRP and addressed e.g. through planning and budget guidelines 
used by LGs when planning the use of the LGDG. However, the EC has compared to 
other DPs, only played a marginal role in integration of such issues. 
However, the following examples do not show any inclusion of crosscutting issues: 
 In Benin, crosscutting issues do not figure a major concern in the documentation 
reviewed from the EUD.  
 In Peru, issues such as gender and environment do not appear prominently in the 
project documentation. The projects financed by the NSA-LA thematic budget line110 
that were reviewed during the field phase do not mention these crosscutting issues, 
neither in the logframe/project proposal nor in the progress reports.  
 In Rwanda, there is no evidence that the crosscutting issues have played a major role 
in the decentralisation support to districts and communities. The focus has been more 
on labour-based infrastructure development and on small-scale support to 
communities with clear local governance support focus.  
 In South Africa, since there is no decentralisation support programme, it obviously 
doesn‘t address these issues, but the LED programmes do encourage that project 
proposals for LED support submitted by local governments do contain gender specific 
information as well as an assessment of the environmental impacts of the economic 
activity being proposed.  
4.3.3 Ind4.3.3 - Inclusion of relevant indicators in GBS performance assessments 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The survey from the 22 EUDs indicated that only one country (Tanzania) had explicit 
performance indicators in the General Budget Support assessment framework. In addition, 
the team has found similar indicators in Ghana GBS.  
Boxes five and six provide an outline of the type of indicators used in the two countries for 
assessment of decentralisation reforms in the annual GBS assessments as well as a very 
preliminary discussion of experiences.  
Box 24 Decentralisation and GBS: Experiences from Tanzania 
Indicators for assessment of decentralisation have been included in at least the last four 
years of GBS assessments. The underlying processes, outcome indicators and temporary 
process actions for the 2010 assessment are included below. 
From a preliminary assessment111 it can be concluded that the indicators are very qualitative, 
that donors generally assessed progress as ―unsatisfactory‖ but that donors and Government 
failed to reach consensus on the assessment summarised below. The government for 
instance maintained that the percentage of budget allocations to LGs had increased very 
substantively (apparently reaching a record high 27% of total public expenditure in 2010). 
                                               
110
 such as ―Proyecto Fortalecimiento de las capacidades de Gestión por Resultados en 4 regiones‖ - DCI-
NSAPVD/2007/019-404 // 157-376 
111
 Largely based on team members knowledge from other recent assignments in Tanzania related to work on 
fiscal decentralisation and country evaluation of SIDA, Irish and DfID programme. The findings are to be validated 
and further elaborated in planned fieldwork. 
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Donors argued that the allocations were ad-hoc, very earmarked (e.g. mainly for salaries to 
staff with budgets outside LGAs control) and not truly formula based. Many of the key 
indicators relate to actions that Government of Tanzania was supposed to implement, but 
where the Government ultimately had different interpretations of appropriate actions. Overall, 
the 2010 assessment in Tanzania was rather critical with some distrust between donors and 
Government – not least because of Governments apparent lack of commitment to 
implementation of the decentralisation policy that many donors saw as critical for improved 
local service delivery for the poor. Although all donors shared the same PAF indicators, then 
they had different responses to the results as they had each separate focus on selected 
indicators for their respective ―performance tranches‖. From 2010 EUD has decided to 
include the outcome indicators below as trigger for release of ―performance tranche‖ (in a 
joint agreement with Denmark and Ireland). 
Tanzania GBS PAF Indicators related to “Empowering Local Government Authorities” 
 
Box 25  Experiences from Ghana with Decentralisation Assessments in GBS112 
Decentralisation issues have for many years been included as targets/triggers in the MDBS since the 
introduction of Ghana‟s first Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2003. The experiences in that regard 
remain to be systematically evaluated, but appear ―mixed‖ at best. Targets are frequently not met and 
there is also an increasing realisation that many of the targets applied have been too focused on 
policy process indicators of limited value
113
. For example, even though the target for the ―development 
of HR Policy‖ was fulfilled, as required – it provided limited if any added qualitative guidance to the 
further decentralisation of human resources. It clearly appeared as if GoG simply submitted a paper in 
order to allow ―the box to be ticked‖ rather than seriously considered policies for possible devolution 
and improved HRM in local governments. Another issue is the relative importance attached to 
decentralisation in the overall MDBS dialogue. Decentralisation issues can easily be crowded out.  
The European Commission (EC) and World Bank have therefore since 2008 explored modalities for 
providing sector budget support to decentralisation. Policy dialogue on decentralisation issues would 
supposedly be strengthened. Additional budget resources would help government increase its 
transfers to MMDAs to generate additional investment and improve service delivery at this level, as 
well as finance recurrent cost, training, and technical assistance associated with developing and 
implementing the decentralisation policy.  
The budget support would be provided against a results matrix including performance indicators. The 
results matrix will be comparable to the Multi-Donor Budget Support Performance Assessment 
Framework but will only focus on decentralisation issues. A robust policy and institutional framework is 
                                               
112
 Case is largely based on the report DEGE Consult 2010: Joint Mission for Review of Decentralisation and the 
DDF in Ghana: 6-17
th
 September 2010. 
113
 The GoG Aid Policy and Strategy (op. cit) explicitly states (section 3.10): ―GoG shall actively encourage 
outcome based conditionalities, as opposed to policy based conditionalities and triggers, in the formulation of DP 
support programmes to the country 
Underlying process 
Local Government Reform Programme  Unsatisfactory 
Outcome indicators  
Percentage of total government budget allocated directly to LGAs, 
which does not go through ministerial votes and is calculated on a 
formula basis 
Off-track 
Temporary process actions 
In response to Medium-Term Pay Policy the inter-ministerial task 
force (including PO-PSM, MoFEA, PMO-RALG, MoHSW, MoEVT) 
has drafted 1) a comprehensive roadmap that provides incentives 
for frontline workers in underserved areas through central and local 
levels, and 2) measures limiting additional recruits to better served 
areas, by October 2009 
Not achieved 
Performance Assessment Framework developed and agreed by end 
of June 2009 and used in the sector review for local government 
reform in October 2009. 
Not achieved 
Baseline Information collected by PMO-RALG on the number of 
village assemblies held at each Local Council per financial year and 
establishment of annual targets by October 2009 
Achieved 
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a prerequisite for budget support. EC aims at having agreement on the modality this year for 
implementation in 2011. 
The latest MDBS Review
114
 noted that ―in terms of progress against the MDBS Performance 
Assessment Framework (PAF), the 2009 PAF had 42 targets spread over 13 sectors or thematic 
areas. Due to the non-availability of data related to the Education Management Information System 
(EMIS) survey for 2009, the education targets and trigger could not be fully assessed at the time of the 
annual review. It was agreed that these would be validated by the 31/07/2010 when the data became 
available. The rationale behind this was based on the fact that the EMIS survey would be capturing 
the outcomes of actions already completed and thus no additional time was being granted for the 
achievement of the actions required. The review concluded that 25 out of the 42 targets had been met, 
14 were not met and three could not be assessed. Good progress was shown in the agriculture, health 
and public financial management sectors, while much weaker outcomes were seen in the areas of 
decentralisation and water & sanitation. 
With relation to the disbursement triggers for the performance component, following on from above, 
only 14 out of the 15 could be assessed during the annual review, making exception for the education 
trigger. In addition, the trigger on the Petroleum Management Revenue Bill was determined to have 
been met at the time of the review, but subject to validation by the 31/07/2010. This was based on the 
submission of an endorsed timetable for its eventual submission to Cabinet, as well as the provision of 
the summary of findings from the public consultations that were completed earlier in the year. Given 
that substantial progress had been made despite external delays to the process, it was agreed that 
this flexibility would be shown. In light of the above, the annual review concluded that 11 of the 14 
triggers had been met and three were not met.” 
Specifically on decentralisation the GBS Review noted that ―the Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural Development has embarked in recent months on a comprehensive decentralisation policy 
review. The exercise included a broad-based stakeholder consultation process at the national 
(national stakeholder conference) and regional level (10 regional stakeholder conferences) and 
workshops with special interest groups (MPs, Political Parties, Traditional Authorities, women, etc.) 
The review encompassed all relevant issues of political, fiscal and administrative decentralisation and 
was conducted with a significant level of political will and commitment. The increase of the District 
Assembly Common Fund (DACF) from 5.0% to 7.5% of total revenues in 2009 has been maintained in 
the 2010 budget and the establishment of the District Development Facility (DDF) with significant GoG 
contributions (10mUSD in 2009; 16mUSD in 2010) are also recognised as demonstrations of GoG 
commitment. The Local Government Service (LGS) has formally been established with the ongoing 
implementation of a roadmap for the decoupling of the Local Government Service from the Civil 
Service. GoG has made significant efforts to reinforce the Local Government Service Secretariat, 
although staff are still lacking. 
The crosscutting nature of decentralisation has brought to light a number of challenges being 
experienced in the area. This includes the insufficient formulation and formalisation of functional 
assignments, roles and responsibilities of the Local Government institutions (RCCs, MMDAs, LGS, 
ILGS, etc.). The Policy Framework currently under preparation is expected to provide clarification and 
clear guidance in this area. There is insufficient funding, often earmarked (and/or taken off at source) 
and the vast number of sources of funds (incl. DPs) creates further issues. The Local Government 
Service (LGS), as principal institution for human resource management and capacity development at 
the district level, is not sufficiently operational. Its tasks must still be clearly defined as against those of 
other relevant bodies (OHCS, ILGS, GIMPA). De-concentrated Departments and Agencies are yet to 
be integrated into the district structures. Collaboration with MoFEP and key sector ministries on 
decentralisation reforms and a clear agreement of roles and responsibilities in the sector is very 
limited. 
The review considered the following PAF trigger related to the area of decentralisation: 
 
The review also considered three targets: 
                                               
114
 Ghana Multi-Donor Budget Support Aide Memoire (Final) of the 2010 Annual review, Accra May 2010.  
 Trigger Conclusion of review 
Finalize the Comprehensive Decentralisation Policy 
following all consultations, and submit Policy and 
Implementation Plan to Cabinet for approval.  
Trigger not met. Cabinet endorsement of 
comprehensive policy and implementation plan 
including MDA specific actions had not been 
undertaken.  
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Despite the encouraging level of activity shown within the decentralisation area over the last year with 
a number of achievements noted, DPs at the review expressed concern that none of the three targets 
nor the trigger was met.‖ 
During the field mission, inclusion of decentralisation indicators in GBS performance 
assessments has been found in the following countries: 
 As already mentioned above for Tanzania, decentralisation issues have for long 
featured in the GBS dialogue. However, the importance attached to decentralisation 
has differed among DPs; until recently SIDA has, as one of the few DPs, had explicit 
performance tranche related to decentralisation. The EC has until the most recent 
GBS agreement not had explicit performance tranches but relied on more holistic 
assessments. In the most recent agreement115 that provides for 300mEUR GBS from 
the EC it includes a joint approach to GBS performance tranches with Denmark, 
Germany and Ireland. One out of five elements of the performance tranche criteria 
relates to decentralisation as the government is required to ―introduce regionally 
disaggregated targets for a number of key social indicators (health and education – at 
least one each) into PAF 2011‖. The particular wording of the indicator followed a 
long debate as many of the previous PAF indicators on decentralisation had been 
difficult to assess in an objective and mutually agreed manner. In particular, in the 
past years it has been difficult to reach agreement between DPs and GoT on how to 
measure progress on fiscal decentralisation. One key policy reform under the LGRP 
had been attempts for transforming fiscal transfers to LGs towards a formula based 
system based on objective needs rather than existing services (e.g. allocation of 
funds for education based on number of school age going children, rather than 
existing number of teachers in a district). MOFEA had on several occasions disputed 
the interpretation of the policy objective (arguing that only OC and not PE should be 
subject to formula based allocations), and it appeared increasingly in recent years as 
if policy direction in the LGR was interpreted differently by the lead LGRP DPs, the 
LGRP and GoT. The introduction of alternative performance measures were by the 
EUD in part seen as a way out of this deadlock in policy dialogue.  
 In Rwanda, M&E of the decentralisation process is included in the GBS indicators.  
 In Sierra Leone, for 2008 and 2010 an indicator for decentralisation is included for the 
GBS i.e. the size of government transfers. However, this has been eliminated in 2011 
as it was difficult to provide reliable statistics for this, e.g. due to delays in the 
transfers it was difficult to track the transfers to the correct year. The indicator for 
decentralisation is in 2011 the increase in the government‘s expenditure for health 
and education, which is a rather indirect measure as it depends on central 
government funding. The indicators for the GBS for decentralisation from 2008 to 
2011 are presented below: 
                                               
115
 MDG Contract 2009/2015 – CRIS TZ/FED/2009/021-300 
 Target Conclusion of review 
The IMCC on decentralisation will initiate a process 
to review existing and new legislation to ensure it 
supports the concept of devolution.  
Target not met.  
1.  IMMC has not yet been inaugurated. A work 
plan or minutes are not available.  
2. Submission of confirmation that L.I. has been 
gazette is pending.  
Human Resource Management Policy, including 
performance management implementation plan 
approved.  
Target not met.  
LGS HRM Policy was developed and was approved 
by Minister prior to 2009 MDBS Annual Review. 
However, an implementation plan is still 
outstanding.  
Implement the intergovernmental Fiscal Framework 
(IGFF) including: (a) Completion and roll out of 
MMDA Accounting Manual.  
Target not met.  
MMDA Accounting Manual has been produced. The 
non-objection of the GAS which is needed prior to 
CAGD/Minister‘s approval is pending.  
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Table 18 Indicators for Decentralisation in the Assessment Framework for General 
Budget Support 2008 to 2011 
Year Indicators 
2008 
i) "The budgetary funds actually transferred to local councils in 2007 expressed as a share of 
total discretionary non-salary, non-interest recurrent spending, will be within 4 percentage 
points of the budgeted share for 2007" and  
ii) "Actual spending as a share of budgeted allocations for health and education will meet or 
exceed the benchmarks set for each year".  
2009 
"Percentage of textbooks transferred from local councils to schools in scholastic year 2007/2008 
increases on 2004/2005 results (>89%)" 
2010 
i) "Transfers to Local Councils in fiscal year (FY) 10 adhere to the quarterly disbursement 
schedule published in the beginning of each fiscal year"; and  
ii) "The variance between available resources and executed LC budgets should not be more 
than 10 percent in FY 2010" 
2011 
i) "Actual non-salary non-interest spending for health as a share of budgeted allocations in 
fiscal year 2010 will exceed the benchmark of 94.08% for fiscal year 2009 by at least 2%." 
ii) "Actual non-salary non-interest spending for education as a share of budgeted allocations in 
fiscal year 2010 will exceed the benchmark of 95.64% set for fiscal year 2009 by at least 2%" 
Source: EUD 
For the following countries, no indicators related to decentralisation have been included in 
GBS performance assessments: 
 In Honduras, a general budget support (GBS) modality is established with the 
government to support the National Development Plan. The GBS contains only 
indicators for education and health. 
 In Mali, there are no specific indicators related to decentralisation in the context of 
General Budget Support. In the context of budget support, a section is devoted to 
public finance management (with the programme PAGAM). Improving public financial 
management is a crosscutting and crucial issue. It will have a direct impact on all 
sectors and the financing capacity of the state. That said, it is regrettable that this 
programme does not take into account the local public finance. 
It is noteworthy that the results in terms of improving public financial management are 
not satisfactory, prompting questions about the continuation of General Budget 
Support. This could influence the decision on whether to continue SBS or not. 
In the other visited countries, the EU is not providing GBS. It is still interesting to note that in 
Peru, although the Euro-PAN programme seems to consolidate in a certain manner the 
decentralisation process due to its original implementation modality, there are no indicators 
on decentralisation in this SBS and decentralisation does not feature in its specific 
objectives/expected results. 
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5 EQ5: Transfer of functions & resources 
Evaluation Question 5: To what extent has EC support contributed to the decentralisation 
of powers, functions and resources to local governments in partner countries? 
It is interesting to put in parallel the detailed evidence presented in the indicators under the 
various JC analysed with the impact of the EC support as perceived by the EUDs. The figure 
below shows the results of the survey to EUD carried out during the desk phase. For the 
EUDs surveyed, the EC support has a rather low impact on: 
 the development of the national decentralisation policies and strategies. 
It has a very low impact on: 
 the development of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes. 
 the increase in the autonomy of local authorities. 
The most significant positive impact that the EC support may have is related to the (however, 
in average, the impact remains rather limited): 
 the increase in local governments fiscal and human resources. 
Figure 18 Impact of support, as perceived by the EUDs 
 
Survey to the EU Delegations, Particip analysis 
 
The table below summarises the evidence gathered during the desk and field phases on the 
focus and the results of the EC support for the various case study countries for which an in-
depth analysis was carried out. The analysis seems to confirm the perception of the EUD. 
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Table 19 Overview of EC support to national transfer of functions and resources (focus 
of the support & results) 
Country \ Criteria 
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Benin   + 0 
Honduras  0   
Lebanon   -  
Mali  +  0 
Peru     
Philippines     
Rwanda     
Sierra Leone +  +  
South Africa   +  
Tanzania +  +  
Overall assessment   + 0 
 
Legend 
Colour Level of EC 
support - Scale 
Description 
 
significantly 
Interventions' objectives or activities do explicitly at significant degree address the 
result area and the concerned interventions are of relative significance compared to 
overall EC support to decentralisation. 
 
partly 
Interventions' objectives or activities only partially or marginally address the result 
area and/or the concerned interventions are relative small compared to overall EC 
support to decentralisation. 
 not at all EC support in the country does not at all address the result area. 
 
Symbol Results - Scale Description 
+ significantly 
Results have to a significant degree been achieved (compared to objectives) in this 
result area. 
 partly 
Results have only partially or marginally been achieved (compared to objectives) in 
this result area. 
0 not at all Results have not all been achieved (compared to objectives) in this result area. 
 
Detailed analysis and evidence on these aspects are provided in the next sub-sections. 
 
5.1 JC5.1 National decentralisation policies and strategies have been 
developed 
Main findings at JC level 
Most countries reviewed (including six of the ten field countries visited) have developed 
national decentralisation policies and strategies, as well as relevant national legislations, 
during the period evaluated. The support from the EC has, however, been limited and in 
most cases only contributed to selected elements of the policies and strategies.  
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EC support for the development of national decentralisation policies/strategies has rarely 
been in the form of stand-alone EC programmes, but has almost always been in 
collaboration with other development partners, as joint support to large national 
decentralisation and local government reform programmes in countries such as in Benin, 
Mali, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and Tanzania. The results have been modest in most of these 
countries. Positive results have been most evident in Mali and, to some extent, in Sierra 
Leone. 
The development of national decentralisation policies – and effective implementation - is 
highly political, and the capacity of the EC and other development partners to leverage policy 
often remains limited. In several of the countries reviewed, it appears that the national 
governments have backtracked on previous policy commitments (e.g. in Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Mali and Tanzania in recent years). In some other countries, the governments 
have remained relatively uncommitted (e.g. in Lebanon and Madagascar) or largely failed to 
act on policies (e.g. in Senegal).  
It can also be observed that several countries, such as South Africa and the Philippines, 
have progressed significantly with decentralisation and local government reform without any 
visible policy contributions from ongoing EC support, which, during the period evaluated, 
focused on different aspects (such as local economic development or capacity building of 
local authorities in specific sectors). When trying to identify condition for success for the EC 
support to development of national policies and strategies for decentralisation, the following 
emerge: 
 A proper situational analysis has to lay the foundation for support – including analysis 
of the ―politics of reform‖, to inform design of EC interventions; 
 EC staff needs to have high-level access to central government and key ministries in 
the decentralisation process. 
 Programme design and aid delivery methods need to be appropriate – this includes 
considerations of comprehensiveness of interventions, chosen entry points and aid 
delivery mechanisms. 
 EC should have a comparative advantage (compared to other donors), e.g. in 
situations where relative large scale support (e.g. in the form of SBS) can take place 
rather than piloting innovative modalities at a small scale which can be done better by 
other smaller organisations (e.g. via the support of technical co-operation agencies of 
EU MS or UN agencies such as UNCDF). 
 The highly political nature of decentralisation reforms may also require successful 
support to entail high-level political dialogue as well as building capacities of local 
stakeholders to engage in reform policies. 
5.1.1 Ind5.1.1 - Existence and quality of national decentralisation policy and specific 
devolution processes 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
In several countries reviewed (e.g. Lebanon, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda and South 
Africa), the EC has not been involved in support to national strategies for decentralisation. 
It appears that the EC has supported national decentralisation policies and strategies only in 
some cases (e.g. Benin, Cambodia, Honduras, Mali, Sierra Leone and Tanzania). The 
support has rarely been in the form of stand-alone programmes, but has almost always been 
in collaboration with other development partners, as joint support to large national 
decentralisation and local government reform programmes. 
Significant positive results can be observed in only the two cases: Sierra Leone and 
Benin. 
 In Sierra Leone, the PRSP I (2005) and II (2008) had decentralisation to elected local 
councils as a key national policy for improving service delivery and local democracy. 
Yet, it is only in 2010 that a formal National Decentralisation Policy was approved. 
This was done after a long process supported by UNDP and the EC together with the 
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WB through the IRCBP116. The policy is now a national document to be disseminated. 
It has been agreed among the stakeholders that the policy was necessary and that 
the document is of high quality. 
 In Benin, the EC has actively participated in the design and development of 
PONADEC (National Policy of Decentralisation), which, since 2009, is the framework 
within which all programming and implemented interventions for decentralisation are 
taking place. While Benin‘s decentralisation & devolution policy still has to go a long 
way to become fully operational, a good foundation has been laid by having 
developed a clear sectoral policy framework (PONADEC) with a clear priority Action 
Plan. 
Box 26 The Benin National Policy of Decentralisation and Deconcentration 
(PONADEC) 
The National Policy of Decentralisation and Deconcentration (PONADEC – "Politique 
Nationale de Décentralisation et de Déconcentration") is the Government of Benin strategy 
for enacting the development aim of involving local governments in administrating their own 
proper activities and contributing to increased service delivery. The focus of the 
strategy/policy is on the implementation of policies of decentralisation, de-concentration and 
planning and how this is done at local government levels. PONADEC was finalised in 2009. 
This means that the focus of PONADEC is the creation of the institutional and organisational 
conditions for a sustainable and balanced local development based on grassroots 
development. There are three specific result areas namely:  
 Implement a policy of planning and balanced development, incorporating the entire 
country to achieve sustainable and equitable development.  
 Ensure the implementation of the principles of good governance in modernisation of local 
administration.  
 Reduce the level of poverty by improving access to basic services and enhancing the 
economic potential of municipalities.  
PONADEC has an implementation horizon of over 10 years to be able to achieve grassroots 
democracy, good governance and sustainable local development through a decentralised 
unitary state which ensures the harmonious development, on the basis of the national 
solidarity, universal access to basic services, and the potential regional and interregional 
balance. 
The EC support has provided some contributions to the development of the national policy 
framework for decentralisation are observed in certain other cases such as: Cambodia, 
Honduras, Mali and Tanzania. 
 Since 1995, Tanzania has pursued a decentralisation policy. Since 1998, the policy 
was guided by a Local Government Reform Policy. The PMO-RALG has been the 
lead institution responsible for implementation and further update of the policy. The 
PMO-RALG has since 2000 been supported by a dedicated Local Government 
Reform Programme (LGRP) team funded by a range of Development Partners 
through a basket funded arrangement. The EC, via its support to the Local 
Government Development Grant (LGDG), made some contribution to overall 
decentralisation policy and strategy as: 
                                               
116
 Since 2006 the EC delegation in SL decided to allocate all funds from the EC Decentralisation and Capacity 
Building Programme (IRCBP) into a WB managed trust fund for support to decentralisation. The trust fund 
finances the Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Programme (IRCBP) and with a contribution of 10,000 
million EUR initiated 31 July 2007 and is expected to continue to mid 2011. The IRCBP supports the 
decentralisation secretariat (DecSec) in the Ministry of Internal Affair, Local Government and Rural Development 
(MIALGRD), the Local Government Finance Commission, capacity building of LGs and other relevant central 
government institutions, and a development grant to local councils. The IRCBP programme and the EC 
contribution have been instrumental to most of the achievement mentioned for Sierra Leone in EQ 5 to 8.  
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 The LGDG itself became the main vehicle/GoT Strategy for devolution of the 
development budget, 
 Once the LGDG was established around 2004 it further developed into a 
strategy for devolution of sector development interventions starting with the 
design of modality for decentralised agriculture sector interventions (the 
Agriculture Development Grant under the ASDP) as a ―window‖ of the LGDG 
in 2005 – soon to be followed by windows for other sectors including health, 
water, education and urban environment.  
The EC was one among several funding partners contributing to the LGDG. Although 
not a lead donor, its contribution was nevertheless critical for the establishment of the 
system. The World Bank originally led the design of the LGDG but had suggested that 
the system first should be piloted in 30% of the Local Governments through a World 
Bank credit effective from 2004. The bilateral donors active in the LGRP basket urged 
for a more rapid implementation – not least because the introduction of the LGDG 
system was also seen as exit strategy for DPs supporting various ―Area Based 
Programmes‖. Especially the Dutch and Irish Embassies were keen to see this 
change happen soon because of recent poor assessments of their area-based 
programmes and because of the increasing demands on development partners for 
aid harmonisation. The EC contributions of 23 million EUR made the upscale of the 
system on a national basis possible to achieve with co-funding from other EC 
member states (initially Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium – later also Germany). 
 In Cambodia, The Government‘s National Strategic Development Plan (2006-2010) 
and the NSDP Update (2009-2013) acknowledge that decentralisation of political 
power and deconcentration of administrative authority are prerequisites for poverty 
reduction. To this end, the Law on Administrative Management of the Capital, 
Province, Municipality, District and Khan, widely known as the Organic Law, was 
adopted in 2008, and the National Committee for Sub-National Democratic 
Development was established. A Preliminary Implementation Framework was 
prepared and work began on the formulation of a 10-year National Program for Sub-
National Democratic Development. According to the project documentation reviewed 
during the desk phase, the joint EC-UN funded ―Strengthening Democratic and 
Decentralised Local Governance in Cambodia‖ contributed to the formulation of this 
10-year programme and particular influenced its emphasis on downwards 
accountability and promoted the voice of communes within the programme. 
 In Mali, during the evaluation period, the EC has given some limited support to the 
development of a national policy framework for decentralisation by contributing to the 
development of guidelines for the transfer of functions and powers to the local level.  
 In Honduras, the Government of Honduras has no formal "policy for decentralisation", 
although policies have been prepared during the last 10 years. From 2002 to 2005, 
the Government of Honduras had decentralisation as part of the national 
development strategy as presented in the 2003 Poverty Eradication Strategy Plan 
(ERP), while the government from 2006 did not have decentralisation as a priority, 
although this changed with the ―Minimum Plan for Decentralisation‖ (Agenda Minima 
de Descentralización) introduced in 2008 with some particular actions for 
decentralisation (education, health). A new national strategy ―Vision 2038‖ was 
approved by the Parliament in 2010, which has decentralisation as one of its pillars 
formulated in more details (Plan Estrategico: 2010-2014: Decentralisation para el 
Desarrollo Local en el Marco de la Vision de Pais 2038, SEIP 2010). During most of 
this period, the EC has contributed to the recent development of the national policy 
framework for decentralisation through its continuous support to the national 
decentralisation process (via PROADES) since 2005. 
The section below presents some information on the country reviewed where the EC has not 
aimed at supporting the development of a national decentralisation policy. 
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 In Lebanon, discussions of decentralisation reforms are still in preliminary stages, so 
support to a policy or strategy for decentralisation is still not relevant. However, the 
President of the Republic of Lebanon, his Excellency General Michel Sleiman, has 
recently, in broad terms, expressed support for decentralisation reforms that ―gives 
municipal councils financial autonomy, strengthens democracy, revitalises regions 
and local participation...‖117. But the ministry in charge of leading the process seems 
quite weak and there is no evidence that the government as a whole support the 
process.  
 In Peru, no policy document exists that defines the Peruvian decentralisation policy. 
The EC support during the evaluation period has not aimed at supporting the 
development of a decentralisation policy directly. The GoP‘s approach to 
decentralisation has been an evolving process starting a long time back (see details 
in Annex 5 of the field visit country note). For the present context, the process took off 
in 2002-2003 with an amendment to the Constitution in 2002 and the elaboration of a 
number of key laws to define the decentralised system (regional, municipal functions, 
elections etc) and again in 2007, when the new government re-forced the process by 
demanding all key ministries to devolve their functions to the regional governments by 
a presidential decree. The efforts of the government in 2005 to reduce the number of 
regions, which was rejected in a referendum in 17 departments, should also be 
mention and the de-facto establishment of the departments as regions.  
 In the Philippines, support from the EC has not directly aimed at supporting an overall 
decentralisation process but mainly focused on implementation of health sector 
programme in a ―decentralised context‖. Decentralisation reforms were to some 
extent a ―big bang‖ major event marked by the enactment of the Local Government 
Code in 1991 that transferred significant functions, powers and responsibilities from 
the national to the local governments. The enactment increased the financial 
resources available to local government units by significantly increasing their internal 
revenue shares. It also transferred close to 70,000 national government agency 
personnel to local governments.  
The devolution ushered in by the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 
was a defining moment that ushered in fundamental and radical changes in the 
history of national-local relations and local autonomy in the Philippines118.  
Several of the basic structures of local governments had developed gradually long 
time prior to 1991, e.g. with introduction of elected officials at municipal and provincial 
level as far back as 1898119. The Government has since 1991 not pursued an 
additional explicit ―decentralisation policy‖ beyond the broad intentions of the Act 
which by many stakeholders also have been interpreted as ―if it is not prohibited then 
it must be allowed‖120 which in this manner has encouraged multiple local 
interpretations of how the law and its policy intentions should be interpreted. 
 In Rwanda, the RDSF, adopted in August 2007, provides the basis for furthering the 
decentralisation process from 2008 to 2012 in a comprehensive and coordinated 
manner. The RDSF outlines five strategic areas to boost the decentralisation process 
and further empower Local Government Authorities. It is aligned to the national 
EDPRS. The DIP has been elaborated by the GoR to implement the RDSF and 
addresses all the strategic areas of the RDSF. Its goal is to reach ―sustainable 
economic growth and social development‖ and its purpose is to achieve ―equitable, 
efficient and effective pro-poor services and local development in an environment of 
good governance‖.  
                                               
117
 Speech of the President, opening ceremony October 17
th
, 2009 – Decentralisation in the near east, 
International seminar, Tripoli, Lebanon, 17-19 2009.  
118
 Extract from: Alex Brillantes, Jr., Gilbert Llanto, James Alm, and Gaudioso Sosmena 2009: Decentralisation 
and devolution in the Philippines; Status, Triumphs, Tests and Directions - an in depth study sponsored by ADB. 
119
 See annex 5 for details.  
120
 Brillantes et al op cit, p. 15. 
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 In Nicaragua, the government from 2002 to 2007 (headed by Enrique Bolanos) had 
decentralisation as a strategy for development and a decentralisation policy was 
approved in 2006. The government chose education as a pilot sector for 
decentralisation and EUD, following CSP 2002-2006, decided to support this and 
other element in the National Education Plan (2001 to 2015). After the change in 
government from 2007 (headed by Ortega), it has however not been a priority to 
establish a more specific decentralisation plan as a new political agenda, without 
decentralisation as a priority, was formulated by the National Human Development 
Plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Humano, PNDH). The INIFOM (Institute 
Nicaraguese de Formacion Municipal) has apparently worked on a National 
Decentralisation Plan, starting in 2009, but this is a weak institution with no broader 
mandate for reform of the public sector. EC is not supporting it. 
 In South Africa, there is no doubt about the quality of the national policies and 
strategies in the DLG field and that the GoSA has its own strategies in this field. The 
Government has ample capacity to formulate these. What is lacking is the capacity 
and will to implement certain key policies throughout the country. The EC has not 
contributed any substantive analysis. Since the fall of apartheid, the reforms of the 
local government system in South Africa have been transformed: the main objectives 
being to support racial integration equalize developments and provide services more 
effective. Decentralisation is per se not a so strong objective. The previous four 
provinces and nine homelands were substituted by nine provinces. Apartheid local 
government consisted of over 1.200 racially-based local authorities. Local 
government was transformed in two phases: In 1995, 843 transitional municipalities 
were created. The second phase, in 2000, was characterised by the incorporation of 
urban and rural areas, reducing the number of local municipalities to 284 (47 Districts, 
6 Metros, 231 Local Municipalities). Each municipality has to develop a 5-year 
Integrated Development Plan (IDP), which guides all investments at local level. 
5.1.2 Ind5.1.2 - Existence and quality of national government institutional 
arrangements to implement decentralisation reform 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
In most countries, the responsibility for implementation of national decentralisation strategies 
lies with the ministry responsible for local governments, for instance: 
 In Benin: the Ministry of Decentralisation, the Local Governance and Regional 
Planning, 
 In Honduras: the Secretaria de Interior y Poblacion (Ministry of Interior and 
Population), 
 In Lebanon: the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, 
 In Madagascar: the Ministry of Decentralisation and Regional Development, 
 In Senegal: the Ministry of Decentralisation and Local Governments, 
 In Sierra Leone: the Ministry of Local government and Rural Development,  
 In Uganda: the Ministry of Local Government (together with several LG specific 
institutional support modalities such as the Local Government Finance Commission). 
In many countries, the wider aspects of reform coordination are also followed up by broader 
coordinating bodies, such as inter-ministerial committees or consultative bodies (this is the 
case, for instance, in Benin, where the PONADEC decentralisation policy is overseen by an 
inter-ministerial committee).  
The EC has supported the coordination bodies in charge of the decentralisation reforms only 
in very few cases such as in Benin, Mali, Sierra Leone and, to a more limited extent, in 
Tanzania and Honduras. As detailed in indicator 6.1.4, the EC has also supported in these 
countries the inter-ministerial mechanisms in place but with mixed results: these inter-
ministerial committees usually do not have the needed strength and political back up to 
spearhead the process and take a real coordinative role in the process. 
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The field phase confirms that, in most countries, the partner governments have established 
bodies or committees for coordination but that these bodies are often weak (with some 
exception such as the PMO-RALG in Tanzania) and that support in this area faces a highly 
political environment. This is well illustrated in the case of Mali (see box below). 
Box 27 Institutional arrangements to implement decentralisation reform in Mali 
In the early years of the decentralisation process, the body in charge of decentralisation, the 
"Mission de Décentralisation et de Réformes Institutionnelles" (MDRI), had the necessary 
weight (with a high level of political support) to lead the implementation of the national 
decentralisation strategies. The fact that decentralisation was under the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Territorial Administration, becoming the Ministry of Territorial Administration and 
Local Government (MATCL), aimed at empowering the ministry in its responsibility to guide 
the decentralisation process. Moreover, the creation of the DNCT within the department 
responded to the need to have an operational entity to monitor the implementation of 
decentralisation and coordination of planned actions. The establishment of the 
Commissioner of Institutional Development was aimed at enhancing the overall consistency 
of the reforms taking into account the various aspects of state reform including 
decentralisation and deconcentration.  
However, from 2004 / 2005, the government's objectives moved gradually away from the 
realities of the technical orientations in terms of decentralisation. Speeches and official 
documents made fewer cases of decentralisation. Through its institutional support to the CDI, 
the EC tried to offer support to line ministries to work on aspects of decentralisation / 
devolution. But the response remained very limited. Both aspects (general policy objectives 
and technical issues related to decentralisation at ministry level) were treated separately and 
remained purely formal. Overall, the persons in charge of the reforms were often 
characterised by a low motivation and limited capacities to carry out this type of exercise. 
The interviews conducted during the field visit carried out in this evaluation clearly pointed 
out the fact that it is not possible to expect that an administration successfully conducts 
alone, from inside, important reforms that challenges the prerogatives and existing 
distribution of powers within the institution. 
The case of Sierra Leone also illustrates the importance of taking into account the 
sustainability of the efforts supported in this area. 
Box 28 Sustainability of the coordination mechanisms put in place for the 
decentralisation process in Sierra Leone 
An inter-ministerial committee (IMC) headed by the vice-president was set up in 2004 to 
coordinate the decentralisation process. The IMC has, however, lacked a technical support 
unit as a secretariat and decision making and actual coordination have therefore been 
impossible.  
As a result, the DecSec, supported by the EC and the IRCBP, has taken care of the 
coordination of the decentralisation process with sector ministries. As the support to DecSec 
will end by June 2011, the coordination is in jeopardy unless the IMC is revitalised or the 
Ministry in charge of the decentralisation process (MLG&RD) takes up the responsibility.  
While national government institutions (sector ministries and their departments and agencies, 
MoFED, MLG&RD) are likely capable of continuing the reform process, an important issue by 
mid 2011 is also the institutionalisation of the two key programmes in this area (the IRCBP 
and the LGFD) into the relevant ministries (MLG&RD and MoFED respectively). In the 
MoFED, the ministry has assumed the expenditures for salaries and office costs for the 
LGFD but a budget for its activities in the field does not exist. For the DecSec, the MLG&RD 
had not yet taken serious actions – only a draft organisational chart exists with two 
departments for now.  
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5.2 JC5.2 National legislations supporting decentralisation processes 
(especially the transfer of functions) have been enacted 
Main findings at JC level 
National legislations supporting decentralisation processes and the transfer of functions have 
been enacted in almost all the countries with decentralisation policies in place.  
Support to the development of legislation for decentralization has only been provided by the 
EC to a very limited extent in the countries studied during the desk phase and visited during 
the field phase of the evaluation. The only major support was to the legislation and 
constitution in Mali and some limited support in Benin to improve the consistency between 
the sector legislation and the legislation on decentralisation.  
The EC, as well as other DPs and national stakeholders, are aware of the fact that, in most 
countries, sector legislations are not fully aligned with overall national legislations related to 
decentralisation. However, this has rarely led to specific actions. One simple reason for this 
is that, during the period evaluated, the focus both of partner countries and development 
partners was on developing a national policy/strategy for decentralisation, which needs to be 
developed before any legislation on decentralisation, and several countries did not have a 
sound national policy or strategy. Another reason seems to be that it is more complicated for 
development partners to support the development of legislation because the translation of 
broad policies into specific legalisation is even more political than the development of general 
policies, and possibly also because of technical complexities. 
5.2.1 Ind5.2.1 - Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation 
processes 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
About half of the ten countries visited during the field phase have a partly developed legal 
framework for decentralisation and two countries have an almost fully developed legal 
framework for decentralisation.  
Overall, the EC support to the development of a legal framework for decentralisation has 
been very limited: only one example of significant support exists (Mali), while some limited 
support was given in a few other countries (such as Benin and Cambodia). The evidence 
gathered during the field phase confirms that the contributions of the EC support in this area 
in Mali have been instrumental (see box below). 
Box 29 Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes - the 
case of Mali 
The 1992 Constitution laid the foundation for decentralisation. Law 93-008 defines conditions 
of the "free administration of Local governments" ("libre administration des collectivités"). 
This text was supplemented by a series of other texts on the status of elected officials and 
staff, local finance, election law, the code community, etc. The legal corpus of 
decentralisation is now relatively complete, as illustrated by the table below. 
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Interviews carried out during the field phase have shown that the EC has significantly 
contributed to the development of the legislative framework for decentralisation, especially 
through its earlier interventions. 
The EC, France and other donors have reiterated their political and financial support to the 
decentralisation process at different times (Round Table of Donors in Geneva in 2004, 
sectoral consultation on decentralisation in 2005 in Bamako). Recent support to the 
implementation of planned reforms in the framework of the national policy of decentralisation 
(DCPND) and the institutional development program (IDP) follows the EC-supported 
programme PARAD, the objective being now to deepen the decentralisation and 
deconcentration by an effective transfer of resources and the development of adequate 
capacities at both regional and local levels.  
 
It is important to note that, in some countries the legal framework was already developed 
when EC entered with support to decentralisation (e.g. Honduras, Nicaragua, the Philippines 
and Tanzania).  
In Honduras, the EC-funded programme PROADES initially intended to support the complete 
revision of the Law on Municipalities that was developed in 1991 (see box below). But, partly 
due to the low priority given by the government during several years, results achieved were 
rather limited. The technical assistance (and relevant short-term missions in this framework) 
still provided some contributions to the amendments to the Law on Municipalities that were 
approved in 2009 and to the current discussions on the revisions of the legislative framework 
that are further required. 
  
Selection of most important decrees and laws regarding decentralisation 
1993-2001 
The principle and conditions for the administration of local government (Law 93-008 of 11 February 1993, 
amended December 1996) 
Law No. 95-035 of 12 April 1995 Local Authority Regulations 
Officials of the Local Authorities (Law No. 95 022 of 30 May 1995) 
Conditions of appointment and duties of state officials in Local Authorities (Law No. 95,210 of May 30, 1995) 
The special status of the District of Bamako (Act No. 96 of February 2, 1996) 
The conditions and terms of provision of Local Authorities of the decentralised services of the State (March 
1996) 
The establishment and management of the Local Authorities (Law No. 96 050, 16 Octobre 1996) 
The fiscal resources of local authorities (the fiscal resources of municipalities (Act No. 044 of July 7, 2000) 
Décret 313, 314, 315, 4-6-2001 : fixant les détails des compétences transférées de l‘Etat aux LG en matière 
d‘éducation, santé, hydraulique rurale et urbaine 
 
2002-2011 
Décret N° 02-313/P-RM du 04/06/2002 fixant les détails des compétences transférées de l‘Etat aux Collectivités 
Territoriales en matière d‘éducation  
Décret N° 02-314/P-RM du 04/06/2002 fixant les détails des compétences transférées de l‘Etat aux Collectivités 
Territoriales des niveaux, commune et cercle en matière santé 
Décret N° 02-315/P-RM du 04/06/2002 fixant les détails des compétences transférées de l‘Etat aux collectivités 
Territoriales en matière d‘hydraulique rurale et urbaine 
Loi n° 07-072 du 26 décembre 2007, art.4: dotation d'investissement des LG, dotation pour la garantie des 
emprunts des LG, dotation pour les appuis techniques, dotation pour l'appui au fonctionnement des LG, dotation 
pour l‘inter-collectivité 
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Box 30 Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes - the 
case of Honduras 
A rather elaborated national framework exists for decentralisation in Honduras. Some of the 
most important laws are listed below: 
 Law of Municipalities (Ley de Municipios, LdM 1991), with some important amendments in 
2009. 
 Planning Law (Territorial Order, 2003). 
 Water and Sanitation (2003), which recognizes municipalities and water boards as 
provider of services and requires the central government to transfer the 33 operating 
systems and aqueducts to the municipalities. 
 Law on forestry (2006).  
 The law of the Municipal Administrative Career (2010 with effect from August 2011).121 
 Law of Municipalities – Amendments (2009). 
 
The box below illustrates some of the issues at stake regarding legal reforms in Tanzania. 
Box 31 Existence of national legislations supporting decentralisation processes - the 
case of Tanzania 
The Government committed itself to a comprehensive local government reform policy in 
1998. Significant progress has since then been made regarding building the capacities of 
local governments and improving their budgets (primarily through increasing central 
government grants. Local Governments play today a significant role in Tanzania for local 
service provision (and manage more than 25% of total public expenditure) but the legislative 
framework for decentralised has not been significantly improved for the last ten years of 
reforms. Certain aspects of legal reforms (in particular related to human resource 
management) have de facto been centralised. A major weakness of the reforms in Tanzania 
has been the lack of comprehensive legal reforms along the principles outlined in the Local 
Government Reform policy. The dialogue around GBS did not alter any aspects of this 
(although the GBS dialogue included elements associated with local government reforms). 
The most pressing issues in terms of local government reform were policy issues related to 
implementation of fiscal decentralisation – in particular the use of formula based allocations 
for more transparent and equitable allocation of resources to LGs.  
The LGRP pursued legal aspects of decentralisation reforms including review of sector 
legislation but this largely failed.  
The particular EC contributions to the reform (via the LGDG) did not have any objectives 
related to legal reforms. 
5.2.2 Ind5.2.2 - Sector legislation is aligned with LG legislation and decentralisation 
policy 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Coherence between sector legislation and legislation on decentralisation is a problem in 
many countries as the ministry in charge of decentralisation rarely has enough power in the 
government structure to assure streamlining of legislation between decentralisation and the 
sectors. In most of the countries visited during the field phase, they were some 
inconsistencies between the legislation on decentralisation and the legislation within the 
sectors (see Volume II - annex 11 for more details). This typically concerns the question of 
what level of government (municipality, district, central government) is actually responsible 
for specific tasks (e.g. water provision, basic education, feeder roads, etc).  
                                               
121
 The law aims to prevent political patronage and improve the efficiency of municipal management through the 
recruitment and retention of qualified human resource, promoting the preservation of institutional memory of 
municipal governments and sustainability of the process regardless of the change of governments. 
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As highlighted during the field visit and the document consulted, the EC, as well as other 
DPs and national stakeholders, are aware of the fact that, in most countries, sector 
legislations are not fully aligned with overall national legislations related to decentralisation.  
However, this has rarely led to specific actions. Apart from minor activities in Benin, Mali and 
Nicaragua, the EC has not supported strongly the alignment of sector legislation with the 
legislation on decentralisation.  
The case of Mali is illustrative of the difficulties of supporting the translation of broad policies 
into concreted frameworks backed by appropriate legal and financial framework (see the 
summary of the field visit observations in the box below).  
Box 32 Alignment of sector legislation with decentralisation – the case of Mali 
As explained in the other EQs, the EC support to the national mechanism for funding local 
governments‘ investments ANICT (to which the EC has strongly contributed) has contributed 
to the fact that the transfer of function could happen at an operational level (LG are now able 
to assume most of their new functions with respect to public investments in a number of key 
sectors). 
However, at a broader level, apart probably from education, sectoral legislation is far from 
being aligned with the legislation on decentralisation and it turns out that, despite some 
efforts to improve the situation, the EC has not managed to make the change happen 
regarding the problems of sector alignment.  
Three decrees D02-313, 314 and 315 were made in relation to transfers in the areas of 
education, health and water. 
LG have taken up the functions recognised by the law and, mainly with external funds, they 
have significantly invested in various sectors (especially education). But central 
administrations have not played the game: none of them planned, organized and actually 
implemented the transfers despite the decrees.  
It is only in late 2008 that the Prime Minister gave a strong impulse to improve the situation 
by requesting the various ministries to actually implement the transfer of functions and 
resources to local governments based on a precise plan of transfers. An Inter-Ministerial 
Commission was set up to monitor the proper implementation of this decision. In addition, 
support units on decentralisation and devolution were established in around ten ministries.  
However, it seems from the interviews carried out during the field visit that these units are 
actually not really operational. At the end, a real transfer of resources and functions has only 
taken place in the education sector (in 2010). The process has mainly focused on teachers 
management. Moreover, the transfer has actually not been properly prepared: overnight, LG 
found themselves in charge of the management of thousands of teachers without adequate 
structures and resources being established for this purpose.  
The Ministry of Health has realized the transfer of community health centre (CSCOM), but it 
turns out that they only have the status of "association". Like the Ministry of Education, the 
Ministry of Health is now using the ANICT to channel the funds for the investment projects of 
LG. Specific "counters" ("guichets") were created for this purpose. 
In the water sector, it is considered that the equipments have been transferred to LG, and 
that, as a consequence, there is nothing more to transfer. However, this is a rather simplistic 
view that summarizes the transfers made in terms of equipments. A proper transfer of 
functions should also ensure that the LG have the means to exercise these functions and 
that a proper accompaniment system is put in place. Once the central government makes the 
transfer, the relevant line ministries should still ensure monitoring, provide overall guidance in 
the sector and ensures that each actor is able to perform its duties. The national services in 
charge of this sector are unfortunately not reluctant to follow this direction. 
Regarding other areas, no major breakthrough is noted.  
Each year an assessment is made on the implementation of the recommendations of the 
Prime Minister; this assessment always leads to the same observation: stagnation. The 
transfer plans prepared or being prepared by the Ministries are generally inconsistent and do 
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not reflect a real sector strategy to ensure consistency between decentralisation, 
deconcentration, transfer of financial resource, human resources adjustment and changes in 
procedures. 
 
Form the analysis carried out during the desk and field phases, it turns out that the focus of 
both of partner countries and development partners was on developing a national 
policy/strategy for decentralisation, which needs to be developed before any legislation on 
decentralisation, and several countries did not have a sound national policy or strategy 
during the evaluation period. 
Another reason of the little support provided in this area seems to be that it is more 
complicated for development partners to support the development of legislation because the 
translation of broad policies into specific legalisation is even more political than the 
development of specific policies on decentralisation and it is associated with high technical 
complexities. Moreover, it requires the capacity to cover many sectors and work with all the 
relevant line ministries.  
5.3 JC5.3 Local governments fiscal and human resources have increased 
Main findings at JC level 
The analysis indicates that local governments‘ fiscal and human resources have increased in 
almost all the countries reviewed (recent negative trends can be observed only in 
Nicaragua). The EC has made some contributions to this evolution with regard to the 
availability of fiscal resources.  
EC support for decentralisation frequently includes funding for local service provision. This is 
either provided in the form of project-specific funding (typically, targeting only a subset of 
local governments in a particular country – such as in South Africa, Uganda or Lebanon) or 
as contributions to a wider system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers (IGFTs) – such as in 
Tanzania, Benin, Mali. The former provides immediate and substantive increases for the 
specific local governments targeted, but does not lead to long-term changes in the level of 
LG financing. However, the latter aims at establishing models for increased levels of funding 
at LG level.  
The framework of multi-donor programmes has been particularly appropriate for such 
support. In Benin, Tanzania and Sierra Leone, the EC and other development partners have 
financed formula-based development grants. In Sierra Leone, the EC has added value to an 
existing programme by extending the programme period for another two years, and thereby 
secured the funding for the local development grant. The EC supported such IGFTs relatively 
successfully in Mali, but in Honduras the municipalities have barely received any of the 32 
million EUR allocated by the EC as budget support for decentralisation during the period 
evaluated.122  
In general, it can be observed that local government staffing levels vary tremendously; local 
governments in Eastern and Southern Africa generally have far more and better qualified 
staff than those in Francophone Africa or in some Asian countries (e.g. in Cambodia). 
Findings from the desk phase and field visits show that the EC mostly provides support to 
increase fiscal resources, and that EC-funded interventions have been less concerned with 
issues related to the increase of human resources in local governments. 
Moreover, the evidence gathered in this evaluation indicates that international donors, 
including EC, generally have little influence on the allocation of human resources to local 
governments. In Mali, the EC has, through dialogue in the various sectors supported, 
advocated for more human resources to the LGs, but apparently with only limited results. 
Decentralisation of personnel is a highly sensitive issue in many countries and external direct 
interventions are rarely, if ever, requested by national governments.  
                                               
122
 Of the funds released by the EC, 25% was spent in the Ministry of Interior and Population, while the remaining 
75% apparently was spent for purposes other than decentralisation. 
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While some aid-dependent countries rely significantly on donor funding for various fiscal 
transfers to local governments, salary payments are in general considered entirely a national 
government responsibility. This evaluation shows that local governments have increased 
their expenditures on salaries for human resources in the period under review, and local 
governments‘ financial resources have likewise increased. However, external DP support – 
and EC support in particular – has been negligible within decentralisation reform support, 
although some donors have provided assistance for wider civil service reform where issues 
of pay and overall size of public services have been analysed and reform has been sought. 
Linkages between such reforms and decentralisation reforms appear weak. 
5.3.1 Ind5.3.1 - Evolution of the structure of local governments in terms of human 
resources 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Among the 10 field countries almost, all have experienced an increase in the number of 
human resources at the local level (although some major issues remain in terms of human 
resource management as described in indicator 5.4.2 and skills of the LG staff as mentioned 
in indicator 6.2.1 to 6.2.4). In particular, this is confirmed by statistics on the public sectors‘ 
spending on salaries and number of staff at the local level.  
The EC has implemented wide support programmes in several countries where human 
resources have strongly increased during the evaluation period (Mali, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa and Tanzania). However, the evidence gathered in this evaluation allows attributing 
some results to the EC support only in Sierra Leone and Mali.  
 In Sierra Leone, district administrations did not exist at local level before 2004. Today, 
all councils are staffed with minimum eight core members (chief administrator, finance 
officer, accountant, planning officer, procurement officer, monitoring and evaluation 
officer, engineer etc.), which all respond to the local councils. The core local council 
staff members mentioned above are, however, still paid by the central government, 
although they should have been devolved fully during the devolution process. The 
IRCBP has been strongly involved with setting up the structures and guidelines for 
human resource development in local councils and significantly contributed to the 
results in this area. However, the central government is still reluctant to transfer 
finances for key staff to local councils.  
 In Mali, overall human resources have increased at local level, in particular thanks to 
the continuous EC support during the past decade. However, the poor resources of 
LG do not allow them to recruit good staff. 
Box 33 LG human resources in Mali 
In 1999, a pool of almost 700 administrative secretaries was appointed for management of 
municipalities after it was discovered that only 200 had been recruited before the deadline 
set in the decentralisation strategy. Specific accountant had also been recruited to handle 
finances under the control of local tax collectors and for municipal accounting. In 2002, a 
census conducted during the National Day of the Communes had revealed that more than 
100 municipalities did not have a secretary general, nearly 280 others had no "commissioner 
of revenue" and over 400 posts of "commissioner of expenditures" were vacant. 
In local governments, the Secretary General (SG) is often the only one to have a 
"baccalaureat" or university degree. The remaining staff consists of an assistant to the 
mayor, an accounting manager and one or two officers and cleaners. It is different in large 
urban LG with an organisation better structured and a management staff generally better 
trained. It is noteworthy that there is a high turnover of staff for two main reasons: general 
shifts at local elections (the new mayors prefer to surround themselves with people of their 
obedience) or late payments and lack of attractiveness of wages. A major effort has 
nevertheless been made in recent years under the leadership of the DNCT (supported by the 
EC): 
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 a special civil service for local government ("fonction publique territoriale" - FPT) was 
established with several branches: administration, finance and technical area. Minimum 
criteria are required to integrate the FPT, improving the level of management staff and 
ensuring safety in employment. 2500 workers have already been part of the FPT so far. 
 New hires were made in 2008 with 721 managers who have followed refresher courses 
before joining their assignment, 
 a Training Centre for Local Authorities ("Centre de Formation des Collectivités 
Territoriales" - CFCT) was established in 2007 with a mandate to train and upgrade 
elected officials and LG staff. The EC is funding part of the CFTC (together with 
Germany). 
At "region" level which also highly disadvantaged in terms of staff, an effort has been made 
to enable the recruitment of 3 to 5 "managers" with university degrees for the positions of 
Secretary General, Finance and Accounting director, Social affairs director and Economic 
development director. 
Source: data collected during the country field visit (see Volume II – Annex 11 for more details). 
The section below presents information collected during the field phase for some of the other 
case studies. For the full field visit country note, please refer to Volume II – Annex 11. 
In Tanzania, it is evident that local government capacities in terms of human and fiscal 
resources have increased tremendously over the last decade. Main trends are summarised 
in the two tables below. LG relative share of public employment has reportedly increased 
slightly since 2006123. The increase in staff at LG level is in broad terms the results of the joint 
government-DP supported LG reform. However, EC support focused only on the fiscal 
aspects of the reforms (see indicator 5.3.2). 
Table 20 LG Share of total Public Employment (Tanzania) 
  1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Central 108.363 101.074 97.146 92.393 92.951 91.407 90.928 92.436 90.708 91.950 97.775 
Regional 24.119 22.667 19.192 16.637 10.172 9.776 10.088 10.302 10.064 9.835 9.481 
Local G 163.255 163.297 156.842 155.397 169.285 168.490 177.812 189.979 187.149 204.606 219.573 
Total 295.737 287.038 273.180 264.427 272.408 269.673 278.828 292.717 287.921 306.391 326.829 
LG share 55% 57% 57% 59% 62% 62% 64% 65% 65% 66% 67% 
Local teachers     110.116 109.879 116.713 116.801 126.744 144.286 154.186 
Teachers share of 
all LG Employees     65% 65% 66% 61% 67% 70% 70% 
non-teacher LG     59.169 58.611 61.099 73.178 60.405 60.320 65.387 
Non teacher 
growth rate          -0.9% 4.2% 19.8% -17.5% -0.1% 8.4% 
Source: PSM HR and Payroll Database 
 
In Honduras. As illustrated in the table below, municipalities‘ total expenditures on salaries 
have increased with 51% in constant prices from 2002 to 2009, so more funds are spent on 
salaries and more resources are available at local level.  
                                               
123
 Interviews with PMO-RALG, however updated statistics were not made available.  
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Table 21 Municipalities expenditures on salaries - Honduras 
Year Total Expenditures 
2002 100 
2003 110 
2004 107 
2005 76 
2006 117 
2007 197 
2008 114 
2009 151 
constant prices, index 2002=100 
The EC has not explicitly aimed at supporting the establishment of more staff in 
municipalities and their management. It is not likely that the EC support through the 
PROADES has significantly contributed to this increase. 
In Lebanon, Human Resources in local governments are very poorly developed – many of 
the smaller municipalities have hardly any staff at all and even larger municipalities like 
Beirut (see below) face significant constraints. EC as well as other DPs have not supported 
reforms of personnel in local governments in Lebanon yet. 
Box 34 Overview of Human Resources in Local Governments - Lebanon 
The administrative staff of municipalities is in dire need of in-depth reform on various levels 
including the development of a new organizational structure and a modern salary scale, new 
job descriptions and requirements. There is also a need for a specialized unit in charge of 
organizing public competitions and training municipal employees in order to gradually build 
the competence and information technology (IT) skills of municipal staff. 
Moreover, there is a need to review the distribution of the authorities related to human 
resource decisions between the central and municipal governments in order to address the 
most prominent obstacles that prevent municipalities from exercising most of their 
authorities. These obstacles include: 
 The depletion of municipal financial resources due to a deterioration in assessments and 
collections; 
 A large number of unfilled vacancies, especially in large municipalities. For example, the 
municipality of Beirut suffers from a very large number of unfilled positions reaching up to 
70% or even 100% in some departments such as Engineering, Rated Institutions, and 
even the Finance Department. Beirut currently counts only about 140 filled positions out of 
the 1.292 positions identified in its organizational structure); and 
 The deterioration of the human resources in a number of municipalities, as well as an 
increase in the average age of their employees. For example, the average age of 
employees at the Municipality of Beirut is approximately 57. 
Despite having a negative impact on the conditions of municipal manpower, the large 
number of vacancies and high average age may also represent an opportunity for 
implementing serious reforms in terms of increasing staff qualifications without having to let 
go current municipal employees. Once detailed job descriptions and hiring requirements are 
developed, municipalities may begin filling their vacant positions with young employees who 
are better able to handle recent technologies. 
In many municipalities, especially the newer ones which tend to lack financial resources, the 
members of the municipal council, including the Municipal President and his/her deputy, 
perform the tasks of assessment, collections, cashiering, accounting, in addition to many 
other administrative and technical functions. Despite this, Chapter 6 of the Municipal Act, 
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namely Articles 103 and 110 which concern disciplinary measures against members of the 
municipal council have not been applied. These articles are essential especially for 
municipalities, which are not subject to the oversight of the Court of Audit and in light of the 
cancellation of the Civil Inspection Board‗s oversight authority over the municipal council 
members. Moreover, Article 111 requires the written approval of the Governor before the 
Municipal President, his/her deputy or municipal council members may be prosecuted for an 
offense related to their duties. The end result is that, except for municipalities, which are 
subject to the authority of the Court of Audit, municipal council members are not effectively 
held accountable by the Lebanese legal system. 
Source: MOIM 2011, Strategic framework, page 57 
 
In South Africa, local government has developed significantly since 2000. The Municipal 
Systems Act of 2000 provided clear guidelines to local government. This saw the 
appointment of staff at local government level to planning functions around the mandatory 
IDPs, and to local economic development through the appointment of LED managers and 
officers in most municipalities. The issue is not always that human resources are available, 
but that these resources are sufficiently competent and skilled, and that they have the 
material resources to effect implementation of plans. The EC contribution has been indirect 
through mainly the LED programmes and the focus on enhancing the numbers and skills of 
the human resources at local level.  
In Peru, the evolution in the expenditures of regional and local governments for personal and 
their relative share of the total public sector is presented below.   
Table 4 Sub-national governments‟ exp. for salaries  
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local Goverments n/a n/a 1.147 2.055 
Regional Governments n/a 5.850 7.045 7.068 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe and consultant‟s own calculations (for details see field visit Country Note) 
Note: 2010 constant price; in million Soles. 
Local governments' expenditures on staff have almost doubled from 2007 to 2010 in constant 
prices, while regional governments' expenditures increased with 21% from 2004 to 2010. The 
figures show a large increase in the number of staff in regional and local governments, which 
was also confirmed in interviews with various stakeholders.    
Table 5 Sub-national governments‟ share of public exp. for salaries  
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Central Government 100% 56% 51% 56% 
Local Governments  0% 7% 10% 
Regional Governments  44% 42% 34% 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe & consultant‟s own calculations (for details see annex of the field visit country note) 
This has however not resulted in a relative higher importance of the regional governments as 
their share of all expenditures for salaries has decreased.  
The EC has not directly supported the increase of staff in the region / local governments 
through support to decentralisation. But various sector programmes (PASA, AMARES and 
EURO-PAN) may have had some effects in certain regions Ayacucho, Huancavelica and 
Apurimac for specific staff in the health sector.  
 
In the Philippines, EC has in general not sought significantly to influence overall resource 
allocations to LGUs. The LGs decide on their own staffing levels and operate within the 
giving fiscal constraints. As discussed elsewhere – the LGs rely largely on fiscal transfers 
from central government that according to the LG legislation accounts for 40% of the central 
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government‘s gross internal revenue (IRA). This has remained stable over the evaluation 
period since the passing of the Local Government Code of 1991. EC support to health sector 
has included some additional levels of funding for provinces juts as reform of health 
insurance system has increased available fiscal resources, which indirectly may have 
translated into increase in LG health personnel.  
5.3.2 Ind5.3.2 - Evolution of the fiscal resources available at local level 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
From the project documentation, literature review and field visits, it appears that the EC and 
other donor support has had some impact on fiscal transfers in several of the countries 
where supported was provided, especially where this was done through various forms of 
Inter-Governmental Fiscal Transfers (IGFT) / local government grants. This was the case in 
Tanzania, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Mali, Benin and Madagascar124. 
From the evidence gathered, it was possible to establish some data on fiscal trends, 
although these are not complete. In all countries the documentation indicates a significant 
increase (from low levels) in local governments budgets, both in relative and absolute terms. 
Some tentative data on selected desk countries are presented in the figure below.  
Figure 19 Evolution of the fiscal resources at local level in selected desk countries 
 
 
                                               
124
 In certain regions Madagascar, the EC experimented a performance based system to finance local 
governments (through call for proposals in the context of the ACORDS programme). This system inspired the 
establishment of a national intergovernmental fiscal transfer mechanism in 2008 (Fonds de développement local) 
which was initially supported by the EC and the WB. However, the 2009 political crisis led to the end of the newly 
launched programme. See also Indicators 3.2.1 and 6.2.1. 
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The figure is based on the table below which indicates some complementary information. 
Table 22 Evolution of fiscal resources at local level in selected desk countries 
 Baseline (year / percent of 
public expenditure managed 
by local governments 
Most current  
(Year / percent of public 
expenditure managed by local 
governments 
Tanzania  2001: 19% 2009: 26% 
Nicaragua 2003: 3% 2008: 8% 
Cambodia 2000: 0% (no LGs) 2008: 6% 
South Africa  2001: Provinces receive 56% of 
CG budgets 
LGs around 6% of total public 
expenditure  
2008: Provinces receive 58% 
LGs around 10% of total public 
expenditure 
 
Lebanon 2003: 4% 2008: 6% 
Jordan
125
  2000: 5%  2006 : 3% 
Benin  2004 : 7% 2009 : 7% 
Mali n.i. 2007 : 3% 
Madagascar 2001: 3%
126
 2009: 4% 
Peru  2007: 11% 2010: 20%
127
 
Philippines  2000: 25% 2009: 25%
128
 
Honduras  2000: 4% 2010: 7% 
Senegal  n.i. 2008: 3% 
Rwanda  2006: 12%  2011: 12% 
129
 
Sierra Leone 2005: 1.5% 2009: 3.8%
130
 
 
The information gathered shows that for 15 countries (including the 10 field countries and 
selected desk country cases where data was available) with EC support, the share of all 
public expenditures at the local level have increased for eight countries, remained 
unchanged for two countries while data is unreliable or non-existence in five countries. 
It is also noteworthy that: 
 EC support includes in some countries some elements of local level funding that 
clearly contribute to increasing fiscal resources at LG level.  
 The potential for systems development is greatest in cases where EC funds are 
transferred as various fiscal transfers to LGs, such as in Mali, Tanzania and Sierra 
Leone.  
 EC support to local revenue generation is limited. The only example is Sierra Leone, 
where the EC is cofounding IRCBP led by the WB.  
The section below presents complementary information gathered during the field phase. 
The case of Sierra Leone  
The increase in local resources in Sierra Leone is illustrated in the table below. The table 
presents the actual and real development in the collection of local revenues from 2005 to 
                                               
125
 Note that data from 2000 is from: 
 http://www.mota.gov.jo/ar/Documents/Contecno/General/Municipal_sector.pdf, whereas data from 2006 is from 
the GOLD 2010 report. Due to different sources it is not conclusive that LGs relative share of public expenditures 
in reality has decreased over the period as different methods of calculation can have been applied.  
126
 "Decentralisation in Madagascar, A World Bank Country Study" - The World Bank 2004. 
127
 Team calculations based on data from www.ofi.mef.gob.pe - see country report for details. 
128
 Figures are approximate figures derived from GOLD 2010 and local case study analyses. According to the 
Local Government Code, 40% of Internal Revenue should be allocated to local governments – however, ―internal 
revenue‖ is defined quite narrowly and funds are allocated based on previews years actual revenue collections.  
129
 These data are from field work and differs from GOLD 2010 data – however field data are deemed most 
reliable – see details in Rwanda Country report.  
130
 Source: Local Government Finance Department and www.econstats.com  
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2009. The table shows that the amount increased three fold from 2005 to 2007 to decline 
again, so the real increase from 2005 to 2009 is 106 percent.  
Table 23 Local councils' collection of revenues from 2005 to 2009 (Sierra Leone) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Actual, Le 
millions 
5,109 6,326 18,110 15,476 16,170 
Actual, Le 
millions, 2009 
prices 
7,834 8,861 22,720 16,908 16,170 
Index 2005=100 100 113 290 216 206 
Source: LGFD and www.ecostat.com 
According to the IRCBP, 50% of all council collected in 2010 more than Le 2,000 or Euro 0.4 
per inhabitant (districts) and Le 3,000 per inhabitant (towns) (IRCDP RF indicator 5.1). These 
figures and the data in table 5 above show that the amount collected is still very limited and 
progress is not satisfactory.  
The councils‘ revenue collection is a serious problem for the sustainability of their activities 
and the whole decentralisation process. Certain systems (e.g. within cadastre, registration of 
local taxpayers etc.) have been set up supported by IRCBP and UNDP/UNCDF, but revenue 
collection is still low in particular in the district councils, while some progress has been seen 
for the city councils. The main reasons for the low revenue collection are: Political 
interference, lack of will and incentives as funds are transferred from the centre and conflicts 
between the traditional paramount chief system and the local councils in the districts about 
collection and right to the local tax and marked dues. 
For all revenues, i.e. local revenues and transfers from the central government, a steady 
increase since 2005 has occurred with a real increase of 150 percent from 2005 to 2010.  
Table 24 Local councils‟ total revenues 2005 to 2009 (Sierra Leone) 
 Local Council total revenues 2005 to 2009 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Actual, Le 
millions  17,959 28,748 32,427 46,370 68,362 
Actual, Le 
millions, 2009 
prices 27,556 40,267 40,681 50,657 68,362 
Index 2005=100 100 146 148 184 248 
 
The case of Benin 
In Benin, even the recent Public Expenditure Review (PER 2010) from the WB does not have 
a full overview of the fiscal position of LGs. As can be seen from the table below the 
evolution of revenues for LGs has over time changed from reliance on own revenues to 
reliance of government grants and shared revenue sources. The total budget available to 
LGs has risen slightly over the past 5 years but this is also accompanied by a reduction in 
own source revenues. In real terms the budgets of LGs has doubled. This is a development 
supported by EC through the FADeC. 
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Figure 20 Composition of LG Income and Revenues - Benin 
 
 
The case of Tanzania 
It is evident that local government capacities in terms of human and fiscal resources have 
increased tremendously in Tanzania over the last decade. Main fiscal trends are summarised 
in the table below. 
Table 25 LG Share of total Public Expenditure131 
Fiscal Year (FY) 
Total Recurrent Expenditure 
(TSH billion) 
LG share 
2001/02 1.253 18,7% 
2002/03 1.527 19,0% 
2003/04 1.834 17,7% 
2004/05 2.252 17,0% 
2005/06 2.875 18,6% 
2006/07 3.142 24,3% 
2007/08 5.452 21% 
2008/09 6.536 21% 
2009/10 7.991 28% 
 
LGs share of development funding is significantly less – but the recent increases are 
relatively more substantial as it increased from 7.9% in 2007/08 to 18.5% in 2010/11132  
These substantive increases of development funding to LGs are a direct result of the LGDG 
system: from 2005 it was rolled out as a national system for all (qualifying) LGs with an 
average level of funding of 1.5 USD/capita – later additional ―windows‖ of the LGDG were 
introduced for agriculture sectors, urban environment, education, water, and health sectors.  
The EC support contributed to the establishment of the LGDG system and overall increases 
in LG transfers partly by its direct contribution to the LGDG but also through GBS support 
where a key performance indicator was defined in terms of increased share of public 
expenditure as LG transfers. 
 
                                               
131
  Note that for 2001-2006/07 the data are actual expenses (but only from recurrent budget) as published 
by PMO-RALG (URT, 2007)—this is the last year of a published local government fiscal review and that data from 
subsequent years hasn‘t been published by PMO-RALG. Data from 2006/07-2009/10 is based on data collected 
from the LG DPG (2010). 
132
  Rapid Budget Analysis 2010 (GBS partners): Aggregate Analysis Background Note – Public Expenditure 
Review November 2010.  
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The case of Mali 
Concerning financial resources: LG resources come from local taxes and transfers from the 
state and donors via ANICT. By processing the data submitted by the Directorate General of 
Budget (Ministry of Economy and Finance) concerning the implementation of the budget over 
the period 2000-2010, we see that the state contribution represents only 20% of the direct 
support to LG. 
Table 26 Origin of transfers to local authorities (excl. LG‟s own resources) 
Year  State budget 
External 
Resources 
Accumulation 
2000 957.500 3.407.000 4.364.500 
2001 2.350.000 3.401.000 5.751.000 
2002 2.300.000 16.108.639 18.408.639 
2003 2.492.000 10.310.000 12.802.000 
2004 2.755.260 5.837.000 8.592.260 
2005 2.755.260 9.946.000 12.701.260 
2006 2.755.260 12.274.690 15.029.950 
2007 3.272.260 10.786.593 14.058.853 
2008 3.036.877 13.877.100 16.913.977 
2009 3.652.239 24.203.307 27.855.546 
2010 3.307.538 9.794.773 13.102.311 
Total 29.634.194 119.946.102 149.580.296 
% 20% 80%   
Sources: General direction of the treasury, Ministry of finances - DGB (Currency: Thousands of CFA,) 
The analysis of the mobilization of ANICT drawing rights (for the investment financing of LG) 
shows that the contribution of the state on its own investment budget is only 11% over the 
last 10 years. 
Table 27 Contribution to local investment fund: Contribution by stakeholders 
Year Other donor EDF State - BSI
133
 total 
Other 
donor 
EDF 
State - 
BSI 
2001 218.965.189 247.540.406 112.392.700 578.898.295 38% 43% 19% 
2002 2.059.352.767 8.470.657.939 1.508.762.358 12.038.773.064 17% 70% 13% 
2003 2.058.853.646 8.402.012.814 985.161.011 11.446.027.471 18% 73% 9% 
2004 1.954.236.838 3.241.075.582 749.340.770 5.944.653.190 33% 55% 13% 
2005 4.090.559.016 2.951.400.907 1.574.500.560 8.616.460.483 47% 34% 18% 
2006 3.228.952.469 8.204.768.755 1.332.054.452 12.765.775.676 25% 64% 10% 
2007 20.087.659.651 5.758.756.046 1.625.383.859 27.471.799.556 73% 21% 6% 
2008 18.498.903.746 5.414.425.303 2.596.568.993 26.509.898.042 70% 20% 10% 
2009 17.012.159.921 5.110.867.094 3.799.601.053 25.922.628.068 66% 20% 15% 
2010 11.066.751.250 2.171.381.050 2.183.427.308 15.421.559.608 72% 14% 14% 
Total 80.276.394.493 49.972.885.896 16.467.193.064 146.716.473.453 55% 34% 11% 
Sources: ANICT calculation on demand of the evaluation mission (Currency: CFA) 
In 2010, a new transfer (of 80,6 billion CFA francs) is operated for the benefit of the LG in 
education. This is actually related to the transfer of teachers' salaries. This figure should not 
create an illusion of volume because no additional resources are actually granted: amounts 
transferred correspond to amounts for payments of charges already defined and these 
transfers provide no additional financial flexibility to municipalities. The opposite can be 
expected as there will be additional costs associated with the management of these financial 
flows and nothing is planned for that. 
A report on local taxation was released in 2011 but it unfortunately only gives figures from 
2007. The finding in terms of local taxation is an average of 1013 CFA francs per capita of 
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tax revenue. Own revenues represent 92% of operating expenses. Wages represent an 
average of 40% of operating expenses, the figure is much higher in small municipalities. The 
2011 assessment report on decentralisation134 indicates that the local taxation accounts for 
75% of own revenues in 2007. 
Trainings of elected officials have systematically concerned the improvement of local 
revenues. In LG supported by specific programmes, an assessment of potential sources of 
tax revenues was made. Improvements were noted where elected officials had a proactive 
approach in this area. However, a general observation is the lack of correlation between the 
improvement in tax revenues and the improvement of the level of investment and services 
(although this was an assumption that underpinned the reasons for decentralisation).  
It is noteworthy that the local taxation system is not included in the state budget system. 
There is therefore no visibility. Existing data came mainly from the OISE database that 
fuelled the database on local finances (FILOC). But the latter is no longer updated since 
2007. 
The 2011 assessment report on decentralisation notes that:  
"Compared to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), these block transfers of the state 
are extremely low, less than 1% throughout the period 2005-2008. Compared to total 
state revenue, the transfer made to LG is only 0,48% in 2009. " 
Moreover, behind these numbers lies a great disparity in the distribution of funds among LG. 
This disparity is due to the fact that ANICT is receiving more and more "targeted" funds, to a 
sector and / or a geographic zone, to the detriment of unrestricted/ discretionary funds. In the 
early years of ANICT, only 20% of funds were targeted. Today the trend is reversed: more 
than 80% of the funds are targeted. As a consequence, the equalization system can no 
longer function. 
It should be noted that the transfer related to funds for investment in health and education 
operated through ANICT from 2007 onwards (15 billion per year on average) can explain the 
situation: there has been an important influx in quantitative terms of sector targeted funds 
(mainly for PISE / education). 
Table 28 Overview of the evolution of the use of discretionary & non discretionary 
funds for local investments in Mali 
DT 2001 DT 2001 DT 2002 DT 2003 DT 2004 DT 2005 DT 2006 DT 2007 DT 2008 DT 2009 DT 2010 
Fonds 
généraux 
4,400,000 15,780,908 693483,  
010,372,237 
7,848,385 5,142,059 7,720,094 5,999,490 5,364,513 5,063,307 4,478,151 
Fonds 
spécifiques 
693,483 2,386,566 2,408,746 3,015,705 4,475,383 5,568,633 23,764,358 24,729,050 17,754,449 23,147,010 
TOTAL 5,093,483 18,167,475 12,780,983 10,864,090 9,617,443 13,288,728 28,763,849 30,093,564 22,817,756 27,625,161 
Fonds 
généraux 
86% 87% 81% 72% 53% 58% 20% 18% 22% 16% 
Fonds 
spécifiques 
14% 13% 19% 28% 47% 42% 80% 82% 78% 84% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Study on fungibility, AHT-Betico, ANICT, 2011; note: the data DT are slightly different than the data 
provided by ANICT (Currency: Thousands of CFA francs) 
This table shows the changes between the discretionary funds ("general funds") and the 
funds allocated (geographically or sectorally) here called "special funds". The percentage of 
unrestricted funds increased from 86% in 2001 to 16% in 2010. The autonomy of the 
"Communes" is thus increasingly challenged. 
The 2011 assessment report on decentralisation mentions such distortions  
"for the transfer of the state, the disproportion is very strong between the sparsely 
populated Communes and the municipalities with large populations (e.g., 613 CFA / 
capita for the Kidal region against 118 CFA / capita for the Sikasso region), - there is 
no correlation with the amount of own resources / capita (Sikasso has the highest rate 
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of own resources / capita, 2358 FCFA, is entitled to a transfer of 118 CFA / capita while 
Mopti has 538 CFA of own resources / capita is entitled to a transfer of 545 CFA / 
capita). " 
Several observations emerged: 
 the operation of joint depends primarily on the own revenues, including local taxation; 
 their own investment capacity is also dependent on the local taxation; 
 transfers of the state are limited, 
 financing of investment depends to 90% from outside. 
 significant distortions between the LG and the equalization system does not play. 
Today, decentralisation is funded primarily by external resources. 
Moreover, it is the sustainability of LG which is at stake and the way they are financed. 
Financing can realistically only be based on local taxation. While flexibility exists in terms of 
financial recovery it is far from covering all the needs. It all boils down to the starting point on 
the mismatch between the functions transferred and the available resources. 
The EUD is well aware of the existing problem. This is why it was planned to work on the 
reform of local taxes in the PARAD programme, through its support to the CDI. Yet, it would 
have been appropriate to have previously carried out a detailed analysis of the cost of 
decentralisation and the means to finance it. 
 
The case of Honduras 
In Honduras, the government failed to comply with the transfer of the central government‘s 
own revenues to the 298 municipalities for years. The percentage of the transfer is 
established in article 91 of the Law of Municipalities, passed in 1990, which was 5% of the 
central government‘s own revenues. But finally in 2005 the GoH met the 5%. At the end of 
2010, the percentage is officially 7%, but the Central Government only schedule 6,5% in the 
national budget, a situation that has mobilized local authorities to monitor compliance with 
the agreed value (7%), the idea is to increase the percentage to 8% in 2011, 9% in 2012, 
10% 2013 and 11% in the year 2014 onwards. Serious confusion exists on all these figures 
and how they should be calculated and interpreted. 
The EC SBS for decentralisation has not been used to support the development of a transfer 
system to municipalities, or systems for more revenue generation or financial management.  
Table 29 Municipalities‟ total revenues, own revenues and transfers (Honduras) 
Year Total revenues  Local revenues  Transfers  
2002 100 100 100 
2003 110 116 105 
2004 117 116 116 
2005 106 113 147 
2006 159 142 219 
2007 168 146 232 
2008 129 99 195 
2009 166 137 253 
Source: Own calculations - see details in annex of the field visit country note (constant prices, index 2002=100) 
In spite of this all revenues for municipalities have increased with 66% in constant prices 
giving the municipalities a substantial increase in resources. It can also be seen that 
transfers from the central government has been the main reason with a real increase of 
153% from 2002 to 2009.  
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With the exception of 2008, municipalities‘ collection of local revenues has also increased but 
the actual collection is still only about Le 500 (27,4 EUR) per inhabitant per year. 
 
The case of Lebanon 
The EC has not supported reform of overall system of municipal finance (until the new 
programme starting in 2011).  
The share of total public expenditures managed by the municipalities has increased 
significantly in relative terms over the last decade (from 3,6% to 5,6%) but is still – in global 
comparisons – at a very low level.  
Table 30 Trends in municipal finance in Lebanon 1999-2008135 
 1999 2008 Real average annual 
increase 
Central government 
expenditures excl. debt 
3,563,036 
($2,383) 
4,507,228 
($3,786) 
5.3% 
Municipal expenditures 128,012 
($86 million) 
253,344* 
($231 million) 
10.6% 
Municipal spending as 
share of central 
government expenditure 
 
3.59% 
 
5.63% 
 
Central government 
revenues 
4,448,393 
($2,966 million) 
7,773,800 
($5,183 million) 
6.4% 
Municipal revenues 247,969 
($165 million) 
457,067 
($305 million) 
7.0% 
Municipal revenues as a 
share of central 
government revenues 
 
5.57% 
 
5.88% 
 
Source: Ministry of Interior and Municipalities 
*This includes the sum of the expenditures incurred by the municipalities plus a 40% share of the IMF for 255 
municipalities deducted in return for providing cleaning services. 
 
The case of Peru 
The local and regional governments have more resources than before, which follows from 
the tables below, which show the real development in transfers and local revenues from 
2001 to 2010. The EC has not supported this.  
Table 31 Transfers to sub-national governments (Peru) 
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local governments 2.232 4.257 10.079 11.965 
Regional governments n/a  615 2.407 3.181 
TOTAL 2.232 4.871 12.486 15.146 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe and consultant‟s own calculations (for details see Annex 8 of the country note) 
Note : 2010 constant price; in million Soles . 
For the collection of local revenues, LGs have increased their collected from 2004 to 2010 
with almost 70%, but the collection is still very limited with only approximately 93 soles per 
inhabitant. In 2010 roughly half (1.235 million Soles) was collected in the Lima region (of 
which 470 million Soles alone in Lima municipality.  
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Table 32 Sub national governments‟ own revenues (Peru) 
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Local Goverments n/a  n/a  1.383 2.317 
Regional Governments n/a  327 416 478 
Total  327 1.800 2.795 
 
The case of the Philippines 
In general, EC has not sought significantly to influence overall resource allocations to LGUs. 
Section 284 of the LGC indicates that 40% of the central government‘s gross internal 
revenue (IRA) in the third preceding fiscal year be transferred to the LGUs as IRA. Provinces 
and cities receive 23% each from the total transfer, municipalities 34%, and Barangays 20%. 
The share of each province, city, and municipality is computed using the horizontal 
distribution formula composed of three determinants namely, population: 50%, land area: 
25%, and equal sharing: 25%. 
IRA has increased in both absolute and relative importance as source of financing LGUs and 
currently constitutes around 60% of LGUs total revenue (for details see annex 5 of the field 
visit country Note). 
EC support to health sector has included some additional levels of funding for provinces.  
 
The case of Rwanda 
The Government launched the Decentralisation Policy with the aim of strengthening the 
practice of good governance and promoting the mobilisation and participation of the people 
in determining their own well-being. To achieve this, the Government passed four 
decentralisation laws relating to provinces, districts, the city of Kigali and urban authorities. 
Under these laws, the four provinces remain arms of the central Government, administered 
by provincial governors approved by the Senate in respect of proposal made by the Cabinet 
and comprising an integral component of the central Government, whilst districts and cities 
now exercise budgetary autonomy. Whilst law No. 17/200218 assigned taxes and fees to 
sub-national levels of government, revenues from these sources are insufficient to cover the 
operating requirements of sub-national governments, let alone carry out functional 
responsibilities assigned or delegated to them, and service delivery relies largely on grants 
from central Government. Since the launch of the decentralisation policy the Government 
has been developing mechanisms to clarify and improve the predictability of the flow of 
resources to district governments. There are currently three main flows of resources from the 
central Government: a block grant (un-earmarked) from central Government; grants 
earmarked for the delivery of specific public services at sub-national level; and revenues 
from the CDF. The relative importance of these three main sources reflects the current status 
of the decentralisation process. Whilst the long-run objective is to devolve services, which 
are currently delegated to local government level (which implies a progressive decline in the 
use of earmarking), the requisite capacities of local governments and the associated 
mechanisms for managing devolution have yet to be established for this in the majority of 
sectors. However, in sectors like health and administrative governance, most service delivery 
has already been devolved, while in others like education efforts for full devolution are 
already under way. This has a clear bearing on the staff working at LG level, as most are still 
fall under the sector ministries and not the District.  
Financing of most Rural District Councils shows that: (1) More dependant on central 
government (CG) transfers - 10% of total annual funding comes from internal sources while 
90% is from external sources especially CDF (demand driven) and sectoral transfers from 
the CG; (2) The sectoral/ Earmarked transfers are meant for infrastructure development; (3) 
Main sources of internal funds include: Service based fees at sector level (markets, slaughter 
house fees), levies on construction materials (sand, concrete, ballast etc); (4) Transfers 10% 
of its total budget and 50% of total internal income to the sectors; (6) Procurement is done by 
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the council; and (7) MINALOC provides technical support through capacity building 
programmes in public financial management.  
 
The case of South Africa 
The Division of Revenue Act provides for the equitable division of revenue raised nationally 
among the national, provincial and local spheres of government. The Municipal Infrastructure 
Grant supplements the funding of infrastructure programmes funded from municipal budgets 
to enable municipalities to address backlogs in municipal infrastructure required for the 
provision of basic services. Other instruments include the Integrated Housing and Human 
Settlement Development Grant, the Integrated National Electrification Programme Grant, and 
others. All transfer is worked out according to a formula, and all allocations made must be 
included in municipal Integrated Development Plans. The Development Bank of Southern 
Africa provides loan and development financing to local government. In respect of financial 
sustainability, key challenges faced by municipalities often relate to the size of the tax base 
and their ability to collect revenue. In rural areas the tax base is usually very low. A number 
of municipalities have negligible revenue bases and are not sustainable without direct 
transfers. The EC supported Local Government Toolkit explains the functioning of local 
government and provides tools for community members to help them engage substantively 
with local government. Likewise the Ward Capacity Building Project trained Ward Committee 
members around the functioning of local government in an effort to stimulate bottom-up 
participation. 
Box 35 Fiscal Decentralisation in South Africa 
South Africa compares well with other developing economies regarding expenditure 
responsibilities and autonomy of Sub National Governments (SNGs). Sub-national 
expenditure in developing countries rose from 12.7 per cent of total public expenditure in 
1980 to 19.6 percent in 1998 (Shah and Thompson 2004). Similarly, education spending 
by SNGs increased from 21 per cent of total public sector education expenditure in 1980 
to 40 percent in 2000 while health expenditure increased from 22 per cent in 1980 to 57 
percent in 1999. Although the trends vary widely across countries, there are areas of 
shared responsibilities among central and sub-national governments in almost all 
countries. On average expenditure autonomy, i.e. percentage of sub-national 
expenditure financed from own-source revenue, in developing countries was 58 per cent 
in 2000. 
Provincial governments‘ revenue amounts to about 50 per cent of total public sector 
revenue in South Africa. But on average 96 per cent of provincial revenue is in the form 
of transfers from the national government to provinces. Approximately 70 per cent of the 
transfers (in 2002-2004) are in the form of equitable share and the rest conditional 
grants. Tax receipts represented on average 49 per cent of own-source (and 2 per cent 
of total) provincial revenue during 2001-2004. Main taxes include Casino taxes, motor 
vehicles licenses and horseracing. Other sources of own revenue include sale of goods 
and services, sales of capital assets, fines, penalties and forfeits, interest and dividends 
and financial transactions in assets and liabilities. 
 
5.4 JC5.4 Local governments autonomy has increased 
Main findings at JC level 
Overall, local governments have obtained some degree of autonomy in all the countries 
studied during their decentralisation processes. The EC support has facilitated such 
processes only to a limited extent, primarily with regards to fiscal autonomy and, more 
specifically, in relation to its support in some countries to IGFT.  
Some of the fiscal transfer systems supported by the EC in multi-donor programmes have 
the deliberate intention of providing funding systematically to local governments with 
significant local discretion and autonomy in its use. This is, for instance, the case with the 
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LGDG in Tanzania. Similar objectives have been pursued in Sierra Leone, whereas it 
appears to have had relatively less emphasis in Mali. The evidence gathered in this 
evaluation show that the EC has only supported financial autonomy indirectly by co-funding 
LGDG (that allows discretionary decisions by LGs) in three countries out of the reviewed 
countries.  
The EC support to IGFT in countries such as Tanzania, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and 
Senegal has some tangible impact, as LGs are given some discretionary power for their use.  
It is noteworthy that the extent to which local governments‘ autonomy has increased depends 
mainly on internal political processes in the respective countries. For instance, as indicated 
above in JC5.3, international donors (including EC) generally have had little influence on the 
allocation of human resources to local governments.  
Overall, the role of international donors appears only to be a rather indirect one, by 
―demonstrating‖ models that, over time, may be appreciated by national governments. 
National governments have proved especially appreciative of models for devolution of 
development budgets to local governments as this typically also is part of broader transition 
from donor-specific project modalities into systems of financing more harmonised with 
national systems. 
Local governments have obtained some degree of autonomy in all the countries studied 
during their decentralisation processes. Most of this was established when the legislation 
was developed, which in some countries happened in the 1990s before the EC entered into 
direct support to decentralisation in any country (top-down entrance point).  
The extent to which local governments autonomy has increased in the countries depends 
almost entirely on internal political processes in the respective countries – the role of donors 
appears only as rather indirect by ―demonstrating‖ models that over time may be appreciated 
by national governments.  
5.4.1 Ind5.4.1 - Evolution of fiscal autonomy (powers to raise revenue, relative share 
of discretionary funds in LGs, autonomy in budgeting etc) 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
LGs‘ autonomy for collection of local revenues exists in all countries studied in the 
evaluation, but LGs do still not use this autonomy very. In several of the countries reviewed, 
fiscal autonomy has usually been partly granted to LGs by legislation. Overall, LG autonomy 
is determined by: 
 The legislation (that may grant autonomy in budgeting etc), 
 The relative importance of own revenue generation and LG discretion in its use, 
 The conditionalities attached to fiscal transfers from central government. 
Some of the fiscal transfer systems supported by the EC in multi-donor programmes have 
the deliberate intention of providing funding systematically to local governments with 
significant local discretion and autonomy in its use. This is, for instance, the case with the 
LGDG in Tanzania. Similar objectives have been pursued in Sierra Leone, whereas it 
appears to have had relatively less emphasis in Mali. The evidence gathered in this 
evaluation show that the EC has only supported financial autonomy indirectly by co-funding 
LGDG (that allows discretionary decisions by LGs) in three countries out of the reviewed 
countries.  
The EC support to IGFT in countries such as Tanzania, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and 
Senegal has some tangible impact, as LGs are given some discretionary power for their use, 
although several limitations remain in most cases.  
The section below provides some examples of the evidence gathered during the field visit.  
 While the reforms in Tanzania successfully have increased the resources and 
capacities in LGs, the relative degree of autonomy of the local governments has not 
significantly increased. The following shortcomings can be noted: 
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 LGs depend largely on fiscal transfers from central government – they 
generate only approximately 5% of their total expenditures through own 
source revenue generation.  
 From 2004-05 a number of LG taxes were abolished by central government 
and LGs (ALAT) dispute the extent to which they have been compensated 
adequately for this, 
 The central government significantly earmark use of transfers to LGs: the 
transfers are mainly sector specific (health, education etc) and within each 
sectoral transfer there are typically very strict earmarking regarding the use of 
funds, 
 Central government continue to send instructions to LGs regarding how they 
are to prioritise spending on even own source revenue, 
 Human resource management in LGs has largely been even more centralised 
after the Public Service Act of 2004 (in spite of other intentions in the LGR 
Policy). 
However, there have also been a few improvements – in particular related to the 
LGDG system. While the LGs increasingly rely on fiscal transfers for their budgets 
and while GoT in many cases have made these transfers in a highly earmarked 
manner, then the LGDG provide an alternative model: funds are transferred without 
string earmarking: the LGs can decide to use the funds for water, education, health, 
roads or other local priorities. The LGDG has in this manner slightly increased local 
autonomy of LGs by empowering their local budget prioritisation process.  
 In Sierra Leone, the local councils are empowered to raise local revenues by the LG 
(2004) and also to prepare their own budgets with the functions given by the LG. The 
budget is prepared following guidelines from the LGFD. The IRCBP has supported 
the development of manuals for revenue collection and management and also the 
guidelines for budgeting, which are used by the LCs. 
 In Mali, the financial autonomy of LG did not improve (see also JC5.3/ Ind 5.3.2). 
Local taxation should be reviewed and the contributions of the state actually depend 
on investment to 90% from outside. Autonomy of LG to choose their investment is 
also limited by the system of allocation of funds. Through an active policy dialogue at 
sector level, the EC has made some efforts to improve the situation and to advocate 
for more transfer of resources from the state to the local136 level but without significant 
success to date. 
 Benin has moved rapidly recently towards a more unified, harmonized approach and 
political commitment towards a strong decentralisation and deconcentration (and 
territorial management) policy and the creation of the corresponding Communal 
Development Support Fund (FADeC, 2008). The donor community and especially the 
EUD in Benin, equally has moved closer towards a sector wide, more unified, aligned 
and harmonised approach in their support to the national 2D-policy (creation of well 
functioning donor working group, increasing use of the modality of global and sectoral 
budget support, increasing channelling of their ODA through the FADeC Fund as 
single instrument for supporting Benin‘s communes). A number of external 
development partners follow more or less also still their existing projects (project 
modality) due to previous contracts signed or because they have certain reservations 
still in regard to channelling their resources fully through the FADeC. However, even 
those more contribute, at least nominally, in parallel also to the FADeC. The FADeC, 
after a good start in 2008 and 2009, in 2010 suffered a setback in terms of 
Government‘s level of funding. Also, many communes complain about the late arrival 
of funds and still weak efficiency of fund allocation, distribution and efficient fund 
management from the side of the central and departmental administration. Also, the 
                                               
136
 The indicator 6 from the PARAD BS programme covers this issue but does not oblige change in this respect. 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
153 
communes themselves lack for a large part the resources and capacities to manage 
the new PONADEC priority action programme and FADeC adequately. 
 In Lebanon, there have been no major changes in the relative autonomy of the 
municipalities over the evaluation period – and EC support has had no objectives in 
that regard.  
 In Peru, the regional and local governments have been given autonomy for budgeting 
and the municipal organic law defines also the local governments‘ autonomy for 
collection of revenues (property taxes, service fees, licenses etc). The regional 
government has very few sources i.e. licenses and fees for services provided. The 
EC has not supported regions and LGs finance directly. An indirect support is the 
EURO-PAN‘s support to the establishment of own budgets for execution agents in 
three regions (Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac) in the health sector. 
 In the Philippines, in general, LGU are relative autonomous with significant degree of 
fiscal autonomy – most of the transfers (the IRA) is e.g. discretionary rather than in 
the form of conditional grants. EC has not significantly sought to influence or increase 
LGU autonomy. To some extent one could argue that the earmarked support under 
health sector projects has sought to centralise some decisions making (see sections 
on planning below). EC concerns have been more focused on e.g. PFM issues at 
LGU levels than their overall levels of autonomy.  
 In Rwanda, a Common Development Fund (CDF) was established in 2002 under Law 
20/2002, with the intention of providing support to districts for development purposes. 
MINALOC acts as the parent ministry to the CDF and also provides the president of 
the board for the CDF. The major source of funding for the CDF comes from the 
Government budget, which is meant to channel an amount equivalent to at least 10% 
of the previous years domestic revenue collection to the fund. The donor community 
also provides funding for the CDF. At the outset, the allocations from the CDF were 
effectively formula-driven in that the fund was divided equally among districts. This 
method of allocation was replaced in 2005 with a dedicated formula, proposed by the 
Board of the CDF and approved by the Cabinet, based on population size, 
geographical area and indicators relating to household welfare and access to basic 
infrastructure within each district. Access to CDF funds, however, requires district 
governments to go through a project preparation process and to submit documents 
related to this before disbursements become effective. Whilst district government 
access to CDF resources from the Government budget is formula driven, allocation of 
funds provided by donors is not. In practice, most donor assistance to districts 
through the CDF is earmarked to specific districts (and therefore simply uses the 
mechanism of the CDF). The block grant for sub-national governments, access to 
Government resources provided through the CDF and allocation of a major proportion 
of earmarked resources for service delivery, therefore, are (explicitly) formula driven. 
The remainder of the transfers are allocated according to a transparent criterion (i.e. 
the total allocation is divided by the total number of districts and allocated to each 
accordingly). Data from MINECOFIN for the 2007 Budget show that over 80% of 
earmarked transfers are allocated according to rules based and transparent formulae, 
with the remainder allocated according to the transparent and rule of dividing the total 
by the number of districts. 
 In South Africa, in principle, the local governments only have limited autonomy on 
local revenue as these only constitute about 3-4% of local budgets and the rest being 
transfers from central government. EC has not contributed to enhancing powers and 
functions of LGs but to some degree to increased resources for local governance, 
services and infrastructure investments. Some smaller municipality structures still 
weak but improvements have been seen from the administrative reform onwards. 
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5.4.2 Ind5.4.2 - Evolution of LG Autonomy for HRM (the extent to which LGs can hire 
and fire and generally manage personnel) 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The EC support to decentralisation has with the exception of the programme in Sierra Leone 
(as part of the IRCBP led by the WB) not explicitly sought to enhance LG autonomy in 
management of local staff. Although some improvements can be noted in this case, the 
guidelines that have been developed are not yet effectively implemented. 
From the fieldwork, it actually appears that the relative autonomy of LGs in management of 
local staff in most countries largely has remained unchanged during the evaluation period. 
Most of the countries had the legal framework for local government HRM established in the 
1990s or earlier. Some gradual increase of staff have occurred (see also indicator 5.3.1) just 
as capacities have been built of LG staff (EQ 6) – but the relative autonomy of LGs in 
managing local staff has not changed significantly in the countries under review.  
Some general trends can be observed: 
 In Africa: a distinction can generally be made between Francophone countries where 
LGs employ very limited share of total public service and some Anglophone with 
relative many staff – including sector staff (such as health and education). In Africa, 
from the sample of field and desk countries reviewed, it is only in Uganda and South 
Africa where the numbers of staff employed and the autonomy in HRM of local staff 
have significantly increased. The EC has not supported those aspects of local 
governments reforms. 
 In Latin America, LGs have some autonomy in managing local staff – but the legal 
framework for this was developed long ago and without EC support, 
 The Philippines, represents a very mature decentralised system with significant local 
autonomy in HRM, but where the legislative framework for local HRM was developed 
before the EC support (in the health sector). 
Box 36 Evolution of LG Autonomy for HRM – the case of Mali 
In Mali, while LG have the right to hire and fire staff, actually, in practice, the weakness of 
their resources makes this autonomy rather theoretical. Most of the locally deployed (sector) 
staff are managed by central governments and not by the local governments.  
Moreover, strengthening of locally delivered services is hampered by low salaries and a 
quantitative deficit of qualified personnel (nurses, midwives, teachers, etc.). In general, new 
staff recruited by the communities at local level does not benefit from attractive conditions 
and have limited guarantees on their jobs. This makes local recruitment almost impossible 
outside the larger cities.  
Only in 2005, did the National Assembly adopt a new special status for officials of local 
authorities. The recruitments are now contested publicly and specific requirements have 
been established in order to secure that the skills of administrative secretaries and other 
officials meet certain levels. The DNCT had to tackle this task as an entirely new experience, 
without tools, legal and methodological instruments and with little support (including of 
development partners). 
 
In general, it appears as if LG HRM is a relatively politically sensitive area where external 
donor support rarely can leverage change. The case of Tanzania is in this regard interesting 
as DP support here failed to hold central government accountable to its own declared 
policies of devolving HRM (see box below). 
Box 37 Evolution of LG Autonomy for HRM – the case of Tanzania 
The reforms in Tanzania have successfully increased the resources and capacities in LGs, 
but there has not been much change in the relative degree of autonomy of the local 
governments. In particular it can be noted that the intended devolution of staff that was 
declared as government policy in the LG Reform Policy paper of 1998 never has been 
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enacted. Several DPs expressed concerns over Government‘s apparent backtracking as 
indicated in the Public Service Act of 2004 (where some confusion is introduced of who really 
employs LG staff – and as central government is given mandate to transfer LG staff across 
LGs).  
EC support to decentralisation in Tanzania included only support for the LGDG system. The 
design of the programme document (jointly financed by various DPs excluding the EU) noted 
major risks associated with supporting a fiscal modality that assumed local autonomy while 
the powers over LG staff apparently was centralised. The corresponding ―letter of sector 
policy‖ issued by the Ministry of Finance assured DPs that action would be taken to devolve 
staff.  
"It is recognised that certain sections of the Act are not compatible with the intentions of the 
Local Government Reform Policy regarding LG control over staff management issues and 
the Government is reviewing the Act with the aim of revising the relevant sections in 2004. 
The revision will ensure that the Public Service Act is fully consistent with the Government‟s 
decentralisation policy" (Paragraph 5.5. of ―letter of sector policy‖ signed by Government of 
Tanzania in relation to the LGDG.) 
However, changes in legislation and practice never materialised – on the contrary the 
Government found it necessary to further centralise the management of staff over the period 
2005-2011. This contributed to dissatisfaction of DPs with Government policy coherence in 
support to decentralisation reforms. The EUD decided however in the period not to take lead 
in these discussions as various EU member states (The Dutch, German and later Finland 
and Sweden were appointed as lead DPs in dialogue on decentralisation reforms). 
 
5.4.3 Ind5.4.3 - The role of various layers of government is clearly defined and extent 
to which LG autonomy is well described in legislation  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Definition of local government responsibilities is a key challenge, in particular in early stages 
of ambitious local government reforms. For each service (education, health water, agriculture 
etc) it must be spelled out how functions and responsibilities are assigned to different layers 
of government. A critical part of this is to define clearly what kind of autonomy LGs have 
relative to the central government according to the legislation.  
The evidence gathered in this evaluation indicates that the EC rarely explicitly has supported 
work to clarify roles of different tiers of government and their relative autonomy, except in 
Mali (minor efforts in this area have also been recorded in Benin and Nicaragua).  
The EC has only very rudimentary supported definition of local autonomy in legislation with 
no clear examples from the evaluation of a substantive EC support (except in Mali).  
The Mali case illustrates the challenges in progressing at early stages of decentralisation 
reforms when the assignments of responsibilities in broad terms are defined in legislation, 
but where effective transfer of powers and resources do not progress (see box below). 
Box 38 The role of various layers of government in Mali 
The broad division of powers between different levels of local governments is not considered 
as a major problem. However, the issue of the ownership of public investments made by a 
higher level local government in the territory of a lower level local government still remains a 
critical issue in many cases. 
In Mali, an audit of the missions of public services has led to an inventory of tasks that must 
remain in the portfolio of the state, specify the level of exercise of its powers (central or 
decentralised) and identify the function transferred to communities or private sector. The 
audit, which involved 44 national departments and 16 departments, highlighted a number of 
findings, including inflated nature of the central government staffing levels. The analysis of 
tasks and functions of public services, led to proposals for devolution and specific transfer of 
powers to local government and privatization of certain functions under the disengagement of 
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the state. The transfer of skills and resources of the state to local governments particularly in 
the areas of education, health, and water/hydraulics was recommended to proceed not later 
than June 2005. The implementation has been slow. 
Regarding dialogue mechanisms between different layers of government, it is noteworthy 
that decentralisation to sub-national entities requires new forms of dialogue mechanisms 
between different layers of government. This can take many forms; one common structure in 
many countries is the creation of national associations of local governments that advocate 
the interests of local governments in dialogue with central governments. 
Overall, in most of the countries under review, only very few real changes have occurred 
regarding definition of local governments' powers and autonomy during the evaluation period. 
In several cases (e.g. Sierra Leone, Nicaragua, the Philippines and Tanzania), the reforms of 
legal framework took place before EC really started its support to decentralisation in the 
respective countries. In other countries, some reforms have taken place during the 
evaluation period but without direct EC support for that purpose (e.g. Honduras) or the 
national context have made any kind of dialogue of legal aspects of decentralisation reforms 
unpractical (e.g. Lebanon). More details are provided in the field visit country notes (Volume 
II – annex 11). 
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6 EQ6: Stakeholders’ capacities 
Evaluation Question 6: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation contributed to 
strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the decentralisation processes in 
partner countries? 
It is interesting to put in parallel the detailed evidence presented in the indicators under the 
various JC analysed with the impact of the EC support as perceived by the EUDs. The figure 
below shows the results of the survey to EUD carried out during the desk phase. For the 
EUDs surveyed, the EC support has an important impact in relation to: 
 the strengthening of local governments' capacities. 
It has also a positive impact on: 
 the strengthening of Non-State Actors' capacities. 
The results are mixed on: 
 the strengthening of central government bodies' capacities. 
Figure 21 Impact of support to decentralisation on capacity strengthening, as perceived 
by the EUDs 
 
Survey to the EU Delegations, Particip analysis 
 
The table below provides a synthetic overview of the evidence gathered during the desk and 
field phases on the focus and the results of the EC support for the various case study 
countries for which an in-depth analysis was carried out. The analysis seems to confirm the 
perception of the EUD, except maybe for the support to the Non-State Actors where the 
perception of the EUD is more positive. This difference seems to come from the fact that the 
analysis carried out below covers a variety of Non-State Actors, including local government 
associations for which the results of the EC support seems rather limited (see details in the 
sub-sections below). 
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Table 33 Overview of EC support to stakeholders' capacities (focus of the support & 
results) 
Country \ Criteria Capacity - central Capacity - local Capacity - NSA 
Benin +   
Honduras 0 0  
Lebanon    
Mali  + 0 
Peru 0   
Philippines    
Rwanda    
Sierra Leone + +  
South Africa  +  
Tanzania  +  
Overall assessment  +  
 
Legend 
Colour Level of EC 
support - Scale 
Description 
 
significantly 
Interventions' objectives or activities do explicitly at significant degree address the 
result area and the concerned interventions are of relative significance compared to 
overall EC support to decentralisation. 
 
partly 
Interventions' objectives or activities only partially or marginally address the result 
area and/or the concerned interventions are relative small compared to overall EC 
support to decentralisation. 
 not at all EC support in the country does not at all address the result area. 
 
Symbol Results - Scale Description 
+ significantly 
Results have to a significant degree been achieved (compared to objectives) in this 
result area. 
 partly 
Results have only partially or marginally been achieved (compared to objectives) in 
this result area. 
0 not at all Results have not all been achieved (compared to objectives) in this result area. 
 
Detailed analysis and evidence on these aspects are provided in the next sub-sections. 
6.1 JC6.1 Improved management and administrative capacity of key central 
government bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and 
implementation (incl. activities of oversight and support to decentralised 
bodies) 
Main findings at JC level 
The development of partner governments‘ capacities and institutional set-up to manage and 
administer the reform process is widely recognised by international development partners as 
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a challenging area. In particular, it implies working in a highly political environment, with a 
variety of actors at central level having sometimes overlapping roles.  
The many policy formulation and reform implementation activities undertaken in several 
countries during the period evaluated, illustrate an overall development of the central 
government bodies' capacities related to decentralisation in most partner governments. 
However, the evidence gathered in this evaluation shows that, in many countries, the 
capacities of key national institutions involved in the decentralisation process still remain 
weak. The EC has supported the development of these capacities in only half of the 
countries reviewed, and often focused only on selected aspects of central government 
capacities.  
Except in Peru and Madagascar,  where the EC aimed at contributing to the development of 
the capacities of the central body in charge of decentralisation via individual activities or 
projects focussing on certain regions137, the EC support took place in the framework of wide 
programmes supporting the national reform process. This support has been provided via 
budget support (e.g. in Mali, Benin and Honduras) or via a WB-managed trust fund in the 
case of Sierra Leone. Some limited support has also been provided in Tanzania through the 
multi-donor basket fund.  
The evidence gathered during the desk and field phases shows that the EC support has had 
mixed results in general, and very limited results in some specific areas of support.  
In particular, it has proved difficult for the EC to support the development of national M&E 
systems related to decentralisation. Support was rendered only in a few countries and, in 
most cases, the systems developed have turned out to be weak and of limited use, or have 
failed to remain sustainable. In Mali, for instance, the use of the national database (OISE138), 
strongly supported by the EC, ceased with the end in 2007 of the Centres de Conseils 
Communaux − the network of Communal Council Centres established to support local 
authorities. Some achievements can be noted in Sierra Leone and Tanzania, where the 
ministries in charge of local governments have developed systems for functional 
performance assessments for all local councils (CLoGPAS139 in Sierra Leone and LGDG 
assessments in Tanzania). Yet, even there, some difficulties are faced in producing up-to-
date information. M&E systems that aim at measuring basic service delivery outputs have 
also proved challenging and the evaluation team found no evidence of functional systems for 
measuring wider service delivery results.  
Efforts to support the development of intergovernmental/interministerial relations in relation to 
decentralisation were made by the EC in only a few cases and faced significant obstacles. In 
general, the analysis carried out in the desk and field phases shows that most countries have 
interministerial coordination mechanisms, but the structures put in place remain weak due to 
a low status given to them in the governmental framework. The case of Mali provides a good 
illustration of the difficulties development partners face when encountering this situation. The 
strong support provided by the EC and other DPs to the main bodies in the charge of the 
decentralisation and state reforms in Mali could not compensate for the lack of will at the 
Prime Minister's Office and Presidency level to develop interministerial initiatives. It is a 
general finding that the EC works mainly with the ministries responsible for local 
governments. However, these ministries generally have limited authority for broader 
government coordination, broader fiscal reform issues, or for working modalities of sector 
ministries.  
There is evidence of some contribution of the EC support to improved management and 
administrative capacity of key central government bodies in some countries. The analysis 
                                               
137
 In Madagascar, although the central government was not the main focus of the programme (which mainly 
focused on local governments), central government bodies, and especially deconcentrated units, were 
continuously involved in the implementation of the programme and in the discussion on the future of the activities 
supported by the EC. The new programme designed in 2007 by the EC and the World Bank clearly aimed at 
intervening at the both the local governments and national government level. However, the intervention was 
eventually cancelled because of the political crisis that occurred in 2009. 
138
 Outil Informatisé de Suivi Evaluation. 
139
 Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment System. 
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carried out shows that this is especially the case where the EC has engaged with other 
development partners in comprehensive programmes supporting the national reform process 
(e.g. Benin, Mali, Sierra Leone and Tanzania), and this has been confirmed by the EUD 
survey carried out during the desk phase.  
As observed in the cases of Mali and Honduras, it appears that SBS has the potential to 
create positive conditions to achieve some results in this area, but does not necessarily 
ensure that the challenges faced by programmes using other implementation modalities are 
better overcome.  
It also emerges from the analysis carried out that the use of long-term technical assistance to 
accompany national reform processes appears to be a crucial element in contributing to 
improvements at this level.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that an in-depth understanding of the national context is critical, as 
the sustainability of the results achieved often remains subject to the risks of important 
political shifts at national level (e.g. Mali and Madagascar) or to a situation where there is 
high turnover of staff (e.g. Peru).  
6.1.1 Ind6.1.1 - Key staff of central government bodies are undertaking policy 
formulation and reform implementation activities effectively 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The EC has provided support to capacity building of central government institutions for 
decentralisation in several countries studied during the evaluation.  
Four countries have been identified (Sierra Leone, Benin, Rwanda, Tanzania) with some 
results of the support, while two (Mali and Madagascar) had some temporal results, which, in 
Madagascar, vanished with the severe political crises. In Honduras, technical Assistance 
support from the EC given directly to the central body in charge of decentralisation had some 
effect, but most disappeared with changes in staff and organisational structures from 2010. 
In Peru, the support to the CND (National Decentralisation Committee) and later SdD 
(Decentralisation Secretariat) was not successful, mainly due to changes in organisational 
set up and political priorities and the low level of support provided during the evaluation 
period.  
The section below provides some details about the countries where the EC support has been 
quite successful. 
 In Benin, the desk review and the interviews carried out during the field visits show 
that key central government bodies involved in decentralisation policy formulation and 
implementation have improved capacities over the last five to ten years. This 
evolution has been supported by EC programmes PRODECOM and PACTE over the 
past ten years. The formulation/implementation of PONADEC is also an important 
element is this improvement. Numerous ministerial and inter-ministerial committees 
are being or have been put in place.  
 In Sierra Leone, the EC has supported the building and maintaining of capacities at 
the central level through the IRCBP programme led by the WB. The main 
beneficiaries have been the staff of the Decentralisation Secretariat (in the MLG&RD) 
and Local Government Fiscal Commission (in MoF). Evidence gathered during the 
field phase showed that staff have indeed been well equipped and trained. The key 
ministry for decentralisation reform, the MLG&RD, is still dependent on external 
assistance for policy formulation and reform implementation, but during the recent 
formulation of the National Decentralisation Policy (NDP), it has had a larger 
importance than previous (in 2003 during the formulation of the LG Act) because of 
the institutional building by the IRCBP, but also support from UNDP to the formulation 
of the policy.   
 In Tanzania, the extent to which central government stakeholders have improved 
capacities for implementation of decentralisation strategies is somehow debatable 
(see also indicator 6.1.2). However, in some areas related to the LGDG system, 
improvements can be observed, for instance, in terms of intergovernmental/inter-
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ministerial relations (see also indicator 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 for example of other 
improvements). 
 In Rwanda, MINALOC/NDIS staff has been formulating and in control of the RDSF 
from the beginning and has increased their capacities over the evaluation period 
considerably. This has also to some degree been supported by EC but not as the 
main and most active of partners.  
The section below provides more detail about the countries where the EC supported 
interventions have had only limited results.  
 In Madagascar, the EC has supported managers of the MDAT department in 
formulating policy and strategy. Unfortunately, in addition to weak institutional 
capacity, a national political crisis since 2009 broke this small capacity. 
 In Mali, as illustrated by the national policy framework document on decentralisation, 
it appears that the capacity to formulate policy exists in the national structures in 
charge of decentralisation (in particular, the DNCT). However, if we look at the wider 
government level and the issue of inter-ministerial initiatives, it turns out that 
capacities are actually quite low. In fact, the DNCT (in charge of the "decentralisation 
reform") and the CDI (in charge of the "state reform") are considered as weak 
structures to be further strengthened. Through the PARAD and PARADER 
programmes, the EC has provided substantial support to these two structures. But 
this support cannot compensate for the lack of will at the Prime Minister's Office and 
Presidency level to develop "inter-ministerial initiatives" (see also Indicator 6.1.4). In 
addition, the number of qualified officers is limited at the DNCT (it can be considered 
that there is a core group of four or five persons). With respect to the CDI: a flowchart 
has been redefined with an enhanced number of officers to meet the needs of 
conducting the reform of the state. Unfortunately, some of these positions are still 
vacant, illustrating the low motivation of the state to develop efficient structures. 
 In Honduras, the Technical Decentralisation Unit (la Unidad Tecnica de 
Descentralizacion) in the Ministry of the Interior and Population (SEIP140) is the 
responsible unit for decentralisation and the coordination of the reform process. It has 
produced the Decentralisation Plan 2010-2014 (Decentralisation para el Desarrollo 
Local, DDL 2010-14) as part of the national development strategy ―Marco de la Vision 
de pais 2038‖. In 2010, when the new government entered, most senior staff at the 
SEIP was changed. As a consequence, the institution has not the capacity any more 
to lead a reform process or formulate policies effectively. For instance, this is seen by 
the inconsistency within the government policy, where the planning ministry 
(SEGEPLAN) is developing a regional strategy while SIEP focuses on the further 
decentralisation to 298 municipalities. The EC with the programme PROADES 
supported the SEIP (formerly SGJ) within a SBS modality and direct technical 
assistance 2007 to 2009, but with limited interest from the receiving government as 
decentralisation was not a high priority. During that period, the establishment of a Tri-
Party Forum with the government, development partners and civil society for 
decentralisation was supported and also in general building up the capacity of the 
SGJ, but both support activities had little results – in particular as the staff was 
changed when the new GoH started in 2010. The technical assistance team produced 
several analyses on decentralisation and papers on how to devolve sectors, but the 
documents were not applied for sector decentralisation as the government did not 
prioritise decentralisation and, according to the present staff at the SEIP, the outputs 
of the technical assistance remained limited. 
 In Peru, the key state actor for coordination and development of decentralisation was 
the CND up to 2006 which was replaced by the SdD (attached to the PCM) in 2007 
following a reorganisation of the government. All stakeholders interviewed agree that 
                                               
140
Up to late 2010 the SEIP was called: Ministry of Governance and Justice (Secretaria de Gobernacion y 
Justicia, SGJ). 
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the SdD is not an effective institution to carry out the coordination for decentralisation. 
The former CND was better positioned (with its own minister) in the decentralisation 
system. The EC supported the CND (and later the SdD) as implementer of the 
AGORAH programme. And, from 2008, the PCM is supported by the EC funded 
Modernisation of the State (PCM) Programme. However, this support has remained 
quite low in terms of size, and overall, due to staff turnover in these key institutions 
and the low priority finally given by the government, the EC support has not lead to 
significant results in terms of contribution to the building up of central government‘s 
capacity for implementation of decentralisation.  
In other countries reviewed, the EC has not provided direct support for capacity building of 
central government institutions for decentralisation. 
 In South Africa, sufficient capacities clearly exist within the central government and 
the EC has naturally not worked on this level with these issues during the evaluation 
period.  
 In Nicaragua, the Government approved a Decentralisation Policy in 2006 as a 
culmination of years with improving framework for policy formulation. This should be 
transferred into a decentralisation implementation plan, which has not yet been 
formulated. The current government does not support decentralisation 
implementation, so few resources are spent on this. The EC has only supported the 
development of a clearer framework for municipalities‘ functions in primary and 
secondary education in the programme PAPSE – this did not include support to 
central institutions for decentralisation. 
 In the Philippines, it has until recently not been an area that EC has targeted, but with 
the new PFM project141 much more emphasis is on LG oversight and reform bodies 
(see bow below). 
The role of the oversight bodies with regard to local PFM is further described in the Joint 
Memorandum Circular 2007-1 (JMC 2007-1), issued by DILG, National Economic and 
Development Authority (NEDA), Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and DOF. 
The JMC 2007-1 clarified the roles of the four oversight bodies in local planning, investment 
programming, budgeting, expenditure management and revenue administration, while trying 
to link these activities into an integrated cycle. Furthermore, it also serves as a springboard 
for reconciling existing and subsequent policies as well as it guides the oversight agencies in 
providing continuous and coordinated capacity building programs for LGUs.  
At the end of 2009, the Coordinating Committee on Decentralization (CCD) was created 
to replace the abandoned JMC 1 committee. The CCD has become the body for policy and 
programme coordination as well as harmonisation of capacity building among the oversight 
agencies and the LGU Leagues. The CCD is best described as a collegial body of oversight 
agencies, consisting of DILG (chair), NEDA, DBM, DOF, the League of Provinces, the 
League of Cities, the League of Municipalities, the League of Barangays
142
, and the Union of 
Local Authorities
143
. The CCD is meant to enforce the JMC 2007-1 and direct and oversee its 
implementation to ensure that its intent and purpose are carried on. Currently there is no 
equivalent coordination forum at regional level which could provide a crucial role in 
reinforcing coordination and communication between central and local levels.  
To interface with the LGUs the oversight bodies rely on their Regional Offices
144
 (ROs). The 
mandate of the ROs includes: (i) The provision of policy advisory and support services to the 
Central Office of their respective Department, Regional Development Councils and other 
regional policy-making bodies to promote sound PFM; (ii) Monitoring the fiscal, financial and 
budget performance of LGUs to ensure compliance with the LGC; (iii) Provision of advisory 
                                               
141
 Support to Local Government Units for more effective and accountable Public Finance Management- CRIS 
reference: DCI-ASIE/2011/022-691 
142
 Barangays are the smallest administrative entity with a population of minimum 2000 persons. 
143
 LGU are three-tiers structure: 1) Provinces (81), Independent Component Cities (5) and Highly Urbanized 
Cities (33), 2) Municipalities (1 511) and Component cities (87) and 3) Barangays (42 008) 
144
 The ROs cover the 16 administrative regions with an average of 6 provinces per RO 
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and technical assistance and support services to LGUs. To date, regional offices have 
focused mainly on their monitoring function to ensure compliance with the LGC.  
Recent efforts/developments in the areas of revenue forecasting, performance based 
budgeting, Internal Control Systems (ICS)/Internal Audit Services (IAS) and monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) are new territory for ROs. If strengthened, ROs could potentially play a 
crucial role with regard to the roll-out of capacity building programmes, provision of policy 
advice and back-stopping support to LGUs. 
Source: PFM Action Fiche 
 In Lebanon, it should be observed that none of the past EC projects had explicit 
objectives within this area: ―capacity building of central stakeholders for 
decentralisation policy formulation and oversight‖. It is only with the newly formulated 
municipal finance reform project that this becomes an objective of support. The 
overall assessment from people met was that the MoIM hardly undertakes a policy 
and oversight role – however, within the last year this has to some extent changed – 
partly because of a dynamic Minister (who later resigned in May 2011) and partly 
because of some donor financed support activities (UN, Italy and World Bank). It is 
the MoIM that is overall in charge of decentralisation policy support and oversight. To 
date it can be noted that these functions are only given scant attention by the Ministry 
that overall is mainly concerned with ―Internal Affairs‖: security and general central 
government administration rather than the role of municipalities. The responsible 
directorate (one directorate dealing with municipalities out of a total 18 directorates in 
the ministry) of the Ministry has only 30 staff members (compared to 350 intended 
positions) – and out of these 23 are contractual workers145. One year ago the MOIM 
conducted an institutional assessment preparing a new organisational chart (with 
assistance from UNDP) for an organisation supposedly to deal with regulations, 
capacity building etc. The ministry currently doesn‘t have the capacity – Italy is 
working with them (and Habitat) to develop curriculum for both staff and politicians at 
municipalities. Initial focus on larger municipalities and newly elected members. With 
support from the UNDP 43 TOTs were trained from MOI. The Ministry has done some 
policy work – e.g. been working on electoral laws – proportional law, women‘s quota, 
redeveloped ballot – this is currently discussed by cabinet and parliament. The MOIM 
has with the NGO ―Common Space‖ been working on a strategy for decentralisation 
workshop/dissemination to debate law on decentralisation – this based in part on 
―book with 100 questions on decentralisation‖ (supported by Italy) - some eight 
months from now the MOIM expects an overall proposal based on consultations and 
studies. The Ministry has also recently – through funds from the World bank – 
completed a major study on LG finance by the World Bank – all reports from these 
assignments are on the ministry‘s website http://www.moim.gov.lb/ . 
Box 39 Resignation of the Minister Baroud - Lebanon 
On 26/05/2011, Baroud announced that he would no longer continue his ministerial duties. 
Baroud‘s resignation came after the developing events that occurred on Thursday between 
the Minister of Telecommunications in Lebanon Charbel Nahas and the Internal Security 
Forces unit that banned him from entering one of his ministry‘s buildings. Baroud asked the 
personnel to leave the building, but his request remained unfulfilled. 
His resignation speech included the following memorable statement: ―Since I no longer want 
to be a false witness or a caretaker minister with the duty to sign the ministry‟s mail, which 
something an acting minister can do and since I don‟t want to violate the constitution despite 
any political stance, I decided to free myself from my duties.‖ 
Sources – see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ziad_Baroud  
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 Interview Rabih El-Chaar, Adviser to the Minister 25
th
 May 2011, Ministry of Interior and Municipalities. The 
following paragraphs are also based on the same interview. 
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6.1.2 Ind6.1.2 - Perception by stakeholders (LG & CSO) that capacities of key central 
government bodies for decentralisation policy formulation and implementation 
have improved 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Overall, in countries where the EC has actively supported the capacities of the central 
stakeholders for decentralisation, the perception of LGs and CSOs about the evolution of 
these capacities is mixed. In some cases, the perception has changed during the evaluation 
period depending on the central governments‘ attitude to decentralisation and the role of 
CSOs and LGs.  
In some countries (e.g. Mali and Honduras) the LGs and CSO‘s perception are quite 
negative. In only a few countries (e.g. Rwanda and Benin), the evaluation team has observed 
that LGs and CSOs see some progress in the central levels‘ capacity for decentralisation 
policy formulation and implementation. In many other cases (Tanzania, Sierra Leone and 
Peru) the appreciation is mixed.  
The section below provides some details about the evidence gathered. 
 In Honduras, civil society organisations, AMHON and local governments do not find 
that the government institutions for decentralisation (the present SIEP, and former 
SGJ) have capacity for policy formulation or management of the decentralisation 
process. This is mainly because of the large staff turnover and the inconsistent 
support to decentralisation from the GoH during the last ten years.  
 In Mali, representatives of local authorities and civil society met during the field visit, 
expressed the fact that there is no doubt that there is little enthusiasm by the 
government to boost the decentralisation process, hence the limited results in this 
area. 
 In Rwanda, the perception of the CSOs and NGOs is that the capacities of central 
government agencies have improved considerably over the past ten years. This is 
seen by the development of Decentralisation Strategic Framework and the 
subsequent Decentralisation Implementation Plans (DIP), that is now in phase 3.  
 In Benin, the field visit interviews clearly show that it is the impression of most key 
stakeholders in the DLG process that the key central government bodies involved in 
decentralisation policy formulation and implementation, have improved capacities 
over the last years. The formation/implementation of PONADEC is an important 
element in this improvement. Several ministerial and inter-ministerial committees are 
being or have been put in place. 
 In Tanzania, the extent to which central government stakeholders have improved 
capacities for implementation of decentralisation strategies is somehow debatable, as 
central government is increasingly being criticised by NGOs, by ALAT and some DPs 
for being effectively implementing the reform policy. For instance, this is reflected in 
the critique by CSOs and DPs of Government policy formulations related to the latest 
LG Act amendments, the Public Service Act sections dealing with LG staff and recent 
Constituency Development Fund.  
 In Sierra Leone, the mayors and officials from two LCs met during the field visits 
agreed that the policy framework and implementation for decentralisation have 
improved, but there are still many issues left in particular for transfers of remaining 
functions and finances to LCs. 
 In Peru, the persons interviewed at the regional level (Ayacucho) did not outline any 
major problem in the central levels‘ capacity to coordinate the decentralisation 
process. However, some of the CSO met highlighted the work done by other donors 
(such as GIZ or the WB) in terms of decentralisation while the EC support is less 
recognised. They also pointed out the improvements of capacities at the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance and the fact that the former CND (and the current SdD in 
charge of decentralisation) actually have not played any significant role in terms of the 
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decentralisation process. Moreover, several persons met highlighted the constant 
problems due to the turnover of staff in government institutions.  
 In the Philippines, the arrangements for central government oversight and 
decentralisation policymaking are widely recognised by stakeholders as weak. This 
was confirmed in the NGO focus group discussion carried out during the field visit. 
6.1.3 Ind6.1.3 - Existence and use of M&E system 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The experiences with M&E systems from countries reviewed are contrasted. It is noteworthy 
that partner countries tend to prefer the development of new systems without really 
coordinating and evaluating existent systems. Overall, only limited results from the support 
from development partners and the EC can be identified. 
In some countries, like Honduras and Mali, the desk review and field visits did not reveal any 
positive results of the EC support for M&E systems related to decentralisation. The EC 
support has contributed to some results in Tanzania and some minor results in Sierra Leone 
and Benin.  
Other countries (Philippines, South Africa, which both have not received EC support in this 
area) have rather well functioning monitoring systems. 
The section below provides some details about the evidence gathered. 
 In Mali, an M&E system (relying mainly on the OISE database) was developed with 
strong support by the EC. However, since the cessation of the system of CCC 
("Centres de Conseils Communaux") in 2007, the database is actually no longer 
functional. Moreover, there was a failure to transfer it to the local authorities. 
Currently, the DNCT carries out the collection and centralisation of hard copies used 
for some of the data collection. 
 In Honduras, a monitoring and evaluation system for the decentralisation process 
does not exist at central level. The GoH applies only a system for categorisation of 
the capacities of municipalities but unfortunately criteria shifted in 2006, so the 
changes in the categories do not give a correct indication of the development.  
Table 34 Municipalities according to category in 2002, 2006 and 2009. 
Category \ Year 2002 2006 2009 
A 24 25 23 
B 62 50 32 
C 123 156 107 
D 89 67 136 
Source: SEIP 
 In Tanzania, although central government capacities (or political willingness) for 
decentralisation policy formulation is by many stakeholders considered weak, 
improvements can be noticed in some areas related to the LGDG system such as the 
strengthening of the M&E system by the annual assessment system (which gives an 
up to date assessment of LG capacities and their adherence to GoT regulations) or 
the basic reporting system that has been put in place (which monitors fiscal transfers 
to LGs, their own revenue generation and expenditures)146.  
 In Sierra Leone, the MLG&RD has implemented at national level a functional 
performance assessment system for all local councils (CLoGPAS) measuring their 
performance in key areas e.g. councils meetings following the LG Act, functioning of 
planning with proper participation of the citizens, financial management, project 
management, procurement procedures and followed etc. Assessments exist for 2006 
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and 2008, but the progress was very limited. The assessment for 2010 will be 
published approximately in August 2011. The system is however focused on 
processes in the LC administration and the MLG&RD with support from UNCDF 
intends to establish a system with focus on results of the decentralisation process.  
 In Benin, the overall M&E is generally weak but the annual sector review of 
decentralisation does concentrate on presenting updated M&E figures on the most 
relevant capacity building and fiscal decentralisation issues. 
 In Peru, a systematic M&E system for decentralisation does not exist and the EC 
provides no support for the development of an M&E system for decentralisation. The 
only national monitoring is the extensive financial information managed by MEF 
(http://ofi.mef.gob.pe/transparencia).  
 In South Africa, generally speaking the M&E situation in LGs is much weaker than 
within the central and provincial governments. However, PFM has improved both 
centrally and locally over the past ten years and central government M&E of LGs has 
also strengthened. This work has been supported by the EC but mainly under the 
PFM support to the National Treasury. 
 In the Philippines, there have been multiple systems for M&E in existence for many 
years (see box below). The system has not been well maintained and it is for instance 
not possible to generate aggregate data trends for the long period it has been 
working. However, with the introduction of the PBGS it is likely that more attention will 
be paid to the use of this data, as it will influence fiscal allocations to LGUs.  
Box 40 LG Performance measurement in the Philippines 
The Local Governance Performance Management System (LGPMS) is a self-diagnostic tool 
allowing LGUs to track their performance in various areas of governance and compare this 
with other LGUs. In 2009, DILG and BLGF agreed to incorporate 11 out of the 19 Local 
Government Financial Performance Monitoring System (LGFPMS) financial indicators in the 
LGPMS. Besides the financial indicators, there are currently no other indicators to gauge 
LGU performance in PFM or to evaluate the linkages between and effectiveness of plans and 
budgets. The LGPMS has now become one of the bases for decision making on loans 
granted by the Municipal Development Fund Office (MDFO) and the Performance-Based 
Grant System. The government also launched the Performance Challenge Fund for LGUs in 
2010. This fund aims to recognise good governance performance particularly in the adoption 
of "good housekeeping" in the areas of planning, budgeting, revenue mobilisation, financial 
management and budget execution, procurement and resource mobilisation. A new tool, the 
"Seal of Good Housekeeping", was also launched in 2010.  
Source: Action Fiche Support to Local Government Units for more effective and accountable Public Finance 
Management 2011 
6.1.4 Ind6.1.4 - Development of intergovernmental / inter-ministerial relations in 
support of decentralisation policy 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
All countries analysed during the evaluation (except Lebanon) have established an inter-
ministerial committee (IMC) to support the decentralisation process.  
The EC has supported these inter-ministerial mechanisms only in a few cases (Mali, Sierra 
Leone, Benin) and with mixed results. Overall, the evidence gathered during the field phase 
shows that, the IMCs real value in the decentralisation process remains low since they often 
do not have the necessary status in the government structure.  
 In Mali, capacities for inter-ministerial initiatives remain quite low. As already 
mentioned in Indicator 6.1.1, the DNCT (in charge of the "decentralisation reform") 
and the CDI (in charge of the "state reform") are considered as weak structures to be 
further strengthened. Through the PARAD and PARADER programmes, the EC has 
provided substantial support to these two structures. But this support cannot 
compensate for the lack of will at the Prime Minister's Office and Presidency level to 
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develop "inter-ministerial initiatives". The attempt to establish an inter-ministerial 
commission on the transfer of functions and powers has illustrated the difference of 
perspectives between the different levels of authority. In particular, because of its 
insufficient institutional and political weight, the choice to give to the DNCT the 
responsibility of the inter-ministerial commission could only lead to a failure. 
 In Benin, several ministerial and inter-ministerial committees are being or have been 
put in place in some cases with the support of development partners active in the 
area. 
 In Sierra Leone, the IMC for coordination of the decentralisation, headed by the Vice 
President established in 2005, has not been functional and the inter-ministerial 
coordination is still very weak. Instead the decentralisation has been coordinated by 
the DecSec in the MLG&RD and the fiscal part by the LGFD in MoFED. As the 
DecSec will be mainstreamed in the ministry until mid 2011, no strong coordination 
unit will exist unless the inter-ministerial body takes up its role. The IRCBP has 
supported the coordination function of the decentralisation secretariat in MLG&RD 
included its ability to encourage the functioning of the IMC but it has not supported 
directly the IMC (headed by the vice-president).   
The section below details the evidence gathered in countries where the EC has not explicitly 
supported the development of inter-governmental and inter-ministerial relations. 
 In Rwanda, as illustrated in the implementation framework for the national 
decentralisation plan, inter-governmental and inter-ministerial relations have become 
quite elaborated and significantly improved in recent years.  
 In Peru, the key state actor for coordination and development of decentralisation was 
the CND up to 2006, and from 2007 SdD in the PCM. An Inter Ministerial Committee 
was established in 2007 to coordinate – inter alia – decentralisation and IMCs have 
also been established in seven line ministries for decentralisation. The committees 
have had some importance for the coordination internally to the various sectors 
covered, but not for the overall coordination of the decentralisation process. The EC 
has not directly supported the inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms.   
 In Tanzania, intergovernmental/inter-ministerial relations have improved during the 
evaluation period. These relations have become more rule bound as LGs have been 
granted formal autonomy in deciding in LGDG utilisation while central Government 
oversight role has been strengthened and operational through, for instance, the 
annual assessment system. 
 In Honduras, the National Committee for Decentralisation (la Comisión Ejecutiva para 
la Descentralización del Estado, CEDE) was established in 1994. It has however not 
taken up the role to coordinate the decentralisation process because of the GoH‘s 
changing policy to decentralisation and a low priority of the GoH to reinforce the 
CEDE. Instead, the ongoing dialogue between the central government and the 
Association of Municipalities of Honduras (AMHON) has helped in the last decade to 
channel the demands of municipal authorities to the executive and legislative 
branches and coordinate initiatives from the government and municipal side. The 
parties signed a ―pact‖ in 2006, which functions as an agreement for the continuation 
of the decentralisation process – although it has not been respected fully by the GoH. 
 In the Philippines, the support to the development of intergovernmental/inter-
ministerial relations has until recently not been an area that the EC has targeted, but 
with the new PFM project147 much more emphasis is on LG oversight and reform 
bodies (see box below). 
                                               
147
 Support to Local Government Units for more effective and accountable Public Finance Management- CRIS 
reference: DCI-ASIE/2011/022-691 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
168 
Box 41 The support to the development of intergovernmental relations in new EC 
programmes in the Philippines 
The role of the oversight bodies with regard to local PFM is further described in the Joint 
Memorandum Circular 2007-1 (JMC 2007-1), issued by DILG, National Economic and 
Development Authority (NEDA), Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and DOF. 
The JMC 2007-1 clarified the roles of the four oversight bodies in local planning, investment 
programming, budgeting, expenditure management and revenue administration, while trying 
to link these activities into an integrated cycle. Furthermore, it also serves as a springboard 
for reconciling existing and subsequent policies as well as guides the oversight agencies in 
providing continuous and coordinated capacity building programs for LGUs.  
At the end of 2009, the Coordinating Committee on Decentralization (CCD) was created 
to replace the abandoned JMC 1 committee. The CCD has become the body for policy and 
programme coordination as well as harmonisation of capacity building among the oversight 
agencies and the LGU Leagues. The CCD is best described as a collegial body of oversight 
agencies, consisting of DILG (chair), NEDA, DBM, DOF, the League of Provinces, the 
League of Cities, the League of Municipalities, the League of Barangays
148
, and the Union of 
Local Authorities
149
. The CCD is meant to enforce the JMC 2007-1 and direct and oversee its 
implementation to ensure that its intent and purpose are carried on. Currently there is no 
equivalent coordination forum at regional level which could provide a crucial role in 
reinforcing coordination and communication between central and local levels.  
To interface with the LGUs the oversight bodies rely on their Regional Offices
150
 (ROs). The 
mandate of the ROs includes: (i) The provision of policy advisory and support services to the 
Central Office of their respective Department, Regional Development Councils and other 
regional policy-making bodies to promote sound PFM; (ii) Monitoring the fiscal, financial and 
budget performance of LGUs to ensure compliance with the LGC; (iii) Provision of advisory 
and technical assistance and support services to LGUs. To date regional offices have 
focused mainly on their monitoring function to ensure compliance with the LGC.  
Recent efforts/developments in the areas of revenue forecasting, performance based 
budgeting, Internal Control Systems (ICS)/Internal Audit Services (IAS) and monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E) are new territory for ROs. If strengthened, ROs could potentially play a 
crucial role with regard to the roll-out of capacity building programmes, provision of policy 
advice and back-stopping support to LGUs. 
Source: PFM Action Fiche 
6.2 JC6.2 Improved capacities of local governments for management of 
decentralised administrative, fiscal and political responsibilities / powers 
Main findings at JC level 
Capacity building of local governments is the area within decentralisation support where the 
EC is most active. Support programmes in this area have been identified in almost all 
countries studied in this evaluation. 
The improvement of local capacities for planning is the area where the EC has been most 
successful, with continuous support in this area over many years in most of the countries 
reviewed. The support has been provided through a variety of approaches, ranging from 
specific support related to the implementation of infrastructure programmes financed by the 
EC (e.g. Lebanon) and support provided within the framework of sectoral programmes (e.g. 
the Philippines and Peru), to broader support to planning capacities within local governments 
structures (e.g. Benin and Tanzania). The use of incentive systems in Tanzania has 
produced particularly interesting results and the system for annual assessments of LG 
performances gives regular M&E data on the results of the capacity building.  
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Some positive results have also been identified in a number of countries in terms of 
improved financial management in local governments. However, the impact of this support 
seems more mixed. In some countries, a major obstacle was the lack of human resources 
with basic skills; although some improvement can be recorded, decentralised structures 
remain weak. In several countries, the limited results can also be explained by institutional 
and fiscal constraints, the difficulty of promoting accountability (in Benin, the focus both of 
local authorities and Non State Actors is more on the service delivery rather than on 
accountability) and the lack of strong back-up of these efforts by national authorities. The 
best results appear to occur when incentives for LG performance are provided – as in the 
case of Tanzania. Similar systems for performance-based grant systems are, therefore, also 
contemplated in many other countries, such as in Lebanon at present.  
Evidence of improved HRM due to EC support is even more limited. This has generally not 
been a priority area of EC support to decentralisation. Some limited improvements can be 
noted in countries where the EC, with other development partners, has funded 
decentralisation programmes of significant size (e.g. Mali) or, in specific sectors, where it has 
also provided wide support (e.g. the Philippines).  
The EC support to M&E at local level has been provided in no more than half of the 
countries reviewed, with very limited results. In only three countries (Madagascar, Sierra 
Leone and Tanzania), M&E systems were actually set-up at local level. In these three cases, 
the use of the systems remains challenging, mainly due to the difficulties of developing a 
consistent system with reliable information that can be used by all relevant stakeholders. 
Different sectors, ministries and donors will frequently require LGs to report in separate 
formats, thus undermining efforts to establish general M&E systems at local level (see 
Tanzania).  
Overall, capacity building of local governments has been a major focus area of the EC 
support to decentralisation during the period evaluated and, combined with efforts from other 
development partners, it is clear that this external support has made contributions in third 
countries that have strived to improve the capacities of local governments‘ staff and 
politicians. Although some areas remain weak, local governments increasingly have the 
minimum level of qualified staff and politicians that allows them to operate and perform their 
basic functions.  
The most successful examples of capacity building are in cases where traditional training 
and other forms of capacity building are combined with additional resources to local 
governments that allow them to practise new skills and translate these into added outputs of 
the local governments151. 
However, efforts in this area still face a number of challenges. First, it can be observed that 
overall staff performance is influenced by many factors other than those addressed by EC 
support (which typically addresses mainly skills gaps), such as low pay, various other 
disincentives in the public service, and the particular challenges related to staff working in 
rural and remote LGs. High levels of staff turnover are occasionally mentioned in EC reports 
as challenges, but these are clearly symptoms of wider problems in the public sector. 
Second, it can be noted that capacity building covers a wide range of activities and these are 
often supported by numerous development partners. This requires that coordination should 
be well organised, if possible in a harmonised framework with a precise division of labour. In 
some cases, it appears that capacities are undermined by too many uncoordinated capacity 
building efforts − for instance, when senior staff are constantly involved in workshops, 
seminars and study tours, making them too busy to work. Related to this is the importance of 
not disconnecting the support to local governments from the support to deconcentrated 
structures and, more generally, to national institutions, which ultimately have responsibility 
for the capacity building systems put in place. As in other areas, the back-up of capacity 
building activities by national authorities is crucial to sustaining the potential impact achieved.  
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6.2.1 Ind6.2.1 - Evidence of improved financial management in local governments  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Support to PFM is among the priorities of the EC support and, at LG level, several support 
activities have been identified. The EC support had some results in Mali, Sierra Leone and 
Tanzania. While the results of support provided in Cambodia and Benin are less clear. There 
was no tangible contribution to improved financial management in Peru and Honduras during 
the evaluation period. 
Examples of cases with some contributions to improved financial management: 
 In Tanzania, the LGDG has contributed to improvements in areas of improved 
financial management (clearly reflected in the improved audit reports from Auditor 
General and annual LG assessments), as well as in improved development planning 
(increased public participation, more comprehensive plans that are better linked to 
budgets, as reflected, for instance, in the results of the annual LG assessments). 
 In Sierra Leone, the IRCBP has worked intensively with capacity building for the LCs, 
in particular with financial management and revenue collection. The IRCBP has a 
staff member (coach) in each LC, who is also supporting the councils in the planning 
process and on M&E. Further, the programme has occasionally financed staff in the 
LCs, e.g. procurement officers. By 2010-2011 all 19 local councils fulfil the LG Act's 
requirement for financial accountability and transparency compared to none in 2004 
(IRCBP RF indicator 0.1). All councils are able to implement investment projects with 
satisfactory financial and contractual management compared to 14 in 2008 and only 
around five in 2005 (IRCBP RF indicator 6.1). 
 In Mali, local governments and especially rural ones, which form the vast majority, are 
still very weak when it comes to the PFM issues. The 2011 assessment report on 
decentralisation152 points out weaknesses in the capacity of local authorities. 
Mismanagement of public funds is often cited. The report actually mentions the 
perception of the citizens about the management capacity of LG and does not present 
trends in the evolution of local government capacities. Evidence collected during the 
field phase (in particular interviews with a variety of stakeholders) shows that 
significant improvements have actually taken place over the period 2005-2010. 
 In Madagascar, the ACORDS programme has supported local governments through 
a grant system in the southern regions of the country with some positive results as 
illustrated by the audits carried out in both supported and not supported LGs during 
and at the end of the programme. The box below provides further details on the 
system put in place in the context of the programme. 
Examples of cases with mixed results or no strong evidence of positive results: 
 In Benin, the PRODECOM and PACTE have put an important emphasis on capacity 
building issues for LGs with some positive results in terms of consolidating the local 
capacities. In particular, local Government training is carried out through CEFAL 
(Centre de Formation pour l‟Administration Locale) and has been underway since 
2008. The emphasis on enhancing PFM capacity of national, regional and local level 
is now a top priority of EC support within the governance sectors. However, 
decentralised structures have remained weak. For instance, the results of the PEFA 
carried out in 2007 show that the general PFM is very poor. Fund utilisation and 
accounting of these, under the FADeC and other sector resources at LG level, are 
very weak. There have thus been some results but the overall level of the capacities 
at local level remains low. 
 In Cambodia, financial management in LGs is still considered very weak and large 
amounts of local spending is channelled in parallel to LG structures. The EC has 
supported a range of broad capacity building interventions - thousands of Commune 
Councillors, central, provincial and district officials, and representatives from the 
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NLC/S and the 24 PAC/S have benefited from capacity development activities and 
attended specific trainings including advocacy, conflict resolution, gender, project 
planning, M&E, financial management, and the Organic Law on sub-national 
administration – the exact impact of training is not documented in the available 
literature. 
 In South Africa, the Delegation (with support of an international team of experts) 
initiated and implemented jointly with National Treasury a PEFA assessment in 2008. 
Weaknesses were identified in relation to public procurement, accounting for tax 
arrears and reporting from front-line service providers and especially at LG levels. In 
addition, the report highlighted the poor predictability of donor flows and weaknesses 
in mutual accountability. The PEFA initiative furthermore served as a platform for the 
re-launch of focused dialogue between the Government and donors going beyond 
PFM. High quality PFM is a key determinant in delivery of cost-effective social 
services. A MTR of the ongoing PFM improvement programme found that the 
programme is delivering good results in terms of the development of diagnostic tools 
and capacity building in areas such as budgeting, internal control and risk 
management. Pilots have also been conducted with a view to rolling out PFM 
improvements in provinces and municipalities. Human resource capacity 
weaknesses, particularly at the lower levels of Government, present a formidable 
challenge. Government has now embarked on a ―clean audit 2014‖ campaign so as to 
focus attention on the task ahead.  
Examples of cases with limited results: 
 In Peru, apart from some activities in the regional programme AGORAH, the EC has 
not supported financial management in regional or local governments during the 
evaluation period. Interviews with the regional administration in Ayacucho and former 
project staff show that the AGORAH programme has not lead to any significant 
results regarding the capacities of the regional governments (in particular in terms of 
PFM) as the programme mostly dealt with execution of infrastructure investments with 
little involvement of the regional administration and LGs.  
 In Honduras, there is little evidence of improvement of municipal financial 
management. The Court of Accounts (Tribunal Superior de Cuentas, TSC) has in 
recent years only been able to audit 44 municipalities each year (15%), although their 
ambition is to carry out an audit in each municipality every second year. There is no 
systematic follow up of the recommendations generated by the audit. TSC, SEIP and 
AMHON agree on the problems with financial management and arrange together 
numerous capacity development activities, but apparently without a good assessment 
of the needs according to some participants met during the field visit. The EC has not 
supported directly financial management in municipalities. 
Results of sectoral support – the case of the Philippines: 
 In the Philippines, it can be observed that LGUs have been granted significant 
autonomy in the management of their affairs and that they are established with 
significant different structures and resource endowments. LGU capacity variations 
therefore are of great magnitude. In addition, it can be observed that Central 
Government supervision and monitoring of LGUs is restricted to the Provinces (80), 
which in turn are supposed to undertake some monitoring of municipalities (1,496), 
which in turn have some oversight of the Barangays (around 42,000). The EC support 
has primarily focussed on PFM within the health sector at provincial levels. There are 
no comprehensive benchmarking or e.g. Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability Assessment (PEFA) scores of LGUs over time that would allow a 
systematic assessment of financial management practices across the many LGUs in 
the Philippines. But the impact of the support on overall PFM in LGUs appears to date 
to have been limited as illustrated, for instance in the 2009 MTR of the Health Sector 
Policy Support Programme (see extracts below). It appears as if the Health Sector 
Support to PFM was constrained by wider PFM issues within the LG sector that could 
not easily be dealt with in a health sector programme – like the overall budget 
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constraints of the LGUs (the MTR notes ―the LGU‘s need for focused assistance in 
developing their capabilities for revenues generation to support increased 
investments was likewise apparent‖) and wider institutional and fiscal constraints for 
e.g. creating an LGU internal audit unit, which the MTR notes is ―neither financially 
nor operationally feasible, given resource and institutional constraints, which restrict 
most LGUs from legally setting-up a new office with the desired personnel 
complement and attendant operational budget support, when they have already 
reached or exceeded the mandated ratio of personal services budget to total budget‖. 
Further information on two cases (Madagascar and the Philippines). 
Box 42 The ACORDS programme and the related grant system for LG put in place in 
Madagascar 
The ACORDS programme adopted a principle which could be summarised as follows: "Put 
the money at the centre of the approach" and which is well documented in the project 
documentation available. Instead of building capacities first and then transfer the money, the 
approach adopted in the ACORDS programme is, in a certain way, reverse: the money is put 
in place (into the municipal budget) at the outset. This is supposed to bring about:  
 a capacity building effect based on "learning on the job";  
 a significant change in the role of the Implementation Unit in charge of the programme, 
which had to evolve towards becoming an adviser and facilitator of this learning by doing 
process. 
Moreover, the "rules of the game" were designed so as to activate linkages and joint work 
among institutions involved in public service delivery (fostering of inter-institution 
cooperation) and avoid ad-hoc support mechanisms disconnected from the overall 
framework in which evolves the LG. 
The programme covered nine regions in the south of Madagascar and took place in two 
major phases: 
 Phase 1: this phase aimed at linking the selection of the LG for the grant systems as 
well as the funding of intermunicipal objectives to a wide dialogue involving the various 
categories of local actors (e.g. regional authorities, consultation bodies - GTDR153, LG, 
target population). This process led to the selection of 267 eligible LG for the grant 
system (via two rounds of call for proposals) and the identification of 172 groups of 
eligible intermunicipal objectives to be further assessed for financial support. 
 Phase 2: this phase aimed at accompanying the implementation of the eligible LG's 
three-year investment plans ("Plan d‘Investissement Trisannuel" - PAT)154 and the 
selection process, and ultimately the implementation, of 35 intermunicipal actions. 
LG were selected for the financial support to the implementation of PAT according to four 
types of criteria: 
 Financial and operational capacity of the LG: this is to assess the following capacity of 
the LG: 1. Experience in project management; 2. Technical experience; 3. Management 
capacity (e.g., in terms of personnel, equipment, ability to handle the budget of the action 
and the information provided in the original 2005 budget and the 2004 administrative 
accounts); 4. The availability of funding sources other than the state subsidy presented 
by the LG as a contribution to the PAT.  
 Relevance: This is to assess to what extent the PAT responds to the concern of 
improving access to basic services. Particular attention was paid to possible synergies 
between the actions in the framework of the PAT and the ones of the clusters to which 
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the LG belongs and that were set in place for the contribution to the creation of a pool of 
development. 
 Methodology: The aim is to evaluate the involvement of the target population in the 
design and implementation of the PAT, the transparency in the overall management of 
the LG, etc. 
 Sustainability: This is devaluing the extent to which organisational and management 
practices tested in the implementation of PAT, may be appropriate by the commune and 
applied outside the programme ACORDS. 
In particular, the ACORDS programme aimed at strengthening public financial 
management at LG level through different mechanisms: 
 As a precondition for receiving funds, a requirement was to have a ―Secrétaire Trésorier 
Comptable‖.  
 Capacity building based on a ―learned on the job‖ approach: Practical learning about 
―how to do‖ what ―needs to be done‖ ―at the right time‖. 
 The need to respect the deadlines in the preparation of budgets & accounts, their 
approbation by the Municipal Council and their publication. 
 The development of procurement guidelines tailored to rural communities (the guidelines 
were eventually adapted and used at national level). 
 Implementation of technical and financial annual audits. 
 Linkages between municipalities and territorial administration were developed in order to 
assure: Funds management (municipalities); Internal control (Council); External control 
(―Contrôle de légalité‖) and financial and accountable backup (District). 
 Public discussions of audits results including executive municipal board, population. 
 
Box 43 PFM at LG level in the Philippines - Extract from MTR 2009  
HSPSP extends support to DOH, DBM and Provincial Local Government Units (PLGUs) for 
the improvement of overall public finance management (PFM) with health sector 
development as the initial focus or entry point. Sector budget support at the local level is a 
new development financing approach introduced by the EC aimed at boosting the sector 
wide development for health in accordance with the national F1 agenda…. 
At the local level, PFM activities were determined in consideration of the PLGUs‘ different 
levels of development, resource availability, absorptive capacity and competence. Specific 
interventions are defined in line with the devolution concept and the sector development 
approach to health (SDAH) and spelled out in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the Department of Health and the concerned 
PLGU.  
There was an observed general increase (from a low of 3% to a high of about 7%) in 
participating PLGUs‘ annual budgets for health from 2007 to 2008. These increases were on 
top of the HSPSP budget support to the provinces. Local Chief Executives (LCEs) appeared 
encouraged to step up local investments on health as a result of the programme. However, 
the LGU‘s need for focused assistance in developing their capabilities for revenues 
generation to support increased investments was likewise apparent. 
Tremendous delays in initial fund releases were experienced due to the following: a) 
circuitous and lengthy processes involved in complying with the requirements for programme 
fund disbursements; and b) an observed lack of levelling of understanding of the programme 
implementation operational procedures. In addition, insufficient attention was given to tap 
and develop the potentials of the CHDs and DOH Reps in programme coordination and 
monitoring. As a result, the desired PFM and PFM-related intermediate results were not 
realised within the time frame specified in the Financing Agreement. The dampened 
enthusiasm and support of LCEs and other programme stakeholders was likewise observed. 
(from MTR 2009, executive summary) 
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6.2.2 Ind6.2.2 - Evidence of improved planning in local governments  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Local planning and, in particular the participative and consultative dimensions, has been 
supported by numerous development partners including the EC and CSOs for many years 
within decentralisation programmes and sector programmes.  
The present evaluation reveals contribution from the EC in all countries studied. The situation 
has improved substantially in five countries (Mali, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Tanzania and 
South Africa) and in some extent in three countries (Benin, Rwanda and Lebanon). EC 
support to sectoral programmes has also improved local planning as illustrated in the 
Philippines (support to the health sector) and in Peru (PASA support to agriculture and rural 
development).  
 In Tanzania, the planning exercises have over the last ten years become more 
comprehensive, more consultative, more oriented to development, increased public 
participation and with better linkages between budgets and plans. The incentives in-
built in LGDG (supported by EC) is widely recognised as having contributed to this. 
The improvements are e.g. reflected in the results of the annual LG assessments. 
 In Mali, planning from district to local government levels has improved over the past 
ten years with development plans being drawn up and coordinated between various 
levels of local government (although planning seems to remain however a very 
bureaucratic and technical process). The national local government investment fund 
(ANICT) infrastructure projects now involve more the local communities in planning 
and decision-making surrounding the planning process. All LGs have their "plan de 
développement économique et social". In most "Communes", specific support has 
been provided by various organisations to design these plans. Results have been 
heterogeneous, depending on the capacity of the consultancy or the NGO involved. In 
many cases, involved organisations substituted for LG in the design of these plans 
instead of accompanying them in this work.  
 In Sierra Leone, the IRCBP has worked intensively with capacity building for the LCs 
in particular with financial management and revenue collection. The IRCBP has a 
staff member (coach) in each LC, who is also supporting the councils in the planning 
process and on M&E. Further, the programme has occasionally financed staff in the 
LCs, e.g. procurement officers. Most councils were in 2010 able to prepare their three 
years development plan following the official guidelines and with involvements of 
councils and wards development committees (WDCs). Before 2004 local 
development plans did not exist, as district councils were not established and cities 
were managed with centrally appointed management committees. 
 In Senegal, the EC programmes have had a positive role in local development 
planning. The development of Local Development Plans is done in a participatory 
manner. Some of the LGs already had their Development Plan (PDL) but others did 
not. Many of the rural communes (38) were supported in designing these plans. Other 
rural communes were supported in preparing their Local Investment Plan (LIP) and 
Annual Investment Plan (AIP). The various communities are to a large degree 
involved in this process. 
 In South Africa, the EC and other donors have put a lot of attention on increased 
capacity at local level in planning and especially through the LED programmes. 
Municipalities are required by law to produce annual IDPs. Release of funding is 
contingent on these plans. These now include local economic development plans. 
The EC has supported the development of this planning capacity through the 
Education and Training Unit (ETU) Local Government Toolkit, the Capacity Building 
Grant (CBP) Ward Committee capacity development. The three provincial LED 
programmes provided support for the development of IDPs, LED plans, and other 
planning initiatives at local government level.  
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 In Benin, increased local development planning was an objective of PRODECOM. 
The priority under PACTE has been to further develop capacities at national and local 
level. Basically all municipalities have development plans today but since the 
relationship between plan and budget and the level of budget execution is still very 
low it is a sign of very serious capacity problems in terms of planning.  
 In Rwanda, local planning has improved over the past years by becoming more 
participatory and more comprehensive. This has been supported by the EC through 
the DPRPR both through the district support and through Ubudehe. The Rwandan 
model emphasises a strong mobilisation of the population in planning and 
accountability, which has the effect that the administration must react to ad-hoc 
requests for information, participation of leaders in government meetings and the 
need for multiple explanations or defence of administrative decisions. However, the 
participatory approach has put strain on the administration staff, which simply doesn‘t 
have time and resources to respond to the aforementioned requirements. But the 
administrations of a district with its small number of staff (part of the personnel are 
under the control of central Government) is not able to ensure effective administration 
and at the same time contribute to achieve a broad and deep participation of the 
people at all levels. 
Box 44 The Ubudehe Fund Allocation and Utilisation Process 
The training of trainers was conducted at different administrative levels (Umudugudu/village, 
sector, district and national level). These trainers are responsible for monitoring, while the 
population led by trainers at the village level analysis of poverty situation of the village, is a 
prioritisation of needs, identifies and categorises the poor. This is done using a social map of 
the village using local symbols. These maps are plotted on tissue stored in the coordinator of 
the village.  
After the participatory analysis of problems of the village, village members are developing a 
community project at the village level where the document contains a list of households and 
their categories of poverty and housing, prioritisation of development projects for the village, 
the details of the logical framework and budget showing the local contribution to priority 
projects.  
Aware of this process, the population also chooses the poorest household, but having the 
ability to move from one category below the poverty category. Supported by village-level 
trainers, this household is also developing a project using the methodology mentioned 
above. The programme finances the subproject Ubudehe household on condition that they 
promise to the village a real contribution in economic development activities at village level.  
After this process, funds are disbursed from the account at the BNR Ubudehe to accounts of 
the districts, which, in turn, transfer them to open accounts in the villages for this purpose in 
the local credit unions. The amount given to the various villages and poor households is the 
same throughout the country (respectively nearly 1.000 EUR and 100 EUR).  
The village council elects a committee for financial and technical management. This 
committee is responsible for tracking the use of these funds to the village and report to the 
executive committee of the sector that sends these reports to the district with a letter. The 
reports outline areas for districts are developed by trainers across sectors (agricultural 
sector) that are responsible for monitoring and other technical Ubudehe in all villages in the 
area, through the Community Development Committee (CDC) sectors and cells.  
In the follow-up, trainers provide training areas at village level by grouping cells especially 
with regard to monitoring data updates villages. There are also briefings, at the 
sector/district, on the use of funds. 
 In Lebanon, the EC has through its support sought to build capacities for local 
planning in various ways. However, the support has been limited to interventions 
leading up to implementation of the intended local EC supported 
infrastructures/project – rather than broader and general development of planning 
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capacities within the local government structures. One of the key components of the 
support under LOGO project was the establishment of the 12 regional development 
offices – these were intended to form the basis for the LG clusters planning for project 
interventions as well as a long term planning capacity. However, virtually none of 
these offices are operative today. Some stakeholders argued that the project set-up 
and methods of contracting out responsibility for ―capacity development‖ delivered 
poorly – see box below.  
Box 45 Results of the capacity development component 
The EC had ideas about the development office functions that were not clearly supported by 
law or coherent with it. The supported project built offices, established one local planner, 
tourist maps (atlas cartographique155) office equipment, communication strategy (TV spot, 
news paper article) and establishment of links with European cities.  
Assistance for the Rehabilitation of the Lebanese Administration (ARAL) prepared LOGO I, 
this included support to 12 clusters of municipalities, 12 development offices and support to 
one project per cluster. LOGO II supports the implementation of the projects – there was 
significant time lack between the different phases (from planning to implementation) and 
communities and municipalities didn't clearly see the linkages.  
Implementation on the ground was in practice not corresponding the overall philosophy of the 
project. 
The development office concept indicated ―partnerships with communities and 
municipalities‖, however, when the project started, they realised that Municipal Councils 
(MCs) were not involved in the design. Their assumed contributions and responsibilities were 
not sufficiently anchored in realistic assessment of the MCs capacities. In execution stage no 
effective involvement of ―platforms‖ – contractual issues always took priority over concepts. 
These problems are not clearly stated in M&E reports but my own reflections. These types of 
reflections were not encouraged as the EU stuck to bureaucratic reporting requirements. 
(Interview Adviser, Ministry of Administrative Reform, LOGO) 
In contrast, the ESFD evaluation suggest that the ESFD was (more) successful in 
establishing participatory planning – most likely because the ambition was more modest: to 
use the existing municipalities for planning and delivery of projects – rather than seek to 
establish ―clusters‖ of local governments for planning more ―strategic‖ projects as under 
LOGO.  
Community Development interventions built a sophisticated and sustainable participative 
methodology able to achieve notable results in term of needs analysis, problems definition 
and planning. The ESFD strategy for community development has been based on working 
through municipal councils rather than the common pattern of through NGOs. This was a 
new strategy for the Lebanon. As Municipalities have legitimacy with the population. The 
process of local development planning and preparation of the Community Development sub-
projects was based on an intensive process of mobilisation, preparation and formulation 
involving both local municipal councils and beneficiary communities. A participatory approach 
to needs assessment was applied by ESFD involving the beneﬁciaries in the preparation of 
projects, and which they perceived as of beneﬁt to them. The ﬁeld visit and consultations 
conﬁrmed that the process was followed although it took considerably longer than planned by 
ESFD. (ESFD Evaluation page 18) 
 
 In Peru, most stakeholders observe that, in general, the planning mechanism and its 
implementation have improved. The EC funded programme PASA has supported the 
participative planning mechanism at the local level in three regions (Ayacucho, 
Huancavelica and Apurimac) and may have contributed to improving capacities in this 
regards. But overall impact during the evaluation period seems rather limited. Apart 
from activities in AGORAH, the EC has not supported financial management, 
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planning, HRD/M or M&E in regional or local governments directly during the 
evaluation period. Interviews with the regional administration in Ayacucho and former 
project staff showed that the AGORAH did not lead to any significant results 
regarding the capacities of the regional governments in terms of PFM, HRD and 
M&E, as the programme mostly dealt with execution of infrastructure investments with 
little involvement of the regional administration and LGs.  
6.2.3 Ind6.2.3 - Evidence of improved HRM in local governments  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Evidence on improved HRM is limited. Only one clear case (Sierra Leone), where the EC has 
provided direct support (actually via a WB-managed trust fund) and HRM/D has improved, 
has been identified. Some minor improvements are also seen in South Africa, in Mali and to 
some extent in Philippines through the health sector programme. Apart from these countries, 
the EC has not supported HRM/D in countries analysed during the evaluation.   
The case of Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone, the IRCBP has worked intensively with capacity building for the LCs in 
particular with financial management and revenue collection. The IRCBP has a staff member 
(coach) in each LC, who is also supporting the councils in the planning process and on M&E. 
Further, the programme has occasionally financed staff in the LCs, e.g. procurement officers. 
The core staff of local governments (chief administrator, finance officer, accountant, planning 
officer, procurement officer, monitoring and evaluation officer, engineer, etc.) are still paid by 
the central government ministries, but they are now accountable to the councils instead of 
the line-ministries they responded to before the devolution. But most important the 
programme has also strengthened the role of the chief administrator as HRD/M manager.  
The case of South Africa 
In South Africa, the availability of suitable skilled and qualified personnel at local level is a 
continuing problem. There are HR systems, procedures and guidelines. Annual Auditor-
General audits monitor HR appointments as well as financial matters. The effectiveness of 
HRM may not be monitored. While the EC has not worked directly with HRM issues at local 
government level there has been support to HR issues both through training of councillors at 
ward level and through larger sector programmes, which were not reviewed during the 
mission. EC support has meant training at LG level for planning, LED and other issues – 
concepts and procedures in terms of participation, planning and management of the 
collective and individual initiatives.  
 
The case of Mali 
Interviews with resource persons from organisations who have been supporting the LG for 
several years, gave a mixed picture. Although the rotation of elected officials is a reality, it 
seems that there is a significant improvement in the capacity of the elected officials who are 
in their second term.  
The level of human resources has been significantly improved with the LG civil service 
("fonction publique territoriale"). But this shift of status from LG employee to civil servant has 
been accompanied by an improvement in their remuneration and benefits without the 
resources of LG being increased. Consequently, the share of the operating budget for 
salaries increased at the expense of other budget lines, e.g. operations and investments.  
Overall, although weaknesses remain, LG have the minimum level of staff that allows them 
to operate and assume their basic functions: administration and overall management of the 
institution, services related to the civil status, monitoring of investments.  
The capacity of LG also depends on support available, support supposed to balance the 
weaknesses of their human resources. The system "Centres de Conseils Communaux" 
(CCC) was established when the "Communes" were created (in 2000), mainly with funding 
from the EU. This system was intended to be temporary (three years), the time that elected 
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representatives and local administration got used to their new functions and define a suitable 
and sustainable way of working.  
But the CCC was maintained until 2007 and the phasing out from the CCC system was not 
sufficiently prepared. The development of "pools of decentralized technical units" (available 
upon request of LG) does not work.  
Several reasons may explain this situation. First of all, efforts in this area are hampered by 
the low motivation of central government officers. For these officers, support to LG is not an 
obligation and it is a way to request high fees for their services at a level which is often 
prohibitive for LG. This brings us back to the issue of the low commitment of the central 
government to accompany the decentralisation process and the weak coordination between 
the central government bodies and the various stakeholders at the decentralised level. The 
second factor is the low capacity of the deconcentrated services' staff itself which is not 
prepared to play this role of support and advice to LG. Finally, LGs need to prepare a three-
year plan of their need in terms of support and technical advice. This plan is required to 
obtain a Provision for Technical Support (managed by the ANICT) which enables them to 
pay for specific technical support. Few LGs manage to produce these plans, and they appear 
more like a series of training rather than a real plan for capacity building with an analysis of 
the needs of these LGs to improve their action. 
A self-assessment system had been introduced in the early years of the decentralisation 
process. This system allows LGs to measure their strengths and weaknesses and identify 
actions to strengthen their implementation capacity. This tool, developed by SNV and other 
partners, has been well used in the LG supported by the DPs. Unfortunately, it seems no 
longer used. 
An interesting action for capacity development of LG has been the establishment of the 
Training Centre for Local Authorities, the CFCT ("Centre de Formation des Collectivités 
Territoriales"). The centre has been supported by Germany and the EU. It provides an 
essential response to capacity development as a sustainable tool for basic training and 
refresher courses for LG staff and elected officials. However, it has faced several problems: it 
is designed to train "category C" employees. Management officers, "category B" and 
"category A", are trained at the ENA, the national school of administration. The partners had 
asked before starting financing the CFTC that this issue should be solved so that the CFCT 
could form all types of LG employees. An agreement was reached, but only for three years: 
the problem will thus appear again. Another issue is that the funding of the CFCT depends 
on the ANICT. The CFCT should have an autonomous budget and not depend on the 
goodwill of the management of the ANICT to finance its operations. It is important to 
underline that the ANICT depends essentially on external funding. 
 
The case of the Philippines 
In general, it can be observed that LGUs in the Philippines have been granted significant 
autonomy in management of their affairs and that they are established with significant 
different structures and resource endowments. LGU capacity variations therefore are of great 
magnitude. In addition, it can be observed that Central Government supervision and 
monitoring of LGUs is restricted to the Provinces (80), which in turn are supposed to 
undertake some monitoring of municipalities (1496), which in turn have some oversight of the 
Barangays (around 42,000). Central Government institutions for LGU oversight are 
furthermore rather weak and consolidated statistical indicators on LGU performance are 
therefore very scanty. Most of the academic literature on LGUs is therefore also based on 
case studies rather than aggregate data.  
In the following sections we explore key areas of LGU capacities with particular emphasis on 
areas where the EC, through the health sector interventions (incl PFM) and SPF, has sought 
to address capacity issues.  
HRM is almost fully devolved in the Philippines: LGUs have full responsibility for hiring and 
firing etc, although Central Government maintains a significant role in e.g. setting overall 
service conditions. LGUs face several key challenges regarding their HRM, this includes 
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evidence of relative overstaffing (compared to fiscal resources available), problems related to 
payment of the stipulated health staff incentives (The Magna Carta for health workers) and 
special challenges for poorer and more marginalised LGUs in attracting and retaining 
sufficient skilled health staff. The EC has, through its support, supported HRM through 
training and capacity building but not addressed the above broader and more fundamental 
challenges, as that is beyond what can be done within a health sector specific intervention.  
Box 46 General HRM issues in LGUs in the Philippines 
The World Bank notes that, as a rule of thumb, when the expenses for personal services 
(PS) of the public sector rises over 25% of total spending, governments risk reducing their 
effectiveness by cutting down expenditure for nonwage costs such as those for goods and 
services, maintenance, and capital expenditure. In the Philippines, PS accounted for an 
average of 45% of total LGU spending in 2000-2007 while Maintenance and Other Operating 
Expenses (MOOE) and (Capital Outlays) CO accounted for 37% and 18%, respectively. The 
budget share of PS was highest for municipalities (53%), followed by provinces (46%) and 
cities (41%). Lower income class municipalities tend to have higher PS spending. The 
situation is worse in LGUs which use job order hirees (who are charged against MOOE) to 
work on tasks that would normally be assigned to regular employees in order to avoid 
exceeding the PS cap. Section 325 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides that 1st to 
3rd income class LGUs should not budget more than 45% of its total annual income from 
regular sources in the preceding fiscal year on PS. For 4th to 6th class LGUs, the limit is 
55%. Many LGUs fail to comply with the PS cap. 58% of provinces, 40% of cities and 75% of 
municipalities exceeded the PS cap prior to the application of the waivers in 2007 on certain 
PS expenditure items from the computations to measure compliance with the PS cap. 
Regardless of level of local government, the percentage of LGUs that are not able to meet 
the PS cap requirement tends to be higher for LGUs belonging to the lower income 
categories than for those belonging to the higher income categories (ADB TA Report 2010, 
Paper on ―Efficient and Effective Mobilization and Management of Resources by LGUs‖ page 
8)  
Box 47 Specific health sector HRM issues in the Philippines 
There are shortages in the availability of physicians and nurses despite the fact that the 
Philippines is one of the largest exporters of health personnel in the world. The Magna Carta 
for health workers, which was created to provide incentives for health workers, has reduced 
financing flexibility for LGUs, and created inequities vis-à-vis both national and LGU levels 
and distorted incentives for health and other local workers. Dual practice of public physicians 
and balanced billing impacts on public sector access, efficiency and overall health system 
and OOP costs. (WB 2010, page 83) 
ADB 2010 TA Report156: 
Under the Magna Carta of Public Health Workers (Republic Act 7305), PHWs are granted 
subsistence allowance, laundry allowance, night-shift differential, hazard pay, and longevity 
pay. These benefits being substantial, many LGUs have not been giving them all and/or in 
full. Less than 50% of provinces, cities and municipalities gave the subsistence and the 
laundry allowance at the prescribed rates in 2007. The number of LGUs giving the hazard 
pay at the correct rates is even smaller. 
The Magna Carta of PHW is an especially sensitive matter at the local level as it creates 
conflict between the LCE and other officials, on one hand, and the PHWs, on the other, when 
the Magna Carta allowances are not granted in full or not granted at all. There are many 
reports of cases filed in the courts or Ombudsman against LCEs and other officials by PHWs 
due to non-implementation of the Magna Carta benefits. 
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6.2.4 Ind6.2.4 - Existence of monitoring and evaluation system and evidence on the 
use of information produced at local level 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
EC support to M&E at local level has been provided in five of the countries reviewed with 
limited results.  
Support for M&E at local level is provided with other DPs in Madagascar, Sierra Leone and 
Tanzania. Direct support to M&E systems is provided from the EC in the Philippines and 
Honduras as part of the support to the health sector and as technical assistance in the 
PROADES, respectively. In Mali, a national M&E system was developed with the EC support 
and was meant to be used at local level, but the database is no longer functioning since 
2007. 
South Africa has built a system for M&E without EC support, which functions for some of the 
larger and urban municipalities, but not the smaller.  
The evidence gathered thus shows that the support so far has actually contributed to 
successfully setting up of only three systems (Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Tanzania). 
Information gathered also shows that these systems are actually not really used and the 
system in the second country is incomplete.  
It appears that several conditions have to be in place for such systems to work at local level, 
in particular: systematisation of data collection, availability of disaggregated data, qualified 
staff as well as willingness of the staff (incl. mayor and councillors) to apply the system.  
 In Madagascar, the ACORDS programme had established an M&E for the 
programme and also allowed to monitor the programme's impact on sector policies. 
This tool has been implemented in the regions and departments but it has so far not 
been used because of instability particularly in the regions. 
 In Sierra Leone, the IRCBP has a staff member (coach) in each LC, who is also 
supporting the councils in the planning process and on M&E. An M&E system for the 
local councils planning system exists and training is ongoing for its use but it has not 
yet been implemented with data and for information use.  
 In Tanzania the development of proper M&E tools has been challenging. A so-called 
LGMD is established for M&E of services, a PLAN-REP system for M&E of planned 
inputs/outputs. However, there are significant challenges in making consistent use of 
the systems and in making the information usable at both local and central level. 
Another weak area is development of consistent local M&E systems. Several systems 
have been introduced – most frequently through sector specific initiatives and 
frequently in an uncoordinated manner at LG levels. The quality of local data on many 
key issues is weak and not used in a systematic manner for decision making – the 
LGDG however did not explicitly target this area for support, although it included it as 
one of its annual performance criteria (see box below) and in this manner provided 
some incentives for LGs to use M&E systems. 
The PMO-RALG guidelines require LGs continuously use the Local Government Monitoring 
Database (LGMD) in monitoring development outcomes so as to inform decision making and 
policy formulation at all levels. In FY 2008/09, 105 (83.7%) effectively used the system while 
27 (16.2%) did not. It was reported in most LGs that the LGMD system had broken down and 
was hence not functional.  
Source: Annual Assessment Synthesis Report, PMORALG 2010, page 21 
 
 In Mali, the OISE database (national M&E system supported by the EC) was 
theoretically intended to provide information to LG and not just to the national level. 
However, during the period when it was functional, LG were asked to feed the 
database but no information was returned to them. In 2007, the end of the system of 
"Centres de Conseil Communaux" lead to the end of the national M&E system. 
 In the Philippines, central Government supervision and monitoring of LGUs is 
restricted to the Provinces (80), which in turn are supposed to undertake some 
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monitoring of municipalities (1496), which in turn have some oversight of the 
Barangays (around 42,000). Central Government institutions for LGU oversight are 
furthermore rather weak and consolidated statistical indicators on LGU performance 
are therefore very scanty. Most of the academic literature on LGUs is therefore also 
based on case studies rather than aggregate data. The relevant EC support is the 
health sector interventions (incl. PFM) and SPF have sought to address capacity 
issues. Information and data management systems are in place at the LGU, hospital 
and Rural Health Unit (RHU) levels (Hospital Management Information System 
(HOMIS), Community Health Information Tracking System (CHITS). According to the 
WB a very serious deficit exists in the available information for monitoring the 
performance of the service delivery system, which impacts the capacity of DOH in 
policy formulation in this important area. The information which is collected is not 
shared, analysed and used effectively. 
 In Honduras, no monitoring and evaluation system exists to generate information for 
use at central or local levels on decentralisation. As part of the technical assistance 
the PROADES facilitated to SEIP (at that time SGJ) a conceptual design for a system 
was proposed, which apparently is still under discussion in SEIP. 
 In South Africa, "Municipal IQ" is a national monitoring system for local government 
which provides high level indicators of municipal performance and flags vulnerable 
municipalities. At local level the collection and analysis of data for monitoring and 
evaluation purposes is often weak. Such systems exist in the metropolitan areas and 
in some of the larger municipalities. Within the smaller and rural municipalities such 
systems are often entirely lacking. No EC support on this subject was found.  
6.3 JC6.3 Improved capacities of relevant non state actors (LG associations, 
etc)  
Main findings at JC level 
The EC has provided some support to the establishment or development of local government 
associations in several countries. Where it has not provided direct support to them, the EC 
has usually involved local government associations in the dialogue initiatives related to the 
area of decentralisation. However, overall, the EC support in this area shows contrasted 
results. In most cases, local government associations remain weak. They are often 
characterised by very limited internal resources and highly politicised processes that make it 
difficult for them to voice their concern in a strong manner at national level. Unlike other 
development partners, the EC has not provided general budget support to local government 
associations, but has financed only a few selected activities. 
In most of the countries reviewed, the EC has worked extensively with local NGOs and 
community-based organisations for the improvement of service delivery. However, examples 
remain limited of support to promote joint work between NGOs and local authorities on local 
governance issues at a larger scale. The EC support to NGOs often takes the form of small 
stand-alone projects that are not well linked to wider issues related to national 
decentralisation processes or wider programmes carried out by the EC or other development 
partners in this area. This illustrates a lack of a strategic approach to involving NGOs and 
other NSA in the support to decentralisation. The case of Madagascar, where the EC has 
continuously involved a variety of Non State Actors in the decentralisation and local 
governance activities, is a notable exception.  
EC support to research in decentralisation and local government issues could be identified in 
only four of the countries reviewed (Honduras, Rwanda, South Africa and Peru). These 
activities often relate to rather small research projects. When the support reaches a 
significant level, as in the Philippines, it remains rather scattered and not connected to a 
wider strategic approach to develop knowledge and capacities in the area of decentralisation. 
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6.3.1 Ind6.3.1 - Establishment and improvement of performance of local government 
associations 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The EC has support the capacity building of local government associations in a number of 
countries but with contrasted results.  
Where it has not provided direct support to them, the EC has usually involved LGA in the 
dialogue related to decentralisation or some specific activities. 
Examples of direct support to LGA: 
 In Cambodia, the ten year National Programme for Sub-national Democratic 
Development acknowledges the importance of downward accountability and the need 
for dialogue between the various tiers of national and sub-national administration. 
This is a key area of EU/UN support: (i) The National League of Commune/Sangkat 
(NLC/S), representing all 1,621 communes and sangkats, was established in 2006; 
(ii) Provincial Associations of Commune/ Sangkat have been established in all 23 
provinces and the capital. The NLC/S is a permanent member of sub-committees of 
the National Committee for Democratic Development at Sub-national Level and plays 
an important role in the policy dialogue and reform process on decentralisation and 
local governance. 
 In Sierra Leone, the Local Council Association Sierra Leone (LoCASL) was founded 
in 2004 and given a limited support by the IRCBP mostly in 2005, before the EC 
joined the funding of the programme. The local councils are represented by the 
councils‘ chairmen and the mayor of Freetown. The chairman for LoCASL is elected 
for a two years period and is from 2011 to 2012 the chairman of Porto Loko. The 
LoCASL is supposed to meet monthly but the frequency of meetings with all chairmen 
present has been irregular depending on funding and events (funded by other 
organisations or the government). Most interviewed staff agreed that it seems like the 
LoCASL has been addressing the interest of the chairmen more than the councils. 
―The LoCASL has turned into a Mayors Club‖ commented a representative from a 
development partner. Some councillors started to establish the councillors‘ 
association as well as some chief administrators. The LoCASL is now working on how 
to integrate councillors and chief administrators (CAs) as well and set up different 
sections within the organisation. The IRCBP supported the drafting of the LoCASL‘s 
constitution and financed some of its meetings.  
 In Mali, an association of Municipalities of Mali (AMM) and an association of "Cercles 
et Regions" have been created. The latter was eventually split into two distinct 
groups: one for the "Cercles" administrative division and one for the "Regions". These 
associations (and especially the AMM) received support from several donors 
(including the EC). They are involved actively in advocacy and facilitation of the 
debate on decentralisation. The High Council of Local Governments regularly 
organises regional consultations with all stakeholders in decentralisation, including 
the presidents of regional assemblies, the presidents of the circle, the mayors of the 
municipalities, governors of regions, Prefects of circles, and representatives of civil 
society. These discussions centre round the problems and preoccupations of local 
authorities. These consultations are used to create a truly dynamic partnership 
between the High Council and local government. The main aim of the consultations is 
to discuss central government laws and regulations and assist in drawing up new 
legislation. In recent years, the associations have not been successful in defending 
the interests of LGs as the head of these associations are also members of the ruling 
party.  
 In Benin, the EC PACTE programme was working closely with the national 
association of local governments (ANCB). Although it plays an increasingly more 
strategic role in the analysis of the decentralisation process, it hasn‘t been able to 
manifest itself properly till date and has remained a very weak organisation. The 
ANCB is basically a mirror image of the municipalities meaning that it exists on very 
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limited own source funding and is forced to seek project funds for basic activities. This 
does not further a strong and independent minded organisation.  
 
Examples of involvement of LGA in EC-financed interventions supporting decentralisation 
 A strong national association for municipalities exists in Honduras (AMHON). It has 
been strengthened as project implementer for the development partners. It was 
established in the mid 1960s and was revitalised in the early 1990s, with the new Law 
of Municipalities. It has played a role to represent municipalities vis-à-vis central 
government and it is well acknowledged. It has recently played an important role for 
the increased transfer to municipalities and the new law on the administrative 
municipal carrier. The PROADES supported AMHON by supporting the establishment 
of the tri-party forum (El Foro Tripartido, EFT), which was set up in 2005 with 
participation of the GoH, AMHON, civil society and development partners. The EFT is 
a forum for dialogue on decentralisation. The programme was implemented in a SBS 
modality for decentralisation (and separate TA) and two of the indicators for the fixed 
tranches were the EFTs permanent functioning and the EFT‘s ―positive appreciation 
of the implementation of PRODDEL (the national decentralisation programme". 
Municipal corporations (mancommunidades) have also been established as a solution 
to issues, which go beyond the borders of the individual municipality. This initiative 
has been strongly promoted by the development partners, including the EC.  
 In Rwanda, the association RALGA was established in the early 2000s and has 
developed into an organisation with increased staff and resources. They are playing 
more and more a strategic role in the analytical work being done especially in terms 
of capacity building strategies for LGs. They are also part of the evolving international 
and regional local government association structures. The EC has supported RALGA 
under the ―Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development‖ Thematic 
Programme (NSA-LA).  
 In South Africa, SALGA is a well functioning and quite large association with capacity 
to work in a unified and concerted way to advocate for DLG issues. It is however 
dominated by ANC and therefore doesn‘t have a clear independent profile in political 
terms. EC has been working with SALGA in terms of the LED strategy and 
implementation issues but not through a formalised support programme. SALGA has 
technical assistance (TA) from German Development Assistance (GIZ) among others.  
 The Association of Municipalities Nicaragua (AMUNIC) was established 1993. It has 
played a role to represent municipalities vis-a-vis central government. It has, 
however, often (and also presently) not been able to conduct a real representative 
role for the members because of its relations to the leading political parties. Examples 
of good regional municipal associations exist. The EC-financed PRODELSA 
strengthened regional associations by positioning programme coordinators in two 
regional associations (AMUNSE and AMUPNOR). 
 The Philippines has a complex organisation of inter-local government associations in 
the form of the local government leagues – the League of Provinces of the Philippines 
(LPP), the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), the League of Municipalities of 
the Philippines (LMP), the Liga ngmga Barangay (LnB), and Union of Local 
Authorities of the Philippines. EC is supporting various inter-LGU collaborations in the 
health sector and various NGOs are working with local governance under the SPF, 
but the EC does not provide direct support to the LG associations. 
 In Lebanon, the EC has not directly supported capacity building of local government 
associations or research institutions working with local governance issues. However, 
the EC has actively engaged in dialogue/conferences with such institutions. There is 
no formal local government association established in Lebanon – the local office of 
the United Cities and Local Governments acts in a way as an official local 
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government association. It legally isn‘t constituted as a governance body representing 
all local governments in the country157. The formal governance body hasn‘t been 
established because stakeholders fear it being split into political factions158. The 
organisation is liaising with several larger European municipalities for twinning 
arrangements with local governments in Lebanon. The organisation has also played a 
lead role in establishing a major conference (October 2009 in Tripoli) on local 
government policy reforms attended by the President. Subsequently it has worked on 
―100 questions on decentralisation‖ and a consultative proves nationwide on future 
direction of reforms. 
 
Examples of countries where the EC has not directly involved LGA in its support to 
decentralisation 
 Four associations of municipalities exist in Peru. The EC has not supported the 
establishment or functioning of national Local Government Associations (LGAs). The 
most acknowledged associations are the AMPE and REMURPE, while FEMULP and 
MUNIRED have fewer members, less support and contacts. All associations have 
their functioning homepage. The existence of four associations has created an 
unstable situation where municipal associations discuss internally instead of directing 
their activities to the central government and their members. At regional level many 
associations exist as well and some of these are linked up to the national system. In 
Ayacucho exists e.g. the Rural Association of Municipalities (la Red de 
Municipalidades Rurales de Ayacucho).  
 In Tanzania, improvement of NSA was not an objective of LGDG or other EC support 
to decentralisation. Other DPs have been more active in this area and a fairly strong 
network of NGOs working with LGs has been created under the NGO Policy Forum.  
6.3.2 Ind6.3.2 - Increase in number and quality of NGOs working with local 
governments for service delivery and improved local governance 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The EC has worked with NGOs for service delivery in many partner countries. However, this 
support has been directly related to the decentralisation process only in a limited number of 
cases and the involvement of national NGOs supported by the EC in the improvement of 
local governance remains rather limited. This illustrates a lack of strategic approach in the 
way of involving NGOs and other NSA in the support to decentralisation. The case of 
Madagascar, where the EC has continuously involved a variety of Non State Actors in the 
decentralisation and local governance activities, is a notable exception. 
 The programme ACORDS in Madagascar has helped through the harmonisation of 
UADEL (Common Support Unit, headed by NGOs). This has led to a better 
understanding of the role of NGOs in the municipality and its prerogatives. In the 
water sector, there was a task force of NGOs to define how to meet project 
management from such municipal experiments under ACORDS. To note a 
contradictory attitude of donors: they go through NGOs for actions by municipalities, 
including the management of funds. NGOs cannot reassign these funds to 
municipalities. The substantive issue is the changing role of NGOs in support of 
municipalities. ACORDS helped clarify things but, to some extent, it has also created 
some unsustainable channelling of funds for local development. 
 In Peru, some efforts have been made to work with local NGOs in the area of local 
governance. A number of projects with NGOs are now financed through the NSA-LA 
programme. But the link with wider efforts related to decentralisation is not evident. 
 In Benin, the NGOs working with advocacy and information around decentralisation 
were very few and far between. Most NGOs supported by the EC have actually 
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 Interview M. Béchir ODEIMI, Resident representative and Director of UCLG.  
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focused on service delivery issues in the sectors health, education and water and 
sanitation.  
 In Mali, the support has taken into account community-based organisations working 
with the "Communes" for service delivery and local governance and efforts have been 
made in areas such as education and health where users' associations are now more 
empowered and their relationship with the "Communes" are rather well defined. Yet, 
regarding local governance, the evaluation team has not identified cases showing the 
involvement of NGOs supported by the EC in the long run. 
 In the Philippines, the EC support through the SPF works primarily with NGOs 
working with local governments for service delivery and improved local governance. 
 In Tanzania, improvement of NSA was not an objective of LGDG or other EC support 
to decentralisation. Other DPs have been more active in this area and a fairly strong 
network of NGOs working with LGs has been created under the NGO Policy Forum. 
The EC support to NSA has not had ―decentralisation‖ of ―local governance‖ as a 
strategic focus but has supported a number of NGOs working with local service 
delivery issues. 
 Governance is a very broad description of a number of different sub-sectors – human 
rights and democracy, legislatures and representation justice, safety and security. In 
South Africa, current EC programmes focus on the first areas, involving 
government/state institutions as well as civil society actors. For the future it is 
intended to continue in theses fields and to this end the modalities and methods of 
working are under discussion. In the 2009, the EUD itself noted: ―Negative sentiments 
about EC aid were provoked as a consequence of major recovery orders against both 
public entities (critical press coverage) and CSO‟s (EC procedures perceived as anti-
developmental). While it should be said that the major recovery orders have in the 
main been issued against older projects designed pre-2000 and to a lesser extent 
pre-2005, it is becoming urgent to restore the EC‟s image notably with civil society. 
The Delegation will devise capacity building initiatives for, inter alia, civil society 
organizations and engage in more regular coaching of partners, for example, on 
procurement and financial reporting issues, as soon as the Finance and Contract 
section of the Delegation has been strengthened.”159 
 In Rwanda, interviews carried out during the field visit with various partners show that 
CSOs do not understand their mandate as representatives of citizens. They also have 
weak organisational capacities and maintain limited linkages with other CSOs. In 
addition, the majority of CSOs are faith-based organisations that are interested in 
service delivery rather than engaging in governance and civic participation. 
Furthermore, civil society organisations have no structured engagement mechanisms 
with which to interact with citizens in their constituencies. It was also recognised that 
CSOs in Rwanda do not have the skills or information for meaningful engagement in 
the budget and other development issues. They also have limited skills or structured 
processes to inform citizens and engage in advocacy. Generally, the concept of civic 
participation and holding the government accountable appears to be a new concept in 
the Rwandan society. The CSOs were found, however, to assist local authorities in 
areas such as citizen information campaigns and education as well as data collection 
processes. The EC has supported this area through a variety of activities mainly 
focusing on community actions.  
6.3.3 Ind6.3.3 - Improvements in quantity and quality of research in local government 
issues 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
EC support to research in local government issues could be identified in only four of the 
countries reviewed (Honduras, Rwanda, South Africa and Peru). These activities often 
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correspond to rather small research projects. And when the support reaches a significant 
size as in the Philippines, it remains rather scattered and not connected to a wider strategic 
approach. 
The list below provides more details from some of the countries reviewed: 
 In the Philippines, many separate interesting initiatives are being supported by the 
EC. However, it is difficult to see the ―strategic outlook‖ – there is no substantive local 
oversight (e.g. in the form of an NGO umbrella organisation) - the activities supported 
are relative disconnected. Several government and NGO organisations conduct 
research into local government issues. The SPF supports e.g. the Local Government 
Academy and the University of the Philippines – however, the support is in the form of 
short and limited interventions that don't form part of a clear long term strategy. 
 In Peru, several national organisations deal with research in local government issues 
and two recognised institutions are "Servicios Educativos Rurales" and "Consortium 
de Investigation Economico y Social", which were both visited by the mission. Only 
the second is supported by the EC in the framework of a NSA-LA project. 
 South Africa has a very active and vibrant research community (especially a number 
of first class universities) also supported by the EC. Historically, much of the findings 
based on local research have been directed at national level in an effort to influence 
national policy. 
 The number of research institutions in Rwanda has increased and these institutions 
have done considerable analysis on issues of local governance. The EC has, through 
its local grants for governance, accountability and research, tried to create an 
interface between NGOs/CSOs/LGs (JADF) and small project funds (2007-2009: 
1mEUR) meaning that different partners worked together to develop local 
collaboration. 
 In Honduras, some limited research exists on the issue of local governments. The 
AMHON has played a role to generating technical documents and systematising 
experiences with support from development partners. The EUD is currently preparing 
a publication on decentralisation in Honduras to be published in 2011. 
 In Lebanon, the EC has not directly supported research institutions working with local 
governance issues. However, the EC has actively engaged in dialogue/conferences 
with such institutions.  
 In Mali, there are no systematised research studies carried out on issues related to 
local governance. There are occasional, very specific and small analyses carried out 
by certain NGOs. 
 In Tanzania, some DPs (in particular NORAD) have strengthened local research 
capacities (at REPOA) for research on LG issues. The programme (formative 
research on local government reforms) has published extensively and built local 
capacities for research on local government reform issues 
(http://www.repoa.or.tz/content/blogcategory/22/49/). The EC has not been active in 
this area.  
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7 EQ7: Local governance 
Evaluation Question 7: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes 
contributed to improving local governance, especially regarding participation, accountability 
and transparency? 
 
It is interesting to put in parallel the detailed evidence presented in the indicators under the 
various JC analysed with the impact of the EC support as perceived by the EUDs. The figure 
below shows the results of the survey to EUDs carried out during the desk phase.  
The majority of respondents from the EUDs voted that local governance has significantly 
improved as a result of the support rendered to decentralisation (62% high or quite high). 
However, nearly 40% are still rather sceptical about the level of impact these interventions 
have had on improving local governance (38% low or quite low). 
Figure 22 Impact of support to decentralisation on improving local governance, as 
perceived by the EUDs 
 
Survey to the EU Delegations, Particip analysis 
 
The table below provides a synthesised overview of the evidence gathered during the desk 
and field phases on the focus and the results of the EC support for the various case study 
countries for which an in-depth analysis was carried out.  
The analysis leads to more mixed results compared to the EUDs perception.  
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Table 35 Overview of EC support to local governance (focus of the support & results) 
 
Participation Accountability Transparency 
Benin  0  
Honduras  0 0 
Lebanon    
Mali    
Peru  0 0 
Philippines    
Rwanda    
Sierra Leone + + + 
South Africa    
Tanzania + + + 
Overall assessment +   
Legend 
Colour Level of EC 
support - Scale 
Description 
 
significantly 
Interventions' objectives or activities do explicitly at significant degree address the 
result area and the concerned interventions are of relative significance compared to 
overall EC support to decentralisation. 
 
partly 
Interventions' objectives or activities only partially or marginally address the result 
area and/or the concerned interventions are relative small compared to overall EC 
support to decentralisation. 
 not at all EC support in the country does not at all address the result area. 
 
Symbol Results - Scale Description 
+ significantly 
Results have to a significant degree been achieved (compared to objectives) in this 
result area. 
 partly 
Results have only partially or marginally been achieved (compared to objectives) in 
this result area. 
0 not at all Results have not all been achieved (compared to objectives) in this result area. 
 
Detailed analysis and evidence on these aspects are provided in the next sub-sections. 
 
7.1 JC7.1. Increased local participation in local government affairs 
Main findings at JC level 
Over the past 10 years, local elections for district and municipal councillors have become the 
order of the day, more and more often in a multi-party democratic fashion. Local elections 
have been held in all the 10 case study countries over the evaluation period, and they are 
increasingly becoming more democratic in nature.  
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The desk review and field visits show that the EC has only directly supported local elections 
in Mali and Benin but that in the other countries this is carried out with assistance from other 
donors or mostly by the country itself as in the case of South Africa, Peru, the Philippines, 
Lebanon and Tanzania. These countries illustrate more independent approaches to 
organising local elections. However, support to national election commissions is often carried 
out by the EC through more indirect interventions and, for instance, support through other 
programmes within the justice, law and order sector or as one-off funding for the 
commissions. This has not been reviewed during the field phase as it fell outside the 
parameters of this evaluation but shows that indirect support for local elections has taken 
place.  
The participation in local government affairs has received significant attention from the EC in 
most of the countries reviewed. Despite the fact that some limitations remain, the use of such 
mechanisms seem to have increased, especially where the EC (often together with other 
development partners) have provided its support through a wide national decentralisation 
programme (e.g. in Benin, Mali, Madagascar, Rwanda and Tanzania), wide sector 
programmes (e.g. in Peru and Nicaragua) or area based programmes of important size (e.g. 
South Africa). 
However, it is important to note that local planning is often done in isolation from any existing 
national strategic development frameworks through local strategic plans. Hence, they often 
result in local processes that are rich in community participation but having weak links with 
national priorities, government agencies and national funding sources, and thus have limited 
prospects for sustainability.  
7.1.1 Ind7.1.1 - Introduction of or improvement in local elections 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Over the past 10 years, local elections for district and municipal councillors have become the 
order of the day, more and more often in a multi-party democratic fashion. Local elections 
have been held in all of the 10 case study countries over the evaluation period, and they are 
increasingly becoming more and more democratic in nature.  
The desk review and field visits show that the EC has only directly supported local elections 
in Mali and Benin but that in the other countries this is carried out with assistance from other 
donors or mostly by the country itself as in the case of South Africa, Peru, the Philippines, 
Lebanon and Tanzania. These countries illustrate more independent approaches to 
organising local elections. 
Evidence from countries with direct support to local elections from the EC: 
Mali has experienced three local elections: 2000, 2004 and 2008 (which were supported by 
the EU). The elections went well and showed the maturity of the country in this area (44% of 
participation at the last election). A potential illustration of the interest of citizens in these 
elections is the high turnover of elected officials with a lot of "votes sanctions" against teams 
considered to be failing in their management. The decentralisation reform has introduced for 
the first time a sense that officials in local authorities can be held accountable for their 
decisions. For this reason during the first mandate of the local councils a big part of the 
population has been more critical and voiced their criticisms. Consequently, local elections 
voter participation has increased and voters have massively exchanged councillors with 
whom they weren't satisfied at almost each election. 
In Benin, local elections have improved over the past 10 years from the first local elections 
held in 2003 and another election held in 2008. All the local elections have been supported 
by the EC. The first allowed, in addition to the introduction of municipalities, the emergence 
of the National Association of Municipalities of Benin (ANCB). The second election saw the 
renewal of up to 80% of elected councillors. Recent support from the EC has been 
implemented through LEPI, attempting to make computerised voter lists available at local 
level.  
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Other countries: 
In Cambodia local elections have been held for Communes/Sangkat Councils in 2002 and 
2009. These have to a large extent formed the basis for an accompanying programme of 
decentralisation across Cambodia. Apparently, EC support has not been directed to LG 
elections.  
In Lebanon, elections for local governments had for a long time been abolished (1963-1998) 
because of political situation and civil war. They were re-introduced in 1998. During the post-
1998 period, the country witnessed a gradual devolution of local development to newly 
elected municipalities - two elections followed – the latest in 2010. But the EC did not directly 
support these. The last general elections of 2004, 2007 (presidential and legislative) and 
2008 (local) were deemed satisfactory by observers. Political pluralism has been confirmed 
with a National Assembly renewed in 2007 and composed of 147 elected members from 13 
parties.  
In Tanzania, multi party elections were introduced in 1994 in LGs, one year prior to national 
elections. The elections have been undertaken with five years intervals in 1999, 2004, and 
the latest in 2009. Elections for the District councils are managed through the same 
institutional arrangements as the national elections (through the National Electoral 
Commission) and are fairly well managed. However, elections for the lower tiers of local 
governments (Villages and ―mitaa‖ etc) are managed by PMO-RALG and availability of 
electoral results and processes are far less comprehensive. As further discussed in the field 
visit country note, the electoral system has remained largely the same since 1994, although 
reform measures have been suggested in order to reform the system. Currently the ruling 
national party (CCM) dominates local elections because of the electoral rules (that inter alia 
prevent independent candidates). The various donor-funded interventions (such as LGRP 
and LGDG) have failed to put electoral reform on the agenda160. 
Free municipal elections have been held in Nicaragua in 2004, while Government and 
National Election Commissions manipulated elections in 2008. EC observers and other 
donors, as well as NGOs, reported direct frauds in many municipalities. Observers agree that 
the results of the municipal election were manipulated by frauds in approximately 37-40 
municipalities (of 144). After this incident the EC has suspended all kinds of budget support 
to Nicaragua.  
In Honduras, during the evaluation period the procedures for the local elections have not 
been changed. National and local elections were executed at the same days in late 2001, 
2005 and 2009. Observations agree that these three elections have been held in fair 
conditions and without any fraud. Although national and local politicians are elected 
separately, many stakeholders agree that the election is mainly seen as a national election. 
Therefore, the AMHON in particular argues that the local elections should be separated from 
the national elections to give the local level more importance. There is significant progress in 
terms of political decentralization, allowing independent candidates for presidential elections, 
municipal and national congress to run. 
In Peru, the EC has not supported the development of local elections. Elections for local 
government have been carried out every third year since 1980 and from 2002 (with the new 
Organic Municipal Act) every fourth year. The regional governments had their first election in 
2006 and again in 2010. In 2010 the system was different as the president of the regions was 
elected separately from the regional councillors giving him a status similar to the president at 
the national level.  
In the Philippines, local government elections are held every three-year in cycles that 
correspond to the six year national elections for the President. Every 3 years, the LG 
elections also coincide with elections of half of the senators (12). The elections have been 
held regularly since the introduction of the LG Code and broadly follow the same patterns of 
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participation. The EC support has not attempted to support activities in relation to this (such 
as civic education for LG elections etc). The EC has not supported LG elections directly. 
In Rwanda, local elections have taken place but due to the process of reconciliation after the 
1994 genocide the local elections are not yet fully democratic and are not based on the 
principle of full democratic representation. The local election process has not been supported 
by the EC.  
In Sierra Leone, the second local council election in 2008 was carried out without any 
irregularities and the candidates were better prepared than in 2004. According to 
stakeholders met, citizens are now more active in local decision-making and are also critical 
towards councillors‘ actions. IRCBP was not directly involved in the election process, but its 
focus on planning processes and local accountability has certainly helped improving the set-
up for elections.  
In South Africa, local government elections exist since 1994 and are supported by EC 
through overall election support. However, the most recent elections in May 2011 highlighted 
service delivery problems. Elections are held under the jurisdiction of the Independent 
Elections Commission (IEC) and have been deemed to be free and fair. 
7.1.2 Ind7.1.2 - Existence and use of mechanisms for direct participation for all 
phases of local government planning cycle 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The participation in local government affairs has received significant attention from the EC in 
most of the countries reviewed. Despite the fact that some limitations remain, the use of such 
mechanisms seem to have increased, especially where the EC (often together with other 
development partners) have provided its support through a wide national decentralisation 
programme (e.g. in Benin, Mali, Madagascar, Rwanda and Tanzania), wide sector 
programmes (e.g. in Peru and Nicaragua) or area based programmes of important size (e.g. 
South Africa). However, it is noteworthy that local planning is often done in isolation from any 
existing national strategic development frameworks through local strategic plans. Hence, 
they often result in local processes that are rich in community participation but having weak 
links with national priorities, government agencies and national funding sources, and thus 
have limited prospects for sustainability.  
In Mali, the situation remains heterogeneous, depending on who provides support for the 
development of the PDESC (local development plans). Some remain at a purely technical 
level paying little attention to participation. A recent citizens' perception survey reveals that 
the vast majority of them feel that they are not involved in decision-making and are 
misinformed. However, the desk review and the field visits show that the planning process is 
quite participatory. The EC has supported with other development partners the elaboration of 
local development plan procedures and through the "Centres for local advice" (CCC – 
"centres de conseil communaux") the preparation and implementation of local development 
plans. Participation of different citizen groups in Mali (youth, women) and local stakeholder 
(NGOs, associations) has been foreseen in the adopted procedures for the elaboration of 
local development plans (PDESC) and is practiced widely in the municipalities. Non-elected 
citizens can be invited and do participate in local municipal commissions.  
In Madagascar, the programme ACORDS has been assisting in the implementation of a 
number of measures to promote transparency of local governance: display of decisions, 
presentation of accounts, and promoting the consultation of key user groups. 
In Benin effective participation in local affairs has been enhanced through encouraging better 
involvement of civil society in local affairs by having a coordinated communication plan in the 
municipalities and also encouraged them to have set up a steering committee for the council 
development plan (PDC). 
In Tanzania, citizens‘ direct participation in local government affairs has received significant 
attention from various DP funded initiatives – in particular support for ―participatory 
development planning‖. This has in recent years been institutionalised by PMO-RALG and 
rolled out as ―Opportunities and Obstacles to Development (O&OD) approach to participatory 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
192 
planning. Several DPs have also supported CSOs to engage with LGs for deepening local 
accountability. The EC has, through the LGDG, boosted the effectiveness of such initiatives 
as the LGDG provided discretionary funding that effectively enabled LGs to budget according 
to local priorities, and thus, has brought the participatory planning beyond simply a wish list.  
In Rwanda, the EC support to increased local participation in local development planning 
was clearly an aim of UBUDEHE support and has to some degree been achieved, as the 
priority of DPRPR was to further develop capacities at local level for planning and budgeting 
as well as PFM related issues. This means that the EC support has been important for the 
relationship between local development planning, community development and strengthened 
collaboration between district administrations and communities as emphasised by the 
UBUDEHE approach, and what the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF) should be 
working with (see also box below). 
Box 48 Focus on the Joint Action Development Forum in Rwanda 
The Ministerial Instruction No. 04/2007 established the JADF at the district and sector levels. 
The Forum is meant to be a consultative body for information dissemination and promotion of 
cooperation among actors supporting local socio-economic development and social welfare 
of the population. The Forum aims at coordinating activities of all development actors so as 
to promote coordination of efforts and efficiency, as well as avoid duplication of efforts in 
development actions. In addition to its main responsibilities, the JADF is a vehicle for 
implementing the DIP. By its nature, the JADF is made up of diverse local organizations, 
capacities, and personalities. In order to ensure participation and effectiveness in the 
implementation of the DIP, the JADFs may organize themselves into task teams which will 
contribute to specific activities implemented by the DIP at LG levels. The councillors are 
directly elected by citizens and are expected to represent the views and opinions of the 
electorate. 
However, discussions with key stakeholders during the field visits revealed that councillors at 
district level have limited knowledge and skills to engage in effective planning and effective 
discussions (despite this situation, they are mandated, through established commissions, to 
discuss and act as legislators and approve district budget). Furthermore, it was highlighted 
that some district councillors tend to be incorporated in the LG authorities‘ activities instead 
of passing accountability duties on to the citizens. At sector level, it was indicated that 
councillors participate in identification of the imihigo activities without participation in 
prioritization and planning processes. Generally, district and sectors councillors have limited 
resources available to facilitate citizens‘ engagement and participation. 
In Sierra Leone, the local government planning system is of a bottom-up type with full 
involvement of the ward level, where councillors are elected161. Almost all councils have 
prepared development plans following the national guidelines in 2010 according to the 
DecSec in MRD&LG. This is a result of the efforts of the IRCBP capacity development 
activities and the direct support of a staff member from the IRCBP (coach) located in each 
council administration. A large number of actors, including NGOs, GTZ, JICA and UNCDF 
are also active at district level to support planning and public participation.  
In South Africa, the EC has been supporting a ward capacity building project over the recent 
years focusing on increased transparency, accountability and participatory planning 
processes. EC support to increased local participation in local development planning was 
clearly an aim of ABMDP support. There is often a tension between planning on the part of 
officials, and participation. Political interference on the part of elected (and paid) party 
councillors is a feature of municipal life. The fact that Ward Committee members are paid a 
stipend in an environment where resources are scarce may also contribute to the upkeep of 
a party patronage system. 
In Nicaragua the municipal planning process is regulated by the law on participation with a 
good involvement of all actors. From 2008 with the CG‘s establishment of People‘s Councils 
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(Consejos de Poder Ciudadana) the Municipal Development Committees has been partly 
sidelined in the planning process and planning has become more controlled by the PCs. The 
PCs were consulted in the national consultation process in 2010. PRODELSA supported 
development of municipal development plans in 15 municipalities and PAPSA supported 
municipalities‘ participative planning within education. 
In Peru, the regional and local planning process includes that the governments shall invite all 
citizens for meetings to discuss the municipal development plan, the budget and the budgets 
execution in a participatory manner. A study162 shows that about 36% of all investments in 
rural municipalities ("distritos") are identified in the participatory planning process. The EC 
has given some limited support to the participatory planning process in three regions 
(Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac) in the PASA programme, where investments for 
economic development were identified by the Participatory Planning (PP) mechanism in local 
governments. Information received during the mission illustrates different impressions on 
how the PP is functioning and the level of participation. According to a study presented below 
financed by USAID, participation has declined from 1998 to 2010 as only 11,6% in 2010 
responded that they have participated in a council or public meeting while 20,6% responded 
positively to this in 1998.  
Table 10: Citizens‟ Participation in Local Governments Activities, pct. 
 1998 2006 2010 
Participation in a municipal council meeting or public meeting 
(session municipal o cabildo abierto)  
20,6 14,7 11,6 
Willingness to pay more taxes  19,7 14 18,5 
Participation in the preparation of the municipal budget  4,3 5,0 
Source: Source: USAID (2010), Cultura Politica en la Democracia de Peru
163
  
In Honduras, the planning system is a bottom up type with communities expressing their 
needs to the local councils and the development of a municipal development plan. 
Municipalities should also arrange open meetings (cabildos abiertos) with the public at least 
twice a year. Some people interviewed during the field visits, expressed that it is likely that 
only half of the municipalities execute their planning with public participation. Planning is also 
disturbed by other agencies having parallel system to that of the local government with direct 
intervention at the community level, for instance the Social Investment Fund (Fondo 
Hondureño de Inversión Social, FHIS). A survey financed by USAID164 shows that the 
citizens in general participate less than before in local issues: 18.5% of the population 
participated in 2006 in a municipal council meeting and only 8.8% participated in a council 
meeting in 2010. Similarly only 6.5% asked for assistance in the municipality compared to 
12.3% in 2004 and the participation in community organisations has also declined from 
24.8% in 2004 to 12.8% in 2010 (see below). 
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Table 36 Citizens‟ Participation in Local Government Activities 
 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Participation in municipal 
council meeting (session 
municipal o cabildo abierto) 
15.1% 18.5% 10.3% 8.8% 
Request for assistance from 
the municipality 
12.3% 13.5% 7.8% 6.5% 
Participation in community 
organisations 
24.8% 18.7% 11.9% 12.8% 
Source: USAID (2010) Cultura Politica de la Democracia en Honduras
165
  
In the Philippines, the SPF supports various initiatives for increased local participation – 
supporting selected smaller LGUs. However, it is not clear how the rather small micro 
interventions can be up-scaled. EC support to health sector planning has not stressed local 
participation (see also Indicator 6.2.2.).  
In Lebanon, public participation in local governments is not well studied. EC support has 
been limited to support to improve local government planning discussed earlier. 
7.2 JC7.2 Improved local accountability of local governments/ decentralised 
units 
Main findings at JC level 
Some countries, such as Rwanda, Tanzania, South Africa, Peru and the Philippines, do have 
systems for disclosure of local budgets, citizen scorecards, performance contracts, and 
extensive information workshops with NGO/CSOs. The EC has supported some of these 
activities, but not systemically (often through small projects involving a limited number of 
local authorities) and not as a priority. The EC has contributed to some improvements in 
terms of audits at local government level in only very few cases, such as in Madagascar, 
where the ACORDS programme has promoted the implementation of financial and technical 
audits. Overall, almost all the case studies show that local accountability has not been a 
major aspect of the EC-supported interventions. 
In several countries, such as South Africa, Philippines, Tanzania and Rwanda, the EC has 
supported large PFM programmes focusing on improving government‘s overall ability to 
perform quality accountability and budgeting. These large PFM programmes do also focus 
on PFM issues and training at the local level. However, a key factor in these programmes is 
that support interventions always start at central government level, and often take a long time 
to trickle down to LGs.  
7.2.1 Ind7.2.1 - Existence and use of feed back mechanisms and procedures for 
dialogue with citizens (notice boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards 
etc) 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
A major objective in decentralisation reforms is that responsibility for most service delivery is 
allocated to local government level. At present, many sector and donor-financed 
programmes continue to be implemented in an uncoordinated and parallel fashion (see also 
JC5.2). This significantly increases the demands on limited LG staff and overstretches the 
already low capacity. The diverse planning, monitoring and reporting guidelines for different 
programmes impose acute pressure on LGs. This pressure on local governments to 
implement good planning and accountability routines means that the focus of a 
decentralisation reform is often on PFM issues and upward accountability (see also JC6.2). 
Consequently, this often leads to less emphasis being put on downward accountability from 
the LGs to the citizens/CSOs.  
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While there is a relatively clear system of accountability in many local governments, the 
performance of accountability mechanisms remains problematic (see examples below). 
Several reasons are usually cited to explain the poor accountability and governance that 
takes place in LG. These include: poor access to information which is in turn caused by 
unfavourable attitude of the council staff, poor working tools and infrastructure, technocratic 
procedures and formats for releasing information and lack of a culture of transparency. Poor 
representation of the citizens by their councillors in the decision-making processes and the 
lack of participation in these processes contribute to further undermine accountability. 
Moreover, and with regard to the relationship of horizontal accountability between local 
politicians and local administrations, tools to measure the performance of the latter are 
frequently under-developed. In those cases where they do exist, there have been relatively 
few incentives to apply and take them seriously, as funds will flow in any case without any 
adjustments. In many cases, elected councillors are not aware of the absolute and 
comparative performance of local civil servants, and lack the necessary tools to measure this 
performance. An additional problem in many countries is the dual subordination of the sector 
staff, which often reports to both, the local councils and to their parent line ministries in a 
system of dual sub-ordination with unclear responsibilities.  
The section below provides some more details from the cases reviewed. 
In Benin, local accountability of local governments has remained weak. The planning system 
is constrained by the lack of availability of financial information on the municipalities and the 
lack of appropriate mechanisms for greater public participation. Despite the institutional 
arrangements described under the laws of decentralisation and implementation of citizen 
oversight where some interesting experiments are conducted by some NGOs, people's 
participation and downward accountability of local elected officials remain low and weak. It 
seems that NGO and CSO involvement in this area is very weak as most are focused on 
service delivery and not advocacy. The evaluation team could not verify this directly at LG 
level but it seems that issues of this nature have been addressed under the various donor-
funded programmes and also the PRODECOM and PACTE, however, very little concrete 
evidence could be found.  
In Mali, the accountability of elected officials towards their citizens is not granted. While the 
council meetings are open to the public, little advertising is given and few incentives are 
provided for such participation. Some argue that cultural factors should be taken into 
account, as it is not usual to hold the chief accountable. Nevertheless, efforts have been 
made to advertise budgets and publish the results of assemblies' discussions on signboards 
in town halls. Unfortunately, this is not done in a systematic manner across the country. The 
2011 assessment report on decentralisation notes that public debate has not become a 
common practice yet. 
In Sierra Leone, the WDC headed by a councillor, functions as the inter-link between the 
council and the grass root level. Democracy has spread out and citizens are much more 
active and involved according to most people met. The IRCBP includes activities in planning 
and public participation and supported this together with other development partners (see 
also indicator 7.1.2 above).  
In Tanzania, the EC-funded LGDG includes as part of its annual performance criteria 
indicators regarding the extent to which LGs publicize their annual budgets and accounts 
through use of notice boards. As a result, the majority of LGs today publicize budgets and 
accounts. Likewise, other DPs than EC have in recent years supported NGOs to strengthen 
community capacities for improved local accountability through use of citizen score cards, 
local public expenditure tracking, etc.  
In the Philippines, feedback mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with citizens (notice 
boards with budgets, use of citizen score cards, etc) has not been systematically promoted 
by the health sector programme but piloted in various ways by the SPF. There have been 
many official initiatives over the years to strengthen the role of (the relative strong) NGO 
sector in local governance (see box below). 
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Box 49 Local Government relations with NGOs and Civil Society in the Philippines 
Our consultations have shown that local governance is constantly being redefined at the 
local level with the participation of civil society in the process of local governance as enabled 
by the Local Government Code. However, not all local governments have active civil society 
groups to enable them to fulfil the ¼ requirement in the local development council. It was 
frequently suggested that such a requirement must therefore be eased. Congruent issues on 
local governance across the consultative workshops include a weak local bureaucracy due to 
the presence of various overlapping developing councils, too many LGU institutions, 
ineffective composition of the LFC and other Special Bodies. Furthermore, it was conveyed 
that the lack of public awareness about decentralization, as well as the absence or lack of 
mechanisms for people participation, inhibits true participatory governance. Across the 
workshops, a desire for a more accountable and responsive local government administration 
was consistently expressed. 
SBN 1252 filed on July 18, 2007 proposes the strengthening of the Local Development 
Council by compelling the local chief executives to convene their respective LDCs, as well as 
to mandate the leagues of LGU‘s, in order to ensure improved compliance via monitoring and 
submitting periodic reports to Congress through the Oversight Committee. Furthermore, SBN 
1156 filed on July 4, 2007 by Aquilino Pimentel proposes the inclusion of Senior Citizens, 
Parents'-Teachers' Association, and War Veterans in the local health board and the local 
development councils in the different local government units, as well as the addition of public 
agricultural as members of the provincial and local development councils.  
Source: Brilliantes et al 2009: Decentralisation In Depth Study, page 49-50. 
In Honduras, the system for communication and use of feed back mechanisms with the 
citizens is mainly organised though the bottom-up planning system and the semi annually 
meetings, where the municipal budget and its execution are presented respectively. The EC 
has not supported systems for citizens‘ dialogue with the municipality through PROADES, 
but the EC has financed some projects through the NSA-LA programmes. 
In Peru, accountability mechanisms are established in the planning cycle (as described in 
indicator 7.1.2 above) via the arrangement of regional and local councils‘ meetings with the 
citizens to discuss the budget‘s implementation and the development plan. The watch 
committees (Comite de Vigilancia), which are elected from the citizens at meetings to 
monitor the work of the councils to give the citizens access to all information about all public 
finances, the information for all local and regional governments can be found on the MEF 
homepage: http://ofi.mef.gob.pe/transparencia - called "consulta amigable" - user friendly 
consultation166. This is a very comprehensive and rather user-friendly page and all financial 
data in the present report has been retrieved from the MEF page. The EC has not supported 
the development of more transparency at local level except in a few projects with local NGOs 
but this has not been done in a systematic manner and is not linked to a wider approach at 
national level. 
In Rwanda, JADF is a great platform to engage district stakeholders in the decision-making, 
planning and budgeting processes. There has been no specific support from the EC to the 
JADF‘s, but members of JADFs have been able to access funds under the NSA local 
authorities support funding from the EC. The action and role of the JADF is further detailed in 
Indicator 7.1.2. Although the Ministry of Finance has explained that full budget 
documentation can be obtained on demand by interested parties, local financial institutions 
stated that they were unable to obtain the documentation at the time of the budget and, 
therefore, relied on media coverage of the budget speech for analysis of budget decisions. 
Full media coverage of the Minister of Finances budget presentation and the plenary 
discussion of budget documents does take place and some of this information is also posted 
on the government website. A complete set of budget documents has, however, not been 
available to the general public at the point of their submission to the legislature. The mission 
was not informed of the use of notice boards at district level for budget transfer information. 
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However, in principle the Imihigo system of accountability does have service delivery targets 
to which the Mayor/Councils have to live up. These are fixed targets, which are reported 
annually to the public and especially to the President. 
In Lebanon, feed back mechanisms and procedures for dialogue with citizens are generally 
poorly developed. This is clearly related to the relative limited role of local governments in 
service delivery. This area has not been supported by EC. 
South Africa experiments with various service delivery and accountability mechanisms such 
as citizen report cards and Service Charters. Obviously the press in South Africa is more free 
and fair than in many other parts of Africa, and an active reporting on service delivery riots 
and misuse of local funds is reported and analysed.  
There is very little or no evidence of improvements in audits at local government level in any 
of the reviewed countries.  
In Tanzania reports from the auditor generally indicate a clear trend of improvements over 
the last ten years. The incentives in-built in LGDG (supported by EC) is widely recognised as 
having contributed to this. Tanzania has seen a relative improvement in this area over the 
past 5-6 years. For instance, significant improvement in quality of LG accounts has been 
seen there. The number of adverse audit opinions has decreased from 45% in 2000 to less 
than 5% today. 
In Madagascar there are two types of audits being implemented by ACORD: Financial Audits 
that are carried out mainly by private companies and technical/performance audits. These 
audits have revealed many problems related to poor infrastructure design and many major 
problems, which are not necessarily related to embezzlement, but rather caused by a lack of 
understanding of exact rules and responsibilities, plus ordinary mistakes. They have served 
as the basis for regular updating of relevant stakeholders and also adjusting procedures at 
local level. The technical audits have highlighted the weakness of the design offices and 
other infrastructure and that there is lack of supervision from the municipalities. 
7.3 JC7.3 Increased transparency in fund allocation and utilisation 
Overall introduction  
Over the past 10-15 years many developing countries have implemented local grant 
schemes that have led to an increase in the transparency and utilisation of local grants. Local 
grant systems vary considerably from country to country and a review of international 
experiences167 regarding allocation criteria for intergovernmental fiscal transfers show that 
most of the countries (see the table below for overview of relevant countries for this 
evaluation) are using measures of expenditure needs, and the size of the local government‘s 
population as the main, if not only, criteria. 
Some countries are using varies proxies for costs of the service provision, like the density of 
the population/land area - low density is often compensated as it is calculated or assumed 
that it causes higher costs of service provision – (e.g. Uganda, Tanzania and the Philippines, 
which use a land factor) or various cost indexes (like Nepal). 
Some countries are also using various poverty indices and measures for the backwardness 
of certain areas (e.g. Uganda, Tanzania, Cambodia and Nepal).  
Finally, an increasing number of countries have introduced performance related measures in 
the allocation of capital development grants, e.g. Uganda, Tanzania, Bangladesh and Nepal.  
As an example Tanzania has elaborated a capital development grant system where the LG 
performance in key generic areas like planning, budgeting, financial management and good 
governance has an impact on allocation of the grants. Some countries, like Ghana, Pakistan, 
Rwanda and Nicaragua have included tax effort as a criterion in the allocation of grants 
(Uganda and Tanzania also make use of some incentives on the LG tax efforts in the 
allocation of capital grants as well). Other countries are planning to introduce a link between 
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the size of the transfers and the administrative/financial performance of the LGs in order to 
provide stronger incentives to improve on administration and service provision (e.g. Sudan, 
the Philippines and Ghana).  
Most developing countries make use of relatively few criteria (often 1-4 criteria for the major 
grants) due to lack of data and administrative capacity and a wish to keep the system 
transparent and simple. Allocation criteria have been reformed and/or are being reformed in 
a great number of countries, typically after a period of testing and gathering of experiences, 
and there is a positive move towards more transparent, formula-based systems in many 
countries.  
Table 37 Overview of Local Government Grant Systems in Selected Case Countries168 
Country Main Transfer 
Schemes 
Allocation Criteria Objectives and other 
features 
Comments and 
coming 
reforms 
Examples from Africa 
Tanzania 
(2005) 
1) Conditional 
grants with little 
flexibility 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Various 
basket funds 
and road 
maintenance 
funds 
 
 
 
3) Non-sectoral 
capital 
development 
grants (from 
2004) and 
capacity building 
grants 
1) Typically one grant with 
formulae per sector. A reform is 
ongoing to establish clear 
transparent allocation criteria 
based on expenditure needs 
instead of available 
infrastructure. An example of 
this is health sector grants, 
which use the following criteria: 
A) Population (70 %), B) Poverty 
count (10 %), C) Vehicle route 
mileage/distance (10%) and D) 
infant mortality rate (10%).  
 
2) Earmarked to boost service 
delivery in these sectors 
(Education, Health and Roads) - 
Formula based formulas.  
 
 
 
3) Clear formula-based: Criteria: 
a) Population (70%), b) Land 
/size of the LG territory (10%) 
and c) poverty count (20 %), d) 
adjustment (+/- 20%) for LG 
performance in key generic 
areas like financial management 
and good governance (upwards 
and downwards).  
 
The Capacity Building Grant is 
based on a transparent 
allocation formula reflecting the 
needs of various districts.  
The conditional grants 
are the most important 
sources for local 
government funding. 
They fill up the fiscal 
gap in the expenditure 
and revenue 
assignments.  
 
 
Support service delivery 
in specific sectors. 
 
 
 
 
Support development 
projects and minor 
capital investments + 
provide good incentives 
to improve performance 
in planning, budgeting, 
financial management, 
procurement and good 
governance.  
A 
comprehensive 
reform is 
ongoing to 
improve the 
allocation 
criteria for all 
recurrent grants, 
establish needs 
and formula 
based criteria 
for allocation, 
starting with 
Health and 
Education. The 
reform will be 
introduced 
gradually. 
Abolition of 
certain local 
taxes have been 
compensated 
through new 
grants.  
A new 
performance 
based capital 
development 
grants scheme 
has being rolled 
out to all 
districts in the 
country to 
promote capital 
investments and 
to ensure LG 
planning 
processes and 
performance.  
Rwanda 
(2007) 
1) Block grants 
for recurrent 
administrative 
expenditures 
 
1) A new allocation formula was 
adopted in 2006 with the 
following criteria: Size of the 
population (20 %), Poverty 
measured by inverse of revenue 
collected (20%), size of the area 
Fiscal gap between 
expenditure needs and 
revenue collected 
 
 
The criteria are 
transparent but 
tend to move in 
opposite 
directions.  
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Country Main Transfer 
Schemes 
Allocation Criteria Objectives and other 
features 
Comments and 
coming 
reforms 
 
 
 
2) Various 
sector grants 
 
 
3) Various 
programmes, 
particularly the 
Common 
Development 
Fund (CDF) for 
capital 
investments 
(10%), bonus for tax effort 
(10%), and finance gap between 
administration cost and collected 
revenues (40%).  
 
2) Allocation criteria varies 
greatly, some using equal 
shares, others are based on 
clients, while others on 
estimated expenditure needs. 
 
3) Allocation formula with 
population, coverage of 
water/sanitation infrastructure, 
and other factors 
 
 
Fiscal gap and to 
promote specific 
decentralization sector 
reforms 
 
 
Promote small scale 
infrastructure 
 
The criteria are 
being reviewed 
as part of the 
sector dialogue. 
There is a need 
for a strong 
guidance of the 
sectors.  
 
The formulae for 
CDF may create 
disincentives to 
improve. The 
capital grant 
system is 
project specific 
and all 
investments 
have to be 
improved 
beforehand.  
 
There are 
multiple smaller 
grants and one-
off budget 
funding 
schemes, each 
with their own 
modalities.  
South 
Africa  
Equitable share 
grant 
 
 
 
 
Specific purpose 
grants 
 
 
 
Fiscal capacity and expenditure 
criteria: Number of poor 
households and the relative 
difference between the number 
of poor individuals and number 
of non-poor individuals, the 
costs of an estimated basket of 
basic services per households, 
population size, historical 
distribution in no. of staff, 
household with services 
backlogs.  
 
E.g. grants for capacity building 
and Infrastructure grants 
Fiscal gap and 
equalization 
 
 
 
Specific services and 
purposes 
Ongoing reform 
to streamline 
and consolidate 
(reduce the 
number of 
grants) the 
system and 
criteria. 
Examples from Asia 
Cambodia 
(2003) 
General 
purpose grant 
for the 
commune/ 
sangkats- the 
so-called C/S 
Fund, which is 
divided in an 
administration 
and a local 
development 
component 
(2003) 
The allocation formulas vary for 
the administrative and the 
development components: 
1) The General Administration 
Component cannot be more 
than 1/3 of the total distributable 
resources of the CSF. This is 
distributed to Commune 
Councils in proportion to its 
number of councillors.  
 
2) The Local Development 
Component, which cannot be 
less than 2/3 of the total 
distributable resources of the 
CSF. This component is 
The objective is to 
support small -scale 
investments in 
infrastructure, service 
delivery and cover the 
costs of general 
administrative functions. 
 
The scheme is also put 
in place to enhance the 
legitimacy of the local 
authorities and support 
learning processes in 
planning, budgeting and 
financial management 
(new innovative and 
The size of the 
funds is set by a 
certain 
percentage, 
approximately 
2.5-2.6% of the 
total domestic 
revenues.  
 
Most of the 
funds have been 
spent on roads 
and smaller 
infrastructure 
projects like 
bridges.  
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Country Main Transfer 
Schemes 
Allocation Criteria Objectives and other 
features 
Comments and 
coming 
reforms 
allocated by three shares 
(criteria): 1) an equal share, 2) a 
share proportional to the size of 
the population in the Commune, 
3) and a share proportional to a 
poverty index, weighted by the 
population of the commune. For 
the poverty assessment, a 
Commune database with data 
on social indicators, by village, is 
used to produce a poverty 
ranking of the Communes. E.g. 
the FY2002 allocation formula, 
used weights for the equal 
shares, population, and poverty 
components, respectively, of 50, 
30 and 20 percent.  
decentralised service 
delivery.  
 
 
Philippines 
(as of 2005) 
One major 
scheme, the 
Internal 
Revenue 
Allotment (IRA) 
 
The size of this 
is set as a fixed 
percentage, 
which is 40% of 
the national 
internal 
revenues three 
years prior to 
the current 
Fiscal Year.  
 
 
Small number of 
capital transfers 
(typical project 
specific) 
The allocation is distributed 
among the different tiers of local 
governments as follows: 
Provinces (23%), Cities (23%), 
Municipalities (34%), Barangays 
(20%). The resulting amount is 
further divided among the LG at 
each level with the use of the 
following formula: 1) Population 
(50%), 2) land area (25%), and 
3) equal sharing (25%).  
 
 
Fill the fiscal gap 
between expenditure 
and revenue 
assignments, 
particularly after the 
devolution of task from 
1991.  
The equal share 
component has 
been questioned 
and there are 
various 
proposals 
(2005) to 
improve on the 
formulae.  
 
There is an 
ongoing review 
of the system 
and it is 
considered to 
introduce a 
more 
performance 
based allocation 
system, which 
should provide 
better incentives 
for the LGs to 
improve the 
performance.  
Example from Central America 
Nicaragua 
(2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development 
grants 
Matching grant. The collected 
tax revenue is matched by a 
Stimulus Development Fund on 
a dollar to dollar basis (since 
2001)  
Contribute to the 
general sources for 
development and 
support incentives to 
collect taxes (tax effort) 
Previously 
(1997-2000) the 
system was 
based on the 
LGs‘ utilisation 
of the tax 
potential, and 
LGs with a high 
utilisation rate 
received more 
grants. This 
system was 
rejected as it 
was seen by 
everybody to be 
too 
complicated).  
Examples from the Middle East 
Jordan 
(2005) 
The system of 
transfers 
The assignment of quotas to 
different municipalities is based 
The transfers cover 
almost 60% of local 
A national 
committee is 
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Country Main Transfer 
Schemes 
Allocation Criteria Objectives and other 
features 
Comments and 
coming 
reforms 
depends on fuel 
tax as the main 
source of the 
transfer pool. 
The system 
distributes the 
pool on specific 
number of 
quotas that are 
assigned to the 
municipalities. 
on the following criteria: The 
special nature of the municipality 
(tourism, commercial, boarder, 
administrative centre….etc.), 
population size, and minimum 
limit of quotas that each 
municipality should receive. 
 
The decisions on the number of 
quotas assigned to each come 
as shared decisions between 
the Ministry of Municipalities 
Affairs and the Ministry of 
Planning, while the Ministry of 
Finance plays a major role in 
deciding the quota‘s monetary 
amount. 
expenditures. During 
the 1990s, the transfer 
pool experienced 
stagnation, while the 
local autonomous 
revenue shrank.  
 
The system is not 
transparent and not 
balancing. 
constituted to 
review the 
current transfer 
system. The 
committee is in 
the process of 
replacing the 
current system 
by a formula-
based one. The 
committee is 
thinking of 
different factors 
to shape the 
formula 
including: the 
current transfer, 
per capita, 
population size, 
salary and 
wages 
expenditures, 
dept service, 
property tax 
revenues, and 
other 
autonomous 
local revenues. 
 
Main findings at JC level 
The EC has supported grant allocation mechanism in Mali and Benin and to a lesser degree 
in Tanzania through the Performance Based Grants to LGs.  
In terms of support in the various countries to wider provision of information to the general 
public on budgets and allocations for local governments, it appears that some aspects of this 
have been supported, but because the main focus of support is on large PFM reform, it often 
originates from the PFM platform, rather than the local government reform platform. 
However, many of the evaluated countries do have ministry websites (like MOF and MOLG 
and specific agencies websites) in e.g. Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Peru and The 
Philippines and through the national media. LGs are also increasingly being encouraged to 
make a full disclosure of their budgets to local CSOs, NGOs and media for wider 
dissemination to the public.  
7.3.1 Ind7.3.1 - Evolution of budget allocation procedures: use of formula based 
grants, etc.  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
The EC has supported formula based grant systems in some of the case countries. 
Countries like Tanzania, Benin and Mali have formula based grants. In Tanzania even a very 
advanced system of local development grants exist. The EC has not supported this work to a 
great extent in Tanzania except contributing to a general development block grant. In 
Tanzania, an increasing share of LG budgets has over the decade been allocated on a 
transparent basis through the use of simple and objective formula. The EC supported LGDG 
has in particular contributed to more transparent allocation of development funds that 
previously was allocated through various DP projects 
In both Benin and Mali where there are specific centrally based investment agencies for local 
government investments, the EC has been instrumental in setting these agencies up and in 
developing the formulas for dispersing the funds among the local governments.  
The system in Mali is presented in more detail in Indicator 8.1.1.  
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In Benin, increased transparency in fund allocation is evident in terms of the FADeC and 
local budgets. The FADeC funds are either conditional or "un-conditional". For un-conditional 
funds there is free choice of the sector, projects and / or activities to be funded. This is based 
on the reason that the funds are in addition to the municipalities own revenues to be subject 
to local planning. In addition, FADEC is sending funds made available to municipalities for 
sectoral activities. The funds for these sectoral activities are only related to this sector. Often, 
resources are allocated for specific activities, but this is not binding. Indeed, there is a wide 
range of options - for example, for investments, illustrated at a situation where the Ministry of 
Education has already identified the sites for the classroom location or a ministry that 
provides resources for 'infrastructure sector' without consulting the LGs. FADeC is working 
on increasing the un-conditional part of the investment grant to municipalities. This interest is 
understandable because it would increase the investment budget for the municipalities own 
priorities and the donors would develop a mechanism to support the communes in the whole 
country (replacing the geographical support, but taking into account the equalization criteria) 
through the national system. In this regard some progress has been made for the FADeC 
budget line for unconditional investment grants. While donors have hesitated to start co-
financing, the GoB took a decision to commit funds (although this was helped by the GBS 
support, especially including from the EC). Since 2008, municipalities have actually received 
investment resources to finance priority actions according to their CDPs. With the increase in 
transfers of investments, the amount invested is increased similarly (although transfers seem 
to have replaced the use of own resources for local investments). The FADeC grant formula 
is based on a combination of a fixed amount (called "endowment structure"), variables 
representing spending needs, the variables being proxy (a proxy) for the ability to generate 
(other) revenues (collectively called equalization grants), and a premium to boost 
performance. 
In Tanzania, the government has since 2003 begun to introduce a more transparent and 
equitable formula based system for allocation of fiscal resources among LGs. The system 
has been most successful for allocation of development funds – spearheaded by the LGDG. 
Funds for allocation of LGDG and related ―sector windows‖ of the LGDG are all shared 
among LGs according to simple formula based allocations (typically based on population and 
adjusted to poverty, land area etc). A similar system has since 2004 attempted to be 
introduced for recurrent funding streams (salaries/PE and other charges/OC). As discussed 
further in Annex 5 of the field visit country note, this has in practice never been effectively 
implemented because GoT has resisted further devolution of staff management which in turn 
makes fiscal allocation of PE on formula meaningless. Fund transfers are today to a large 
degree published in newspapers – especially funds from the LGDG system. The 
dissemination is however not yet systematic, although LGDG has set a good example. 
Similarly, the PMO-RALG has established a website with overview of both transfers and 
expenditures at LG level169.  
In Madagascar, the EC supported ACORDS programme (more than 65mEUR were 
committed for the intervention under the 9th EDF) has allowed the experimentation with a 
performance based system to finance local governments (through call for proposals) which 
inspired the development of a national intergovernmental fiscal transfer mechanism in 2008 
(Fonds de développement local) supported by both the EC and the World Bank (see 
Indicator 6.2.1 for more details on the ACORDS programme). 
In Sierra Leone, as part of the IRCBP, the LGFD has developed formulae for tied sector 
grants to local councils and a council development grant. Grants are conditional and no 
flexibility exists for their local sector allocation. The development of grants for sectors started 
in 2005 when the first functions were devolved from ministries to LCs. The principle is that 
the same finance formerly used at central level shall be transferred to the LC- followed 
transparent and fair formulae. The system is generally well accepted by stakeholders. 
In Honduras, the EC has not supported the development of transfer systems. 
                                               
169
 http://www.logintanzania.net/index.htm and www.pmoralg.go.tz 
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In Lebanon, the main transfers from central government to local governments in Lebanon are 
made through the Independent Municipal Fund. But the EC support has not sought to further 
develop or reform this arrangement during the evaluation period, but it is a key priority in the 
newly formulated municipal finance project. This system has recently been thoroughly 
analysed (MOIM 2011 op city) and key conclusions are that the current system is in 
transparent and with problematic allocation criteria (although with elements of formula based 
allocations).  
The revenues of the taxes and fees that constitute the Independent Municipal Fund are not 
publicly available. The lack of transparency of data, confounded with withdrawals and 
deductions taking place without the consultation of municipalities (see next section), has 
created an environment of mistrust between central and local governments; 
As previously mentioned, the distribution criteria are set in a Decree rather than a Law. This 
has given the government the right to change the allocation of the revenues as it sees fit. 
Consequently, this has made the distribution to municipalities unpredictable with an adverse 
impact on the ability of municipalities to effectively plan; - The government has regularly 
altered the criteria for distribution that effectively changed the municipalities' share of the 
Independent Municipal Fund. Between 1993 and 2007, the government has adopted 4 
different versions for distributing the Independent Municipal Fund revenues. This further 
introduces uncertainty and instability to the municipalities' budgeting and planning processes;  
Source: MoIM 2011 op. cit 
In Peru, the EC has not supported the development of the transfer system to regional and 
local governments, however some indirect support is given by the application of the official 
system for transfers, through MEF to three regions (Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Apurimac) 
in different programmes (PASA, AMARES y EURO-PAN).  
The Philippines has for long had a formula based LG grant system in place in the form of the 
IRA (see below) – over the years since 1991, this has not been reformed significantly 
although it creates some imbalances by not considering fiscal equalisation and by creation of 
incentives for LGUs to strive to change LG status (see annex 5 of the field visit country note). 
ADB and JICA have supported various analytical works with the aim of reforming the IRA – 
EC has not supported this area.  
Box 50 Main features of the IRA  
Section 284 of the LGC indicates that 40% of the central government‘s gross internal 
revenue in the third preceding fiscal year be transferred to the LGUs as IRA. Provinces and 
cities receive 23% each from the total transfer, municipalities 34%, and Barangays 20%. The 
share of each province, city, and municipality is computed using the horizontal distribution 
formula composed of three determinants namely, population: 50%, land area: 25%, and 
equal sharing: 25%. This IRA distribution formula is considered too simple to respond to the 
already existing imbalances in the fiscal capacity among the LGUs. Thus, there is a clamour 
to revise it to achieve a better fiscal balance at the local level. In other words, the current 
formula needs to be revised in order that the IRA distribution is based on an accurate 
estimate of the financial needs and revenue potential of local government as well as on the 
disparity in development situation. 
Source: From JICA 2009 
The law provides avenues for citizen access to financial information at LGU levels, but LGUs 
have not always been very forthcoming with information. The government has recently 
introduced a new system that may strengthen LGU adherence to good local governance. 
The Performance Based Incentive Policy (PBIP) is an incentive framework to rationalize 
National Government (NG) intergovernmental fiscal transfers to LGUs towards improving 
overall LGU performance in governance (including their disclosure of LG finance 
information). On 20 February 2009, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee 
approved the above-mentioned policy to be implemented to Investment Coordination 
Committee (ICC) approved projects with Performance Based Grant System (PBGS) 
component. Donors have generally encouraged this initiative – and the WB financed 
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analytical work in support of this PBGS back in 2005 – however, results have only recently 
been taken up by Government and are entirely funded by government. Similar systems have 
been introduced in the health sector (with EC support) – however, the PBGS in the health 
sector appears to approach the financing instrument, in a way that it seems that health  is 
largely being delegated rather than devolved to LGU responsibility (see below).  
Box 51 Implementation of Performance-Based Financing Approaches in the 
Philippines 
In F1, performance based financing (PBF) means that budget allocations and releases will 
be conditioned on the achievement of performance targets. F1 aims to install a performance-
based budgeting system for hospitals, public health facilities, and regulatory agencies that 
necessitates reforms in the respective agencies‘ management and procurement system and 
implementation of a performance audit and review system. DOH is now shifting to 
contractual mode of dealing with LGUs. It enters into service-level agreement with LGUs 
when it provides resources to implement a component of the Province-wide Investment Plan 
for Health. The agreement specifies the rights and responsibilities of the DOH and LGU and 
the performance benchmarks to be used to measure compliance. This approach is in 
contrast to the previous unconditional provision of drugs and other inputs. DOH contracting 
of leptospirosis cases with a number of private hospitals also exemplifies the use of PBF in a 
public/private partnership arrangement. 
Source: World Bank 2010, p.35 
In South Africa, the emphasis on enhancing PFM capacity of national, regional and local 
level is a priority of EC support within the governance sectors (PFM capacity remains weak 
at local level). Local accountability of local governments still remains weak. Likewise 
involvement in this area is very weak as most is focused on service delivery and not 
advocacy. Increased transparency in fund allocation is evident in terms of SBS and 
contributions to local budgets. How much the wider public shares this, is not clear. Fund 
utilisation and accounting of these has increased considerably over the evaluation period 
also driven by EC rules and regulations. The National Treasury is a very strong and powerful 
organisation that – supported by Department for International Development (DFID) and EC – 
is very active in setting formula for transfers to provincial and local governments.  
7.3.2 Ind7.3.2 - Financial information (esp. on transfers from government and their 
allocation) provided to the citizens 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
In terms of support in the various countries to wider provision of information to the general 
public on budgets and allocations for local governments, it appears that some aspects of this 
have been supported, but because the main focus of support is on large PFM reform, it often 
originates from the PFM platform, rather than the local government reform platform. 
However, many of the evaluated countries do have ministry websites (like MOF and MOLG 
and specific agencies websites, for instance in Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Peru and 
the Philippines) and through the national media. LGs are also increasingly being encouraged 
to make a full disclosure of their budgets to local CSOs, NGOs and media for wider 
dissemination to the public. In Tanzania, Mali and Benin where formula based transfers exist 
and supported by EC, financial information (esp. regarding the official communication on the 
planned budget) is indeed provided to the citizens (see also previous indicators).  
In Nicaragua the law on transfer to municipalities (2003) defines a gradual increase of the 
total central government budget to municipalities from 3% in 2003 to 10% in 2010. 
Distribution to municipalities follows a formula with population, fiscal capacity, revenue 
collection and actual use of CG transfers as criteria. Some government funds are however 
transferred to investments in municipalities parallel to this system included some from 
PAPSE for O&M of education.  
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8 EQ8: Service delivery 
Evaluation Question 8: To what extent has EC support to decentralisation processes 
contributed to enhancing and sustaining service delivery at local level? 
8.1 JC8.1 Increased financial resources and improved allocation of resources 
for local service provision. 
Main findings at JC level 
In virtually all the countries under review, local governments have experienced an overall 
increase in their budgets, both in total figures and as a share of overall public expenditure. 
(see also JC 5.3).  
However, only in four of the countries has the EC support considered ―increased financial 
resources for local governments through sustainable systems of local government transfers‖ 
to a significant degree as a key objective of the support (e.g. Benin, Mali, Sierra Leone and 
Tanzania). For all these countries, it can be concluded that EC support has led to increased 
fiscal resources available for local governments' delivery of services. Furthermore, the 
support has led to the establishment of systems, in the form of local government grant 
modalities/reforms of the IGFT systems, that lay the foundations for sustainable levels of 
local government financing. In these countries, the EC support has also sought to make the 
fund allocation more transparent, objective and needs-based by introducing systems of 
formula-based allocations.  
In some of the other countries reviewed, the EC has made very significant contributions to 
local development projects implemented within local governments in various project 
modalities without the use of local government grant (IGFT) modalities. These may 
contribute to improved services in the specific localities, but they do not contribute to wider 
governance reforms that include issues such as how local governments generally are 
financed.  
In several countries, the EC has also sought to enhance Private-Public Partnerships (PPPs) 
at local government level to further enhance the likelihood of improved service delivery by 
LGs. Positive examples include the Philippines (PPPs in the health sector) and South Africa. 
However, the South Africa case also illustrates the risks of promoting PPPs without sufficient 
local stakeholder consultations.  
8.1.1 Ind8.1.1 - Total increase in funds allocated for service delivery (as opposed to 
administration) in local governments 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Fiscal resources available for development in local governments have in all countries under 
review increased (see also indicator 5.3.2) – and these have largely been allocated for 
service delivery. The relative share of ―administration‖ as overall share of LG budgets is very 
hard to determine, but seems from available data to have remained constant.  
The significance of these increases and the relative role of EC support differ significantly 
(see table below). Furthermore, it can be observed that the EC has made financial 
contributions for ―local service delivery‖ in two significantly different ways that lead to very 
different kinds of ―governance reform outcomes‖ although they both may contribute to service 
delivery improvements:  
 In some countries (e.g. Benin, Mali, Sierra Leone, Tanzania), the EC has provided 
funds to local governments for service delivery (typically small scale capital 
investments) through various forms of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer (IGFT) 
systems – typically a kind of ―Local Government Development Grant‖, which not only 
increases funds available for local service delivery in local governments, but does so 
in a manner that lays the foundations for a stronger and sustainable system for 
financing services at local government levels.  
 The EC has in several countries (e.g. South Africa and Lebanon) provided funds 
through more specific ―project modalities‖ for various local projects implemented 
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within specific local governments. This (as discussed in JC 8.3) may lead to 
significant improvements in local services, although wider intergovernmental fiscal 
relations remain unchanged. 
Table 38 Overview of LG Financial Resources and EC Contributions during the 
evaluation period 
Country 
 
Latest figure on 
LG share of 
public 
expenditures
170
 
 
Significant 
increases in 
overall levels 
of LG 
budgets over 
evaluation 
period?
171
 
Relative 
importance of 
EC contributions 
to such overall 
increases? 
Direct EC 
contributions for 
decentralisation 
(million € - 
commitments) 
 
Financed through 
IGFTs/ building 
sustainable 
modalities for LG 
services/ 
financing? 
Benin 7% No N.a. 22.5 Yes 
Honduras 7% Yes Minimal 34.0 No 
Lebanon 6% No N.a. 13.2 No 
The Philippines 25% No N.a. 2.1 (+28mEUR of 
sector support) 
No 
Rwanda 12% No N.a. 35.2 No 
Mali 3% Yes Significant 118.9 Yes (partly)
172
 
Peru 20% Yes Minimal 13.3 No 
Sierra Leone N.i. N.i. N.i. 9.1 Yes 
South Africa 58% No N.a. 7.6 (+110mEUR of 
various LED support) 
No 
Tanzania  26% Yes Medium 23.4 Yes 
 
In Benin, local governments manage less than 2% of total public expenditure – the 
importance of relative increases in local government allocations on service delivery is 
therefore modest as explanation of possible service delivery improvements. The local 
government spending in 2008 totalled 3,374 FCFA per capita, against 2,530 FCFA in 2007, 
an increase of 33%. This increase was attributable to an improved level of collection of own 
resources by the municipalities from 2007 to 2008 from 16.0 to 19.1 billion FCFA (19% 
increase) and the increase in transfers of the GoB, whose share of the total general budget 
expenditure of the state increased from 1.5% to 1.9% between 2007 and 2008. The trend 
continued in 2009 with a budget transfer for investment (FADeC) of 7,436 billion FCFA 
against 5,436 in 2008. This has been supported by the EC both through GBS but also 
especially through SBS for decentralisation. If we look at 2008, own resources of 
municipalities for recurrent costs stood at an average of 53% of total resources. This share 
increases with the size of the town, between 20% and 56% for municipalities with over 
90,000 inhabitants. The capital, Cotonou, stands out with an own revenue source for 
recurrent costs of about 80%. The share of investment expenditure in total expenditure in 
turn decreases with the size of the municipality by 49% to 24% to an average of 33%. This 
shows that the resource poor and rural municipalities have difficulty in meeting both recurrent 
and investment needs. This is the background for the work that the EC spearheads with 
other DPs in terms of securing an equitable and more demand driven transfer system 
through FADeC. The central government transfers to municipalities have increased sharply 
since 2006 (up 14% in 2007, up 42% in 2008 compared to 2007). In 2008, a total of 10.3 
billion FCFA have been paid to the municipalities, of which 53% allocated to investment and 
from the FADeC. So while the service delivery improvements can only be called tentative at 
                                               
170
 See table ―indicator 5.3.2‖ for details. 
171
 Defined as more than 20% relative increase.  
172
 The ANCIT is not entirely a normal IGFT but established the basis for such. 
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most the EC has been instrumental in securing increased funding for LGs for key functional 
needs and for local investments. Actual figures on service delivery in the municipalities are 
hard to come by but as the table below demonstrates there is a very large gap between 
annual planned budgets at LG level and actual expenditures. This is normally an indication of 
poor capacity to transfer, manage and implementation funds for investment in service 
delivery improvements – an area that the EC and other partners have concentrated on in 
larger sector programmes and also for investment purposes through the FADeC in the last 
three to four years. But with only 5% (PER 2010) of the national budget being spent through 
LGs the issue of decentralised service delivery is clearly more a centrally sector driven 
prerogative than a local development planning one.  
Table 39 Average % expenditure against budget 2004-2009 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
2004-2009 
Administration/Functions 
Investments 
Total Expenditure 
75 
41 
58 
64 
30 
47 
76 
48 
62 
125 
42 
83 
60 
88 
67 
67 
76 
70 
78 
54 
65 
 
In Mali, funds for LG investments are channelled through ANICT. The evolution of these 
amounts is described in details in EQ5. It is noteworthy that, over the period 2001-2010, 147 
billion FCFA (223mEUR) were allocated to and mobilised by LG. Between 2002 and 2006, 
the average was 10 billion FCFA/year (15mEUR). From 2007 onwards, the average 
increased with the shift to sector fund in education and health up to 25 billion FCFA/year 
(38mEUR). On average, this corresponds to 50,000 EUR per LG but, as explained before, 
there are actually huge disparities between LG. The box below provides complementary 
details on the system put in place for the contribution of the EC to this system. 
Box 52 EC contributions to IGFT via the ANICT/FICT system in Mali 
In the 2001-2010 period, the contribution of the EC amounted to 76mEUR ("Droit de Tirage"). 
This represents 34% of the funds raised via ANICT. The contribution of other donors during 
this period accounts for 55% of the funds and the central government for 11%. It is important 
to note that the contribution of the EC has been instrumental in the first FICT ("Fonds 
d‟Investissement des Collectivités Territoriales") managed by the ANICT. During the 2001-
2005 period, this contribution amounted to 70% of the funds. Without the EC support, the 
FICT would not have reached a substantial level and would not have covered the whole 
country. The ratio was then reversed with the introduction of specific sector "drawing 
counters" ("guichets sectoriels") in 2007. Today, thanks to the EC budget support and the 
fact that the EDF funds for ANICT are not targeted, a minimum of equalisation can continue.  
LG which do not receive targeted funds can benefit from a minimum level of drawing rights. It 
is noteworthy that there is no consolidated data to assess the share of investment excluding 
ANICT funds. A qualitative study in 2004 (PADC feasibility financed by the AFD) was carried 
out on a limited sample of LG and revealed that 72% of funding registered as "LG 
investment" in the period 2001-2004 came from the ANICT. Yet, when all actual investment 
projects carried out in the administrative division were considered, only 40% of the 
investments had been funded by the ANICT. This fact was explained by the investments for 
which funding did not go through the LG budget. These investments actually often reflected 
the dynamism of the Mayor to raise funds from other sources. There is no evidence whether 
this situation has prevailed in subsequent years.  
The transfer mechanism of ANICT in Mali is based on financial resources of the state and 
external resources available. The funds for local investment of local authorities (FICT) are 
95% for the investment in infrastructure and 5% for the operating costs of ANICT. The Board 
of Directors determine ANICT regional envelope available. The Regional Council then 
determines the drawing rights of each circle (district) and each municipality. From 2004 the 
contribution rate has been adjusted in order to facilitate investment in certain sectors: NRM 
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and Environment 5%; Water 10%; Education, Health Facilities 50%; Markets, 
Slaughterhouses, Bus stations, Parks 15%; Infrastructure (town hall, access roads) 20%. 
 
In Sierra Leone, the total revenues of the local councils have increased in real terms with 
148% from 2005 to 2009 to 68.4 bill Le (app. 13.4mEUR), and the expenditures follow the 
same pattern according to LGFD. The figure shows clearly a substantial increase in LCs 
expenditure, which indicates that more services are provided173. The EC has contributed to 
this development through the Institutional Reform and Capacity Building Programme, which 
has financed the local development grant to local councils and also provided support to local 
councils‘ revenue generation. 
In Tanzania, LG budgets have increased significantly. JC 5.3 describes in detail the 
amazingly extensive overall increase in LG budgets: an incredible ten fold increase over ten 
years (from 0.2 billion TZS in 2000 to 2.2 billion TZS in 2009). This increase has largely been 
in the form of earmarked central government transfers for key services under local 
government responsibility such as: education, health, agriculture, roads and (to a lesser 
extent) water. Reliable data on details of LG expenditures for the entire ten-year period under 
review are not readily available. However, it is evident that most of budget increases have 
been earmarked for priority sectors (not least because almost 80% of the funds have been 
earmarked central government transfers for these sectors). Annex 6 of the field visit country 
note (see Volume II – Annex 11) provides a detailed overview: LGs would typically spend 
more than 50% on education services, some 14% on health with lesser allocations to various 
other sectors. Costs for administration (the political council and various non sector specific 
staff such as accountants, tax collectors, and administrative officers including village 
executives, ward executives etc.) were about 13%. 
Figure 23 LG Expenditure Patterns (the case of Tanzania) 
 
Most of the increased LGs resources come from fiscal transfers – in particular earmarked 
fiscal transfers for education and health, so the above expenditure patterns come as no 
surprise. The particular EC contributions to these developments have foremost been the EC 
contribution to the LGDG (total 20mEUR) just as GBS (to which EC contributes) has been a 
significant (but not sole) source enabling the GoT to increase its budgetary allocations for 
services such as education and health through LGs.  
In Honduras, the EC has not directly supported the building up or transfer of more resources 
at municipal level via PROADES. Municipal expenses for operations have increased with 
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 The exact figures for service delivery can however not be presented due to limitations in the statistics from 
MoFED. 
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51% from 2002 to 2009 in constant prices indicating, that more funds are available for 
service delivery. Expenses for service delivery cannot be separated.  
Table 40 Municipal Expenditures in Honduras from 2002 to 2009 
Year 
All expenses 
(egresos totales) 
Operacional costs 
(gastos de 
funcionamiento) 
2002 100 100 
2003 114 110 
2004 124 107 
2005 75 76 
2006 96 117 
2007 211 197 
2008 137 114 
2009 167 151 
Source: Ministry of the Interior and Population (SEIP) - see detailed calculations in annex 7 of the country note 
(Volume II). constant prices index 2002=100 
 
In Lebanon, local governments have throughout the evaluation period only managed a rather 
small part of total public expenditures (around 6% throughout the period). For local 
governments generally, there is no evidence of increased financial resources and improved 
allocation of resources for local service provision (reform of Internal Municipal Fund or 
similar). The EUD has in the evaluation period not sought to reform local government finance 
in a systematic way but mainly tried to deliver local projects ―through local governments‖ by 
project specific financing (a new programme in support of municipal fiscal reforms was 
developed during the evaluation period not yet effectively started). However, such project 
specific funding has been substantive and in the case of EU been provided for funding of a 
range of service delivery improvements. The EC has supported establishment of local 
development projects in municipalities and unions of an estimated value of 52mEUR. This is 
a significant investment in the concerned communities that only constitute a sample of the 
municipalities in Lebanon. The investments include a wide range of support: 
 Eco-tourist plans and related paths, 
 Rural parks, 
 Municipal centres, 
 Roads, 
 Solid waste, 
 Rural health, education, 
 Improved farming. 
In Peru, the expenditures for regional and local governments have increased during the last 
year in constant prices, which indicates that local services are better than before. The EC 
has only supported this indirectly through sector programmes. During the evaluation period 
the expenditures of the regional and the local governments have increased substantially as 
shown below. 
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Table 41 Total expenditures of the Public Sector (Peru) 
 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Central Government 42,643 49,337 43,731 54,148 
Local Governments n/a n/a 6,898 17,707 
Regional Governments n/a 9,158 12,776 16,177 
Total  42,643 58,495 63,405 88,032 
Source: www.ofi.mef.gob.pe & consultant‟s own calculations - for details, see Annex 8 of the country note 
(Volume II) 
Note : 2010 constant price; in million Soles . 
The EC has not supported decentralisation programmes with funds for regional or local 
governments‘ expenditures. EC Sector programmes (PASA, EURO-PAN and AMARES) and 
Programa de Apoyo al Desarrollo Socioeconimico y a la Descentralizacion en las Regiones 
de Ayacucho y Huancavelica, AGORAH in the three priority regions (Ayacucho, 
Huancavelica y Apurimac) have however supported this indirectly by providing support to 
LGs, regional governments and ministries at regional level.  
In the Philippines, it is concluded from recent policy review (see extract below) that public 
resources allocated for health only have increased marginally – and mainly driven by 
increased DOH resources rather than added resources by the LGUs. However, it should be 
noted that fiscal data on aggregate LGU spending is very poor. Some initiatives – such as 
the special congressional funds for health have leveraged additional LGU allocations (see 
box below). During the field visit to Negros Occidental, it was found that Provincial health 
allocations generally had increased and currently constituted 40-50% of total provincial 
expenditures (different figures were quoted during interviews). EC support for fiscal aspects 
of the health reforms have focused on the wider aspects of general sector financing – 
especially the health insurance scheme, rather than e.g. explored use of conditional grants 
for local governments health services.  
Box 53 Health Financing in the Philippines - Extracts from Health Sector Policy 
Review 2010 
Low levels, Fragmentation and Inequity in Health Financing 
In 2005 at the beginning of F1, the Philippines spent only 3% of its GDP on the health sector 
while other Southeast Asian countries spent, on average, about 4-5%. This number has 
grown very slowly (there has been slight increase in national government financing for DOH) 
but the shares (percentages) between government, social insurance, private insurance and 
private OOP have hardly changed. In fact, as the review points out, private OOP spending is 
growing in the Philippines. 
Fiscal Space and Health Spending. The low levels of public spending on health are partly 
related to fiscal space issues in the Philippines. Fiscal space for health refers to the ability of 
a country to increase public spending for health without jeopardising the government‘s long-
term fiscal sustainability (Heller 2006). From a macro-fiscal perspective, the prospects of 
availability of additional public resources for health in the Philippines have been traditionally 
low. As Chapter 2 showed, the revenue to GDP ratio in the Philippines is below the average 
for other middle-income countries, including in East Asia, and the health sector has not been 
traditionally accorded a high priority – as indicated by the elasticity of public spending on 
health. Moreover, with almost 50% of the population of the country working in the informal 
sectors, it has been hard to mobilise resources from this group through the PHIC‘s Individual 
Program. In most LMICs such as the Philippines, achieving universal coverage has required 
long periods of time, and substantial dependence on general budget revenues to finance 
universal health insurance coverage (Langenbrunner and Somanathan, 2010, Gottret and 
Schieber 2006).  
Overall trends in DOH, LGU and PHIC Financing: After declining in real terms for nearly a 
decade, the DOH budget has increased its spending on health as a percentage of 
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government expenditures. As a result, government expenditures on health have increased 
from 6% in 2002 to 6.8% in 2007. In particular, spending for public health interventions such 
as vaccines, anti-tuberculosis drugs, and the upgrading of government health facilities to 
provide emergency obstetric care has increased in the past two years. However, the 
increase has largely been limited to central government expenditures, while LGU 
expenditures on health have declined in real terms. Also, PHIC‘s share of health 
expenditures has hardly grown since it was established in 1995 (this is discussed in greater 
details in the next section).  
Inequity in LGU Financing and Absorption Capacities – LGUs are at different states of 
natural endowments, economic development, and institutional capacities. This impacts their 
revenue-raising capacities as well as the ability to absorb resources. Moreover, the inequity 
in the internal revenue allotment (IRA) among provinces, cities, and municipalities translates 
into highly variable health services. Changes in the IRA are beyond the control of the DOH 
and require intervention at a higher level of government. Wide regional and provincial 
variation in LGU health spending occur mainly because of LGUs‘ heavy reliance on IRA, 
which does not take account of health needs. The inequities in LGU allocation are 
exacerbated by the fact that highly urban cities can generate additional resources from their 
large tax base (property and business taxes) while poor, rural municipalities and provinces 
cannot do the same. Because the IRA allocation favors cities, there has been a flurry of 
municipalities wanting to be cities. The proportion of the IRA going to health is not nearly 
enough to fund the cost of devolved health functions, a situation that has left many health 
facilities in a poor state of repair.  
Fragmentation in Financing – Devolution has led to the fragmentation of service delivery as 
public health functions and primary care (the responsibility of municipalities) were de-linked 
from primary and secondary hospitals (the responsibility of provinces) which were in turn de-
linked from tertiary and national referral hospitals (the responsibility of DOH). The lack of 
inter-jurisdictional payment system for referrals, the mobility of patients, and frequent 
bypassing of primary care and district hospitals to start with, has led to the fraying of the 
financing and delivery system, manifest in overcrowded provincial and DOH hospitals, and 
underutilised health centres and district hospitals. The ―network model‖ that existed prior to 
devolution – based on the district catchment area and district health structure that responds 
to it – has all but disappeared.  
Recent efforts under F1 – Formula 1 carried out several initiatives to correct some of the 
inherent weaknesses of devolution. To ease the problems of service fragmentation, 
lumpiness of investment, and externalities (spill-over effects), some municipalities have 
organised themselves into inter-local health zones (ILHZs) so that they can share resources 
and benefits together. As of end-2009, as many as 274 ILHZs have been organised in 72 
provinces for various reasons, although little has been done to empirically evaluate their 
effectiveness, impact and sustainability.  
Until recently, there was little planning capacity for health in LGUs. This problem is being 
addressed with the roll-out of the Province-wide Investment Plans for Health (PIPH). The 
PIPH has become the principal instrument to coordinate and consolidate the fragmented 
strands of resource mobilisation by the province as it lays out the multi-year investment plan 
based on needs identified and the various financing sources (IRA, commodity self-reliance 
plans relying mostly on locally-generated revenues, reimbursements from PhilHealth, 
additional central government grants, LGU‘s own loans, commodity and in-kind support, and 
external assistance, if any). Lower-level localities are also undertaking their own city and 
municipal investment plans for health. It remains to be seen how far these local health 
investment planning initiatives can generate additional resources for health, allocate them 
properly, and result in a rationalised efficient service delivery system. To measure provincial 
health expenditures, Local Health Accounts are also being piloted in 11 provinces.  
Source: World Bank – Health Sector Policy Review 2010- pp 75 
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Special Congressional funds for health  
Since 2007, the National Government through the DOH has leveraged LGUs to provide 
resources to specific public health programmes through specially grant allocations. In 2007, 
Congress appropriated 150mPHP to be used by LGUs for family planning and reproductive 
health services. In the following year, Congress also appropriated 2 billion PHP to be used 
by LGUs for Maternal, Neonatal and Child Health And Nutrition (MNCHN) services. In both 
cases, the governing rules require that the LGU should first show that it has spent some of its 
own resources to these programmes before it can access the Congressional grants, to 
indicate that the LGU does consider these programmes as a priority. As a result, the annual 
budgetary appropriations to the DOH have ballooned in recent years. This is an important 
development for it reinstates the DOH and the regional Centers for Health Development 
(CHDs) as key players in local health financing, an influence DOH lost with devolution.  
Source: World Bank – Health Sector Policy Review 2010- pp 33 
 
In Rwanda, LG budgets have grown in total numbers, especially after 2006 (see table below) 
but LG share of national budget is constant 12% over the period 2006 to 2011 and is not 
projected to grow either in the near future, as projections for 2012/13 it remains at the same 
level. This does not necessarily mean that the administrative budget versus the service 
delivery budget has grown since most services are delivered though line ministry budgets but 
it does show that LGs do not have much control over the service delivery budget as such. 
Figure 24  National versus District Total Budgets 
M CFW 2006 2007 2008 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 
Districts 34,703,770 68,154,550 84,660,910 134,737,526 110,059,002 128,532,235 137,023,702 
Nat. budget 
total 
281,539,806 419,701,400 521,135,190 988,304,673 984,022,047 1,068,684,952 1,141,509,690 
District % 
share 
12% 16% 16% 14% 11% 12% 12% 
Source: MINECOFIN 
Service delivery improvements at LG level are more centrally driven than locally – 
earmarking and programme approach in sectors. Improved and sustained economic growth 
averaging 10% p.a in the recent years - has encouraged socio-cultural development and 
significantly reduced poverty. Baseline surveys that informed development of the EDPRS 
2008-2012 give background evidence that national statistics (trends) justify the engendered 
impact of decentralisation during the period (2001-2009) in form of reduced unemployment 
rate174; improved GDP175, increased access and utilisation of land (agricultural production). 
Rates of poverty reduction since 2000 have been modest (though not fast enough to meet 
either the targets set in Vision 2020 or the MDGs)176.  
In South Africa, eliminating backlogs in basic service and infrastructure delivery is a South 
African national priority. While much has been achieved, many remain without basic 
municipal services in water and sanitation, solid waste removal, electricity connection, and 
provision of housing. Improved governance has increased the availability of government and 
                                               
174
 According to the EICV 2007 results, levels of declared unemployment are very low in Rwanda but under-
employment is high. There has been diversification of household income sources as the proportion of the 
employed labour force engaged in agricultural occupations fell by 9% nationally to 80% between 2000/01 and 
2005/06, with most of the decline occurring among men. The share of the labour force working in formal 
employment increased from 5% to 10% over the same period or an estimated 1.25 million people of working age 
(15 to 70). Young people and women more often perform unpaid work than men. 
175
 GDP grew from an average of 6.4% in 2006 to about 10% p.a in 2009 
176
 Average poor person‘s consumption is at about RWF 150 per day, increased by over 2% since 2001. 
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donor funding. There are three broad streams of national transfers to local government: the 
equitable share as well as infrastructure and current transfers (conditional grants). According 
to Treasury's 2005 Medium Term Budget Policy Statement the equitable share in 2005/06 
comprised R10578 million, infrastructure grants R6130 million and capacity building and 
restructuring grants R749 million. The percentage of transfers in total municipal budgets (or 
rather: the dependency rates) varies enormously: from 92% in Bohlabela/Bushbuckridge 
(Limpopo) to 3% in Cape Town (Western Cape). The EC did not directly contribute to these 
fiscal transfers. The EC contributions for local service delivery were earmarked for projects in 
selected local governments (four provinces) with a total budget of approximately 100 million 
EUR. 
In Cambodia, it was noted during the desk phase that EC support has been restricted to a 
special fund. Each year 1,8 mUSD is granted through the Inter-Commune Co-operation fund 
for projects that straddle commune boundaries. Since 2006 more than 260 projects have 
been implemented across 12 provinces and 54 districts. In rural areas, inter-commune roads 
and small bridges have been built, helping local residents and farmers better connect to 
markets and services. In remote areas, school dormitories have been built for indigenous 
young people to attend schools. Service projects have also been implemented to respond to 
women‘s concerns, environmental issues, eco-tourism and farmers‘ training needs. 
8.1.2 Ind8.1.2 - Improved targeting of resources through e.g. need based formula 
based allocations 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Procedures for improved targeting of fiscal resources have improved in several of the 
countries. This includes efforts for improved planning procedures (see also EQ6) and efforts 
for more transparent and need based allocation of central government funding for local 
governments through establishment of formula based local government grants as part of 
IGFTs (this was also discussed in EQ7/JC7.3). 
The EC has in particular made contributions to development of such formula based grant 
systems in Benin, Mali, Sierra Leone and Tanzania. 
In Benin, decentralisation started with elections for the 77 Municipal Councils in 2004. The 
municipalities were given a number of tasks mandated by law, amongst others the 
construction and maintenance of rural roads, primary schools and rural water supply. The 
municipalities were similarly assigned a number of revenues, amongst others taxe de voirie, 
sales tax etc., however their most important source of income from the outset was transfers 
from the central government. With only about 5% of the national budget being spent through 
the municipalities this remains extremely low also in comparison with other developing 
countries. Benin has in recent years taken further steps in promoting decentralisation. In 
2007, a Decentralisation Ministry (MDGLAAT) was established, and in 2008 elections for the 
second generation Municipal Councils were held. 2008 further saw the creation of FADeC 
(Fond d‟Appui au Developpement Communale), a block grant (formula based) for the 
municipalities, and CONAFIL (Commission Nationale des Finances Locales), a policy 
advisory body, which provides oversight of the allocation of FADeC funds. Finally, in late 
2009, a National Decentralisation Policy PONADEC was adopted as a guide for the 
decentralisation process in a 10-year perspective. All of this has been supported actively by 
the EC. The proposed formula-based grant for investment purposes is described above 
under Ind 7.3.1. 
In Mali, the following criteria are used to calculate the drawing right (DT) of each LG: 
Population, Remoteness and Level of equipment. During the first period (FICT1), small LG 
were clearly favoured, it was to compensate for their under-equipped situation. A fourth index 
was been considered and corresponded to the rate of recovery of the "TDRL" (tax per capita, 
the main financial resource of the LG). This index was not applied during the FICT1 and its 
use during the FICT2 has encountered some difficulties. In fact, there is no pre-determined 
formula to allocate budget to LG. Each year, the Board (based on a proposal of the DG of the 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
214 
ANICT) decides the weight to be attributed to each of these criteria. A formula was proposed 
for the FICT 2 (2004 ANICT study)177. It seems that this formula could not be applied because 
of the difficulty in calculating the indices, the multiplication of drawing counters ("guichets") 
and the fact that funds became targeted sectorally and / or geographically. In general, the 
development partners now complain about the lack of transparency in the current method of 
calculation. The EC support had limited influence on the choice of the method to calculate 
the drawing rights although through its programmes it has supported efforts of national 
partners in this area.  
In Sierra Leone, the economic principle behind the devolution process is that local councils 
should be given the amount that the centre formerly has allocated for the functions (vertical 
distribution) and the amount should be divided between the councils (horizontal distribution) 
following need based formulae based on population, age distribution, number of installation, 
enrolment rates, etc. This has already taken place since 2005 and should imply a better use 
of resources, more targeting and more local involvement. The IRCBP has supported the 
development of the formulae for transfers and also their size by financing the development 
grant.  
In Tanzania, the EC has contributed to the LGDG that has served as model for establishing 
an overall system for transfer of formula based allocations of development funds to LGs. 
Development funds for LGs are today almost entirely transferred on a formula basis. The 
general formula for LGDG is based on population, land area and poverty patterns. The 
annual allocations are furthermore adjusted annually in accordance to the performance of 
past years. Development funds for sectors are typically adjusted with inclusion of sector 
specific data (child mortality in health sector, number of farmers etc in agricultural 
development grants, number of school going children in education sector etc). 
8.1.3 Ind8.1.3 - Existence of public-private partnerships in the delivery of services 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Public Private Partnerships have generally been strengthened in all the countries reviewed. 
This has typically taken place as a broad transformation where EU has been one among 
several external donors to support the process. 
The EC contributions to changes have been most significant in three countries where 
interventions have been of very different character:  
 Lebanon: the EC in various ways have sought to improve public – private 
partnerships; partly in the establishment of waste management services and partly by 
development of the ―eco-plans‖ in the clusters of municipalities supported under 
LOGO. It is too early to determine if establishment of such partnerships will be 
successful. 
 The Philippines: in the health sector, the EC has supported innovations regarding 
enhanced hospital autonomy and reforms and strengthening of the health insurance 
system whereby private resources for health services are mobilised and utilised (and 
retained) by semi autonomous hospitals under the local governments (the provincial 
hospitals). The systems are perceived by stakeholders as sustainable and leading to 
improved services (ref health Sector Policy Review of 2010 – see also box below). 
 South Africa: the national Treasury produced detailed guidelines and procedures for 
the establishment of Public-Private Partnerships. These were aimed at large 
partnerships, were onerous and meant that such partnerships were slow to emerge. 
National policies on PPPs were only slowly emerging at local levels. However, the EC 
support for local economic development programmes (in Limpopo, KwaZulu-Natal 
                                               
177
 "La détermination des droits de tirage de chaque collectivité territoriale résulterait de l‘application de la formule 
suivante: 
• Droit de tirage = droit de tirage pour l‘ensemble de la région x (indice synthétique de la collectivité /  indices 
synthétiques de toutes les collectivités de la région); 
• Indice synthétique = Indice population + indice éloignement + indice équipement + (recettes TDRL recouvrées / 
prévisions de recettes TDRL)." 
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and the Eastern Cape) made funding available contingent on the establishment of 
such partnerships. Consequently partnerships were imposed on beneficiaries; often 
these proved to be flags of convenience to secure funding, while the weaker partner 
did not always benefit. It has not been possible to quantify the extent to which weaker 
partners have been empowered. Many partnerships did not appear sustainable. 
However, in some instances where such partnerships were established (e.g. with the 
sugar industry in KwaZulu-Natal), they have yielded positive results, mainly in job 
creation and the sustaining of small enterprises. 178 
Box 54 PPP in the Philippines - Extracts from Health Sector Policy Review 2010 
Hospital bed capacity in the Philippines is below the average for East Asian countries and 
below the rates of other MICs such as China and Thailand. The capacity gaps are most 
prevalent in rural and hard to reach areas, which means that the gaps in service delivery 
most affect poor families that live in these areas. Few new hospitals and hospital beds are 
being added, and the hospital system is being over-run by population growth, the rise of non-
communicable diseases, the frequency of accidents, other trauma and an aging population. 
Public-private partnerships are often limited to medical imaging. Inequity and variance is 
growing between the well-endowed private sector and autonomous government hospitals 
that are able to pass the highest levels of global accreditation and ill-endowed public and 
private hospitals. 
The majority of the public hospitals systems (with the exception of a few DOH managed 
centres of excellence in Manila) have not undergone systematic investment and upgrading 
since before devolution, even though the population has grown and the role of hospitals has 
changed substantially in the past 25-30 years. Under ―Formula 1‖, provinces have received 
financing to upgrade parts of their hospitals. In most provinces, funds available for 
investment are limited, and upgrading has focused mainly on minimum standards for 
emergency obstetric services. Provinces have been asked to prepare rationalization plans for 
the hospitals in their area as a pre-requisite for investment; in an attempt to ensure new 
investment is consistent with efficient, sustainable operation of hospitals. But the available 
investment resources are too limited to finance major expansion and upgrading of hospital 
capacity in areas that need increased capacity. In spite of DOH efforts to insist on rational 
investment criteria, external intervention in hospital investment continues to undermine these 
efforts, leading to a non-sustainable investment that is not consistent with a high quality, 
modern hospital system. There is a need for nationwide analysis of the gaps in hospital 
capacity and planning for how to fill these – through a combination of public and private 
sector investment.  
With regards to hospital autonomy, Some central hospitals have Maternal, Neonatal and 
Child Health And Nutrition (GOCC) status. DOH retained hospitals were given some fiscal 
autonomy since 2004. But an accountability framework for GOCC hospitals and fiscally 
autonomous DOH hospitals was not put in place before they were given autonomy. Many 
LGU hospitals do not have fiscal autonomy and are not able to retain PhilHealth revenues. 
The hospital autonomy framework is not comprehensive: there are gaps in relation to 
autonomy over personnel and capital investment, gaps in relation to information systems for 
performance monitoring, weak accountability framework and gaps in policies for financing 
social functions of the hospital more explicitly. The DOH has begun to develop some of the 
building blocks for increasing the accountability of hospitals through attempts to develop a 
hospital score card. However, because of the lack of robust hospital information systems in 
most hospitals, the basic foundations for a hospital score card are not yet in place.  
Private hospital capacity is concentrated in Metro Manila and other major metropolitan areas. 
A substantial share of private hospital beds is found in very small hospitals. Many if not most 
of these are probably not functioning at the standards usually expected for secondary care 
hospitals. However, ―inflation‖ of the categories of hospital license has occurred to such an 
extent that it is difficult to assess how much private hospital capacity exists at secondary and 
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 Interview with key LED focal points in KwaZulu Natal Province.  
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tertiary levels in the Philippines, in the sense in which secondary and tertiary levels are 
understood internationally. Inflation in the categorization of hospitals is motivated by in part 
by the payment system used by PhilHealth (and Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMOs)/private health insurers) which pays at higher rates for tertiary level hospitals, even 
for the same procedure. The fact that PHIC (and HMOs/private health insurers) only cover 
drugs and diagnostic tests for inpatients may be driving unnecessary hospital admissions in 
low-level hospital facilities for patients who could be diagnosed and treated in outpatient 
settings. The fact that PhilHealth sets reimbursement ceilings per hospitalization and permits 
hospitals to balance-bill means that patients are not protected from catastrophic costs. It also 
means that hospitals are not subject to pressures to minimize costs and increase efficiency. 
Patient choice is not an effective driver of hospital efficiency, because patients have limited 
scope to compare prices for hospital treatment. There is good evidence that PhilHealth 
reimbursement leads to inflation in private hospital costs.  
As is the case in many countries, patients routinely bypass first –contact care to seek care in 
more expensive hospital settings. First-contact (primary care) in the Philippines is largely 
perceived to be providing public and preventive, rather than curative, services and therefore 
patients prefer to seek care at the next levels. (World Bank 2010 op cit page 82-83) 
Source: World Bank – Health Sector Policy Review 2010- pp 33 
In other countries reviewed in this evaluation, the EC has not played a significant role in this 
area: 
 In Tanzania, PPPs are developing in all sectors, although private sector participation 
in some sectors has been under significant competition from a rapidly expanding 
public sector (in particular in health and education sector). In the agricultural sector 
more emphasis is paid to PPPs in current agricultural policies compared to former 
socialist Ujama policies. For all infrastructure development, LGs have over the last 15 
years largely abandoned past practices of direct implementation and instead 
outsourced construction works to the private sectors. The LGDG requires all LGs to 
outsource construction work. The drive towards enhancing PPPs is pervasive and 
broadly supported by all development partners in all sectors. Specifically in the local 
government sector, this was to a large extent initiated in 1999 when the basket 
funded Local Government reform Programme took off (and EC was not part of the 
basket). The EC participated marginally in the design of the LGDG where PPP 
modalities were encouraged.  
 In Benin, there are examples of public-private partnerships in delivery of services in 
Benin. Through 15 years of concerted effort initiated in Cotonou, the system of pre-
collection of solid waste by NGOs working at the household level has been well 
conceived and implemented. In the main urban areas, the NGO‘s serve from 60-85% 
of establishments of their zones and receive payments regularly and adequately for 
their efforts. This high level of service is based on a high level of commercial 
establishment participation, offsetting the lower household level of participation. 
Cotonou has precise pre-collection zones and the pre-collectors work with official 
authorization. The authorization specifies performance criteria and appends a terms 
of reference and is given annually. The NGO‘s then enter annual contracts with each 
household they serve. The fee for service in Cotonou is based on the city‘s tariff 
structure, which takes affordability into consideration for each area and enables extra 
charges for additional volumes collected per source of generation. This is an area 
especially supported by the WB and not so much by the EC.  
 In Mali, there is no real public-private partnership for the delivery of basic public 
services in Mali. The system that prevails is more a system of co-management with 
the users. For example in the health sector, they are user groups that manage 
community health centres (CSCOM – "Centres de Santé Communautaire") and a 
"partnership framework" has been established between these associations, LG and 
the deconcentrated health services. Regarding schools, a management committee 
involves the school principal, the parents and a representative of the LG. 
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 In Peru, the EC has not supported the establishment of public private partnership as 
part of the support to decentralisation.  
 PPP are a developing issue in Rwanda but not one that the mission could find a lot of 
evidence on. However, as stated before volunteers deliver many services especially 
within health. The GoR encourages this as part of the wider civic duties of the citizens 
in Rwanda. Once a month all citizens are asked to participate in cleaning their 
neighbourhood and working for environmental improvements.  
 In Sierra Leone, PPP related to the delivery of social services have not been 
developed according to the stakeholders met during the mission. The IRCBP has not 
supported this. 
8.2 JC8.2 Improved operation and maintenance of locally provided services  
Main findings at JC level 
Systematic data on O&M of local facilities are rarely available and have not been 
systematically supported by the EC in its decentralisation support but more frequently 
analysed as part of sector specific support (health, education etc). Where undertaken, 
general user satisfaction surveys indicate that only marginal (if any) improvements have 
taken place.  
EC support has to a large extent focused on broader policy and capacity development with 
support for service delivery at local level mainly in the form of increased capital investments 
with limited focus on operation and maintenance issues. In several of the programmes, the 
basic premise is that since local authorities are permanent institutions with some recurrent 
annual budgets, then it is by definition at least more sustainable to support local investments 
under responsibilities of such local governments rather than simply (as typically in the past) 
support local investments with loosely defined ―community‖ responsibilities for operation and 
maintenance.  
In several of the countries reviewed, it is reported that there are substantive problems with 
O&M of facilities (e.g. in countries as different as Mali, Lebanon and South Africa). In 
Tanzania it is found that road maintenance has improved – which almost entirely can be 
ascribed to the establishment of the Road Fund and related systems and financing 
arrangements of local governments road maintenance – developed as part of road sector 
support rather than as part of general local government reform/decentralisation support (the 
EU contributed to the general establishment of the Road Fund, whereas other DPs were 
relative more active on the particular aspects related to LGs use of the Road Fund).  
Wherever data is available on O&M budgets it is most commonly noted that allocations are 
―insufficient‖ and significant maintenance problems are pointed out in for instance Lebanon, 
Mali, Sierra Leone and South Africa. 
In several countries, it can be noted that the responsibility for O&M is shared between central 
governments and local governments and successful O&M hinges on well-defined (and 
resourced) intergovernmental arrangements.  
The case of the Road Fund in Tanzania is illustrative as it provided a stable source of O&M 
funding as well as clear modalities for sharing these among local governments and guidance 
for their utilisation. The arrangements for the road fund were supported by several 
development partners in Tanzania (including the EU) as part of their infrastructure 
development support (thus it didn't grow out of efforts for local government 
reforms/decentralisation support). Road funds are now common in many developing 
countries, but the extent to which this also includes windows for local government revenue 
sharing varies.  
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8.2.1 Ind8.2.1 - Allocations for operation and maintenance in local budgets and 
assessments of their adequacy 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Data on operation and maintenance budget allocations are scare in all countries reviewed. 
EC support to decentralisation has in general not paid much attention to these issues. EC 
support has to a large extent mainly focused on broader policy and capacity development 
with support for service delivery at local level mainly in the form of increased capital 
investments with limited focus on operation and maintenance issues. In several of the 
programmes, the basic premise is that since local authorities are permanent institutions with 
some recurrent annual budgets, then it is by definition at least more sustainable to support 
local investments under responsibilities of such local governments rather than simply (as 
typically in the past) support local investments with loosely defined ―community‖ 
responsibilities for operation and maintenance.  
Wherever data is available on O&M budgets it is most commonly noted that allocations are 
―insufficient‖ and significant maintenance problems are pointed out in for instance Lebanon, 
Mali, Sierra Leone and South Africa. 
In several countries, it can be noted that the responsibility for O&M is shared between central 
governments and local governments and successful O&M hinges on well-defined (and 
resourced) intergovernmental arrangements. The case of the Road Fund in Tanzania is 
illustrative (see box below) as it provided a stable source of O&M funding as well as clear 
modalities for sharing these among local governments and guidance for their utilisation. The 
arrangements for the road fund were supported by several development partners in Tanzania 
(including the EU) as part of their infrastructure development support (thus it didn't grow out 
of efforts for local government reforms/decentralisation support). Road funds are now 
common in many developing countries, but the extent to which this also includes windows for 
local government revenue sharing varies.  
Box 55 Arrangements for financing road local governments road maintenance in 
Tanzania 
Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania enacted the Roads Tolls Act in December 
1998, establishing the Road Fund and the Road Fund Board. The main source of funding is 
the fuel levy – 30% of the income is distributed to local governments as a conditional grant 
for maintenance of roads under there responsibility (local urban roads as well as district 
feeder roads) whereas the remaining 70% is for maintenance of national roads (trunk roads, 
highways etc). The funds are shared among the approximate 140 local governments 
according to a formula based on existing stock of roads eligible for maintenance. The funds 
are transferred to local government as earmarked for maintenance and local governments 
have to report on a quarterly basis on use of the funds. 179 
 
In several countries, arrangements for O&M of local services, is largely seen as ―community 
responsibilities‖ where local water communities, school, committees is given the main 
responsibility for maintenance with often vaguely defined roles for backup from local 
governments.  
Local governments are in some countries (e.g. Mali) given general guidelines regarding e.g. 
―earmark minimum 15% of your revenue for O&M‖ – these broad guidelines appear difficult 
to adhere to, difficult to monitor and overall insufficient in the absence of well defined sector 
specific arrangements that specifies in details the responsibilities of central government, local 
government and users for O&M with related clear financing modalities.  
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The information collected during the field phase is presented below. 
In Mali, it turned out to actually be very difficult to assess any contribution of the EC to the 
improvement of local infrastructures maintenance, especially given the fact that the aid was 
delivered in the form of budget support. The EC has indeed supported the CCC ("Centres de 
Conseils Communaux") which plaid an active role in this area providing specific guidance for 
the improvement of LG maintenance system. Overall, it appears that maintenance of local 
infrastructures is still a major problem in Mali. The central government formulated a directive 
in order to oblige LG to allocate 15% of their budgets for maintenance operations. This 
seems however difficult to be applied given the limited budgets of LG (which is largely used 
to pay salaries and to cover the financial requirements for new investments). There is no 
consolidated study giving the exact share of LG budget for maintenance. Recent qualitative 
studies indicate either an absence of expenditures for maintenance or a very low level of 
expenditures. In Mali, LG generally consider that the responsibilities for maintenance of 
buildings and equipments lies at the level of the management committees and that costs 
should be covered by the budget of these committees (e.g. school management committee, 
health facilities users associations).  
In Benin, the Evaluation Team while could not make a full analysis of the question of 
operation and maintenance budgets at local level. Normally municipalities have been using 
their own small revenue sources for O&M budgets, but these have fallen considerably over 
the past 5 years. Only the larger municipalities of Cotonou and other cities have some local 
revenue sources that allow for some meagre O&M budgets. The FADeC unconditional grants 
will have a degree of operation and maintenance built in to them.  
In Sierra Leone, according to the LGFD, MLG&RD and some LCs budgets revised in 2010 
by the team, the amounts in the councils‘ budgets for maintenance are very small and local 
revenues are for districts mainly used for administrative purposes while cities have 
implemented a few investments in infrastructure. The phenomenon of preferring new 
constructions instead of maintenance of the existing180 is still prevailing. IRCBP has 
supported councils‘ financial management and budgeting.   
In South Africa, in 2002 the Institution of Municipal Engineering of Southern Africa (IMESA) 
undertook a survey of municipal infrastructure maintenance and found that South African 
authorities compare unfavourably with the international benchmarks in respect of strategic 
planning, asset accounting, and planning and making financial provision for improvement of 
infrastructure. A 2007 report by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
found that in respect of financial planning and management many municipalities do not have 
even the basics in place, and there are gross shortcomings in maintenance policies and 
practice; and that there is a wide range of capacity and competence between these two 
extremes can be found in municipalities. 
Table 42 Municipalities capital projects vs. operations in 2003/2004 (South Africa) 
 Percentage of total budgets 
Municipalities Operating Capital 
Metros  84,4% 15,6% 
Local and district  75,1% 24,9% 
All municipalities  80,6% 19,4% 
The report asserted that for the typical impoverished municipality, basic levels of water 
services have been provided, "subsequent lack of maintenance coupled with no control over 
the high levels of informal connections means that the majority of these schemes are no 
longer capable of providing a consistent daily basic water supply". It concluded that "at least 
90‖ of these municipalities are not going to be able to provide services to their indigent 
communities without considerable financial support from national government. 
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 Kenema City allocated Le 12.5 millions for maintenance in the budget from 2010 to 2012, while Kenema 
district did not allocate any fund for this. .   
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
220 
In Tanzania, data on operation and maintenance of facilities in LGs are rather scarce in 
Tanzania, with the exception of road maintenance where data suggests that percentage of 
rural roads qualified as passable (good and fair) has improved from 50% in 2005 to 56% in 
2010181 – this modest improvement is primarily the result of support financed under the Road 
Fund. It is widely recognised that O&M of water facilities is poor, but LGs responsibilities also 
are vaguely defined (primarily community based O&M). Data on O&M of e.g. schools is 
almost non-existent: an enormous expansion (more than doubling of school infrastructure) 
took place in recent years at great speed that may constitute a major O&M burden in near 
future. The LGDG intends to strengthen LGs capacities for O&M; however the measures 
applied for doing so are weak. O&M issues are included in the annual assessments, but the 
analysis of O&M budgets is not very detailed (see box below). 
Box 56 Tanzania LGDG - Summary of annual assessments in 2010 
It is prudent for LGs to ensure sustainability of their investments. As such, the Assessment 
sought to establish if the LGs make budgetary provision and practical executions for 
operation and maintenance of investments. All the LGs except Mwanga DC made budgetary 
provisions for O&M of investments for FY 2009/10. While all LGs except Mkuranga DC, 
Chato DC, Kisarawe DC and Rufigi DC (3%) had no evidence of having executed the 
budgetary provisions in FY 2008/09. 
In Lebanon, EC support for local development has focused on establishment of additional 
―projects‖ – the only available external evaluation (of ESFD) poses serious questions about 
the sustainability of projects (see below).  
The support of ESFD has been mainly concentrated during the planning and the tendering 
phase, with minimal support after these projects were handed to the local communities. We 
noticed that the projects operated as close as possible to their agreed-upon action plan until 
the hand-over phase when they were still accountable by legally binding agreements to 
ESFD (who had provided an initial seed budget for operations) but they went idle soon after 
external accountability stopped. 
Source: Impact Evaluation of ESFD
182
 page 8. 
In the Philippines, LG M&E system does not provide specific data on O&M of capital 
investments generally. EC support is mainly within the health sector and within this sector, 
O&M is integral part of overall budget allocations and service provisions (capital expenditures 
in the health sector are relative minor compared to ―recurrent‖ and ―O&M‖ expenditures) and 
therefore discussed under section 8.1 and 8.3. As further discussed in section 8.1: it can be 
concluded that public resources allocated for health in recent years only has increased 
marginally – and mainly driven by increased DOH resources rather than added resources by 
the LGUs. However, it should be noted that fiscal data on aggregate LGU spending is very 
poor. Some initiatives – such as the special congressional funds for health have leveraged 
additional LGU allocations. During the field visit to Negros Occidental, it was found that 
Provincial health allocations generally had increased and currently constituted 40-50% of 
total provincial expenditures (different figures were quoted during interviews). It is generally 
recognised that EC support to improved health planning at provincial level has leveraged 
some increase in local budget allocation for the health sector (largely O&M). In addition it 
should be noted that EC support for fiscal aspects of the health reforms have focused on the 
wider aspects of general sector financing including the health insurance reforms rather than 
solely LGU financing of health services.  
In Honduras, funding for maintenance and operation cannot be seen separately in the 
municipal budgets. Table 10 above shows that municipal expenditures have increased with 
67% from 2002 to 2009, and some of this might have been allocated for maintenance.  
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 Data from 2011 GBS PAF. 
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 Impact Evaluation of the Community Development Component of the Economic and Social Fund for 
Development (ESFD), Ziad Moussa, Evaluation Specialist - March 17th 2010 
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In Peru, no data exist on LGs‘ or regions‘ allocations for operation and maintenance in MEF‘s 
homepage. The EC has not supported funds for better maintenance and operation of 
services provided from regional or local governments directly.  
In Rwanda, the mission could not complete a detailed analysis of this aspect. The EC 
supported labour intensive small infrastructure projects under the CDF for districts are 
maintained by the operational budgets of the districts. The 2010 evaluation report noted that 
district did maintain the projects. It was not possible to get a full overview of LG budgets.  
8.2.2 Ind8.2.2 - Evidence on improvements in degree of operation and maintenance 
(operational schools, operational water points, etc) 
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
Systematic data on O&M of local facilities are rarely available and have not been 
systematically supported by the EC in its decentralisation support but more frequently 
analysed as part of sector specific support (health, education etc). Where undertaken, 
general user satisfaction surveys indicate that only marginal (if any) improvements have 
taken place.  
In several of the countries it is reported that there are substantive problems with O&M of 
facilities (e.g. in countries as different as Mali, Lebanon and South Africa). In Tanzania it is 
found that road maintenance has improved – which almost entirely can be ascribed to the 
establishment of the Road Fund and related systems and financing arrangements of local 
governments road maintenance – developed as part of road sector support rather than as 
part of general local government reform/decentralisation support. 
Details from the country cases are presented below. 
In Lebanon, EC support for local development has focused on establishment of additional 
―projects‖ – the only available external evaluation (of ESFD) poses serious questions about 
the sustainability of projects (see previous indicator).  
In Mali, the external audit reports183 note that in the 2008-2009 sample 16% of investment 
projects are not completed and not functional, there are also several fully implemented 
investment projects that are not functional. The same report indicates that 55% of 
infrastructures are not subject of a maintenance policy. It notes that for 41% of investment 
projects there are insufficient technical studies (although there was a significant improvement 
as it was 67% of insufficient studies in 2006-2007). Construction defects are numerous 
(71%) showing a significant weakness in terms of control. Water infrastructures are the ones 
with the most defects. LG generally consider that the responsibilities for maintenance of 
buildings and equipments lies at the level of the management committees and that costs 
should be covered by the budget of these committees (e.g. school management committee, 
health facilities users associations). The issue of maintenance of local infrastructures is 
indeed still a real problem to date. 
In South Africa, in many municipalities knowledge of even the extent and capacity of the 
infrastructure assets they possess can be patchy and unreliable. Many municipalities are not 
conforming to the requirements of the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), 
Municipal Systems Act and other legislation that requires them to ensure that adequate 
provision is made for the long-term maintenance of their infrastructure assets. For example, 
in respect of electricity, no comprehensive national data on the condition and age of 
infrastructure exists. This makes maintenance at municipal level difficult. Similarly in respect 
of water reticulation it is estimated that losses due to lack of maintenance amount to about 
30% of supply. Much of the finance for municipal infrastructure is provided by national 
government through the Municipal Infrastructure Grants. Trends indicate that between 2000 
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 Contrôle externe des investissement des Collectivités Territoriales (2008). 6 rapports semestriels entre 2008 et 
2010 ont été réalisés par le bureau d‘audit SOCOTEC financés par la EUD Mali. Marché no : 
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and 2008 municipalities have not shown any marked progress in construction, maintenance 
and repairs of basic infrastructure184. 
In Tanzania, the EC has in Tanzania been involved in developing the Road Fund that 
allocates 30% of its collections to local governments. In Education the EC has also been 
active for supporting funding and development of the education grants. These initiatives have 
led to considerable increase in funds being available for LGs for local service delivery over 
the past 3-4 years. Data on operation and maintenance of facilities in LGs are rather scarce 
(see previous indicator). It is widely recognised that O&M of water facilities is poor, but LGs 
responsibilities also are vaguely defined (primarily community based O&M). Data on O&M of 
e.g. schools is almost non-existent: an enormous expansion (more than doubling of school 
infrastructure) took place in recent years at great speed that may constitute a major O&M 
burden in near future. Central government also provides earmarked funding for e.g. health 
services in local governments. The LGDG intends to strengthen LGs capacities for O&M; 
however the measures applied for doing so are weak. O&M issues are included in the annual 
assessments, but the analysis of O&M budgets is not very detailed. 
In Honduras, the delegation of functions within education, health and water and sanitation 
has according to people met from in particular ministries had the effect that communities and 
municipalities are more active in the maintenance and operation of local infrastructure. This 
is however not supported by Citizen satisfaction surveys on local services (see indicator 
8.3.2 for details) that indicate that citizens generally find that the quality of local services 
generally has decreased (slightly) from 2004 to 2010, although with slight improvements in 
solid waste management and water services.  
In Peru, stakeholders met informed that regions and local governments provide more funds 
for maintenance and operation of local investments. The EC has not supported funds for 
better maintenance and operation of services provided from regional or local governments 
directly. 
In the Philippines, EC support has mainly been to the health sector - wider operation and use 
of services are discussed in section 8.3 whereas narrowly defined O&M of infrastructure is 
not a major issue.  
In Sierra Leone, MLG&RD staff report of a few examples of councils‘ allocating more 
resources for operation of services - an example is Freetown City Council‘s additional 
spending for wage management.  
8.3 JC8.3 Improvements in the coverage and quality of locally provided 
services 
Main findings at JC level 
The relative importance of the EC contributions is obviously closely related to the extent to 
which EC support for decentralisation includes significant local development funds. 
Significant EC contributions have been made in several countries (see also indicator 8.1.1) − 
in some cases, as specific ―project funding‖ typically targeting only a limited number of local 
governments in a particular country, such as in Lebanon or South Africa. The stock of 
infrastructures developed in, for instance, Lebanon (52 million EUR for local projects) or 
South Africa (100 million EUR) has been very significant and without doubt led to increased 
access to various services in selected local governments. 
However, a more interesting, but also complex, question refers to the extent to which EC 
support to decentralisation reforms has enabled local governments to deliver services in a 
sustainable manner by supporting decentralisation of functions (see also EQ 5), increasing 
capacities (see also EQ 6), and enhancing local governance (see also EQ 7) and resources 
in a mutually supportive manner. This has primarily been achieved when interventions 
combine policy reforms, capacity development and increased funding through some form of 
IGFT system. Examples of this include ANICT ("Agence Nationale d'Investissement des 
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Government University of the Western Cape April 2008). 
 Thematic global evaluation of the EC support to decentralisation processes; Final Report Volume II; 
February 2012; Particip GmbH 
223 
Collectivités Territoriales") in Mali, the "Local Government Development Grant" in Tanzania, 
and the "Local Development Grant" in Sierra Leone.  
In countries where local governments manage a somewhat higher share of total public 
expenditures (such as in Tanzania, where the level reaches 26%), it is evident that overall 
improvements in how local governments manage funds may translate into a significant 
impact on overall levels of service delivery. In other countries where decentralisation is at an 
earlier stage, and where local governments manage only a small fraction of public 
expenditures (such as in Mali, where the level is 3%), the EC has recognised that the overall 
impact of service delivery may be limited, but that providing development funding through 
forms of IGFT systems will demonstrate the potential role of local governments in service 
delivery – rather than directly and immediately improve it. 
With regard to the extent to which EC support to decentralisation has led to qualitative 
improvements of locally-provided services, it can be observed that: 
 Decentralisation of responsibilities for service delivery is, in many of the countries, still 
―in progress‖ – for instance, local provision of primary education or health is, in 
several countries, a responsibility shared between local and central governments. 
Typically, local governments are mandated to provide basic infrastructures (e.g. 
schools, clinics), whereas the overall sector policy is determined by central 
government − just as decisions on, for instance, numbers and skills of teachers and 
health personnel typically are decided centrally. Decisions on such issues as salary 
levels are almost always decided centrally. Thus, it is frequently central governments‘ 
institutions that have most of the decision-making powers for factors critical to 
determining ―quality of services‖.  
 Support by the EC (and other development partners) to decentralisation tends to 
focus either on general capacity building or provision of development funds that 
enables local governments to construct infrastructures (e.g. EC support in Tanzania, 
Mail, Benin and Lebanon). The capacity building provided under decentralisation 
support is mainly for general administration (e.g. general planning and public financial 
management – see also EQ 6) rather than capacity building more directly related to 
qualitative service delivery improvements (e.g. training of teachers) that normally will 
be done as part of sector-specific intervention (e.g. in education). The external 
support to decentralisation, therefore, focuses largely on general local government 
capacity building, provision of infrastructure development and access to services, 
rather than on qualitative aspects of service delivery, which are, typically, mainly 
considered in sector-specific programmes.  
 The limited data on qualitative aspects of service delivery also suggest very limited or 
no improvements in the quality of locally-provided services.  
Overall, in most of its support to decentralisation, the EC has contributed to some expansion 
of local infrastructures aimed at improving, for example, health access, education, roads, 
water, waste management, agricultural services, and natural resource management. Indeed, 
it appears that EC support to decentralisation can relatively easily have some impact on 
―access to services‖ by expanding the availability of small-scale infrastructures frequently 
planned and delivered by local governments. However, improving overall quality of service 
provision appears to be a far more complex task that cannot be addressed within 
―decentralisation reforms programmes‖ alone. In this manner, external support to 
decentralisation is similar to General Budget Support, which also is predominantly seen to 
have been successful in improving ―access to services‖, rather than qualitative aspects of 
service delivery185. 
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8.3.1 Ind8.3.1 - Evidence of improved access to locally provided services delivery 
esp. for vulnerable groups (quantitative expansion of services)  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
EC contributed in most of its support to decentralisation to some expansion of local 
infrastructures aiming at improving access to health, education, roads, water, roads, waste 
management, agricultural services, natural resource management etc.  
The relative importance of the EC contributions is obviously closely related to the extent to 
which EC support for decentralisation includes significant local development funds.  
Significant EC contributions have been made in several countries either as specific ―project 
funding‖ (typically targeting only a limited number of local governments in a particular 
country) such as in Lebanon or South Africa. The stock of infrastructures developed in e.g. 
Lebanon (52 million EUR for local projects) or South Africa (100 million EUR) has been very 
significant and without doubt led to increased access to various services in selected local 
governments.  
The case of Lebanon and South Africa is described in more detail below. 
An interesting question is the extent to which EC support to decentralisation reforms has 
enabled local governments to deliver services in a sustainable manner by supporting 
decentralisation of functions (EQ 5) increasing capacities (EQ 6), enhancing local 
governance (EQ 7) and resources in a mutually supportive manner. It turns out that this has 
primarily been achieved when interventions combine policy reforms, capacity development 
and increased funding through some form of intergovernmental fiscal transfer (IGFT) system. 
Examples of this include: the ANICT in Mali, The Local Government Development Grant in 
Tanzania and the Local Development Grant in Sierra Leone.  
In some countries where Local Governments manages a rather higher share of total public 
expenditures (such as in Tanzania – 26%) it is evident that overall improvements in how local 
government manage funds may translate into a significant impact on overall levels of service 
delivery. In other countries where decentralisation is in an earlier stage and where local 
governments only manage a small fraction of public expenditures (such as in Mali – 3%), the 
EC recognises that the overall impact of service delivery may be limited but that providing 
development funding through forms of IGFT systems will demonstrate the potential role of 
local governments in service delivery – rather than directly and immediately improve it.  
The cases of Tanzania and Mali are described in more detail below. 
 
The case of Lebanon 
In Lebanon, the EC has supported establishment of local development projects in 
municipalities and unions of an estimated value of 52 million EUR (see also the annex 3 of 
the field visit country note). This is a significant investment in the concerned communities. 
The investments include wide range of support: 
 Eco-tourist plans and related paths, 
 Rural parks, 
 Municipal centres, 
 Rods, 
 Solid waste, 
 Rural health, education, 
 Improved farming. 
There are no meaningful statistics available to determine overall trends in access of services 
delivered by municipalities or the quality of these. The projects under LOGO are still under 
implementation. The ESFD project has recently been evaluated but the evaluation was rather 
tentative (see box below).  
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Box 57 Findings from the ESFD project evaluation (Lebanon) 
The level of access to public services and provision of basic utilities increased as 
consequence of ESFD interventions, but more than half of the projects are still not 
completed. From the visits on the field and the information collected it appears that in the 
communities where the projects have been completed, there is an increase of services 
provided to the populations or the beneficiaries are using the new facilities. The fact remains 
that most of the interventions still have to be completed and after a long while since the first 
contact with the beneficiary community. Another issue not well assessed is how many poor 
people access the services: this demands that more accurate analysis of ex-post 
developments should be done. (page 21) 
 
The case of South Africa 
Service delivery improvements at LG level more centrally driven than locally – earmarking 
and programme approach in sectors. However, KZN visit shows some considerable 
improvements in serviced delivery through EC supported ABMDP and LED initiatives. The 
figure below gives details of the EC supported LED programme in KwaZulu Natal and that 
over 90% of the projects have targeted improved service delivery.  
Figure 25 Total Estimated Value of LED Projects per Target – South Africa 
 
Source: P Forsyth, Analysis of expenditure for the EU funded eThekwini Municipality Area Based Management 
Programme 2003-2008 (2009) 
The table below also shows a strong link between LED investments and economic 
development in terms of multiplier effects on the local economy and a possible value added 
in economic terms for both rural and urban areas. 
R 32.701.531; 1%
R 10.363.844; 1%
R 7.344.601; 0%
R 2.145.232.447; 93%
R 116.748.171; 5%
Total stimated value of proj cts
1. Different approaches to ABM operationalised and tested 
2. Enhanced capacity of ABM managers, municipal managers, staff, councillors, communities, and other 
stakeholders to play respective roles in ABM 
3. Democratic processes deepened  
4. Service delivery improved  
5. Economic development enhanced  
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Table 43 Gijima Programme Outcomes – South Africa 
Gijima investment 
through direct grants 
Notional „strong‟ 
multiplier effect 
Expected economic 
leakage out of rural areas 
Possible economic 
value added 
R129 million 2.5 40% R65 million 
Source: Gijima KZN, Report on the Performance of Gijima KZN against the Logical Framework 2005 to 2010 (July 
2010) – www.gijimakzn.org.za 
The box below analyses in more detail the question of whether the focus on LED outcomes 
have been consistent with decentralisation and local governance issues whether it has led to 
enhancement of local development planning and improved service delivery. 
Box 58 Results of LED programmes on service delivery (South Africa) 
A national LED framework has been put in place but remains theoretical and does not 
provide either accurate guidelines concerning the projected minimum contents of a LED 
strategy for local municipalities nor adequate policy documents. LED was never designed to 
be the vehicle for overall improvement of LGs‘ functioning nor for regional development or 
planning innovations. However, it has been a consistent reply from the EUD to the economic 
and developmental challenges facing South African local governments. This raises questions 
in regard to the expected role of LG: should municipalities become the implementing agents 
of projects associated with a LED framework or should they rather create the enabling 
environment through planning tools at their disposal (such as incentives, land use rights, 
specific services)?  
Figure above shows that jobs have been created under the LED Programme in KwaZulu 
Natal and therefore that this has contributed to increased service delivery and also planning 
as this is a key aspect of the LED approach.  
The experience of the field visit shows that virtually none of the interventions analyzed have 
either scaled up into national level or expanded into other parts of the country articulating 
better the economic possibilities of different (even neighbouring) areas. The LED 
programmes apparently vary in outputs and outcomes and some success can be seen in 
places but not an overall positive trend. 
They have grown in isolation responding to specific local needs or plans. While a few may 
have maintained the activity at the level it was designed for, many of them have actually led 
to very little or disappeared. Connection between LED projects and national policymaking 
remains very poor (isolated projects on a territory even if very well designed). In South Africa 
it is particularly striking how there is an insufficient linkage between local projects and the 
construction of national policies. The sectoral approach remains the rule, both at national and 
co-operation level, and this creates a significant barrier to design a long-term consistent 
process of change through the different levels of territorial governance. And the duration of 
the projects on LED is one of the most evident barriers to the sustainability of what they are 
intending to achieve. The low rate of success of LED projects must lead to a serious re-think 
of the value of the current approach. 
 
The case of Tanzania 
Tanzania has witnessed marked quantitative improvement in access to services provided by 
LGs, in particularly in areas where LGs have received substantive fiscal central government 
transfers over the last 5 years – i.e. in particular in the sectors of education (the by far largest 
sector in local governments) and health, but it is increasingly recognised that quality of 
service provision is a major challenge186. It is broadly recognised that local government 
reforms have played a major facilitating role in this quantitative expansion of services, but 
also that the lack of certain elements of LG reform (e.g. regarding staff devolution and 
                                               
186
 For general analysis of trends in service delivery in Tanzania see Publications by the Research and Analysis 
Technical Working Group http://www.repoa.or.tz/content/blogcategory/35/67/#ph09 for excellent critique of 
problems related to Quality of services see e.g. http://www.twaweza.org/  
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effective implementation of formula based fiscal transfers) have impacted negatively on the 
degree of equity in resource allocation and possible qualitative aspects of services. The 
major explanation of relative poor qualitative improvements in e.g. education sector relates 
however to sector specific issues such as inadequate attention to teacher training and 
motivation, inadequate allocation of school materials etc. The trends for selected main 
sectors delivered by LGs can be briefly summarised as below187. 
The education sector 
Enrolment in primary education has improved significantly since 2003 and remains high, but 
has declined from 97,3% in 2007 to 95,9% in 2009 (Figure below). 
The MKUKUTA target of 99% by 2010 is still attainable; however, reaching the children not 
yet enrolled will be a significant challenge, since it implies enrolling the children who are the 
hardest to reach at the requisite age, including the disabled. 
Figure 26 Net enrolment rate (%) – Tanzania 
 
Sources: PHDR 2007 and Ministry of Education and Vocational Training; Basic Education Statistics in Tanzania 
(BEST) 2009. 
There has also been sustained progress in access to pre-primary, secondary and tertiary 
education. However, pass rates of the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) and the 
transition rates from primary to secondary school have deteriorated recently, highlighting the 
ongoing challenges of achieving quality in educational outcomes at all levels. 
Children from all wealth quintiles have benefited from the expansion of primary and 
secondary education since 2000 as shown in the higher net attendance rates reported by 
HBS 2007 (Table below). However, data indicate that the least poor continue to benefit 
disproportionately from government spending in education, particularly in access to tertiary 
education. The proportion of young people from the poorest two quintiles of households who 
are attending tertiary institutions is only 4%, compared with 56% from the least poor quintile. 
Gender parity has been achieved in primary enrolment but only limited improvements are 
recorded at higher levels. 
                                               
187 The below section is large extraction from the Poverty and Human Development Report 2009 and in particular 
Brief 2 Progress Towards Improved Quality of Life and Social Well-being for All Tanzanians – available at 
www.repoa.or.tz   
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Table 44 Primary and Secondary School Net Attendance Rates, by Wealth Quintile, 
2000/01 and 2007 (Tanzania) 
 Primary Education Secondary school (forms 1-4) 
2000/01 2007 2000/01 2007 
Poorest Quintile 0.47 0.78 0.01 0.10 
2
nd
 0.58 0.79 0.05 0.12 
3
rd
 0.57 0.84 0.03 0.13 
4
th
 0.65 0.89 0.05 0.21 
Least Poor Quintile 0.72 0.91 0.15 0.25 
Tanzania 0.59 0.84 0.05 0.15 
Source: Hoogeveen, J. & Ruhinduka, R. (2009). Poverty reduction in Tanzania since 2001: Good intentions, few 
results.  
Note: Calculations interpret attendance data in the HBS as equivalent to enrolment and report as enrolment rates. 
The wide variations in educational outcomes reflect persistent disparities in budget 
allocations to local governments for education. In 2008/09, the ten LGs with the lowest 
budgets received on average TShs 21.000 for staffing per child, compared with TShs 
161.000 per child for the ten LGs with the highest budgets. In the 20% of districts with the 
highest budgets, the average pupil-teacher ratio is 44:1; in the 20% with the smallest 
budgets, it is 70:1. In the 20% of districts with the highest budgets the PSLE pass rate is 
57.6%, whereas in the bottom 20% of districts it is 43.6% (URT, 2008). Formula-based 
grants to LGs were intended to improve equity in education funding, but are not yet fully 
implemented.  
The Health sector 
The continued decline in under-five mortality means that Tanzania is on track to meet the 
MKUKUTA goal in 2010 and the MDG for under-five mortality in 2015 (MDG 4) is also within 
reach (figure below). 
Figure 27 Estimated and Projected Under-Five Mortality 1997 – 2015 (Tanzania) 
 
Sources: Tanzania Reproductive and Child Health Survey (TRCHS) 1999; Tanzania and Demographic Health Survey (TDHS) 
2004/05; Tanzania HIV/AIDS and Malaria Indicator Survey (THMIS) 2007/08. Notes: Each survey measures mortality in the five 
years preceding the survey. For the purpose of trend estimation, survey estimates are assigned to nearest "middle year" with 
exponential trend line. 
Water and Sanitation  
The latest survey data show a downward trend in access to clean and safe water in both 
urban and rural areas. In HBS 2007, only 40,5% of rural households and 79,4% of urban 
households reported access to a piped or protected water source (Figure 6). These data 
were collected prior to implementation of the Water Sector Development Programme but the 
trend is nevertheless very worrying. 
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Figure 28 Survey Data on Water Supply (Tanzania) 
 
Source: HBS 2000/01 and 2007; Census 2002; TDHS 2004/05. 
In Senegal the contribution of the EC for Rural Communes has meant some quantitative 
improvements in service delivery. PSIDEL funded investments of 1219 projects amounting to 
FCFA 3,146 billion (or 4,8 million EUR) in 90 rural communes in 6 departments. The funding 
has affected the building of infrastructure and increased access to services in schools, health 
facilities and water points. However, some actions have also affected local economic 
development especially in the agricultural sector. 
 
The case of Mali 
As indicated in the field visit country note, the projects financed via the ANICT have helped 
the LG to substantially increase their "credibility" as well as the level of equipment which 
have included classrooms, equipment for local administration, economic equipments188 and 
to a lesser extent to health facilities. The table below shows the number of ANICT funded 
projects in different sectors for the period 2001 to 2010. It is important to note that the EC 
contribution amounts to 76 million EUR (which has enabled to finance not less than 7,466 
local infrastructure projects). 
Table 45 Number of ANICT funded projects by sector (Mali) 
Code Label Amount EDF 
Amount 
other DPs 
Nr of 
Projects 
EDF 
Nr of 
Projects 
other DPs 
Total amount 
Nr of 
Projects 
total 
101 
Territorial planning - 
economy 
1,458,360,432 2 652 773 632 139 146 4,111,134,064 285 
106 Equipment – economy 21,265,091,916 16 606 702 812 3,259 1,503 37,871,794,728 4 762 
202 Sanitation – environment 36,282,796 39 150 062 6 5 75,432,858 11 
203 
Living conditions – 
environment 
80,769,929 651 955 261 9 18 732,725,190 27 
207 
Natural resource 
management– 
environment 
1,894,471,954 1 281 613 789 211 88 3,176,085,743 299 
304 Culture – social 1,161,331,978 694 149 884 139 41 1,855,481,862 180 
305 Education – social 14,574,666,533 59 437 453 934 2,289 3,541 74,012,120,467 5 830 
                                               
188
 Market place, transport hub, veterinary facilities, etc. 
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Code Label Amount EDF 
Amount 
other DPs 
Nr of 
Projects 
EDF 
Nr of 
Projects 
other DPs 
Total amount 
Nr of 
Projects 
total 
308 Hydraulic – social 3,753,416,794 5 271 764 729 578 271 9,025,181,523 849 
309 Health – social 5,690,031,233 9 925 312 347 828 573 15,615,343,580 1 401 
310 Sports – social 58,462,331 182 711 107 8 8 241,173,438 16 
TOTAL 49 972 885 896 96,743,587,557 7 466 6,194 146,716,473,453 13,660 
Source: ANICT 
 
The section below provides details on three more cases: the Philippines, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone. 
The case of the Philippines 
In the Philippines, the EC support has a particular focus on the health sector. In general, it 
can be noted that overall health service access and quality has improved. There are 
significant problems regarding outreach to the poorer sections of society. The recent health 
sector policy also notes the following critical issues:  
 There are capacity constraints as health sector inputs have not kept up with 
population growth. The bed-to-population ratio is roughly 1 per 1000 inhabitants, 
lower than in other East Asian countries such as China (2,6 beds per 1000 
inhabitants), Vietnam (1,2 beds) and Thailand (2,2). Moreover, many of these hospital 
beds are clustered in large city centres and better-off LGUs. This is particularly true 
for private hospital beds, which account for approximately half of all hospital beds in 
the country. The availability of skilled health sector staff is also a problem, especially 
in the public sector. While the Philippines do not have a problem with the overall 
supply of doctors and nurses, there is large scale out-migration. The Philippines is 
one of the largest suppliers of trained nurses in the world. (World Bank 2010, op cit 
page 5) 
 Poor households largely rely on public hospitals, whose quality of care is problematic 
and client responsiveness is low. Consumer surveys conducted in 2005 and 2006 
indicated that people chose private hospitals over public ones since they perceived 
the latter as providing better quality care. Due to financing barriers, however, poor 
people do not have access to private hospitals, creating inequity in access to care. 
Public hospitals (DOH and LGU) suffer from many problems, including inadequate 
financing, poor allocation of resources, lack of quality benchmarks and standards, 
and limited accountability. Access to good quality first contact care is also uneven, 
and when available, people often bypass first (primary care) level to seek care in 
hospitals, as there is no effective referral system and penalties are not applied for 
bypassing the less costly first contact level. Global experience shows that high 
utilization of good quality first contact care is equity-enhancing and cost-effective for 
the health system. (World Bank 2010, op cit page 6) 
Box 59 Summary of Health Service Trends in the Philippines 
1/ At the aggregate level, the Philippines has made steady and significant progress in its 
population health outcomes over the past several decades. Life expectancy increased to 
almost 72 years in 2007, up from 53 in 1960. Childhood mortality also continues to decline in 
the Philippines. The infant and under-five mortality rate during the 2004-2008 period stood at 
25 and 34 per 1,000 live births respectively. This is lower than the rates of 29 and 40 per 
1000 live births in 2003 (DHS, 2008, DHS, 2003). The country is ―on-track‖ to achieving 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 4, which calls for a two-thirds reduction in the under-
five mortality rate over the period 1990-2015.  
2/ On maternal and reproductive health, progress has been less than expected and regional 
and income related disparities across all health outcomes are persistent and potentially 
widening. Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) has improved more slowly than expected (162 per 
100,0000 live births in 2006) and the country is not expected to reach the MDG 5 goal of 
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three-quarters reduction in MMR between 1990 and 2015, as well as universal access to 
reproductive health services. According to the 2008 National Demographic and Health 
Survey (NDHS, 2008), child mortality indicators are four times higher among the lower 
income quintiles as compared with higher income quintiles. Life expectancy in 2006 in some 
provinces of the Philippines (La Union) was similar to high middle-income countries such as 
Chile and Slovenia. In comparison, provinces such as Sulu and Tawi-Tawi have life 
expectancy levels similar to low-income countries such as Ethiopia and Guinea. 
3/ While there is an unfinished agenda with the MDGs, the burden of disease is rapidly 
changing in the Philippines and non-communicable diseases (MDG Plus Agenda) are 
emerging as a health sector challenge. Projections show that by 2030, Non-Communicable 
Diseases (NCDs) will account for 87 percent of the disease burden in the Philippines. 
Currently, deaths from cardiovascular conditions are one of the top 10 causes of reported 
deaths. Moreover, injuries are also a major contributor and the number of road traffic 
accidents in the Philippines is increasing. Poor households are as vulnerable to NCDs as 
non-poor households.  
Financial protection from the costs of ill-health, a key outcome of the health sector, and 
measured in terms of out-of-pocket payments, is getting worse in the Philippines. This is 
despite the implementation of universal health insurance (UHI). In 2006 (the last year for 
which comprehensive household level OOP data are available), the share of health spending 
in per capita expenditures was at its highest levels in the past 18 years. Poor households in 
the Philippines are spending a higher share of their disposable income on health care as 
compared to the better-off. While expenditures on drugs and medicines account for the 
biggest share for both poor and rich households, there is an increasing shift towards OOP 
financing hospital charges. Out-of-pocket spending as a share of total health spending is 
very high and has increased.  
There are large income-related disparities in the utilization of health services. For example, 
skilled birth attendance among the highest income quintile is 94 percent as compared with 25 
percent in the lowest income quintile. Only 13 percent of all births in the lowest quintile occur 
at the facility level compared with 84 percent in the highest quintile. Similarly, immunization 
coverage is only 70 percent among the lowest quintile as compared with 84 percent in the 
highest quintile. Some prominent reasons affecting the decision to seek care (in public and 
private facilities) include: (i) economic barriers, (ii) geographic distance, (iii) quality of care 
concerns such as the unavailability of drugs; 
Source: World Bank 2010: Transforming the Philippines Health Sector: Challenges and Future Directions 
(Philippines Health Sector Review), Report No. 54934 – PH, (Final), October 27th, 2010 
The case of Rwanda  
In Rwanda, it is very difficult to get exact data and budget overviews from the districts. This 
makes any analysis of service delivery improvements over the past 10 years rather academic 
and non-utilitarian because of lack of baseline data as well as concrete data evidence of 
improvements. The section below is based on the findings of the 2010 DPRPR and Ubudehe 
evaluations both carried out for the EC.  
Box 60 Extract (on service delivery) from the Final Evaluation Report of Ubudehe 
Furthermore, in a country where some 85% of the population‘s livelihood is dependent on 
agriculture and livestock, one of the more efficient methods to reduce poverty in Rwanda is 
to increase the purchasing power of farmers. An increase in purchasing power would have a 
ripple effect on the sectors of trade, production and processing enterprises, handicrafts and 
services, which are all currently under-represented in Rwanda. The development of rural 
areas can thus be regarded as the overall outcome for the development of the whole 
economy in Rwanda and Ubudehe can most certainly contribute towards this. As an overall 
conclusion, we would like to emphasize that Ubudehe is one of the best achievements we 
have observed during the past 25 years of collaboration with the European institutions. 
Ubudehe has won the prestigious UN Public Service Award due to the participation and 
ownership of millions of citizens and the strong support of the Authorities of Rwanda for 
poverty alleviation. As such, the price that was awarded seems totally justified. This success 
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was no coincidence, but the result of work, often unique, made by all project stakeholders, 
led by the Rwandan government and the constant support provided by the European Union, 
Action Aid and other donors who participated in the programme. 
The Evaluation of Ubudehe in 2010 concluded that there was a particularly high relevance of 
the Ubudehe programme towards beneficiary‘s needs (which is attributed to the participatory 
approaches, leading to a strong ownership of the actions to be undertaken for responding to 
those needs, as well as the EDPRS and the Millennium Development Goals priorities, which 
all are guiding reform initiatives being undertaken by the government of Rwanda. Regarding 
efficiency, some weaknesses were observed in terms of management of the Programme. 
Particular areas of weaknesses included: financial management (not mismanagement, but 
heavy procedures and difficulties due to the scope of the programme) during its first phase 
and the lack of human resources provided to the CDF for a proper management and 
operational follow-up of 55.000 funding; obvious gaps in the information chain between the 
field (Sectors) and the upper levels (Districts, CDF, ministries); a lack of impact assessments 
and related lessons learned; and the inadequacy of EDF financial procedures to such a 
complex programme. Nevertheless, at local level, good governance is noted and has largely 
contributed to the success of the programme. In addition, improvements are noticeable 
between the first and second phase of Ubudehe. The CDF had in fact progressively 
established a complex follow-up system, even if not perfect. The weak point actually 
remained the reporting and documentation throughout the programme. 
In conclusion, the EC support has contributed to service delivery improvements especially 
through small infrastructure investments but also to local economic development through a 
focus on community agriculture and husbandry projects. The EC is also a big donor in terms 
of GBS and overall some economic improvements and sustained economic growth 
averaging 10% p.a in the recent years has encouraged socio-cultural development and 
significantly reduced poverty. Baseline surveys that informed development of the EDPRS 
2008-2012 give background evidence that national statistics (trends) justify the engendered 
impact of decentralisation during the period (2001-2009) in form of, reduced unemployment 
rate (according to 2007 survey results); improved GDP (GDP grew from an average of 6,4% 
in 2006 to about 10% p.a in 2009), increased access and utilization of land (agricultural 
production). Rates of poverty reduction since 2000 have been modest (though not fast 
enough to meet either the targets set in Vision 2020 or the MDGs) as an average poor 
person‘s consumption is at about 150 RWF per day, increased by only over 2% since 2001. 
Over 90% of poor people still live in rural area with an increasing urbanisation putting strain 
on services in the urban areas.  
The evaluation of Ubudehe in 2010 found that effectiveness within the Programme estimates 
that at least 1.4 million189 people have been direct beneficiaries of the Ubudehe Programme. 
This is actually a very low estimation, which is based on an average of only 10 beneficiary 
households per project per village. According to the sample, the number of beneficiaries for a 
Community project can actually vary, ranging from 5 – 6 households in the case of a cow 
livestock project, to a few thousand in the case of a road or a health centre project. It would 
not be an exaggeration to estimate that probably at least 20% of the population of Rwanda 
has benefited from the programme, including potential indirect beneficiaries to the scope. In 
terms of empowerment, community participation and ownership, the Ubudehe objectives 
have been successfully achieved. In addition, it was noted that unplanned and unintended 
changes also occurred, notably through the creation of temporary and more long-term jobs, 
as well as new activities, initiated through Ubudehe projects. 
Other aspects addressed under the DPRPR are building of market places and access to 
water. Therefore a number of people have improved access to services but this is also the 
case with other donor projects/programmes in the districts. However, the mission could not 
get exact numbers. 
                                               
189
 Estimation that at least 1.4 million people have been direct beneficiaries of Ubudehe, EUD budget for Ubudehe 
(23,338,883 €) the investment would represent the equivalent of 16 € per final recipient and this targeted the most 
vulnerable and poorest segments of the districts. 
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The case of Sierra Leone  
In Sierra Leone, no separate data exist for access to services for vulnerable groups – only 
the more general indicators below. Improvement for vulnerable has however been identified 
and confirmed by interviews with development partners and government officials during the 
mission as well as field visits carried out by the mission team in 2010 and 2011, The 
implementation of investments are now more spread more out at the district level to cater for 
infrastructure for less favoured groups at ward level e.g. water and local markets and even a 
pre-schools (Kenema city). Some of these investments have been financed by the 
development grant from the IRCBP.  
The table below presents some data for outcome indicators from the IRCBP result framework 
relating to both improved access and quality of locally provided services (see full matrix in 
the Annex 6 of the field visit country note). The matrix has been updated regularly during the 
course of the programme and latest in March 2011. As the National Public Service Survey 
was last carried out in 2006 for some variables and in 2008 for others, the data only provides 
the information that citizens‘ perception of public services has improved from 2007 to 2008.  
Table 46 Outcome indicators in the Result Framework for the IRCBP 
Relevant 
indicators in 
this evaluation 
Indicator Baseline Latest 
Ind 8.3.1  
Primary schools having at 
least one textbook 
35.5 % (2005) NA 
Health clinics having essential 
drugs 
32 % (2005) NA 
Ind 8.3.2  
Percent of population seeing 
improvements in health 
service 
56 % (2007) 84 % (2008) 
Percent of population seeing 
improvements in education 
service 
65 % (2007) 90 % (2008) 
Source: IRCBP result framework 
It is evident that many investments in local councils‘ infrastructure have taken place from 
2005 to 2011 but the total number of different installations, e.g. health clinics, schools, roads, 
water systems is presently not known. 
The quality of the investments in terms of service delivered is also not known and it is also 
clear that while new constructions have been established others have been demolished or 
been given up.  
Stakeholders agree that the available data is inconclusive on improved service delivery. All 
interviewees met during the field visit share the view that some improvements are seen and 
good foundations have been laid now for the local council system. The real results will likely 
not be seen before the DSDP has been in implementation for some years, which will work 
directly with local councils‘ service provision. 
EC contribution to this is the general support through the IRCBP and all its activities and the 
support to some particular projects in three councils. 
8.3.2 Ind8.3.2 - Evidence of qualitative improvements to locally delivered services  
Detailed evidence at indicator level 
During the field visits, the team explored the extent to which evidence was available for 
documentation of qualitative aspects of locally delivered services – and the relative 
importance of EC support in explaining possible improvements. The exercise proved in many 
cases very challenging for several reasons:  
 General data challenges regarding monitoring of the quality of services, 
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 The complexity of service delivery arrangements where many contributing factors 
explain qualitative service delivery improvements – e.g. health improvements may be 
related to establishment of new clinics – but also explained by changes in children's‘ 
nutrition, the education of parents etc, 
 The time lag between certain interventions e.g. local governments building a new 
school and qualitative changes in educational services,  
 Challenges regarding lining specific EC supported interventions to wider sector 
impacts 
However, with these challenges in mind, it is nevertheless possible to draw certain tentative 
conclusions regarding the extent to which EC support to decentralisation has led to 
qualitative improvements of locally provide services: 
 Decentralisation of responsibilities for service delivery is, in many of the countries, still 
―in progress‖ – for instance, local provision of primary education or health is, in 
several countries, a responsibility shared between local and central governments. 
Typically, local governments are mandated to provide basic infrastructures (e.g. 
schools, clinics), whereas the overall sector policy is determined by central 
government − just as decisions on, for instance, numbers and skills of teachers and 
health personnel typically are decided centrally. Decisions on such issues as salary 
levels are almost always decided centrally. Thus, it is frequently central governments‘ 
institutions that have most of the decision-making powers for factors critical to 
determining ―quality of services‖.  
 Support by the EC (and other development partners) to decentralisation tends to 
focus either on general capacity building or provision of development funds that 
enables local governments to construct infrastructures (e.g. EC support in Tanzania, 
Mail, Benin and Lebanon). The capacity building provided under decentralisation 
support is mainly for general administration (e.g. general planning and public financial 
management – see also EQ 6) rather than capacity building more directly related to 
qualitative service delivery improvements (e.g. training of teachers) that normally will 
be done as part of sector-specific intervention (e.g. in education). The external 
support to decentralisation, therefore, focuses largely on general local government 
capacity building, provision of infrastructure development and access to services, 
rather than on qualitative aspects of service delivery, which are, typically, mainly 
considered in sector-specific programmes.  
 The limited data on qualitative aspects of service delivery also suggest very limited or 
no improvements in the quality of locally-provided services.  
(EC) support to decentralisation can relatively more easily have some impact on ―access to 
services‖ by expanding the availability of small scale infrastructures frequently panned and 
delivered by local governments (local schools, local clinics etc) - but that improving overall 
quality of service provision is a far more complex task that cannot be addressed within 
―decentralisation reforms programmes‖ alone.  
Information from several country cases was already provided in previous sections (see in 
particular Indicator 8.3.1). The section below provides some more evidence from the field 
phase for the following three major cases: Benin, Mali and Tanzania.  
In Benin, the recent 2010 PER by the WB states that even if the operating costs accounted 
for an average of nearly 70 percent of total public expenditure over the period 2004-2009 for 
LGs, their share dropped to 61,6% in 2009. By contrast, after several years of decline, the 
evolution of public investment spending has experienced a reversal of trends from 2006. The 
share of investment expenditure in total public expenditure increased from 23,7% in 2006 to 
38,4% in 2009. This increase is mainly due to increased capital expenditure domestically 
financed nearly 28,5% per year while that of foreign-financed expenditure was limited to 3%. 
In particular, it should be noted that capital expenditure domestically financed doubled 
between 2008 and 2009. This change in the economic composition of public spending in part 
reflects the will of the authorities in Benin (supported through GBS) to provide basic 
infrastructure to improve the competitiveness of the economy and support growth in the 
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medium and long term. How this has translated into improved quality of service delivery at 
local levels is still too early to say. 
In Mali, the Statistical Yearbook "Malikunnafoni" 2002-2008 produced by the technical unit of 
the PRSP provides interesting background information. Knowing that the social indicators 
measured relate directly to services provided at local level (usually under the responsibility of 
LG despite incomplete transfers), it can be considered that these potential improvements are 
due in large part to the implementation of decentralisation.190 The rate of assisted deliveries 
increased from 40 to 61% between 2002 and 2008, the coverage of antenatal care increased 
from 54 to 84%. The percentage of population with access to a health facility within 15 km 
from 68 to 86% (for the same indicator but for a radius of 5 km, it increased from 44 to 58%). 
The number of primary schools increased from 3923 (incl. 3441 public schools) to 4687 (incl. 
3921 public schools), which represents an increase of 14% of public schools. The level of 
enrolment increased from 1,3 to 1,8 million pupils in primary education. The gross enrolment 
rate increased from 67 to 80% between 2002 and 2008 and the net rate from 51% to 61%. 
The student/ teacher ratio decreased from 57 to 52. The percentage of households with 
access to safe water increased from 57% to 71%. The results of the citizens' perception 
survey (conducted as part of the 2011 assessment report decentralisation) confirm the 
positive opinion in terms of LG improving the level of service provided. Apart from the 
management of water points, more than 50% of the population is satisfied with the quality of 
decentralized services, 72% for school construction. For example, the following table taken 
from a 2009 study on decentralisation in the education sector191 shows the contribution of LG 
and "Cercles" councils to education (sample of 16 LG in three regions). This contribution of 
15 EUR per student at LG level (21.000 EUR per year globally) is not negligible given the low 
budgets of LG. As a comparison, the effort of the central government in education for 7 to 15 
year-old students was 56 EUR per student. 
Table 47 Contribution of LG to the level of expenditures per student (Mali) 
 (amount per student and in CFA) 
"Conseils 
de Cercle" 
LG LG > 2000 
inhabitants 
LG from 
10000-20.000 
inhabitants 
LG < 10000 
Operating expenses      
Teachers‘ salaries 
Other expenses (subv. ECOM, 
facilitators, etc)* 
Costs of organizing the exams* 
Allocation of school supplies 
Sub-Total 
75 
- 
 
121 
211 
407 
525 
545 
 
301 
343 
1 714 
45 
345 
 
183 
375 
948 
285 
179 
 
201 
73 
738 
1 245 
1 110 
 
521 
580 
3 456 
Investment expenses      
Classroom construction 
Other constructions 
Expenses on school furniture 
Other expenses 
Subtotal investment 
1 645 
332 
156 
- 
2 134 
5 920 
2 064 
811 
- 
8 796 
2 975 
447 
- 
- 
3 422 
5 175 
809 
1 050 
- 
7 034 
9 610 
4 937 
1 384 
- 
15 932 
Total (operating+investment) 2 541 10 510 4 370 7 771 19 388 
* declarative elements that could not be verified in the administrative accounts  
As detailed in the field visit country note, the contribution of the EC was instrumental in the 
provision of funds that have increased the level of services. 
Tanzania has witnessed marked quantitative improvement in access to services provided by 
LGs, in particularly in areas where LGs have received substantive fiscal central government 
transfers over the last 5 years – i.e. in particular in the sectors of education (the by far largest 
sector in local governments) and health, but it is increasingly recognised that quality of 
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 For example, very few newly built schools are not under the responsibility of LG. 
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 I&D 2009. 
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service provision is a major challenge192 - this is e.g. reflected in poorly equipped and poorly 
staffed rural schools and subsequent low levels of learning. 
Box 61 The situation of the education sector in Tanzania 
The findings of Uwezo‘s large scale assessment involving over 20,000 households and over 
40,000 children reveal that there is a crisis in education in Tanzania. By the time they enter 
Standard 3, 100% of children should have basic competencies in literacy and numeracy. The 
reality is that by Standard 3, 7 out of every 10 children cannot read basic Swahili, 9 out of 
every 10 children cannot read basic English, and 8 out of every 10 children cannot do basic 
mathematics. Even by the time they complete primary education, large numbers of children 
cannot do what they should have mastered five years earlier in Standard 2. Breakdowns by 
districts reveal large disparities, with some districts performing far below the national 
average.  
The stark reality is that, despite the enormous advances in education made possible by 
investing trillions of shillings each year, the vast majority of children in Tanzania are not 
learning.  
Source: www.uwezo.org  
It is broadly recognised that local government reforms have played a major facilitating role in 
this quantitative expansion of services, but also that the lack of certain elements of LG reform 
(e.g. regarding staff devolution and effective implementation of formula based fiscal 
transfers) have impacted negatively on the degree of equity in resource allocation and 
possible qualitative aspects of services. The major explanation of relative poor qualitative 
improvements in e.g. education sector relates however to sector specific issues such as 
inadequate attention to teacher training and motivation, inadequate allocation of school 
materials etc193. The EU has in its support to the LGD primarily sought to support the 
establishment of a basic Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer System (IGFT) for local 
government development funding: i.e. developing a system that ensures that LGs receive 
predictable levels of funding in a transparent (formula based manner). The support to the 
LGDG sought to enhance LGs adherence to basic good governance criteria (such as 
improved PFM, more participatory planning, citizen access to information etc) – however, 
efforts for improving sector specific services (beyond funding that allowed LGs to build e.g. 
class rooms) was left to the respective sector programmes and not tackled within the overall 
local government reform or LGDG.  
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 For general analysis of trends in service delivery in Tanzania see Publications by the Research and Analysis 
Technical Working Group http://www.repoa.or.tz/content/blogcategory/35/67/#ph09; for analysis of problems 
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